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— footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author’s name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19;
— quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language sources should be duplicated in brackets in the original language, that is, in English;
— the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion;
— the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.

All articles accepted are published in Russian and English, in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal, respectively. The editorial board takes responsibility for translation of the articles.
THE STATES OF THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL COORDINATES

Abstract

The author identifies the main political trends of the South Caucasian states, the United States, the EU, and NATO in the context of the crisis in Eastern Europe of spring-summer 2014 and Georgia’s signing of the Association Agreement with the EU. She looks at the main trends of the multifaceted policy of the South Caucasian states stipulated by their geopolitical location, possibilities, and prospects for their cooperation with Russia.

KEYWORDS: the Southern Caucasus, regional cooperation, separatism, interstate conflicts, Russia, the European Union, the U.S., NATO, globalization, regionalism, transportation routes, strategic importance, risk factors.
Introduction

The Southern Caucasus is a region that is gradually gaining more and more importance as a source of huge amounts of natural gas and oil and the crossroads of European and Eurasian transportation routes. Its strategic consequence, however, is not limited to its energy potential no matter how important it may be. Its geopolitical value is created by its immediate proximity to the conflict-ridden regions of the Middle East and the fact it borders on Russia, as well as on Turkey and Iran, two regional heavyweights. Today, relations between the South Caucasian countries and their neighbors are marred by numerous recent risk factors that may upset the regional balance and change the roles and positions of extra-regional powers and their alliances—the United States, the European Union, and NATO.

These changes went through several stages:

- The international situation created by the November 2013 EU Summit in Vilnius, at which several post-Soviet states were expected to sign the Agreements on Association and Free Trade Area;
- The grave crisis of the spring and summer of 2014 around Ukraine, which led to armed clashes in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions and claimed a multitude of civilian lives;
- The confrontation between Russia and the United States (the West).

The “referendums” in Crimea and Sevastopol drove Russia into international isolation; Turkey, its regional partner preferred to side with the opposition among the Crimean Tatars ethnically close to the Turks.

At all times, Russia has attached special importance to the Southern Caucasus and the Black Sea regions as a security guarantee of its southern border and access to the World Ocean; they have been tied by etnocultural and confessional factors and the community of their peoples, which goes back centuries. Today, these relations are marred by risk factors and unexpected U-turns that might upset the regional political arrangements and the role of the regional and global actors, such as the U.S., NATO, the EU, Turkey, and Iran. The changes in the domestic and foreign policies of the South Caucasian states—Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia—are no less important.

Throughout the post-Soviet period, the regional political situation has been and remains highly unstable. Each of the three states is struggling with three levels of political tension: global (the very divergent interests and equally strong pressure of global forces); regional (unsettled conflicts, on the one hand, and the desire to organize cooperation with Turkey and Iran, on the other); and domestic (political developments inside each of the states).

The 2008 armed conflict in Georgia changed a great deal in the integration objectives of the South Caucasian states, as well as their relations with Russia and the leaders of the Euroatlantic world and its alliances. It is highly important to trace the origins of the risk factors in these relations and their dynamics.

The Global Level: the U.S., NATO, and the European Union

Early in the 2000s, the United States developed a much greater interest in the Southern Caucasus and acquired long-term aims in the region. American publications insistently repeated that prote-

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1 Unlike the author, the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus proceeds from the basic principle that the Caucasian region is divided into three sub-regions: the Northern Caucasus (the administrative units of the North Caucasian and Southern Federal Districts of the RF); the Central Caucasus (the independent states of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia); and the Southern Caucasus (the northeastern ils of Turkey and the northwestern osts of Iran) (for more details, see: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press AB, Stockholm, 2006; Idem, Tsentral’ny Kavkaz: istoria, politika, ekonomika, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 2007).
tion of the interests of American oil monopolies in the region was one of the strategic tasks, the other being containment of Russia. The level of American involvement depended on the state of its relations with Russia and Russia’s policies in the post-Soviet space.

The August 2008 events supplied Washington with an excuse to plan “confrontation to Russian expansion.” The January 2009 Report of the American Heritage Foundation said, in part, that “Russia’s war with Georgia was … to reassert economic domination of the Caucasus by force and prevent additional oil and gas pipelines from being built outside Russian control.” The report encouraged the Barack Obama Administration to focus on preventing “questionable Russian activities.” They became especially obvious in the spring and summer of 2014 in the course of the international crisis around Ukraine.

Washington’s course was accompanied by NATO’s strategy of gradual penetration into the South Caucasian region directly connected with the task of maintaining stability along the oil- and gas pipelines. This explains why the Istanbul NATO Summit (July 2004) concentrated, for the first time in its history, on stronger ties with the Caucasian and Central Asian countries. It offered Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as Armenia, which announced early in 2005 that it was ready to cooperate with NATO within IPAP, new opportunities. Erevan came close to making a choice between its continued CSTO membership and further cooperation with NATO. Azerbaijan, likewise, moved closer to more active cooperation with NATO through an extensive political dialog within the permanent mission in Brussels and involvement in the NATO Afghan mission.

Despite its involvement in the NATO military operations in Afghanistan and its ascension to the “intensive dialog” (ID) level, the Bucharest NATO Summit (April 2008) denied Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP) because of the disagreements between the United States and the key European members. The then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer pointed out that “the Russian factor could not be ignored when discussing Georgia’s problems and the prospects for resolving them.” This largely explains why the EU moved to the fore in dealing with the South Caucasian countries; it also played the main role in stemming the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in August 2008.

From the very beginning, the EU demonstrated a lot of pragmatism in the Southern Caucasus. It was one of the main initiators and investors of the Eurasian Transportation Corridor (TRACECA) designed to link Europe to the countries of Central Asia, the Middle East, China, and Japan and provide the shortest routes for delivering Caspian energy resources to Europe. In July 2003, the post of Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus, similar to the one the EU had for Russia and the Ukraine, was instituted on Greece’s initiative.

This was when the EU made an attempt to settle the “frozen conflicts” in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh and failed because the sides flatly rejected all sorts of concessions. This is largely explained by the economic interests of elite groups in the conflict regions and outside them and the post-Soviet confrontation between the conservative and democratic forces still active in the post-Soviet space. The international mediators, Russia among them, pursued their own interests; they supported the conflicting sides, making a settlement impossible.

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6 Kommersant, 17 September, 2008.
In August 2008, the EU leaders did a lot to discontinue the armed confrontation between Russia and Georgia. The Extraordinary Council of the European Union convened on 1 September in Brussels adopted a special document on “the open conflict launched by Georgia,” which led to “violence and an illegitimate reaction by Russia.”

The 2008 Caucasian crisis shattered the trust between Russia and the West. Since then, the EU has been struggling to weaken its energy dependence on Russia. On 7 May, 2009, the EU Prague Summit opened an absolutely new trend of the European Union’s East European policy by adopting the Eastern Partnership Program for six countries—Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus—which presupposed closer economic relations and their more active “involvement in Europe.”

The European Parliament resolution of 20 January, 2011 on an EU Strategy for the Black Sea described the Black Sea as “partially internal to the EU and geographically mostly a European sea.” The document said that the EU should carry out concerted actions in the region of geostrategic importance for its members and strengthen its contacts with the Black Sea countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ukraine, and Moldova). The resolution pointed to the need for a Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Program and “a specific budget line for the Black Sea Strategy.”

The resolution was passed amid heated discussions. Some of the members disagreed with the EU policies in the Southern Caucasus, while other supported the description of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as “occupied” territories. The majority rejected the advice offered by a U.K. deputy to keep away from a region “which belongs to the sphere of Russia’s historical interests” as “unjustified skepticism.”

The South Caucasian countries, in turn, took into account the Russian factor when steering toward the European Union. “The war in Georgia, which seriously frightened post-Soviet states as well as Europe and made them realize how far Moscow was prepared to go in defending its interests, served as a powerful boost to the development of the Eastern Partnership program.”

This explains why the leading politicians of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia tried, each in his own way, to preserve the balance in their relations with the EU and Russia. Early in October 2013, at a meeting with members of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU Council, the then Prime Minister of Georgia Bidzina Ivanishvili deemed it necessary to point out that Georgia believed that the EU should remain engaged in an intensive and principled dialog with Russia, carried out in a way that would convince Moscow that the policy pursued within the Eastern Partnership program was not aimed against Moscow. Later this was confirmed by Irakly Garibashvili, who replaced Ivanishvili as prime minister in November 2013.

Armenia found itself in a more difficult situation. It had agreed to join the Eastern Partnership program and initial the agreements on association and a free trade area at the November 2013 EU Summit. After the Moscow talks between the presidents of Armenia and Russia, which took place on 3 September, 2013, President Sargsian announced that his country would not initial the already drafted Agreement; it would join, instead, the Customs Union with a view to taking part in shaping the Eurasian Economic Union. On 10 September, 2013, Vzgliad, a newspaper of the Russian business circles, published the figures calculated by the Eurasian Bank, which illustrated how much Armenia would gain from its CU membership (lower gas prices—$180 instead of $270; positive dynamics for

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12 Ibidem.
13 [http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/content/article/2283587html].
Armenian labor migrants; calling off trade dues, and other privileges). On the other hand, there is an opinion that Armenia retreated from its previous stand because it needed Russia (CSTO) on its side in case of a Karabakh inflammation.

Speaking at the November EU Summit, President Sargsian pointed out that his country would seek effective mechanisms of cooperation with the EU, which, on the one hand, would reflect the profound nature of bilateral social, economic, and political relations and, on the other, would not contradict other forms of its cooperation. He pointed out that the five-year long history of European Partnership confirmed its usefulness and its viability.15

President Ilham Aliev of Azerbaijan, who attended the Vilnius Summit, declared that his country occupied a very special position shaped by the nature of its relations with the EU countries in the energy sphere and signed an agreement on a simpler visa regime with the European Union.

The EU Vilnius Summit of 28-29 November, 2013, at which Ukraine was expected to sign the agreement on association and a free trade area and Georgia and Moldova to initial similar agreements, was tagged by many as a “summit of failed hopes.” The widening international scandal around Ukraine created a negative background for the initialing of the Association Agreement; the ceremony, which developed into nationwide celebrations, took place on 27 June, 2014 in Tbilisi and was marred by the grave crisis between the United States and Russia.

After signing the Agreement, Prime Minister Garibashvili invited Abkhazia and South Ossetia to use the economic advantages offered by the Agreement, which specifically pointed out that their products of adequate quality would be welcome in the EU.16

The economic relations between the EU and Georgia were developing in full accord with the latter’s so far low development level: in 2013 its export to the EU countries was slightly over 0.5 billion euro and consisted of agricultural products, raw materials, scrap metal, and textiles, while its import from the EU countries, to the tune of over 2.5 billion euro, consisted of machines and other equipment, combustible materials, and other non-agricultural products.17

This fully applies to Armenia: over 40% of its GDP is earned by import and 10% by export, which is predominantly raw-material: ores, precious and semi-precious metals and stones.18

Thanks to its energy resources, which bring good money into its coffers, Azerbaijan is in a better situation; however, the lopsided fuel-oriented economy prevents diversification of its economic branches and the creation of new jobs. The surplus labor force seeks employment abroad, mainly in Russia. As distinct from Georgia and Moldova, Azerbaijan can and does export its agricultural products to Russia.

The Regional Level:

Turkey and Iran

Along with the Euroatlantic countries, Turkey and Iran, two regional powers, are growing more and more interested in the South Caucasian states.

Back in December 1991, Turkey was the first country that recognized the independence of Azerbaijan and, later, Armenia and Georgia. It was approximately at the same time that Turkey was challenged by Iran, which was looking for its share of influence in the region and which accused Turkey of fanning pan-Turkic feelings in Azerbaijan. It feared their spread to its own multimillion

Azeri population; Russia did not like it either, due to its own Turkic-speaking regions in the Northern Caucasus and the Volga area.

Having lost the Russian market, Azerbaijan and Georgia extended their economic relations with Turkey, while consistent confirmation of their territorial integrity coming from Ankara and the need to settle the “frozen” conflicts did a great deal for their political relations.

In February 2007, the presidents of Georgia and Azerbaijan and the prime minister of Turkey signed the Tbilisi Declaration on a Common Vision of Regional Cooperation, the Memorandum on Mutual Understanding in the Sphere of Energy, and an agreement on building the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway. Kazakhstan and China (the latter plans to use it to send its products to Europe by the shortest available route) were also interested. Turkey and Azerbaijan carry the main financial burden and, despite Washington’s disapproval and its refusal to fund it if Armenian was not involved, the project preserved its initial format.

Armenia remained largely isolated because it refused to withdraw its armed units from the “controlled territories” (the Azeri districts around Nagorno-Karabakh) or move away from the preliminary conditions on which it had agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey and open its border. According to well-known Armenian political scientist St. Grigorian, there were no signs that Azerbaijan and Armenia would be ready to arrive at a Karabakh compromise any time soon. This meant that Armenia would be left out of regional projects in future too.19

The above describes the pre-2008 war situation in the region. The Russian-Georgian conflict and independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia changed a great deal in the region, in particular, because of the talks between Armenia and Turkey, which began in September 2008.

The August 2008 unofficial visit of President of Turkey Abdullah Gül to Armenia opened a period of defrosting in the relations between the two countries, which, for many decades, had no diplomatic relations. President of Armenia summed up the visit by saying that his country was ready to settle its relations with Turkey on the “no preconditions” basis, while his Turkish colleague, highly assessing the results of the bilateral talks, confirmed his proposition of 12 August, 2008 on setting up a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.

It was in April 2009, in the wake of President Obama’s visit to Ankara, that Turkey tried even harder to settle its relations with Armenia and open the border between the two countries. In the process of signing the road map, Turkey agreed, under American pressure, to contemplate a settlement with Armenia, leaving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict aside. As could be expected, Baku responded with a flare of indignation and, late in April of the same year, signed a Treaty on Strategic Partnership between Azerbaijan and Russia in Moscow.20

The Zurich Protocols signed by the foreign ministers of Turkey and Armenia on 10 October, 2009 on “good-neighborly relations without preconditions” can be described as another attempt to change the South Caucasian balance of power. Later Armenian analyst Vigen Hakobian wrote that Erevan had tried once more to disentangle itself from the transportation isolation intensified by the 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict and failed because the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict defied all solutions.21

In 2010, however, Armenia and Georgia were excluded from a new set of documents on Turkey’s national security as “threats to the Turkish state.” In August 2010, Russia and Armenia signed a Treaty on Strategic Partnership; a Treaty on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance between Turkey and Azerbaijan followed suit. In Baku, it was interpreted as evidence of the growing dissatisfaction with what the Minsk OSCE Group was doing to resolve the Karabakh conflict.22

19 See: Ponedelnik (Tbilisi), No. 5, February 2007, p. 3.
22 [http://russian.eurasianet.org/node.58511].
The new geopolitical realities determined the nature of the relations between the South Caucasian states and Iran, another regional power. The Southern Caucasus is important for Tehran economically and is doubly important from the point of view of regional and national security. Iran borders on Azerbaijan and Armenia, the relations with which can be described as specific.

In the north, Iran borders on Azerbaijan (their common border is over 600 km long); the two countries still have a long list of so far unsettled contradictions, the periodically resurfacing idea of a Greater Azerbaijan (which would include a large part of Iran’s territory with a predominantly Azeri population) being one of the stumbling blocks.23

The two countries have not yet reached an agreement on the use of the Caspian resources, which negatively affects their bilateral relations; in July 2001, they came dangerously close to an armed conflict in the Caspian.24

On the other hand, the relations between Armenia and Iran are very positive for many reasons, including a large Armenian diaspora in Tehran, Isfahan, and Tabriz. In recent years, the two countries intensified their economic contacts. It should be said that Armenia, “wedged in between” Turkey and Azerbaijan and cut off from Russia by the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, can reach the outer world only across Iranian territory.

On the whole, Iran’s Caucasian policy is strongly affected by Tehran’s mistrust of the “Western democracies,” the clashes with which (inevitable in the Southern Caucasus, according to certain Iranian analysts) cause numerous problems. M.-R. Jalili goes on to say that Iran’s regional policy harmonizes, in a broader context, with the specific structures of Tehran’s relations with Moscow and Ankara, on the one hand, and with the global context of international policy, on the other.25

While constrained in its foreign policy initiative by the never-ending American pressure, Iran is ready to join the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.26 Until recently, Tehran was essentially totally excluded from regional cooperation and was not mentioned in the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. Its efforts to bring the conflicting sides closer failed.

**In Lieu of a Conclusion**

**In a New System of Coordinates**

On the whole, the situation in the Southern Caucasus remains unstable; its three countries are looking for ways and means to settle the frozen conflicts. Without constructive international support and firm consensus of the sides involved, they are unlikely to succeed.

Their economic development level will remain unimpressive, oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan being the only exception. This means that they should learn to take into account the major international economic and political trends and find their own niches in the world system. Eldar Ismailov and

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23 Russia acquired the northern part of Azerbaijan under the Treaty of Turkmanchay of 1828; since that time the Azeri nation was developing in two directions: the northern part became an independent republic when the Russian Empire disintegrated and, later, one of the Soviet Union’s republics that gained its independence in 1991. The southern part remained within Iran.


25 See: Ibid., p. 72.

Vladimer Papava have rightly pointed out that their progress, based on “the low potential” of their economies, depended on the degree of their openness and the rates of their integration into the international economic system.27

Finally, the very different or even opposite foreign policy orientations of the three South Caucasian states cannot help them achieve full-scale cooperation. Today, the “regional historical community and Caucasian identity as an international, ideological and socially-psychological phenomenon”28 of the South Caucasian peoples are losing their previous power. Living in a single geographic space, the South Caucasian republics are disunited: there is no territorial integrity and there are very different potentials of economic cooperation with the outside world. The prospects for European integration that have opened up for some states are creating additional problems for others. Georgia and Armenia each went to their own side—the EU and the CU—which might create even more problems for Armenia which needs transit routes across Georgian territory. In September 2014, Georgia intended establishing a partial visa regime for Armenian citizens who come to stay in the country for a longer time.29

None of the three South Caucasian countries has clear ideas about its relations with the European Union. Georgia signed the agreement on association and a free trade area, which still lacks important details. Armenia has not yet signed any documents related to its choice of integration partners. Azerbaijan, the economy of which can be described as raw-material, prefers to remain neutral. On the whole, current stability is fairly precarious.

If adopted, the Aggression Prevention Act initiated by the U.S. Congress and passed in two readings in July 2014 would have extended the “major non-NATO ally status for Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova” to create wide possibilities for their military cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. Baku hailed the bill, while Deputy Defense Minister Kerem Veliev said at a press conference that NATO membership is the country’s final aim.30 At the same time, Armenian experts wrote about Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan possibly drawing closer to the Customs Union members and partial de-blocking of the Armenian-Turkic border if Armenia accepted the Madrid Principles as a first step toward possible settlement of the situation around the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.31

This means that the field of geopolitical maneuvering in the Southern Caucasus and the Black Sea area is widening, yet for the three South Caucasian countries the nature of their relations with Russia, their northern neighbor, remains highly important. Their positions on many international issues have undergone changes, but each of them objectively needs continued relations with Russia.

Competing with Russia in the sphere of energy supplies to Europe, Azerbaijan, as well as Armenia depend on Russia to a certain extent because of the huge number of their labor migrants in Russia. Armenia also counts on Russia to address its economic and transportation problems.

Despite the Association Agreement with the EU, Georgia has preserved its fairly stable relations with Russia and even invented a new formula of “With Russia, but not in Russia.”32

29 [http://www.regnum.ru/news//1828177.html]. Here and hereafter, the information is given as of the writing of this article.—Ed.
In the near- and mid-term perspective, these countries are unlikely to change their relations with Russia, which means that Russia and each of the South Caucasian republics should take the objective interests of each other into account.

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Eldar MAMMADOV

Ph.D. in Law, Vice President of the International Association for Court Administration for the Central Asia/India region, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan being in resignation (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE RULE OF LAW AS A KEY FACTOR OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Abstract

This article analyzes the role and place of the rule of law in the public administration system in contemporary conditions. It reveals the close collaboration between the efficient functioning of the government and the actual implementation of this principle.

KEYWORDS: the rule of law, principles, factors and subfactors of the rule of law, public administration.

Introduction

Public administration affects different institutional and non-institutional processes in the public administration system and is carried out with the help of a variety of political-administrative, value-ideological, legal, and other mechanisms, including the use of diverse methods of forming, adopting, and implementing government strategies, programs, plans, as well as political-legal and personnel decisions.

Since the second half of the 20th century, dramatic changes have been going on in public administration, which is seen as the activity of the government and its officials aimed at the practical implementation of public policy drawn up on the basis of corresponding procedures.

These changes have not only enriched the idea of public administration, but also significantly changed the functions of the public administration bodies themselves. For example, in some countries
(for examples in socialist-oriented states) planning, material-technical supply, social security functions, and so on, are narrow, while in others (including in developed countries), they are broad. New approaches are universally being practiced to functions that relate not only to maintaining and strengthening the market economy, but also to performing anti-monopoly measures, combating unemployment, decentralizing enterprises and institutions in various spheres, and others.

State regulation is currently a key function of public administration in sociopolitical, economic, and sociocultural spheres, having become a juridical reality in the modern state. Its main tools are taxes, standards, state orders, customs tariffs and duties, as well as state contracts, state registration, state licensing, privatization, business bankruptcy procedures, and so on.

The content and mechanism for carrying out state regulation include:

1. adopting legal regulations (establishing common rules);
2. ensuring that legal regulations correspond to the real tasks that the administration must solve;
3. coordinating and general monitoring of the activity of public administration bodies, etc. to ensure adherence to the established code of behavior by all physical and legal persons;
4. monitoring the implementation of legal regulations adjusting various courses of relations;
5. carrying out state protection of the rights and legal interests of the participants of public relations regulated by corresponding legal regulations (rules).

Public administration in current conditions is inconceivable without the active use of different forms of legal regulation of public-legal relations performed by laws and by-laws, as well as judicial acts.

However, today it is important not only to adopt correct laws and by-laws that do not contradict each other, but also to ensure their strict observance and unconditional performance by all physical and legal persons in society.

Therefore, the rule of law is one of the most important tasks of public administration and is just as important as the best embodiment of the will of the people and the proper guarantee of the efficient, economic, and productive functioning of the government.

**Essence of the Rule of Law**

The rule of law is traditionally understood as the supremacy of the law in the regulatory legal acts system. Laws that are regulatory legal acts not only regulate public-legal relations, establish mandatory rules of behavior, and are set forth by measures of public enforcement, but also have a higher legal force, and all other regulatory legal acts must comply with them and cannot contradict them.

Since the Constitution sets forth the most important fundamental provisions relating to the essence, goals, and conditions relating to the functioning of the state in the political, economic, and social spheres, as well as the fundamentals of legal relations among the state, society, and the individual, it is considered the main law and all other laws and by-laws (regulatory legal acts) must comply with the Constitution.

In current legal systems, there is a strict legal hierarchy, in respect to which laws must comply with and be subordinate to the constitution, regulatory legal acts to the constitution and laws, and law-enforcement acts to the constitution, laws, and regulatory legal acts.¹

¹ When I say that one legal act complies with another legal act that possesses greater legal force, I mean not only the content of the legal act, but also the activity carried out to create it.
Therefore, the rule of law and the strict legal hierarchy that functions in compliance with it create a stable regime of legal legitimacy, as well as establish a just legal order and ensure legal stability in the state and society.

However, the rapid development of legal views in the last decade has led to the rule of law being perceived as much broader than its initial traditional understanding. Therefore, the rule of law today also acts as one of the attributes of a legal state and as an independent legal doctrine that has become a powerful way to protect human rights and freedoms.

It is obvious that recognizing the rule of law only as the law having greater legal force and bylaws (regulatory legal, including departmental) not contradicting or standing above it cannot be grounds for recognizing such a state as legal, since the laws adopted and adoptable might be both illegal and unjust. So it is very important to also understand the rule of law from the viewpoint of a legal state in which the law governs the state.

A legal state is bound and limited not only by legislation, but also to the law as a whole, and all of its law-making and law-enforcement activity should be based on legal requirements, remain within the boundaries of the law, and not contradict the law. In so doing, laws should not only be based on the law and not contradict the law (i.e. laws should not only be legal), but also only be adopted by authorized bodies (i.e. legislative power bodies) in strict correspondence with the procedure set forth in the Constitution.

What is more, according to the doctrine of the rule of law, no one may be above the law, everyone must be equal before the law, no one can be punished other than for violating the law and only in the procedure set forth by the law. The law must be in full force without any constraints in space (throughout the entire territory of the country), time, or range of people and apply equally to all entities of legal relations (without any exceptions).

The term “the rule of law” was first used in England at the beginning of the 17th century, however, the concept itself appeared much earlier, although it was never related to the ideas of democracy in the contemporary sense. But it was precisely thanks to Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, beginning in the 18th century, that it came to be understood that the freedom of action of those endowed with power should have legal limitations. Despite several differences (mainly in legal customs and their history), the ideas of the rule of law are close to the ideas developed in Roman-German legal philosophy about a legal state.

**Principles and Factors Determining the Rule of Law**

In contemporary legal systems, the rule of law is defined by the following principles:

1. The governmental bodies and its officials and agents as well as other persons are accountable under the law.

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2 In the petition to James I from the House of Commons in 1610, while prior to this the idea was voiced in the decision of the Court of Common Pleas under the chairmanship of Edward Coke, although the king himself thought this view of his power to be “treason.”
3 For example, Aristotle claimed that “the law should govern,” while Cicero said, “We are all servants of the laws.” The law was made absolute by ancient Chinese “legalists”—followers of the school of Han Feizi, although they also believed that the law should not be a means for the people to keep the rulers in check, but rather a means for the rulers to govern the people. But as early as the 13th century, Thomas Aquinas claimed that the rule of law was the “natural order” established by God. In German—Rechtsstaat and in French—État de droit.
(2) The laws are clear, widely and timely publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.

(3) The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, and efficient.

(4) Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals that are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve.

As can be seen from the principles mentioned above, the rule of law prevents the government and its officials from being above the law, from possessing extremely broad powers, and, in so doing, acting independently or arbitrarily. These principles also demand that the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced in an accessible, fair, and efficient way. In so doing, the legal system should be available and independent of other branches of power, while judges should be impartial and issue verdicts based only on facts and the laws.

Today, two main concepts of the rule of law can be singled out—formalistic and substantial. The first does not apply to the justice of the regulations themselves, but affects the procedural attributes that the legal system should have (this separates how efficiently and predictably the system works from ethical questions about being accountable for the result). The other concept (its different interpretations) focuses on the content of laws and includes fundamental human rights and freedoms that ensue from principles of legitimacy, morals, and justice.

On the basis of the abovementioned four universal principles, the main factors determining the rule of law in contemporary legal systems are singled out, which I will look at in turn below.

Constraints on government powers is one of the most important factors of the rule of law in the state and society. Modern societies have developed systems of checks and balances, both constitutional and institutional, to limit the reach of excessive government power, and to subject the government power, or ruler, to legal restraints. Long since it is considered that authority is distributed in a manner that ensures that no single organ of government has the practical ability to exercise unchecked power, while in the event of violation of the law the government, its officials and agents will be accountable under the law.

The following subfactors are delineated as constraints on government power:

1. Government powers are defined in the fundamental law—Constitution.
2. Government powers are effectively limited by the legislature, the judiciary, independent auditing and review (including study, analysis, expert assessments, investigation, and inquest).
3. Government powers are subject to non-governmental checks by independent experts.
4. Transition of power is subject to the law and carried out peacefully in compliance with the requirements and procedures set forth by the law.

Absence of corruption as one of the hallmarks of a society governed by the rule of law is a manifestation of the extent to which government officials abuse their power or fulfill their obligations under the law.

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6 In order not to confuse the formalistic interpretation with the substantial, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommends using the term “the supremacy of statute law” for the first, and “the rule of law” for the second.
7 Based on a study of these factors, the World Justice Project publishes a rule of law index annually for 99 countries around the globe.
8 From the Latin corrumpere—to defile, corruption—bribery, waste. Today bribery and the corruptibility of officials is called corruption.
Corruption is conventionally defined as the use of public power for private gain and is viewed as a dangerous and significant obstacle to economic development and the stability of the state, while its absence is equal to the victory of progress and justice in the state and society.

Officials who have discretionary power over the distribution of resources that do not belong to them may be subject to corruption. They are prompted to abuse their powers by the possibility of obtaining economic gain (rent), while the main restraining factor is the risk of exposure and punishment.

Forms of corruption vary, but include abuse of power, improper execution of duties, bribery, extortion, improper influence by public or private interests, and misappropriation of public funds or other resources.

In terms of the rule of law, the absence of corruption among government officials in the executive branch, the judiciary, the legislature, the police, and the military is especially important because this dangerous phenomenon is not simply undermining the credibility of the government, justice or defense capability of the country, but also leads to a reduction in national wealth and decrease in living standards.

Corruption interferes with business, causes a decrease in the funds necessary for economic development and implementing social programs, and creates conditions for people who have money and connections to be able to change the laws and other acts in their interests.

Although no one can guarantee rapid and complete victory over corruption, from the experience of countries with a low corruption level (for example, Singapore, Hong Kong, Sweden, and others), the following main subfactors for successfully combating corruption can be given:

1. establishing an efficient public administration system, disbanding corrupted administration bodies, simplifying bureaucratic procedures aimed at ensuring free business and equal conditions for conducting business, introducing competition in rendering state services (including the duplication of functions of different administration bodies);

2. ensuring the transparency of government bodies and openness of departmental systems, open access and free discussion of all departmental operations and documents, including those relating to conducting tenders, issuing licenses and certificates, entering state contracts, and so on (providing the disclosure of state, military, and commercial secrets is kept at the necessary level);

3. reviewing (cancellation or change) of non-constitutional (potentially corrupt) regulatory legal acts that violate the human and citizen rights and freedoms enforced in the Constitution;

4. introducing economic or other sanctions for bribery or refusing to participate in anti-corruption investigations, the toughening up of criminal legislation relating to the manifestation of corruption, strict adherence to universal equality under the law and the inevitability of punishment;

5. training qualified administrative personnel, ensuring high material and social provision of officials (including a good salary, high-quality medical services, interest-free loans for buying real estate, high pensions, etc.), using economic mechanisms for increasing the incomes of officials without violating regulations and laws;

6. establishing strict standards for fulfilling one’s obligations, as well as high ethical standards for officials, strict surveillance over the implementation of these standards at each level of the bureaucratic machine, presentation of regular reports on the part of all civil servants about their income and spending, minimalization of conditions that make it possible to carry out corruptive acts;
(7) maintaining the independence of courts from the legislative and executive power branches, as well as non-interference of representatives from these power bodies in the work of the law-enforcement bodies, raising the efficiency of the judicial-legal system;

(8) improving the election process aimed at encouraging the voter to vote for a particular candidate not only for ideological reasons, but also keeping in mind his potential for being subjected to corruption;

(9) protecting freedom of speech and the media as efficient tools for fighting corruption;

(10) providing citizens with constant, laconic, and understandable explanations of their rights and obligations, carrying out thorough investigation of citizens’ complaints about corruption and unreliable performance of obligations by civil servants, including demands to compensate for losses.

Open government has become essential to the rule of law in the state and society.
An open government offers mechanisms and principles that ensure efficient collaboration between the government and its citizens, high-quality and balanced decisions on the part of the government, and engagement of civil society and business in making these decisions.
The main components of an open government are transparency, administrative proceedings that are open for public participation, and collaboration between the government and its citizens.
An open government also ensures that its actions are publicized and understandable, provides open data, guarantees the transparency and accountability of government spending, purchases, and investments, and carries out efficient public control.
Thus, an open government empowers citizens by giving them a way to voice their concerns and demand accountability from their governments.
The most important indications of an open government are as follows:
(1) laws and other regulatory legal acts are publicized and accessible;
(2) laws and other regulatory legal acts are stable;
(3) the public has the right to petition the government and participate in its affairs;
(4) official information is available upon request.
An open government is far more than transparency and encompasses such subfactors as:
(1) clear laws that are publicized in a timely fashion;
(2) stable laws and other regulatory legal acts;
(3) official drafts of laws and regulations that are available to the public before they are adopted; and
(4) administrative proceedings that are open for public participation;
(5) the availability of official information.

The observation of fundamental human rights and freedoms is the most important factor of the rule of law in the state and society. A system of positive law\(^9\) that fails to respect core human rights established under international law is at best “rule by law.”

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\(^9\) Officially recognized law that is valid within the boundaries of a state and enforced in the legislation, that is, law expressed in the legislation. Positive law has an official and documental form of expression and is embodied in laws and other regulatory legal acts; positive law is law that boils exclusively down to the law. Positive law proceeds largely from the state and its power structures: it is constructed in the image and likeness of the state, expresses the interests and will of those groups and social strata that it primarily represents and protects.
The absence of rights and freedoms might not only be a great blow to a specific person, but also arouse opposition and disorder in society, which in turn will inevitably entail the emergence and increase of social, economic, and even political conflicts in the state.

Some specialists formulate the concept of human rights and freedoms simply and laconically:

1. every authority is limited by the law;
2. every person has the right to his or her own privacy, in which no one can interfere, including the authorities;
3. every person may protect this privacy by legal means, by making complaints, including to the state.

Today in the civilized world, respect for human rights and freedoms is perceived as an initial condition of permanent peace and sustainable development. States consider it their duty to assume international obligations on the recognition and guarantee of human rights and freedoms.

The rule of law in a legal state and law abiding societies should guarantee the rights embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including:

1. the right to equal treatment;
2. the absence of discrimination;
3. the right to life;
4. the right to personal immunity;
5. the right to the due process of the law;
6. the right to freedom of opinion and expression;
7. the right to freedom of belief and religion;
8. the absence of any arbitrary interference of privacy;
9. the right to freedom of assembly and association; and
10. the protection of fundamental labor rights.

In order to recognize the effective guarantee of basic human rights and freedoms from the viewpoint of the rule of law, a large number of variables are combined to form the following sub-factors:

1. Equal treatment and absence of discrimination;
2. The right to life and security of the person is effectively guaranteed;
3. Due process of law is observed;
4. All rights of persons accused are observed during administrative and criminal proceedings;
5. Freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of belief and religion, and freedom from arbitrary interference with privacy are effectively guaranteed;
6. Fundamental labor rights are effectively guaranteed.

Order and security is one of the important factors of the rule of law in the state and society. Ensuring public order and security is a fundamental function of the state, the main goal of which is to create favorable conditions for the normal coexistence, labor, and rest of citizens, as well as the respect of their honor, human dignity, property, and public morality.
The establishment and maintenance of public order and security presumes the adoption of the necessary measures in order for all the actions, deeds, and behavior of citizens in the places of their socialization do not go beyond the regulations of the law, morals, or social norms.

The state must effectively prevent crime and violence of every sort, including political violence and vigilante justice. Violence not only harms society, it also prevents it from reaching such goals as executing fundamental human rights and freedoms and ensuring access to existing opportunities and justice. If legal regulations are not adopted, violence in extreme situations might become the norm.

The following aspects are indicators of a normal state of affair in the state in this area:

1. the low level of crime;
2. the absence of civil conflict, including terrorism and armed conflict; and
3. the absence of violence as a socially acceptable means to redress personal grievances.

The main subfactors for ensuring order and security in the state and society, as well as indicators of the level of activity of the government in this area are the following:

1. crime is under efficient control;
2. civilian conflict is essentially limited;
3. people do not resort to violence to redress personal grievances.

_regulatory enforcement_ as an important factor of a rule of law society presumes that the government not only upholds regulatory legal rules (adopt laws and other regulatory legal acts), but also properly enforces them.

Regulatory enforcement is closely related to legality, which can be viewed as the state of social life in which qualitative, non-contradictory legislation exists, and the adopted laws are respected and executed by all government bodies, officials, organizations, and citizens.

Legality is the most important manifestation of democracy and the main principle of a legal state. A vital warranty of legality is its precise and unconditional enforcement not only during the execution of legal regulations, but also when drawing up and adopting legal regulations.

In the terms of rule of law in a state and society, the public enforcement of government regulations has become a pervasive method to achieve good behavior of all society members. The proper public enforcement for complying with legal provisions (norms) helps to detect the real responsibility scale for negligence and abuse by officials pursuing their own interest.

The purpose of the state care of compliance with the rules established by its legal regulation is to ensure effective law enforcement without undue public or private intervention by the timely creation of regulatory procedures that can simultaneously assert in society respect for due process.

The rule of law in the state and society in terms of regulatory enforcement implies the following subfactors:

1. government regulations are effectively enforce, as well as applied and enforced without improper influence;
2. administrative proceedings are conducted without unreasonable delay;
3. due process is respected in administrative proceedings;
4. the government does not expropriate without just (adequate) compensation.

_Civil justice_ is an important factor of the rule of law in the state and society. In a rule of law society, ordinary people should be able to resolve their grievances and obtain remedies in conformity with fundamental rights through formal institutions of justice in a peaceful and effective manner, rather than resorting to violence or self-help. Civil justice requires that the system be accessible, affordable, effective, impartial, and culturally competent.
Accessibility includes general awareness of available remedies; availability and affordability of legal advice and representation; and absence of excessive or unreasonable fees and hurdles.

Impartiality includes absence of arbitrary distinctions, such as social and economic status, as well as decisions that are free of improper influence by public officials or political, economic and private interests.

In a rule of law society, it is essential that alternative dispute mechanisms provide effective access to justice, while refraining from binding persons who have not consented to be bound by the mechanism.

Efficient civil justice from the viewpoint of the rule of law is characterized by such subfactors as:

1. people can access and afford civil justice;
2. civil justice free of discrimination, corruption, improper government influence, and unreasonable delays;
3. civil justice is effectively enforced, and legal proceedings are accessible, impartial, and effective.

Efficient criminal justice system, as one of the key factors of the rule of law in the state and society, is a natural mechanism for dealing with complaints of victims and taking measures against persons who committed crimes, which also involves the resolution of conflicts in a legal way to ensure all persons remedies.

Reliable functioning of criminal justice will make it possible not only to solve crimes committed and expose and punish criminals, but also to prevent the innocent from being wrongly accused, reduce tension in society, and, in the event of civil justice, peacefully and efficiently resolve conflicts that arise without resorting to violence.

In a rule of law society, the criminal justice system should be capable of effective preliminary investigation and judicial examination of criminal offenses within reasonable deadlines guaranteeing the protection of rights of the suspects and victims of crimes on the basis of legal proceedings, impartiality, and without improper influence.

The subfactors of the rule of law in criminal justice are:

1. accessible, timely, and competent criminal investigation and legal proceedings;
2. criminal justice is free of corruption;
3. criminal investigation and legal proceedings free of charge;
4. criminal investigation and proceedings are carried out independently, without any pressure from the outside and without improper government influence;
5. criminal justice and correctional supervision are effective.

Informal justice has also recently been considered a factor of the rule of law. This entails acknowledging the role played by traditional, or “informal,” systems of law, including traditional, tribal, and religious courts, as well as community-based systems in resolving disputes. These systems often play a large role in cultures where formal legal institutions fail to provide effective remedies for large segments of the population or when formal institutions are perceived as foreign, corrupt, and ineffective.

This is why different forms of informal justice providing they are effective, impartial, and protect fundamental rights, and are held to the same standards of fairness in resolving disputes as formal systems (i.e. they are timely and effective, impartial and free of improper influence, and respect and protect fundamental rights) are a significant factor of the rule of law.
**Conclusion**

The rule of law is a vitally important element in forming public administration based on the law. It is of principal importance for the advanced development of the state and society, and in recent years has become a kind of indicator of the state’s attitude toward corresponding legal values and the maturity of society.

The regime of the rule of law is an essential condition for building a democratic legal state and successful carrying out the reforms needed to modernize the political, legal, economic and social systems and raising public administration to a qualitatively new level.

In this way, the rule of law serves not only the establishment of law and order and legal stability in a state, but also makes public administration ordered, transparent, and less subject to abuse by officials. This, in turn, removes the artificial obstacles to the country’s socioeconomic development, stimulates the creation of a prosperous society, and promotes the active progress of the nation toward a better future.

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**Sabina GARASHOVA**

Ph.D. (Political Science),
Senior Lecturer
at the Chair of Diplomacy and Contemporary Integration Processes,
Baku State University
(Baku, Azerbaijan).

**U.S. GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS IN THE CASPIAN REGION**

**Abstract**

This article studies the gist and area of focus of U.S. geopolitics in the Caspian Region. However, it takes a general approach and does not examine U.S. relations with each of the Caspian states individually. It analyzes the reasons for the U.S.’s increased interest in the region and determines the main trends of its political and economic activity. The article concludes that the U.S.’s successful geopolitical activity in the region has helped Europe to become the first major importer of Caspian oil.

**KEYWORDS:** U.S. interests, geopolitics, Caspian Region, oil, the Caucasus, Azerbaijan.
Introduction

After the Soviet Union disappeared from the political map of the world, the Caspian Region became a major center of international rivalry. This is directly due to its enormous supplies of energy and other natural resources. In addition, the region has realistic prospects of becoming a vitally important hub of transcontinental transportation-communication systems in the North-South and East-West directions. Today the Caspian Region is an area of severe opposition, largely between the U.S. and Russia. In this respect, in recent years, the U.S.’s strivings to ensure its geopolitical and geo-economic interests have been particularly noticeable. So an analysis of the gist and trends in U.S. policy in the Caspian Region seems to be sufficiently important and pertinent.

After the Central Caucasian states declared their independence, the U.S. gained open access to the region. As already noted, the Caucasian-Caspian Region is not only of economic, but also of immense geopolitical significance for international players, particularly the U.S. This is also shown by the fact that in 1997, Washington designated the Caspian Region as a zone of its strategic interests. Sandy Berger, President Bill Clinton’s National Security Advisor, said during his speech on 27 March, 1997 at the Center of Strategic and International Research that China, Turkey, and the Caucasus were of strategic importance for the U.S., while expanding its presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus was one of the U.S.’s foreign policy priorities.¹ This was also clearly announced in President Barack Obama’s U.S. energy doctrine.² It is important that the U.S. has access to the region’s potentially enormous natural resources, guarantees its geopolitical presence, achieves its national goals, and ensures security against the threats of international terrorism, particularly after the well-known events of 9/11 in New York and Washington. After these events, U.S. strategy regarding the region underwent significant changes, as a result of which expansion of military-technical cooperation with the Caspian states became an important trend in U.S. geopolitics in this region. In addition to the above-noted, one of the important trends in U.S. geopolitical activity in the region is limiting the Russia’s presence and influence there in every way possible.

The United States does not want any single nation to have full control over this geopolitical area, while it would like the world community to have unhindered financial and economic access to it. Consequently, the U.S. is not only set on investing its national capital in the economy of the region, but also on the financial participation of its Western allies. This analysis of the problem focuses particular attention on studying the gist of U.S. strategy regarding the Azerbaijan Republic.

Imperatives of U.S. Foreign Policy in the Caspian Region

In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the appearance of the newly independent post-Soviet states, the Caspian Region assumed a central place in world politics. An East-West standoff began gradually building in the Caspian Region in the 1990s.³ This has been gradually turning the region into an arena of geopolitical rivalry among the leading nations on the planet. First of all, there is an open struggle between the strongest nation in the world, the U.S., and Russia, which is significantly weaker in the military-political and economic respect. As already noted, this is due to the re-

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The region’s extremely advantageous geopolitical location, as well as its large reserves of natural resources, primarily Azeri oil and gas. American strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski thinks that it is Azerbaijan and the strategic energy projects involving Baku that hold a central place in U.S. geo-economic policy. The U.S. political elite and scientific-analytical circles think that in order to efficiently ensure national interests in the Caspian Region, it is primarily important to establish closer contacts with Azerbaijan and dynamically develop relations.

Without the Soviet Union, its main and powerful opponent in world politics, the U.S.’s role as the only superpower significantly grew at the beginning of the 21st century. The U.S. is playing a decisive role in forming a new world system.

Despite the fact that the foreign political contours of U.S. strategy in the present century have pretty much already been defined, they are still nevertheless taking shape to this day. It appears that the geopolitical map of the world will ultimately be compiled by means of interaction among divergent forces both in America itself and in the rest of the world.

Disruption of the balance of power on the world arena that began during the second half of the 20th century has led to an abrupt increase in the geopolitical activity of the West, primarily of NATO, throughout the entire post-Soviet area, particularly in the Caspian Region. As already noted in the introduction to this article, the geopolitical interest of NATO and the U.S. in this region is not accidental. It is precisely in this region of the post-Soviet expanse that the vitally important geostrategic and geo-economic interests of the leading countries of the world largely intercept. Granting West European and American companies free access to the oil and gas fields of the Caspian Region is the main imperative of the geopolitics of the Western states in this region. It stands to reason that this will allow the West to become less dependent on Middle Eastern oil and thus establish lower energy prices. In all likelihood, along with economic interests, the U.S. is also pursuing important political interests. When defining the situation in the region in keeping with U.S. tasks, American researcher and Director of the Strategic Studies Institute Douglas Lovelace writes that “a U.S. goal of irrevocably integrating these states into the Western state system … can make them an intensifying focus of international rivalry with Russia.”

Senator Sam Brownback notes that it is also of strategic importance for the U.S. that the Caspian states become “strong, independent, economically viable, and politically sovereign.” The senator explains the importance of this goal as follows:

— the Caspian countries will be able to exert real efforts to reduce anti-Western extremism from Iran;
— the vast energy reserves of this region can reduce the energy dependence of the Western countries on Russia;
— strengthening the market economy in the region may have a positive effect on the political and economic situation in Russia and China;
— the Caspian Region is a favorable arena for spreading freedom and democracy. And this will make it possible to create conditions for developing pluralistic societies.

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So when summing up all of the U.S.’s aims in the Caspian Region, four main factors can be identified:

- first, assisting regional cooperation and resolving conflicts, which mainly applies to the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict;
- second, creating a situation in which the routes of Caspian energy sources would help to increase diversity and not concentration of world energy reserves;
- third, creating as favorable opportunities as possible for American companies;
- fourth, supporting the independence and economic prosperity of all the states in the region.

It is important to note that strengthening geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia was defined as one of the most important vectors in the U.S.’s foreign policy activity. The U.S. is striving to eliminate the possible development of hostile coalitions and independent blocs that could challenge the American government. This is precisely why Zbigniew Brzezinski thinks that the U.S.’s main aim in Eurasia is to create conditions “where no state or combination of states gains the capacity to expel the United States from Eurasia or even to diminish significantly its decisive arbitration role.” In this context, ensuring strategic interests in the Caspian Region is very important. “Declaring the Caspian as a zone of U.S. vital interests will make it possible to spread American influence in Central Asia in the future. The most important component of Washington’s policy in this respect is to render economic, financial, and political support to Azerbaijan, which occupies a strategically important position in the Transcaucasia due to the Caspian’s energy resources and sea communication with Central Asia.”

The main provisions of the U.S.’s new national security strategy formulated as early as September 2002 by President George Bush are characterized by the intention to act independently, regardless of the position of the European allies, which it demonstrated very bluntly during the Iraqi war of 2003. In the spring of the same year, America’s Rand Corporation prepared a forecast report at the request of the U.S. air force about the possible development of the situation in Russia and the CIS countries. The report noted that economic and ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus that are dangerous for the oil and gas pipelines of the region could severely disrupt the balance of power in the region and even lead to an armed conflict between Russia, on the one hand, and several GUAM member states, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, which supports them, on the other. In this situation, these countries might turn to NATO for help and would most likely receive it in the form of contingents of Turkish and American troops.

An analysis of this problem shows that the American presidents before Obama were more active in protecting U.S. strategic interests in the Caspian Region. The opinion of Martha Brill Olcott can be presented as confirmation of this, who believes that Washington’s influence in the Caspian Region is currently at the lowest level. This reality was created by the dynamism in Russia and China’s foreign policy activity. According to the author, the U.S., having concentrated its attention on military reforms and creating security potential, could achieve much more success in the Caspian Region.

Fortifying the U.S.’s Position in the Caspian Region

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the cultural and economic ties between the former Soviet republics and Russia did not break off immediately. When focusing its attention on the

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processes going on in the post-Soviet territory, the U.S. supposed that the countries of Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus were all still essentially in Russia’s sphere of influence. It was only several years later, after it became clear how weak and inefficient Russia’s policy was in this vector and how the Central Asian and South Caucasian states were actively looking for ties with Western countries, that the U.S. began drawing up a more balanced and long-term policy in the region.

Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy John Wolf thought that when acquiring their independence, “the [Caspian] Region’s governments inherited institutions and legal systems ill-suited for today’s global economy. A mad rush toward exports that neglects the need for effective institutions, transparent and predictable laws, and balanced economic growth will only undermine that country’s stability and distort economic development.”

We will note that in contrast to the Caspian states, which are primarily looking for political and economic benefits, the U.S. has mainly been directing its attention to the region for geopolitical considerations. Using the capital of its transnational corporations, it has begun to fortify its influence in the region, thus creating obstacles for Russian oil companies with respect to the exploration and production of the Caspian’s energy resources and their transportation to the external markets.

The goal of U.S. policy is to ensure its leading position in the key issues of the region’s development. Naturally these issues include raw hydrocarbon production and transportation to the external markets, the establishment of new transportation systems and economic ties in the region, and so on. At the same time, U.S. policy has its long-term sights set on diversifying energy sources in order to reduce its dependence on Middle East oil.

The Caspian’s problems include geo-economic, legal, geopolitical, and cultural issues that require in turn special approaches and solutions. However, they are rather complicated since they affect both the bilateral and multilateral relations of the states in the region.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the main problems of the Caspian Region included the following: the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea and the newly independent states’ expectation that they would receive high profits from the development of hydrocarbon reserves.

The first problem did not appear until after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while its resolution was made difficult by the national interests of the Caspian states. The Caspian energy resource boom was largely maintained by the U.S., which did everything to keep it going, essentially provoking the countries of the Caspian Region to confront their neighbors and engage in unilateral actions. The U.S. stubbornly pursued its goal, taking advantage of the oil factor and the intention of the leaders of the region’s countries to distance themselves from Russia.

Robert Blackwill, former special assistant to President George Bush, Sr. for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs noted when talking about the West’s interests in the region that now that all nuclear weapons have been removed from Kazakhstan, the trilateral community no longer has vital interests either in the Caucasus or in Central Asia. The West’s only interest in these regions lies in the large supplies of energy resources in the Caspian basin. Foreign companies are already trying to assist in the development of these resources, coming up against serious opposition from Russia. The governments of the countries of the trilateral community should render energy support through the efforts of private companies, since these resources could be of

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particular importance to Western Europe in the 21st century, when energy supplies from the Middle East begin to decrease.\textsuperscript{15}

Increased interest in the region has also been generated by the dynamism in America’s contacts with the regional states. In 1995, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Bill White made a trip around the Central Asian countries. The same year, Zbigniew Brzezinski went to Azerbaijan and held talks with President of the Azerbaijan Republic Heydar Aliev. He noted that the United States highly assessed Azerbaijan’s geopolitical potential in the strategically important region of Central Asia and the Caucasus, in which it could become a regional backbone. A little while later, the American press began publishing information on extensive hydrocarbon reserves on this country’s shelf, and this gave rise to the increased interest of American business and political circles. At the end of 1996, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for CIS Relations James Collins, who was in the Transcaucasus at that time, personally gave Heydar Aliev Bill Clinton’s message offering begin partnership in oil production and oil transportation in the West direction.\textsuperscript{16}

The signing of a Russian presidential decree in 1995 on the strategic course of the Russian Federation, which is considered a transitional result in the pursuit of Russia’s foreign policy toward the CIS, can be considered important in the general evolution of American policy toward the countries of the region. It noted that Russia’s main vital interests in the economy, defense, security, and protection of Russians’ rights, the guarantee of which is the foundation of the country’s national security, are concentrated in the CIS countries.”\textsuperscript{17} The decree noted in particular the need for Russia’s consolidation as a leading power in forming a new system of international political and economic relations in the post-Soviet expanse.

This decree prompted the U.S. to activate its efforts in the Caspian region. It was after this that the U.S. began balancing its policy and looking for different ways to gain a stronger foothold in the region.

According to Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State under Bill Clinton, four vectors in which the U.S. should focus particular attention in the Caspian Region can be singled out\textsuperscript{18}:

— developing democracy;
— creating a free market economy;
— promoting peace and cooperation among the countries of the region and beyond it;
— integrating regional states into the world community.

We will note that Russian researchers have a specific approach to the American presence in the region. For example, well-known political analyst V. Pisarev identifies three main groups of aims in U.S. foreign policy in the Caspian Region. “The first group consists of making use of the changing geopolitical situation in the world and growing strategic role of the Caspian Region. The second group includes the U.S. penetrating, establishing its presence, and strengthening its position in the Caspian Region in every vector affecting the U.S.’s resolution of its international problems. The third group envisages acquiring the opportunity to control the establishment and prospects for developing the region’s resource potential by littoral states, including the Russian Federation, creating spheres of dependence of the former Soviet republics on American economic, political, scientific-technical, and other forms of assistance, and increasing influence on the nature and dimen-

\textsuperscript{17} Russian Presidential Decree No. 940 of 14.09.95 \textit{On the Approval of the Russian Federation’s Strategic Course with CIS Member States}.
It should also be noted that U.S. foreign policy in the Caspian states has applied several key tools. The main one was aimed at simplifying the economic and political systems in the Caspian Region. This topic encompasses such issues as establishing democracy, protecting human rights, and building a market economy. These tools of U.S. foreign policy were supported by a powerful propaganda campaign. What is more, for a long time, the Bill Clinton administration was the only judge for the Caspian states and these tools gave it the opportunity to manipulate the Caspian states.

The gist of the following element of U.S. policy was that if a state is not democratic, it cannot be stable, prosperous, or develop favorably. Thus,

- First, America began opposing countries with authoritarian regimes, launching various sanctions against them.
- Second, having assumed responsibility for forming the state systems of the region’s countries, the U.S. thus acquired a safe lever of direct influence by assisting in drawing up constitutions and other regulatory acts.

And it was the U.S. that presumed the need for conducting political reforms in the region by implementing assistance Programs, carrying out public and private diplomacy, and supporting nongovernmental organizations. So the U.S. acquired the opportunity to gain a stronger foothold in the region based on both government and nongovernmental legal organizations and funds.

All of the above shows that the importance of the Caspian region for the U.S. has been sufficiently widely discussed in various scientific and political circles. Such keen attention from the U.S. gradually made it possible for it to fortify its position in the region. The stronger the U.S. became in the region, the more aggressive its policy.

An analysis of the political reality in the region gives grounds to conclude that since the beginning of the 1990s, the U.S. has mainly been supporting the sovereignty and independence of the regional states. It has also been helping to carry out strategic oil and gas projects in the Caspian Region. In our opinion, a perceptible achievement of U.S. geopolitics in the region is that Europe has become the first major importer of Caspian oil. This goal was largely pursued under presidents Clinton and Bush.

We also believe that after Barack Obama was elected president, the dynamism of U.S. political activity in ensuring strategic interests in the region perceptibly diminished. Several factors can explain this.

- First, before the Ukrainian events, the U.S. put particular emphasis on resetting relations with Russia. In so doing, the U.S. decreased its military-political activity in the post-Soviet expanse to a certain extent.
- Second, in addition to the Caspian Region, the U.S. acquired other problem zones (the events in the Middle East, the Iranian factor, and unfinished affairs in Iraq and Afghanistan). It is obvious that in such difficult circumstances, the U.S. was unable to ensure its important interests in the Caspian as necessary.
- Third, by making efficient use of the energy factor and applying improved military political technology, the U.S. acquired a real opportunity to ensure its interests more actively in the region.

20 See: A.I. Utkin, Amerikanskiaia strategiia dlia XXI veika, Moscow, 2000, p. 81.
Against the background of all these new conditions, the U.S.’s position in the region under Obama looks much weaker. Our opinion coincides with the position of Ariel Cohen, a well-known American expert on foreign policy, who thinks that the Obama administration has de facto recognized the CIS as a sphere of Russia’s dominating influence. This reality was observed after the U.S. began carrying out its reset policy. In his opinion, the reset policy essentially meant refusing to promote U.S. strategic interests in Eurasia. The U.S. was to give its activity throughout the post-Soviet area, particularly in the Caspian Region, perceptible dynamism. It stands to reason that in doing this it had to pursue its own strategic interests. Ariel Cohen thinks it is important for U.S. strategic interests to render all kinds of support to energy diversification and integration of the Caspian Region in the world energy market and pipeline building, as well as to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states of the region.22

We think that at this stage, that is, in the context of the Ukrainian events, the resetting of relations with Russia does not hold any further promise, and the U.S. will continue to be active in the Caspian Region. It stands to reason that U.S. policy will no longer be designed with Russian interests in mind. Most important, we think, the need is felt for resetting relations with the Caspian states. Otherwise it will be impossible to talk about the efficiency of U.S. geopolitics in the region.

When analyzing the essence and trends of U.S. geopolitics in the Caspian Region, it is particularly important to note that, although it has vitally important strategic interests in the region, the U.S. is not openly showing any concern about the unsettled conflicts. The U.S. has repeatedly stated the importance of settling all of the conflicts, including the Armenian-Azeri Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The U.S. has also repeatedly announced that peaceful settlement of all conflicts in the region meets its interests. But despite this, as one of the cochairs of the OSCE Minsk Group said, the U.S. has still not taken one decisive step toward fair settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This reality gives reason to believe that U.S. passivity in resolving regional conflicts is giving Russia good opportunities for maneuver. Many Western experts even think that the U.S. has essentially removed itself from the problem of the frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus and in so doing surrendered its position to Russia.

**Conclusion**

The major geopolitical changes relating to the collapse of the Soviet Union and formation of the independent Caspian states have drastically transformed the entire geopolitical situation in this region, which has become an arena of acute geopolitical rivalry among world and regional powers. The situation that developed at the beginning of the 21st century is inevitably leading to more intense competition between the U.S. and Russia in this region. This is particularly true since the situation is becoming aggravated, first, by the fight to gain control over potential sources of energy resources, second, by the fact that the region is the epicenter of the geopolitical fault line in the post-Soviet expanse, and, third, by the high conflict potential both in the Northern and the Southern Caucasus.

The geopolitical factor is playing a vital role in the West’s increased interest in the Southern Caucasus. Bordering on Russia in the north and on Iran and Turkey in the south, this region is ad hoc a buffer, a sphere of geopolitical rivalry, and a constructive link between them. What is more, the advantageous geographic location of the Caspian states, particularly the Azerbaijan Republic, makes it possible to use its territory for laying transport routes that begin in Baku, which is one of

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the most important prerequisites for the economic development of this region in the context of the growing globalization of the world economy. In so doing, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route holds a key place in oil transportation, which is fully supported by the West and arouses undisguised discontent in Russia. And this is not accidental, for the geography of Caspian oil deliveries and their transportation routes are directly related both to the geopolitical and the geo-economic interests of the main players in this region.

However, despite the fact that in recent years American influence in the Caspian Sea basin has weakened to some extent, the U.S. continues to show a great interest in it, since it regards the Caspian Region as the main guarantor of the West’s energy security.

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Niyazi NIYAZOV

D.Sc. (Hist.), Associate Professor at the Chair of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University (St. Petersburg, the Russian Federation).

MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN AZERBAIJAN AND UKRAINE IN 1994-2014

Abstract

This article examines the main stages in military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and Ukraine in 1994-2014. It shows the role Ukraine played in the deliveries of modern arms systems for the armed forces of Azerbaijan and in modernizing the combat systems at the disposal of the National Army of Azerbaijan, as well as the interaction between the sides in building up the productive capacities of Azerbaijan’s military-industrial complex.

KEYWORDS: Azeri-Ukrainian relations, military-technical cooperation, military-industrial complex.

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet empire, the states that emerged on its ruins chose different ways to ensure their military security. Some exerted immense efforts to become integrated into NATO,
others tied their interests in this sphere to the interests of Russia and joined the CSTO it patronizes, while the rest tried with more or less success to go their own way, attempting to cooperate with both the first and the second. These countries, which remain outside the control of NATO or the CSTO, often become serious partners for each other in the military sphere. This primarily applies to the military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and Ukraine in 1994-2014.

The historical-genetic, or, as it is also called, retrospective method was chosen as the main scientific means for analyzing the special features of cooperation between the two countries. It makes it possible to examine the cause-effect relations and patterns of development of a particular event or phenomenon and to identify the special features of the subjective and objective factors, in our case, the specifics of political and economic development, which is extremely important for understanding the processes being studied.

A wide range of sources in the public domain comprised the empirical base of this study. It stands to reason that this is an extremely limited source base for this type of research. However, this is a typical problem today for almost any research on the history of the post-Soviet countries—it is essentially impossible to gain access to archive documents that reflect the special features of the foreign and domestic policy of the named states. However, modern information technology makes it possible to draw extensive empirical material from open sources for studying different aspects of the foreign and domestic policy of essentially any state. The application of this technology is made easier by the widespread availability of this kind of source in electronic form—many printed media recognized by the scientific community can no longer manage without electronic versions of their publications and, moreover, are increasingly placing reports on their pages initially introduced into the information field precisely by Internet publications. This means it is possible to carry out an objective study of the special features of the history and politics of post-Soviet states with the help of contemporary information processing methods.

Unfortunately, today the flow of publications on the topic of this article, as well as on topics relating in general to the military security policy of the post-Soviet states pursued both in the West and in the East suffers from one serious shortcoming—works are often based on research studies that are in many ways duplicated.

For example, a Western expert proficient in Russian or even a prestigious Western research center notices a particular article in the Russian central media on the special features of the military security policy of the CIS countries; the information in this publication is then used to write a paper in English, which, in turn, some time later, is noticed by a Russian researcher, and he uses these data in his own work as though from a foreign source, and so the process goes on. The most surprising thing is that Russian-language “expert” media, as well as the Internet resources of the post-Soviet states, essentially go unnoticed by both the Western and Russian expert community.

Nor does the use by the post-Soviet states of the English-language versions of their media or Internet resources help to form an objective picture, while resources that publish information in the national languages are excluded even from the potential empirical field of such studies.

Based on the above, I tried to use data published in the media and Internet resources of Azerbaijan and Ukraine in this study.

A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed

In the time that has passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries that emerged on its ruins have been building their statehoods with different degrees of success. In so doing, it has
become clear that interaction between the once fraternal republics is occurring not along the vertical—through Moscow, as was the case during Soviet times—but along the horizontal—by means of intensified bilateral relations or joint participation in various regional organizations and unions, such as the CIS, CSTO, GUAM, CU, and CES. This development of events has been promoted by a great many factors, beginning with political and ending with cultural. We are interested in how these processes have been progressing within the framework of the bilateral relations between Azerbaijan and Ukraine in the military sphere.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorny Karabakh, which began in 1988, escalated into a full-fledged war. By the spring of 1994, Armenian armed formations had succeeded in seizing 20% of Azerbaijan’s territory.

The Bishkek truce signed by the sides in no way meant that the country’s military security had lost its priority importance for official Baku. On the contrary, Azerbaijan’s new political leadership headed by Heydar Aliyev began paying particular attention to defense policy. An analysis of the military-political situation that had developed by the spring of 1994 brought the Azeri side to the conclusion that one of the reasons for the country’s defeat at the first stage of the Nagorno-Karabakh war was that Baku did not have any real military or political allies.

This situation primarily developed due to the poorly conceived foreign policy of President Elchibei, who was in power in 1992-1993. He thought that Azerbaijan’s only ally in the international arena could be Turkey.

Hoping that Moscow would help it to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, in 1993 Azerbaijan joined the Collective Security Treaty (CST). However, Baku subsequently lost faith in Russia’s ability to regulate the conflict and achieve the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied territories. And since it did not think that membership in the same military organization as Armenia could meet its national interests, on 2 April, 1999, Azerbaijan left the CST along with Uzbekistan and Georgia. The latter had also been placing its hopes on Moscow up to the last with respect to settling the conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Judging by everything, at that time, no one in Moscow seriously perceived the consequences of Azerbaijan and Georgia’s withdrawal from the CST (later the CSTO), since most politicians, military experts, and other officials were sure that without close military-technical cooperation with Russia Baku and Tbilisi would, at the very least, be unable to ensure the need of their armed forces for various arms systems and, at the very most, be unable to cope at all with the task of creating national armed forces.

It was precisely at this time that Azerbaijan and Georgia turned their sights to Ukraine as an alternative supplier of hardware and arms. What is more, Azerbaijan already had a certain amount of experience in cooperation with Ukraine in this sphere.

As though confirming their intentions to establish special relations with Kiev in the military sphere, on 14 April, 1999, Azerbaijan and Georgia, along with Ukraine, held trilateral exercises aimed at protecting the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline from possible terrorist strikes. The participants in the exercises stated through the then Georgian Minister of Defense David Tevzadze that “the exercises are being held within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program.”

It cannot be said that intensification of military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Ukraine, and in passing with Georgia too, initially rested on any clear and well-conceived political or economic base—each of the sides primarily resolved its own problems. But since Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Georgia were the key players in creating the regional organization GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, and Moldova—The Organization for Democracy and Economic Development)—in 1997, Russia perceived the interaction of these countries in the military sphere as anti-Russian. Moreover, on 24 April, 1999, at NATO’s anniversary summit in Washington, Uzbekistan, which, as noted, had also left the CST, joined GUAM. This was the NATO summit that adopted the historical decision on the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to NATO, and it took place against the background of the bombings of Yugoslavia.

Without any real levers of influence on the situation at that time, Russia limited itself to diplomatic statements criticizing the actions of the West, while beginning to relate with growing suspicion to any forums and organizations that, from the Russian viewpoint, were acting under Washington’s aegis.

For the same reason, Russia became very sensitive to any activity of the GUAM countries (after April 1999, GUUAM) in the military sphere. For example, in August 1999 the Peace Shield-99 exercises were held near Lvov. It was reported that “within the framework of the exercises, a meeting will be held of the defense ministers of these countries [GUUAM], at which questions of stepping up and coordinating military cooperation will be examined.” And immediately following this, the sensational conclusion was made that “the matter concerns establishing the military component of GUUAM.”

In actual fact, neither then, nor some time later, nor even at the present stage, when Ukraine has now encountered the problem of separatism, was GUAM (GUUAM) capable of creating a cooperation mechanism in the military sphere that could have grown into an effective military-political union. The national interests of these countries prevail over general interests, including in fighting separatism. However, this does not exclude the fact that the listed countries were actively involved in bilateral relations in the military sphere in the past and continue to expand military-technical cooperation. Moreover, such cooperation not only promotes an increase in the combat capabilities of the national armed forces, but is also a high-income sphere of foreign economic relations, or to put it more simply, profitable business.

It would seem that Ukraine realized earlier than the other CIS countries that Azerbaijan’s growing economic power and financial potential were turning it into a very attractive partner in military-technical cooperation. However, for some time, Kiev was in no hurry to cooperate with Baku in expanding the military-industrial complex, which Azerbaijan began to develop after the State Committee of the Azerbaijan Republic for Special Machine-Building and Conversion, which used to be engaged in military production, was eliminated in December 2005 and the Ministry of the Defense Industry (MDI) created in its place.

This action (or to be more precise, inaction) on the part of Ukraine was possibly due both to the low evaluation of the effectiveness of such cooperation and to the worries that development of the Azeri defense complex would deprive Kiev of some of its hardware and arms contracts with Baku. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s interest in close cooperation with Azerbaijan, both in petroleum product deliveries and in advancing its own technology to the foreign markets, prompted Kiev to establish cooperation with Baku in military production.

In November 2006, sensing the advantage of military cooperation with Baku, the Ukrainian side became an initiator of “activating military and military-technical cooperation” with Azerbaijan, and

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a month later, during his visit to Azerbaijan, the then Ukrainian prime minister Viktor Yanukovich said that “Ukraine and Azerbaijan see great prospects for cooperation in the military-industrial complex and will implement several joint projects.”

In the spring of 2007, Azerbaijan summed up the results of the MDI’s work for the first time. In so doing, Ukraine, along with Turkey, Russia, Belarus, and Rumania, figured among the countries whose experience was used to establish military production. Despite the great potential of joint bilateral projects in military production, Ukraine, as before, was primarily interested in carrying out large arms deliveries to the Azeri market, since this promised Kiev significant monetary infusions. In turn, Azerbaijan, aiming to strengthen its armed forces, was eager to buy various combat systems from Ukraine.

According to the information published in *Moscow Defense Brief* and relying primarily on data supplied by countries for the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms and posted on the Organization’s website, between 2000 and 2007, Azerbaijan purchased from Ukraine 12 MIG-29 and 2 MIG-29UB bombers of Soviet manufacture and 12 L-39 training combat planes of Czech manufacture; 36 M-46 130-mm towed guns, 45 T-72 tanks, two Soviet BMP-1, three Ukrainian BTR-3U, 85 PM-38 mortar launchers, and 12 9RK58 Soviet *Smerch* multiple rocket launcher systems. What is more, according to the same U.N. Register, Azerbaijan purchased 55 122-mm D-30A howitzers, and in 2007, four BTS-5B, as well as a SU-25 UTG fighter bomber, which at one time was created for deploying on the *Tbilisi* aircraft carrier, now better known as *Admiral Kuznetsov*.

In 2008, Azerbaijan continued to buy Soviet armored vehicles from Ukraine and acquired 70 BTR-70, as well as 18 2S1 artillery systems, better known as *Carnation* SAU. In so doing, *The Military Balance* for 2009 claims that the Azerbaijani army has 12 *Carnations* at its disposal. In our opinion, this is a discrepancy, a result of *The Military Balance* obtaining its data from different publications in the public domain, while the U.N. Register of Conventional Weapons relies on data that are officially presented by the Participating states.

At the same time, it should be noted that publications in the media are faster off the mark. For example, one of the first facts about Azerbaijan purchasing another batch of heavy arms systems in Ukraine in 2009 was published by the Milaz.info agency. It reported directly in the title of one of its publications, “This year, Azerbaijan has bought armored vehicles from Ukraine.” Admittedly, no precise information was published at this point about the items purchased. It did not become known until the end of 2010 that between February and November 2009, Azerbaijan had purchased an additional 29 of the mentioned self-propelled *Carnation* units. This information later appeared in the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms, where it was also reported that in 2009, Azerbaijan purchased

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12 “This Year, Azerbaijan has Bought Armored Vehicles from Ukraine,” available in Azeri at [http://www.milaz.info/news.php?id=8796].

from Ukraine an MIG-29UB bomber and 11 Mi-24\textsuperscript{14} strike helicopters modernized for carrying out combat action at night. In Azerbaijan, they were designated as MI-24 G (Gecə/night). According to S. Zgurets, editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian journal \textit{Defense Express}, these vehicles (MI-24 G), “were modernized by South Africa’s Advanced Technologies and Engineering, the Konotop Air Repair Plant \textit{Aviakon} and the Luch State Kiev Design Bureau enterprise. The improvements were based on a set of modernized Mi-24 Super Hind Mk.4 developed by the South African company.\textsuperscript{15} However, another statement by the Ukrainian expert attracted more attention: “It has almost become a rule that first arms samples are modernized or made under contract with the Azerbaijani Armed Forces and then this hardware finds its place in the combat ranks of the Ukrainian army.”\textsuperscript{16} The interest of the Azerbaijani side in these vehicles was promoted by the fact that Baku proposed investing in the Ukrainian military-industrial complex in order to carry out joint production of rotorcraft. Ukrainian Prime Minister N. Azarov announced this in the fall of the same year after his meeting with Ilham Aliev.\textsuperscript{17}

By the end of 2010, it became known that the Azeri side was showing an interest not only in modernized helicopters, but also in the latest antitank guided missile launchers developed by the Ukrainian military-industrial complex along with colleagues from Belarus. As a result, Azerbaijan, along with Belarus and the armed forces of Ukraine itself, became one of the first customers of the \textit{Skif} portable antitank guided missile launcher.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Not Only Business, But Also Politics}

By the turn of 2009-2010, the sides were ready to continue mutually advantageous cooperation in different spheres of foreign policy, including in military cooperation. In April 2009, during President Viktor Iushchenko’s visit to Azerbaijan, an Action Plan for Ukrainian-Azeri Cooperation for 2009-2010 was signed, which also included a Protocol between the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and the Azerbaijan Government on Making Amendments to the Intergovernmental Agreement on Military-Technical Cooperation of 24 March, 1997 (Minister of Defense Yuri Ekhanurov signed for the Ukrainian side).\textsuperscript{19}

So it comes as no surprise that during the meeting between the Ukrainian President and journalists of \textit{Ayna} and \textit{Zerkalo}, he was asked whether military-technical cooperation would continue between the two countries and whether this cooperation would cause pressure to be exerted on Ukraine from the side. The head of the Ukrainian state answered this question as follows: “Our cooperation [in the military sphere] is carried out in strict compliance with the regulations of international law and in conditions of openness, so any foreign pressure on Ukraine in this question is pointless. To sum

\textsuperscript{14} See: United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).
\textsuperscript{16} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{17} See: “Azerbaijan is Willing to Invest in the Joint Production of Helicopters in Ukraine,” available in Russian at [http://1news.az/politics/20101030100124321.html].
up, I will note that our countries have immense opportunities for implementing large-scale projects both in the military-technical and in the military-industrial sphere.\textsuperscript{20}

The question asked the Ukrainian president and his reply were not a simple formality. The thing is that the increase in deliveries of hardware and arms from Ukraine to Azerbaijan made Armenia very nervous, which apparently at first was seriously hoping to retain its supremacy in the regional arms race due to essentially free deliveries of various arms systems from Russia. However, as quantitative and qualitative supremacy began going to Azerbaijan, Erevan began criticizing Kiev for its desire to cooperate with Baku in the military sphere.

What is more, after the Five-Day War on the wave of Russia’s discontent over Ukrainian-Georgian relations in the military sphere, Armenia also began giving negative evaluations of Ukraine’s international military cooperation policy, primarily criticizing its interaction in the military sphere with Azerbaijan.

In March 2009, against the background of another Russian-Azeri scandal relating to the delivery of Russian arms to Armenia totaling $800 million, a Moscow-Erevan-Kiev-Tbilisi satellite TV link-up took place.

During the TV linkup, an Armenian journalist asked former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma the following question: “What goals is official Kiev pursuing as the main supplier of arms to Azerbaijan, which is in no way hiding its aggressive intentions?” Despite the fact that this was more of a statement than a question called upon to express yet again the Armenian viewpoint on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, Leonid Kuchma replied very reasonably that if Ukraine did not supply the arms, it would not be difficult for Azerbaijan to buy them from the U.S. or another country.\textsuperscript{21}

There can be no doubt that the former Ukrainian leader was bluffing a little by saying that Azerbaijan could easily buy arms from the U.S., but he was absolutely right in suggesting that Baku’s financial possibilities allowed it to find alternative arms suppliers in other parts of the world. So Kiev is striving to strengthen military-technical cooperation with Baku. After all, according to the data of the Kiev Research Center of the Army, Conversion, and Disarmament, which S. Zgurets used in the mentioned work, Azerbaijan accounted for “7% of the total volume of Ukraine’s arms export at year-end of 2009.”\textsuperscript{22}

The dynamic growth of Azerbaijan’s defense spending prompted the country’s political and military leadership, at the turn of 2010-2011, to give serious thought to purchasing new samples of armored vehicles for the needs of the Azerbaijani National Army, which were superior in terms of combat capabilities the large number of Soviet T-72 tanks at the disposal of the Azerbaijani army.

Judging by everything, it was precisely within the framework of this approach that Azerbaijan showed an interest in January 2011 in the Oplot combat vehicle created in Ukraine on the basis of the Soviet T-80 tank. It was proposed that closer acquaintance with the new tank be made at the 10th International Arms Exhibition IDEX-2011, which was held in Abu-Dabi between 20 and 24 February.\textsuperscript{23}


\textsuperscript{22} S. Zgurets, op. cit.

At the exhibition itself, the conviction of the observers that Azerbaijan would become the first purchaser of the new Ukrainian tanks only grew. In any case, even the Russian experts participating in the exhibition boldly declared that “Azerbaijan will most likely become the first foreign buyer of Oplot.” However, the transaction did not take place, and in the spring of 2011, the media of Ukraine and several post-Soviet countries reported, with reference to the Thai newspaper Bangkok Post, that “the command of Thailand’s land troops has decided to purchase 200 Ukrainian main battle tanks, Oplot T-84U, while in the fall of the same year, it was confirmed that Thailand, to which Kiev initially promised to sell 49 vehicles, would be the main purchaser of the new Ukrainian tanks.

We think the reason the Azeri side decided not to purchase the Ukrainian tanks is obvious—Baku was not happy with the deadline Kiev declared for carrying out the order. As general director of the Malyshev Ukrainian Plant N. Belov admitted recently, the Ukrainian side will execute the Thai contract for Oplots as early as 2015, while the production cycle of the new tank amounts to 9 months.

As a result, Baku signed a contract with Russia for the delivery of the tanks, and on 10 February, 2012, it became clear that Azerbaijan intended to buy T-90S tanks from Russia. The contract for this was signed between the Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense and Rosoboronexport as early as 2011, while in the fall of 2012, the sale of T-90S tanks to Azerbaijan was also confirmed by the Russian media. In so doing, no one knows for sure about the dimensions of this transaction, presuming that, as in the case of other post-Soviet countries, Azerbaijan would purchase a batch of 10-30 vehicles from Russia. This is why the information that Baku immediately bought 94 T-90S tanks had the effect of a bomb being dropped on the expert community. It is worth noting that Azerbaijan also purchased all the servicing technology for these vehicles. It was also reported that the Azerbaijan Republic had signed an option for the purchase of another large batch of T-90S tanks. In addition, in 2011-2012, Azerbaijan bought 93 T-72 tanks from Belarus.

As the figures show, Azerbaijan was interested in receiving large numbers of modern tanks and service vehicles in a short time, which the Ukrainian side could not guarantee. However, the breakdown in the talks on tank deliveries did not deal a serious blow to the military-technical cooperation between the two countries.

In March 2011, the then Ukrainian Defense Minister M. Ezhel was received by Azeri President Ilham Aliev, and then he met with Azeri Prime Minister A. Rasizade and Azeri Defense Minister

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S. Abiev, as well as head of the Milli Mejlis O. Asadov. According to Ukrainian information resources, the sides not only noted the role of the leaders of both countries in strengthening ties between Azerbaijan and Ukraine, but also agreed on the possibility of modernizing various Soviet arms systems at the disposal of Azerbaijan’s armed forces at the enterprises of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. In so doing, the sides deemed it necessary to note that “an efficient regulatory legal base of bilateral cooperation, including in the military and military-technical spheres, has been created” between the two countries.

It is possible that precisely the existence of this base prompted Azerbaijan’s Minister of the Defense Industry Yaver Jamalov to announce in May of the same year that joint production was beginning with Ukraine of Skif and Barier antitank guided missile launchers. In so doing, the Azeri minister noted that Azerbaijan’s Ministry of the Defense Industry initially planned to engage in joint production of antitank guided missile launchers with South Africa’s Denel Company, but preference went to the Ukrainian enterprise Luch, since its products could be installed both in helicopters and in land-based vehicles.

After showing an interest in Skif, Azerbaijan willingly or not supported another post-Soviet country with which it has close ties in military-technical cooperation. The matter concerns Belarus, since the antitank guided missile launchers mentioned are a joint Ukrainian-Belarusian project. It stands to reason that integration of the enterprises of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of the Defense Industry into the joint manufacture of this kind of weapons system not only raises the combat potential of the Azeri National Army, but also gives official Baku additional opportunities for strengthening its political position in the post-Soviet region.

The illusion may be created that the development of Azeri-Ukrainian relations in military-technical cooperation are problem-free, but certain difficulties have nevertheless arisen, and they are mainly related to the political processes in Ukraine itself. For example, after Viktor Ianukovich came to power at the beginning of 2010, certain forces tried to interfere in the development of military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and Ukraine. However, keeping in mind that the new Ukrainian president’s team stated that it wanted to help the country recover from the economic crisis, Kiev did not curtail its cooperation, but on the contrary, began intensifying and expanding it. In so doing, Azerbaijan and Ukraine began talking about “forming and implementing large-scale long-term projects.”

A certain threat to military cooperation between the sides arose in September 2011 when representatives of the Party of the Regions in Ukraine stated in the words of deputy chairman of the faction M. Chechetov that military relations with Baku might be reexamined in order to maintain regional security, adding that talks in the region about arms deliveries should take place with the participation of Russia. It is worth noting that this statement was published in the pro-Armenian
Ukrainian news portal Analitika.at.ua and, for this reason, came to the direct attention of Azeri journalists.\(^{40}\) Ukrainian expert T. Berezovets also expressed a similar opinion regarding Kiev’s arms deliveries to Baku. It is interesting that the extreme pro-Russian position of these people did not permit them to notice that Russia itself was increasing deliveries of hardware and arms to Azerbaijan during the same period. In turn, Azeri military expert U. Jafarov deemed it necessary to note that this development of events would in no way affect the combat potential of the Azeri armed forces, since the country has other partners in military-technical cooperation throughout the world.\(^{41}\)

It is difficult not fall victim to temptation and, against the background of the 2014 events, accuse these gentlemen from the political and expert community of pro-Russian sympathies or even of deliberately damaging Ukraine’s military-industrial complex. However, we feel that what happened is more related to the active efforts of the Armenian diaspora in Ukraine than to Russian policy. This is shown in particular by the fact that it was the above-mentioned information resource of the Armenian diaspora that supported this initiative, although the first interpretation cannot be completely excluded.

Whatever the case, Kiev’s real economic interests did not permit it to reject military cooperation with Azerbaijan. And as early as November 2011, after meeting in Almaty at the sitting of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, the then defense ministers of Azerbaijan, S. Abiev, and of Ukraine, M. Ezhel, signed an Action Plan for Bilateral Cooperation for 2012.\(^{42}\)

Information first spread by the Ukrainian website mil.in.ua, which specialized in covering military security problems, and then reprinted by Azeri information resources showed that the two countries were continuing their military-technical cooperation. The report said that the Azerbaijan Republic entered a contract for the delivery of defense production manufactured at the Topaz plant in Donetsk. Journalists concluded that the matter concerned the deliveries of Kolchuga radar stations—this was precisely what the Topaz plant specialized in.\(^{43}\) There was no official confirmation or denial of the information on the planned deliveries of Kolchugas from either the Azeri or Ukrainian side, but nor did anyone deny a contract had been signed.

Now, two years after this information appeared, it is difficult to say whether the Ukrainian side was able to at least partially carry out the contract, or whether its implementation was halted due to the fact that the Topaz plant was in the combat zone and its equipment, according to the Ukrainian National Security Service, was removed to Russia.\(^{44}\)

But let us return to the events of 2012. The fact that the sides continued to actively engage in military cooperation was also mentioned at the meeting between Azeri Defense Minister S. Abiev and his Ukrainian colleague D. Salamatin, who was appointed to this post in February 2012, and before that occupied the post of general director of the Ukroboronprom state concern, that is, was the very person who, due to his work, promoted in every way military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Ukraine. It comes as no surprise that the Ukrainian minister was warmly received in Baku, where the

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\(^{41}\) See: Ibidem.


sides came to terms not only about Mr. Abiev’s return visit to Ukraine, but also about the development of bilateral relations in the defense sphere.\textsuperscript{45}

Not only the information reports about the meetings between officials mention the continuation of military cooperation with Ukraine, a few other facts also indirectly show it. For example, in October 2012, the Azeri information portal Aze.az reported that modernization of Mi-24 strike helicopters was continuing in the country under the Mi-24 Super Hind program of the ATE Aerospace company and Azerbaijan’s Azairtechservice company, together with other “foreign partners.”\textsuperscript{46} It can be claimed with a large degree of probability that there were also Ukrainian enterprises among the latter, since beginning in 2009 they delivered some of the equipment and arms for improving these vehicles, as mentioned above.

In 2012, Azerbaijan continued to purchase special armored vehicles in Ukraine, since there was a report on the purchase of 14 evacuation BTS-5B vehicles created on the basis of the T-72 tank.\textsuperscript{47}

Since the beginning of 2013, the flow of information about new contracts between Azerbaijan and Ukraine in the military sphere has noticeably decreased. There are two possible explanations for this.

- First, by the indicated time, the Azeri side had completed equipping its armed forces with heavy weapons of the previous generation, while the Ukrainian side was not ready to offer Baku any exclusive samples of new combat systems, which cannot be said of Kiev’s competitors—Russia, Turkey, and particularly Israel.
- Second, by this time, performance of earlier signed agreements was underway, so there was no urgent need to sign new ones.

Admittedly, the sides continued to cooperate in the modernization of technology and established joint production of some types of arms.

All the same, a certain amount of information about military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and Ukraine continued to come in. For example, in August 2013, it became clear that along with a few NATO countries, Azerbaijan was the purchaser of Ukrainian radar stations manufactured by the Iskra plant.\textsuperscript{48}

The events in Kiev (the opposition demonstrations of forces dissatisfied with the then president Viktor Yanukovich’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, which began in the fall of 2013) did not at first influence the interest of the Ukrainian side in continuing military-technical cooperation with Azerbaijan. For example, on 29 November, 2013, Azeri Minister of the Defense Industry Ya. Jamalov received a delegation headed by General Director of Ukraine’s Ukrspetseksport A. Kovalenko. At the meeting, the sides came to terms on the development of cooperation between the Ministry of the Defense Industry of Azerbaijan and Ukrspetseksport.\textsuperscript{49}

Nor did the employees of Ukroboronprom lag behind their colleagues. They too, ignoring the processes going in Ukraine, were willing in December 2013 to offer the Azeri military BTR-4MB.
armored transporters. It was presumed that the Azeri side would be able to acquaint themselves more closely with the combat capabilities of the vehicle at the First Azeri Exhibition of the Defense Industry ADEX-2014, which was to be held in September 2014.\textsuperscript{50}

The many experts and ordinary visitors to the exhibition were able to acquaint themselves with the leading manufacturers of hardware, arms, and auxiliary equipment in the halls of Baku Expo Center. A total of 200 companies and 23 official delegations from 34 countries of the world\textsuperscript{51} participated in the exhibition, including from Azerbaijan and Ukraine.

According to the author of this article’s personal observations, the Ukroboronprom stand did not particularly stand out at ADEX 2014, particularly since it did not have any full-scale models of heavy vehicles, including the promised BTR-4MB. The representatives of the Ukrainian delegation themselves did not hide the fact that the capacities of Ukrainian defense enterprises are currently engaged more in fulfilling various contracts for their own armed forces than carrying out foreign contracts. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian side showed it was willing to establish cooperation with new partners. Admittedly, this mainly applied to deliveries of various engineering vehicles and electronic aviation technology defense systems.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and Ukraine has come a long way. During this time, Kiev has always shown itself to be a relatively reliable supplier of a variety of combat systems for the needs of Azerbaijan’s defense and security structures and equipment for the needs of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of the Defense Industry, while Baku has always paid for its purchases on time and in full.

The healthy pragmatism in this sphere has also promoted a strengthening of interstate relations. In so doing, relations in the military-technical cooperation have not undergone any serious revision during the changes in political regime in Kiev. In our opinion, the accumulated experience of interaction between Azerbaijan and Ukraine will make it possible for the countries to continue enjoying all the advantages of the military-technical cooperation they have created between themselves. In so doing, it cannot be excluded that Ukraine may become a purchaser of Azeri military-technical hardware, for example, drones, which Azerbaijan has already been successfully manufacturing for several years and is now offering in the international markets.

In any case, despite the circumstances Ukrainian gunmakers are currently experiencing, Azeri-Ukrainian military-technical cooperation will not become a thing of the past.


THE MUTUAL CONTAINMENT POLICY OF RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND OBSTACLES

Abstract

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caucasian region\(^1\) has gained great strategic importance and become one of the main political, security, and economic competition arenas between Russia and the United States. Both countries have attempted to promote their influence in the region while destabilizing their rival’s interests and position. This complex and closed competition has resulted in a mutual indirect containment policy and aggravated the situation in a region that is suffering from internal crisis. In this article, the authors aim to examine the barriers and obstacles the United States and Russia have encountered in developing their desired economic, security, and political order in the Southern Caucasus, as well as how they have tried to contain the rival despite the existing obstacles. To do so, the researchers primarily discuss the importance of the Southern Caucasus in the foreign policy of both the United States and Russia and discuss why the region has become the center of their full-fledged competition in the past two decades. In addition, they investigate Russia and the United States’ achievements and the structural obstacles

\(^1\) Unlike the author, the Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus proceeds from the basic principle that the Caucasian region is divided into three sub-regions: the Northern Caucasus (the administrative units of the North Caucasian and Southern Federal Districts of the RF); the Central Caucasus (the independent states of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia); and the Southern Caucasus (the northeastern is of Turkey and the northwestern osts of Iran) (for more details, see: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press AB, Stockholm, 2006).
Central Asia and the Caucasus are regions that in the past two decades, in the shadow generated by the political, economic, and security developments, have gained great geopolitical importance. Many regional and trans-regional powers have an interest in each of these regions and they have been arenas of competition for the world powers and alliances, including the United States, the European Union, Russia, and China. The latter have defined their fundamental goals in order to influence the region. However, the most intense competition has been created by the United States and Russia at the economic, geostrategic, and security levels. In recent years, many political analysts have examined the competition created between Russia and the United States from the point of view of a New Cold War. The gap created after the collapse of the Soviet Union could have given the United States the opportunity to play an important role in the area. But in the current decade, by recovering its power, Russia has tried to overshadow the influence gained by its competitor and once again seize its historical hegemony as the most influential country in the whole of East Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.

However, the main competition in the Central Asia and the Caucasus seems to be concentrated on the Southern Caucasus, particularly due to the geographical, political, security, and economic importance of the region for both rivals. From the geographical point of view, the Southern Caucasus is connected to Iran, Turkey, the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, and Russia. This region, which includes the three republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, is the main route for transporting the energy resources of Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. This area is also strategically very important for both Russia and the United States, because it is adjacent to the highly tense borders of the southern part of Russia in the Northern Caucasus. Various security, economic, and political factors have made the region one of the central points of competition between the two rivals.

In this article, the authors aim to examine the barriers and obstacles the United States and Russia have encountered in developing their desired economic, security, and political order in the South Caucasian region, as well as how they have tried to contain the rival despite the existing obstacles. To do so, the researchers primarily discuss the political, security, and economic conditions and importance of the three republics in advance and investigate the foreign policy objectives and priorities of both the United States and Russia in the Southern Caucasus, as well as how they have pushed on to achieve their interests in the past two decades.

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Objectives and Priorities of Russia’s Foreign Policy in the Southern Caucasus

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, due to the changes in the regional and international arena, which meant a change in the international system from bipolar to unipolar, had to adopt and apply a new foreign policy strategy. There were different reasons for this, but the most considerable were loss of its hegemony in the international arena and the lack of an overall policy for setting goals and strategies. Weaknesses in the decision-making system and lack of understanding of the situation that Russia was experiencing are among the other main reasons that can be mentioned. Following Russia’s weakness in various economic, political, and military aspects, the country’s policymakers tried to cope with the problems by reconstructing their domestic and foreign policies, goals, and strategies. At the time, their main domestic and foreign concerns were rebuilding the country’s economy, resisting the United States’ unilaterality policy, and restoring their lost strength and hegemony as a great power in the international arena.

At the end of the communist era, Soviet politicians who saw the danger of collapse tried to reform the old policies in order to save the country from falling into the abyss. These reforms included Glasnost and Perestroika, which failed to save the country. After the collapse of the old and rise of the new system, the endeavors of Russia’s new politicians concentrated on adopting moderate policies in the political arena and forming good relations with the West. They also tried to retain the status of their country as an important power in the world. However, the adoption of these policies during Yeltsin’s presidency caused Russia’s place in the world to decline. The end of the Yeltsin era and the rise of Vladimir Putin was the starting point of fundamental changes in the country’s policies, especially in international and foreign policy. Putin sought to rebuild and increase Russia’s power in the international arena. To do so, Russia first looked at the newly independent republics, which are traditionally known as the Near Abroad in the political language of Russians and are regarded as its backyard.

The presence of the United States as the third actor jeopardized Russia’s political, economic, and security interests in the Southern Caucasus and led to Russia’s special focus on the region in an attempt to reduce the influence of its rival. The events of 9/11 and the United States’ direct military presence in the region to extend its security umbrella caused Russia concern. In addition to the above factor, Azerbaijan and Georgia’s interest in joining NATO, which was welcomed by the Western countries, was interpreted in Moscow as a tactic to push Russia away from its backyard. It views all the above-mentioned plans and activities as a systematic effort to decrease its role and traditional hegemony in the region. Russia knows that the Southern Caucasus will have a very important place in its future and, therefore, the region is of primary importance for it in defining a successful foreign policy. Since Russia needs economic progress and energy resources to remain in the competition and rebuild its power, the Southern Caucasus, due to its strategic position and abundant energy resources, can provide Russia’s security and political and economic interests to a large extent. One of Russia’s

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main goals in the region is to win over third countries in the energy sector in order to triumph in the 

Generally speaking, in order to answer the question of why the Southern Caucasus is of partic-
ular importance in Russia’s foreign policy, the following can be stated:

1. It borders on the Northern Caucasus, which poses heavy internal threats to Russia’s secu-
rity. In most areas of the Northern Caucasus, there are secessionist movements and active 
conflicts between the separatists and the Russian government. It stands to reason that threats 
such as gun trafficking, drugs, radical Islamism, Wahhabism, and terrorism have a negative 
impact on Russia’s security. But Russia is more concerned about the expansion of NATO 
to the East, something that brings up memories of the Cold War and threatens loss of control 
over the area.

2. The Southern Caucasus is the border between this country and other important southern 
neighbors, including Iran and Turkey. Both countries have a special place and position in 
Russia’s foreign policy. Since the new republics gained their independence, Turkey has 
been trying to increase its influence in the South Caucasian region with emphasis on the 
historical, cultural, and linguistic similarities with some of the countries in the region. Rus-
ia regards Turkey as a rival with a clear tendency toward West, therefore it keeps a close 
watch on this country in the Southern Caucasus. However, Iran’s position in Russia’s for-
eign policy is different from Turkey’s, because this country can provide Russia with access 
to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and does not have normal political relations with its 
regional rival, the United States. Therefore, Iran has a special place in Russia’s foreign 
policy.

3. The Southern Caucasus is highly unstable due to internal conflicts and upheavals. These 
conflicts have also created potential roots of tension between the Southern Caucasus and its 
neighbors. One of Russia’s main concerns in the region is that it could pave the way for 
external players, especially its rivals, to the region, thus destabilizing Russia’s position and 
hegemony. It will also pose a risk to the region’s energy security. That is why Russia is 
trying to control and manage the events in the region to prevent instability.

4. This region plays an important role in the development of energy resources in the Caspian 
Sea. Following the last decade of events in the Arab countries, the importance of Caspian 
energy resources has doubled, and the West also wishes to receive energy resources from 
the region. In previous years, there was rivalry between the regional and trans-regional 
powers to dominate the Caspian energy resources, which posed a dilemma for this region.\footnote{See: D. Shahnazaryan, “The South Caucasus: Problems of Stability and Regional Security,” \textit{Demokratizatsiya}, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2006, p. 17.} Naturally, the transportation of energy resources is of crucial importance in this competition 
and Russia, by having dominance over the corridors, could have an important role to play 
in this process.

5. Because of the region’s strategic position and energy resources, regional and trans-region-
al countries, especially the United States, are paying special attention to the Southern Cau-
casus.\footnote{See: V. Naumkin, “Russian Policy in the South Caucasus,” \textit{The Quarterly Journal}, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2002, p. 31.} With the arrival of new contenders, especially the United States, Russia is keeping 
a close watch on the developments in the region in its Near Abroad.

The special importance of the Southern Caucasus in Russia’s foreign policy is not a reason for 
other regional and international powers to stop comprehensive competition with Russia in order to
achieve their political, security, and economic goals and benefits, and to set the stage empty for Russia. Due to its particular geopolitical and geostrategic position, the Southern Caucasus is also of unique importance in the United States’ foreign policy. Below, we will examine the reasons for and the subsequent competition and rivalry that has formed between the two powers to achieve their interests in the region.

**The United States’ Foreign Policy Objectives and Priorities in the Southern Caucasus**

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Southern Caucasus became particularly important for the Western countries, especially the United States. The influence of the United States in the Southern Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been growing gradually but consistently and has made it one of the most important players in the region. Due to the abundance of energy resources in the region, U.S. politicians have been trying to expand their influence in the area in order to gain access to and establish control over these resources. The Southern Caucasus is also particularly attractive for the United States as a new market for their products. Therefore, expanding economic ties with the republics of the region has been one of its priorities. Also, in order to pursue its special political-security goals and interests, the United States has been using its extensive presence in the region to put pressure on Russia and Iran. To do so, it introduced several economic and military agreement and projects. One of the fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy in the region is security, stability, and democratization of the government systems in the countries of the region that could provide safer access to the Southern Caucasus’s energy resources. The United States has also been politically and economically supporting alternative energy transportation routes in the Southern Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines, with the aim of weakening Russia and Iran’s position as its main rivals in the region.

Military cooperation with the South Caucasian countries, especially Georgia and Azerbaijan, has been another way to put pressure on these two countries. The 9/11 events increased the importance of the Southern Caucasus—especially Azerbaijan and Georgia—for the United States. After the invasion of Afghanistan, the military troops needed a number of bases close to Afghanistan in order to transport troops and military equipment. Although Russia did not seem to oppose the presence of the United States in the area at that time because of the threat of radical Islam within its own borders, the United States’ plan to continue its presence even after withdrawal from Afghanistan made Russia angry.

Recognizing the importance of the Southern Caucasus in U.S. foreign policy involves the following:

1. Preserving the independence and security of the South Caucasian countries is important for the United States for two reasons: first, any kind of instability in the region paves the way for Russia to intervene and expand its control over the region, which goes against the United States’ plans and policy in the region. The second reason is the security of trans-

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14 See: S. Cornell, op. cit., p. 113.
portation routes for the Caspian Sea’s energy resources. The United States is deeply concerned that any kind of instability in the region will also affect the security of energy resources.

2. Extending energy transportation pipelines, such as the East-West corridor, and ensuring access and control over the resources in Caspian Sea. Many schemes have been proposed for transporting Caspian energy resources, two routes of which, the northern and western, are supported by Russia and the United States, respectively. The northern corridor passes through Russian territory, while the western corridor is connected to the Black Sea through the Southern Caucasus. The two countries are trying to maintain their energy security by controlling the energy corridors of the region. The United States tries to downplay the importance of the Russian energy transportation corridor by supporting the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

3. Decline of Russia’s influence in the newly independent states. According to the U.S. authorities, Russia’s control over the Caucasian region and Central Asia, as well as the management of security concerns and threats that it faces in the region, can improve the political status of the country at the regional and political levels, which contradicts U.S. foreign policy objectives in dealing with Russia.

4. Preventing the expansion of Iranian influence in the region. Because of Iran’s religious and cultural commonalities with the Southern Caucasian countries, it could play an important role in regional affairs; this is unacceptable to the United States and its active allies in the region, such as Israel. In the past two decades, the United States has tried to contain and reduce Iran’s influence and role in the region using political, economic, and propaganda leverages, which has been successful.

5. The United States’ deep and strategic interests in the Southern Caucasus is a warning for Russia that shows the Americans are looking for a long and effective presence in the region and are trying to encourage the regional states to join NATO, as well as the European Union as a means to contain Russia’s influence and interests in its back yard.

**Competition of the United States and Russia in the Southern Caucasus**

The United States and Russia, in line with their adopted foreign policies, are looking to achieve maximum interests in the region. Challenges between the two countries have emerged in the Southern Caucasus and continue in many dimensions. In this competition, the United States is aiming for its key goals, such as ensuring security of production and transportation of energy, fighting terrorism, and establishing a direct presence on the borders of Iran and Russia. In contrast, Russia is seeking

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to recover its lost power of the former Soviet era and dispel security concerns, as well as establish control over the energy resources of the region. The major challenges of these countries are formed in security and the economy, which are somewhat related to each other. The following is a review of these challenges.

After the Soviet collapse, the newly independent countries of the South Caucasian region faced many economic problems. One of these problems was the significant number of people of Russian origin in these countries and their loyalty and sympathy toward Russia, as well as their better economic conditions compared with other ethnic groups, which gave them greater dominance over the economic affairs of the states. The major economic problems of these newly independent states were due to their dependence on the economic and monetary systems of the former Soviet Union. The economic effects inherited from the communist system caused the continued dependence of these countries on Russia. The importance of the energy resources of the Caspian Sea for the West and the importance of the Southern Caucasus for transporting these resources to the European Union have enabled the regional countries to reduce their economic dependence on Russia and tend toward the West. The tendency of the South Caucasian countries toward the West is economically very important for Russia, because Russia is the most important exporter of the products these countries require. Prior to this, Russia cut its fuel exports to these countries and imposed pressure on them in crisis situations, using this factor as a means to maintain control over the regional countries. With the arrival of the West in the region and the possibility of reducing the economic dependence of these countries, Russia lost one of the most important means for preserving its hegemony in the region.

Since the Soviet Union collapsed and the importance of the energy resources available in the region was revealed, the United States has been trying to expand its influence over it. In order to control the economic resources, the United States is forced to compete with Russia and is trying to attract the South Caucasian regional countries by offering different schemes such as providing financial assistance.

After the South Caucasian republics gained their independence, Azerbaijan acquired greater economic importance than Georgia and Armenia due to its significant amount of energy resources in the Caspian Sea, which could be a good replacement for the energy delivered from Russia or the Middle East to the West. This country could also provide alternative access to the energy corridors from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea to Europe that pass through Russian territory. Due to the importance of the issue, U.S. foreign policy officials have been offering Azerbaijan financial assistance and encouraging it to apply for NATO membership, thus undermining the role of the Russian economy in the region. Therefore, the Western countries have been seriously considering the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline projects that pass from Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, as well as the Nabucco gas pipeline that passes from Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Austria, and trans-Caspian and trans-Anatolian pipelines. Because of the pivotal role of the country’s territory and oil and gas resources in all of these projects, implementation of these projects will either undermine Russia’s dominance over Azerbaijan or destroy Russia’s monopoly on energy transmission projects and its sale to European states. In fact, Russia has sought to replace the European

Union as a purchaser of its energy resources and China is one of the main choices in this regard. One of China’s special features is that despite its large population, the country is poor in terms of energy sources and this is considered a major threat to its economic growth and development. So Russia considers China to be one of the best alternatives to the European Union market for exporting its energy resources.

Georgia is another republic of the South Caucasian region that has turned into a center of the economic competition between Russia and the United States. After it gained its independence, this state had close relations with Russia, but after the Rose Revolution, which led to the rise of a new generation of political elites with closer ties to the Western countries, the United States has gained a foothold for itself in Georgia. Georgia is the only country in the South Caucasian region with open access to the sea, which can facilitate the transportation of energy from the region to the West, which has increased its importance.

Economically, Armenia is in a different situation from the two other countries in the region. It was one of the most developed and industrialized regions of the former Soviet Union. However, in terms of energy resources, it is a poor country, although it is rich in natural resources such as gold, copper, iron, zinc, and tin. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia was confronted with serious economic problems similar to the other countries in the Southern Caucasus. Russia tried to retain its control and influence over Armenia by rendering financial support and by means of energy exports, but in recent years Armenia’s economic and political ties with the United States and the European Union have upset the balance with Russia. This convergence led Armenia to receive loans and assistance from Europe and the United States to reduce its dependence on Russia and adopt its own economic policies more independently.

As mentioned above, the competition between the United States and Russia is not only shaped by economic competition, but also by political and security rivalry. Due to the ethnic and separatist conflicts throughout the region, the Southern Caucasus has encountered heavy clashes and conflicts that have led to instability and threaten security in these countries. The United States and Russia have always tried to manage the security crises to strengthen their foothold in the region and, in this regard, both sides have tried to surpass each other with their own introduced plans. Meanwhile, 9/11 was the turning point in the region’s security policy and plans. This incident led to the establishment of U.S. military bases in the Southern Caucasus that created a new level of security concern, and, as a result, the competition between Russia and the United States is assuming a new form. Following this incident and the subsequent changes, the authorities of the two countries have tried to improve their position and pursue their goals and plans in the region more effectively. The United States’ plans are mostly about expanding NATO and the OSCE’s activities to the East, while Russia’s plans are mainly focused on the cooperation of collective security, previously within the framework of the Commonwealth in the form of the CIS and during the last ten years within the CSTO and potentially the SCO. In this regard, the two powers have tried to encourage other countries to join the mentioned organizations.

Georgian-NATO relations officially began in 1994 when Georgia joined the NATO-run Partnership for Peace. It was the first state in the South Caucasian region that asked for NATO membership, a request that made its powerful northern neighbor, Russia, angry. The eastward expansion of NATO was contrary to the top-level assurances that Mikhail Gorbachev was given in 1990 when the West promised it would not enlarge NATO to the East. The Georgian authorities knew that after joining NATO their country, which borders on Southeastern Europe, would enjoy greater strategic

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importance and would have a guarantee of security and stability in the region and against Russia. After the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, Georgia became even more aware of the need to cooperate with other countries and organizations to establish security in the country. Security establishment is also important from the economic perspective for the Georgian authorities. By realizing that cooperation with NATO could expand their country’s chance of becoming a main corridor of energy pipelines to Europe, Georgia’s foreign policymakers requested NATO membership. In addition, Georgia found participation in this organization to be a necessary step to joining the European Union and receiving financial aid. The ongoing conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are major obstacles for this country in its accession to NATO. Considering the fact that one of NATO’s provisions for countries joining the organization is the settlement of internal, ethnic, or external territorial disputes before full membership is granted, Russia is trying to prevent Georgia from joining NATO by fueling its conflicts. The Russia-Georgia war was designed not only to thwart Georgia’s bid for NATO membership, but also to take revenge on NATO itself for violating the “top-level assurances” given Gorbachev in 1990.

However, Georgia is not the only country in the region that has cooperation with NATO. The Republic of Azerbaijan is another South Caucasian country that joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992. Even though the authorities of this country have not taken a formal position to join the organization, Azerbaijan is engaged in broad cooperation with NATO. After the 9/11 events, this cooperation took on a new form and, subsequently, the Republic of Azerbaijan has been the host of military training exercises. But this military cooperation could create some challenges in the region. One of the major challenges is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As a supporter of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the United States is faced with the fact that supporting Azerbaijan could directly affect its relationship with Armenia, and this caused Erevan to move closer to Russia. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the resulting problems can be described as a lever of control in the region, because there will never be any peace in the region until the conflict is resolved. By using this lever, Russia is trying to halt the momentum of U.S. influence in the region. And by offering its own proposals, it is strengthening its own position in the South Caucasian region. The Commonwealth of Independent States, or CIS, was one of Russia’s tools for competing with the United States and preventing NATO from gaining influence in the Southern Caucasus. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan originally formed the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Georgia also joined the alliance in 1993, but withdrew in 2008 as a result of war with Russia.

In recent years, Russia has tried to continue its cooperation with the member states, especially in the form of economic cooperation, but the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, which includes Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, resists Russia’s ambition to expand its hegemony to all of the new republics of Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. The military cooperation established within the GUAM framework was described by Tedo Japaridze, Ambassador of the Republic of Georgia to the United States in 2000, as a strategic alliance of countries with common problems and common threat perceptions. In the military area, GUAM countries primarily sought to build a viable alternative to the regional security organization dominated by Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States. As a common strategy, GUAM members refused to join, or subsequently withdrew, from the CIS security arrangements. “Military cooperation within GUAM serves as a stepping-stone to the ultimate goal of establishing institutional ties with or actually joining NATO.” It is believed that the GUAM formation was “essentially tantamount to an attempt to turn

27 Ibidem.
The member states hoped to form a pole in the region and expand the conception of regionalism to indirectly jeopardize Moscow’s position in the post-Soviet countries. One of the common economic interests of the member countries was joint participation in transportation of the Caspian Basin energy resources, as well as building new transit routes through the Caucasus and the Black Sea. They also aimed to form a security structure within the countries. The United States welcomed the GUAM formation and viewed it as a unique opportunity to achieve its economic, security, and political goals and interests in the region. It also hoped that the organization would promote the stability, political and economic development, and independence of the member states, resulting in a weakening of Russia’s influence.

Perhaps the main reason for adopting the current form of competition in the South Caucasian region is the tendency of both powers, Russia and the United States, to avoid disrupting the security of the region at a level that affects the achievement of their own goals and interests. The United States is mainly concerned about the geopolitical importance of the region, as well as its unique economic importance. The security of energy transportation corridors in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea is very important for this country, although Russia is also concerned about the disruption of security in the region or, more likely, the appearance of transregional contenders.

Conclusion

The political and geopolitical facts of the Caucasian region and the vast and multi-dimensional goals and interests of Russia and the United States have caused the two powers to face many opportunities and threats, none of which has been successful in containing the rival. As the main and most influential regional actor, Russia has attached great importance to the Caucasus due to security, strategic and economic considerations, and political desires. Russia has adopted a pragmatic strategy guided by geopolitical considerations and following its security, economic, and political interests and priorities in the region. The main priorities are to maintain sovereignty, territorial integrity, and border security in the Northern Caucasus, and political stability and economic dominance over the region. Keeping in mind the importance of the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, as well as the security challenges in the region, Russia is attempting to reduce the dominance and intervention of transregional powers, especially the United States. Despite the fact that the political and economic dependence of the regional countries provides a potential opportunity for dominance over the region and achieving its goals and interests, Russia also faces barriers and limitations to developing its desired security-political order in the Southern Caucasus. The political differences and conflicts among the South Caucasian states, as well as between them and Russia, and their different interpretations of the security, economic, and political threats and opportunities are the most important barriers to the formation of Russia’s desired security and political order. Unequal distribution of power and economic resources and the political and military conflicts among the three countries of the South Caucasian region and Russia have caused great distrust as well as vulnerability of these countries toward each other and toward Russia. Thus, by forming close ties with transregional powers, especially the United States, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia have tried to create a balance of power in the region, which is another obstacle to the formation and establishment of Russia’s desired order in the region. Another major factor that challenges Russia’s intended order is the conflict of interests and extended competition with the United States in the Southern Caucasus and Caspian Sea.

As a transregional actor, the United States has been developing its foreign policy priorities in the Caucasian region in the last two decades. These main priorities are political containment of Rus-

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sia, stopping Russia from regaining its power in the newly independent republics, gaining control over the vast energy resources of the region, preventing political and security instability as disruptive factors for energy transformation, and creating political and military blocs to extend its influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Despite the U.S. achievements in establishing its political and economic ties with the countries in the region and imposing its plans regarding energy transportation corridors to Russia, it has simultaneously encountered potential and structural obstacles to reaching its objectives. The major obstacles for the United States’ desired security and political order in the region, such as expansion of NATO to the East or membership in the European Union, include the political and military conflicts in the region, as well as the unequal distribution of power and economic facilities among the three countries. Another obstacle to the United States’ objectives is Russia’s efforts to limit the abilities of the three countries in their rapid political turns toward the West by using the economic and security levers that have been a big part of Soviet legacy. Collective cooperation agreements formed under the leadership of Russia after the Soviet Union collapsed are another containment tool to reduce the military and security influence of the United States in the region. Competition over energy resources and transportation corridors, the security dependence of the regional countries on Russia or the United States, the formation of conflict blocs, the attempts to eliminate or weaken other regional players, such as Iran and Turkey, militarization of the region in the shadow of the conflicts between Russia and Georgia, as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have created competition and increased the complexity of the situation in the Caucasus.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY IN GEORGIA

Abstract

This article examines the provision of food security as a mandatory condition of sustainable agricultural development in Georgia. It analyzes such issues as the increase in income in the agrofood sector and the decrease in poverty in the rural areas.

The author believes that the following prerequisites are mandatory for providing food security in the world: availability of stable financial institutions in the rural areas; scientific support and extension (training and providing consultation for peasants (farmers), as well as establishing a reliable system for informing them); a developed food and social infrastructure; powerful market-oriented agrofood production; alternative non-agricultural jobs in the rural areas; a free domestic market protected from adulterated, contraband, and dumping products; effective public and private institutions; and active international cooperation.

KEYWORDS: food security, sustainable development, Georgia’s agriculture, financial resources, adulterated and contraband products, agro-biodiversity.
More than 90 percent of agricultural products are produced in the private sector, although privatization has led to the emergence of small businesses instead of large ones, a fragmented material and technical base, and industrialization of production.¹

This privatization was carried out mechanically and it practically ruined the necessary infrastructure for agricultural production.²

Introduction

Most of the problems in the agrofood sector are directly related to the efficiency of the land market and land profitability. Launching a land market will help to enlarge the area of agricultural land, spread intensive agro technology, and increase the banks’ interest in the sector.

The way the authorities provide information on external markets of agrofood production and international standards must be streamlined, which will help to improve sales opportunities and the issuing of bank loans for the processing sector in order to meet the demand of processing enterprises working with raw materials supplied by farmers. All of this will significantly accelerate rehabilitation of the processing industry, which could play an intermediate role between the financial institutions and the farmers.

Distribution of Regional Financial Resources

Several steps must be taken to ensure that stable financial institutions are available in the rural areas. In particular, extensive propaganda must be carried out among commercial banks, particularly those working according to micro financing schemes, in order to establish ties that are economically acceptable for peasants (farmers) and businessmen. The state, using the available scientific potential and in cooperation with donors, must help to raise the qualifications of bank employees with respect to agrofood risk assessment. In order to extend lending to businesses in the rural areas, the activity of micro financing institutions should be based on an analysis of market-oriented opportunities. It would be expedient if viable lending relations could be established.

Under the conditions of price disparity for agricultural machinery and agrofood products, renovation of the vehicle and tractor fleet is a slow process. Widespread leasing of production means and protection of the interests of leasing companies must be promoted by improving the corresponding legislation, and a well-organized system of technical service should be launched in all districts and territories of the country. Financing the leasing of agricultural equipment will be more advantageous for banks, due to the relatively lower risk, than issuing loans to purchase it.

In order to improve access to loans for the agroindustrial sector, an effective insurance system must be formed. The people making decisions about lending should make a correct assessment of the

risk level and maintain substantiated economic activity tactics to ensure effective use of the branch’s potential.

Tax policy should also be addressed when examining the financial resources of the agrofood sector. In this area, the current tax legislation must be simplified and an incentive-based environment created for businessmen that will ensure a boost in production and legalize businessmen as registered payers. It may be worth thinking about completely abolishing VAT in this area, which would help to eliminate land parceling and develop cooperation. Taxing small and medium businesses with a single consolidated tax would also be expedient. Due to the government’s resource deficit, an effective tool for forming a market environment in the sector would be to use an incentive system. Tax rates in Georgia should be no higher than those in neighboring countries. And, finally, farmers should be regularly informed, by means of extension, about tax legislation issues.

The share of foreign direct investments in the agricultural sector is very low. In 2007, this index amounted to 0.8% of all FDI in Georgia, and in 2008, it was only 0.5%. In 2009, it rose to 3.4%, but in 2010, it fell to 1.1%. In 2011, the share of FDI in agriculture amounted to 1.3%, in 2012 to 1.8%, and in 2013, it fell again to 1.3%. This low index shows the high risks and low profitability in this sector.

Agriculture as an industry sector is, of course, less attractive for investors, since only communications and energy are highly profitable for them. Agriculture should be rendered state support in a way that makes every peasant (farmer) want to join this sphere. For example, such countries as Belgium, Norway, Austria, Canada, the U.S., and others directly finance agriculture from the budget in many cases, and this financing is quite significant. The European Union granted 60 million Euros in 2008 alone to support agriculture.3

In addition to improving the situation, the potential of Georgia’s agrofood sector must be advertised in order to assist the inflow of investments into it. This will be a clear demonstration that the diversity of its natural resources, multivectoral agrofood sector, cheap workforce, professional personnel, and, most important, nearby voluminous sales markets are conducive to carrying out different kinds of business in the country.

Raising the Level of Farmers’ Knowledge as the Main Factor in Bringing about Change

Training and providing consultation for peasants (farmers), as well as establishing a reliable system for informing them (extension) are of particular significance in the tough conditions of financing the market environment. Efforts must be stepped up to raise professional qualifications and retrain farmers, particularly young ones. In order to raise the effectiveness of agrarian education, intensive ties must be established with the leading educational institutions in the country and abroad, as well as with successful local farmers and businessmen.

Incorporating successful international experience that corresponds to our diverse reality is acquiring growing significance with respect to improving the material-technical base of the system and accumulating experience. Private structures also need assistance in this sphere. The accent should be placed on forming regional chains and supplying and fortifying them with a material-technical base. Recommendations should be drawn up regarding the problems, as well as proposals for publishing corresponding literature and for training and providing consultation for businessmen in the provinces.

Keeping in mind world experience, consultations for consumers provided by corresponding services should be free at the initial stage. In order to raise the efficiency of the system, the maximum use must be made of the intellectual potential of scientific research institutions, higher educational institutions, colleges, and leading practitioners. Demonstrational consultations could be carried out at rehabilitation experimental stations of the Academy of Sciences, training departments of higher educational institutions, colleges, and successful private enterprises and farms.

The country should promote the formation of showcase farms of different profiles, as well as consultation by successful experienced farmers. At the same time, young farmers should been given the opportunity to take internships in the leading agricultural countries of the world and subsequently apply the experience they gain when they return home. The state should also assist in carrying out consultations for interested production goods merchants.

The Agrofood Industry and Alternative Jobs in Rural Areas

A developed production and social infrastructure is an important prerequisite for ensuring food security. The following measures should be carried out in this area: rehabilitation of the irrigation and drainage system; providing peasants (farmers) with agricultural machinery and high-quality pesticides, fertilizers, and vaccines; rehabilitation of nurseries of annual and perennial crops; restoration of animal-breeding activity in animal husbandry; and support of the private sector in the supply sphere.

The country should have a powerful, market-oriented agrofood industry. The development of the processing industry will promote integration, an increase in export resources, the creation of alternative jobs, and the availability of loans for farmers. When examining this component, we should also note the importance of lowering administrative barriers for trade, introducing international standards and certification, organizing exhibitions, fairs, and other support undertakings, and providing information on the market and its analysis.

Efforts should be aimed at developing non-profile agricultural production and social servicing, as well as material production, and releasing workers from agricultural production in order to provide them with alternative jobs. The state should try to create a favorable environment for developing small and medium business by means of legislative changes aimed at helping to create such jobs. The main emphasis should be placed on rapid rehabilitation of the processing industry. Small cooperative enterprises operating in the manufacture of canned fruit and vegetables, tomato and plum sauce, tea, wine, etc. could become successful. Along with creating small businesses in rural areas and increasing the economic efficiency of production, social issues can be addressed by creating additional non-agricultural jobs both directly at enterprises and in their service sphere.

The development of agro tourism will follow close on the heels of economic and political stability in the country. Georgia has all the prerequisites for this, such as its diverse natural conditions, hunting and fishing areas, lakes and rivers, excursion routes, interesting historical monuments, original and tasty cuisine, comfortable houses that can easily be made into family hotels, and so on. Small investments could help farmers (peasants) to receive and accommodate tourists at the level of normal everyday standards, as well as feed and entertain them, which would generate additional income for the population. Expanding folk craft would also be conducive to tourism.

Keeping in mind the natural-economic resources in Georgia, farm structures, their income, the mentality of manufacturers, as well as the selective policy regarding the country’s transition to a market economy, a vital vector in the agrofood sector is forming different types of cooperatives and associations. It is worth noting that in the past two years, the Georgian Law on Agricultural Coop-
eratives has been drawn up and come into force in the country. What is more, the European Neighbor-
hood Program for Agricultural and Rural Development (ENPARD) has been launched in Georgia,
within the framework of which support is rendered to the development of cooperatives and associa-
tions of farmers. In order to successfully develop this vector, an efficient agrarian policy of state
support of agricultural and cooperative development must be drawn up, information based on an
analysis of world experience on agricultural cooperation distributed and intensive explanatory work
carried out, the country’s intellectual resources, including those of the Academy of Agricultural Sci-
ences and higher educational institutions, used for resolving cooperation problems, and barriers re-
moved that hinder the development of joint agricultural scientific activity.

Protection from Adulterated and Contraband Products

The domestic market should be protected from adulterated, contraband, and dumping products. As a member of the WTO, Georgia should observe the domestic market protection rules established by this organization. At the same time, since locally manufactured products do not enjoy the same demand as subsidized products, the need has arisen to protect the local market. This can be done by means of customs duties coordinated with the WTO, simplified procedures regarding the use of sea-
sonal duties, green box measures permitted by the WTO for supporting business in agriculture, a
significant increase in the export potential of products, and, as a result, an improvement in the trade
balance, an increase in product competitiveness as a result of introducing new technology, organizing
the manufacture of environmentally pure products, strict adherence to the WTO obligations assumed
regarding phytosanitary and veterinary security, and establishing a unified smooth-operating service
of safe food and border control of agrofood production.

In 2014, an Association Agreement was signed with the European Union that makes the EU
market promising for Georgia and institutes certain privileges with respect to the agricultural pro-
duce the country manufactures and exports. A legislative framework that corresponds to European
standards is being created with respect to the manufacture of environmentally pure agricultural
produce.

Against this background, as well as in the context of the intensified struggle against bio terror-
ism in the world, the authorities should restructure the veterinary and phytosanitary control services,
as well as control over the quality of agricultural produce, including flour. A unified food security
code that corresponds to European standards should be drawn up that will fully regulate food secu-
rity and quality, as well as monitor the origin of products. In order to rid the market of low-quality
products, a gradual transition to voluntary certification (which ensues from the WTO requirements)
should be continued, the system for issuing certificates to private companies should be improved,
control mechanisms over certified products should be established, and standards should be reexamined
to ensure that they are in harmony with international and regional standards.

The government should step up control over the quality of local and imported products of
plant and animal origin and quarantined pests, which requires gradual introduction of the Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Points system adopted by the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Com-
misson. This is a system of evaluation and control of hazardous factors of raw food, technological
processes, and finished products called upon to ensure the high quality and security of food prod-
ucts. This will result in full-fledged monitoring of product quality from the farm to the consumer
and step up efforts to identify adulterated products and their removal and destruction by the cor-
responding services.
Preserving Agro-Bio Diversity

Georgia boasts diverse flora and flora that possess unique genetic properties, as well as aboriginal species distinguished by unique adaptation capabilities and resistance to disease. The state should encourage the creation of a register of genetic resources of agricultural plants and animals and assess their potential value, as well as ensure the protection of these resources during farming and improvement of the traditional methods of animal husbandry. The state is obligated to carry out effective measures to protect the soil from erosion, as well as improve the fertility of unfertile soil and prepare exploitation projects for raw stocks of those fertilizers that are not manufactured in Georgia. Demonstration plots should be created with the help of the extension service and the corresponding education of farmers promoted.

Sustainable development of the rural areas is closely tied to energy supply. Due to the many years of natural gas and electricity shortages in Georgia, the population has begun using wood, which has led to the improper felling of trees and destruction of shelter belts. Reduction in the area of shelter belts and wooded areas has led to rapid soil erosion and landslides. Degradation of the agro landscape and a drop in agricultural diversity is occurring. Creating new shelter belts is an efficient way to combat these phenomena. Government-targeted programs on soil-protection measures must also be prepared regularly. And, finally, the state should encourage the implementation of independent programs aimed at developing renewable sources of energy (water, wind, geothermal waters, and biogas) and raising the efficiency of their use.

Since the country has long refrained from using fertilizers and pesticides, favorable conditions have emerged for manufacturing biologically pure products. The government, along with corresponding departments, should create incentives for the organizers of bio farms in order to improve the infrastructure of the corresponding territories. This will also assist the development of agro and family tourism. A way to promote environmentally pure products, both in the local and international markets, should be elaborated. Keeping in mind all the above, it can be concluded that food security is a multifaceted issue. It requires equal efforts and mutual support from the state, consumers, manufacturers, farmers, scientists, and researchers.

Conclusion

Ensuring food security is a challenge both for the public and private sectors. Many expected and unexpected problems can arise on the way to reforms, but viable levers are available for managing the possible complications. And it is extremely important that reforms be carried out in order to ensure food security. After all, this is aimed at providing consumers with high-quality food, creating a competitive environment, and assisting the expansion of the food industry and export.

“In order to develop land, the demographic situation must be changed, and millions of people must be drawn to the rural areas. Life in the countryside should be comfortable and appealing, but in order to achieve this, the restoration of agriculture must not only be an economic, but also a priority social project.”4

“A strategy must be determined for making a breakthrough in agricultural development. This requires preparing a long-term, calculated for a 5-7-year period, comprehensive program (strategy) of sustainable and safe development of Georgia’s agricultural industry. The goal is to achieve maximum satisfaction of the growing needs of the population for food.”5

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In order to reach these goals, political will, a comprehensive approach, a clearly developed action plan, and coordinated measures of the state, the private sector, consumers, and international organizations are needed. Jacques Diouf, former Director-General of the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), had the following to say about food security: The FAO plays an enormous role in providing international food security. We think the position of the Committee on World Food Security must be strengthened, which should gather at the level of agricultural ministers and then increase its members by inviting not only the representatives of other international institutions, but also nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and civil society to join it. The Committee should be endowed with powers to keep tabs on the situation in all aspects of international food security and, if necessary, make quick decisions.⁶


GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND FORMATION OF AN INNOVATION ECONOMY IN AZERBAIJAN

Abstract

This article analyzes the formation and development of the innovation economy in Azerbaijan and emphasizes that this type of economy cannot be formed on the basis of fundamental scientific research and applied developments alone. It also takes a look at the levers of government influence on stimulating the innovation process in the country.

KEYWORDS: innovation economy, regulation, tax credit, scientific and technical exchange, national competitiveness.

Introduction

The creation, transfer, and processing of information and knowledge has become a topic of intense analysis in contemporary science and is viewed as a vital component of socioeconomic de-
development. It goes without saying that the dynamics of innovative development at the local and global levels is based on organizing the transfer of technology and knowledge. This process has been called the transfer of technology—in this case, technology implies not only production processes as such, but also the corresponding processes of development of market relations, social development, public administration, in-house management, and so on. It is also important to find a comprehensive unified approach to all the main and secondary phenomena that are related to creating, transferring, and distributing knowledge and its embodiment in subsequent innovations.

In so doing, it is also important to keep in mind the instability of sociopolitical development that is being manifested in many countries of the world. Despite the fact that innovation-driven growth is considered a generally recognized way to form the economy, the laws governing this process are not entirely clear. There are situations when it is impossible to find and apply the corresponding technology for resolving certain intensive problems in a country’s economic system at a specific time or for removing the contradictions that new technology creates. There is also another situation when relative technology as such exists but it cannot be used to ensure the realization of innovative and scientific and technical potential. And finally, there are frequently situations when relative technology has not only been developed, but is also being successfully used in the scientific and technical and economic environment where it was created, but cannot be implemented in a new situation, as least not without significant modifications.

Each of the above instances ensues from flawed innovation infrastructure. This shows that a country’s social or production structure should not be regulated by volition; a corresponding innovation infrastructure should be created that will ensure the synergetic effects of innovations. Otherwise the attempt to use a particular technology for resolving serious problems will not only prevent the existing contradictions from being removed, but will aggravate them, creating increasingly new problems.

Enterprises of the real sector of the economy are brought together by commodity and monetary flows and the obligations that regulate them. Keeping in mind that hundreds of different economic entities participate in the appearance of the end product in the market, we can understand how a widespread network forms that covers the country’s entire economic system. So the innovation process must be analyzed with respect to the entire complex of scientific and technical, socioeconomic, and human aspects and viewed as a phenomenon of economic development. There are numerous levers of government influence on stimulating innovation-driven growth in the country. We will take a look at the most important below.

**Tax Credit for Invigorating the Innovation Process**

Several technological and fundamental developments have currently accumulated in Azerbaijan, and a scientific-production base has formed. However, the existing scientific and technical potential is not oriented toward embodying scientific and technical achievements in the production sphere and in other areas of activity. So in order to achieve success in the competitive struggle, not only should a progressive technological structure be created, but also all the available tools employed for direct and indirect state regulation of innovation activity and investment in it. Legislation about intellectual property is a particularly important element of the legal framework for regulating the innovation process at the state level.

The following forms of state investment are among the direct methods of economic regulation: direct financing, lending, stock exchange transactions, leasing, state programming and planning, state contracts and state entrepreneurship. However, indirect methods that entail creating external condi-
tions for innovation activity are the most important and effective. There are three types of them: stimulation by means of depreciation policy, tax credit, and direct donations from the budget for companies engaged in manufacturing new types of products. We believe that tax credit is the most effective method among them.

However, tax credit also has its negative aspects. First, there are no clear priorities, since the tax credit system applies equally to all branches of the economy, without targeting scientific-intensive areas. Tax credits are issued by reducing the taxable base, as well as by lowering tax rates and tax payments by means of deductions. Tax subsidies on some types of activity can also be used in the taxation system, for example, deducting a certain part of income related to the creation and introduction of new technology from the taxable amount. In order to stimulate innovation activity, the following types of tax credits are used in world practice:

- issuing tax credits for investment and research purposes;
- deferring tax payments in the amount of innovation investment from profits;
- lowering the VAT rate by increasing innovation spending;
- organizing tax holidays for several years for profits from the implementation of innovation projects;
- issuing tax credits on dividends of physical and legal entities obtained on the shares of innovation organizations;
- reducing the profit tax rates on joint and contracted research and development (R&D);
- issuing tax credits only for spending on priority innovation projects;
- issuing tax credits for profits obtained from the sale of licenses, patents, know-how, and other non-material assets from the intellectual property category;
- reducing taxable profits by the cost of equipment and devices transferred to higher educational establishments, research institutes and other innovation organizations;
- deducting charitable donations used to finance innovations from taxable profits;
- depositing part of the profits of an innovation organization in special accounts with subsequent tax credits if the funds are used for innovation purposes.

Researchers have analyzed the influence of tax credits on the development of the innovation economy in many countries of the world. An example is the research of Nick Bloom, Rachel Griffith, and John Van Reenen, who empirically proved the dependence of the amount of investments in research and development of the private sector on tax credits. This research made use of data over a 19-year period (1979-1997) for nine countries belonging to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The authors came to the conclusion that introducing a 10% tax credit leads to an increase in investments in R&D of 1% in the short term and of 10% in the long term.

It should be noted that the Tax Code of the Azerbaijan Republic envisages rather significant tax credits in the national economy—their percentage amounts to 30% of the volume of all payments into the budget, or approximately 4.2% of the country’s GDP. Targeted use of innovation potential, as well as invigorating socioeconomic processes by means of tax credits has a significant effect on the development of medium and small business in Azerbaijan. The development of medium and

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small business makes it possible to efficiently perform fiscal policy and increase personal income, on the one hand, while it eases the implementation of state social policy, creating new jobs, on the other.3

However, the level of tax credit in the country in terms of its qualitative and quantitative indices has still not reached the level of many other states. For example, whereas in the EU countries, there are five main types of tax credit for innovation enterprises (reducing the taxable base by writing off expenditure for R&D or by accelerated depreciation of capital expenditure; tax credits; special tax rates; lowering taxes on the salary of those employed in R&D; and reducing tax spending on joint research),4 in our country there are only two, and they cover far from all innovation structures, applying largely to only industrial enterprises and technology parks, as well as private educational institutions. The first are exempt from paying VAT into the budget for seven years from the time the enterprise is registered and are exempt for the same time from land tax. The second are exempt from paying VAT entirely.5 Keeping in mind that technology parks in Azerbaijan are not opened that often, while educational institutions, public and private, are not the main participants in R&D (the volume of scientific developments and research by state scientific institutions is 4.5-fold higher than the same index in the country’s educational institutions),6 there is no point in talking in present conditions about tax credit for innovation enterprises.

The following aspects can be added to the problem of providing tax incentives for stimulating activity in the innovation sphere in Azerbaijan:

1. Improvement of the tax mechanism should keep in mind the low sensitivity of the country’s enterprises to small tax credits (for example, to a tax reduction of 10-15%, as N. Bloom, R. Griffith, and J. Van Reenen suggested).7 Here more powerful economic incentives must be used, for example, the use of tax holidays at the first stage of implementing innovation projects.

2. The customs and tax policy that is pursued in the country does not stimulate the export of domestic scientific-intensive production, which stops foreign investors from investing in technological renewal of joint and national enterprises with export potential.

3. The powers of government bodies in the provinces are insufficient for carrying out their own independent tax policy to provide enterprises with incentives to renew production technology and the inventory of services rendered and products manufactured.

4. New approaches must be adopted in order to form a new tax policy and introduce new tax mechanisms. Low tax rates are fairly good incentives for invigorating investment activity of enterprises in the private sector, but they have less effect on the public sector. So this mechanism is unable to stimulate state enterprises to invest their own profits. A solution might be to use a comprehensive approach to tax policy regarding enterprises operating in the innovation sphere, including the enterprise’s full exemption from all types of taxes during the establishment of its activity. The government should invigorate scientific and technical progress along the whole chain—from carrying out fundamental research to introducing developments into production, keeping in mind state priorities and limited resources. Incentives should activate the use of innovations and ensure restructuring and increased competitiveness of the real sector of the economy.


4 [http://riep.ru/upload/iblock/527/527bf2bed4b455725d41e437fde035f0.pdf].

5 See: A. Musaev, op. cit., p. 79.

6 [http://riep.ru/upload/iblock/527/527bf2bed4b455725d41e437fde035f0.pdf].

7 See: N. Bloom, R. Griffith, J. Van Reenen, op. cit.
Increase in Scientific and Technical Exchange in Priority Branches of the National Economy as a Factor of National Competitiveness

International scientific and technical exchange is one of the most important processes in the development of the global economy. The present economic model is characterized by global integration processes that imply reaching the same level of technological development in all countries of the world. Due to the differences in intensity with which centers of gravity are formed in science, the development of the world economy has never been equal throughout history. Integration processes are also slowed by differences in the level of development of the existing centers of gravity.

More active international scientific and technical exchange could help to resolve these problems. Backward countries must be supported economically, and global exchange of technical and scientific knowledge carried out, which will have a drastic influence on scientific and technical progress throughout the world. The world scientific and technical centers that exist in the world at this time differ from each other both in level of development and in quantity and quality of the results obtained. If this kind of exchange is streamlined, different approaches could be united in order to resolve a particular problem. In addition, exchange will act as a driving force behind scientific and technical progress and scientific thought. Encouraging this kind of exchange at the level of state policy will significantly help the development of the national economy—China, South Korea, and Japan are pertinent cases in point.

Depending on the ways used to transfer technology and information, scientific and technical exchange can be divided into commercial and noncommercial. The following are considered noncommercial ways that do not involve financial agents:

- Publishing activity—issuing guides, specialized literature, publications with open access of scientific articles, creating open databases, and so on.
- Exhibition activity—preparing and holding symposiums, scientific conferences, seminars, scientific achievement exhibitions.
- Educational processes—exchanges of postgraduate students, students, experienced personnel.

The migration of specialists is the most ambiguous aspect of international scientific and technical exchange. Personnel migration could be a compulsory process in those cases when specialists do not find use for their knowledge and skills in their home country. However, more often a brain drain occurs—world scientific centers lure highly qualified specialists from other countries, thus increasing their scientific and technical potential and, correspondingly, lowering the potential of the other countries. We believe that the state should keep tabs on migration processes because a brain drain could be extremely detrimental to our country’s long-term scientific prospects.

Noncommercial exchange implies the transfer of knowledge and, despite the absence of monetary obligations, is a key factor in the progress of world scientific thought. Large companies that

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follow foreign scientific studies and publications to find new developments and approaches to be used in production, as well as help researchers to publish their works, also participate in noncommercial exchange.

Commercial scientific and technical exchange presumes payment for knowledge that one party to the contract transfers to the other. Forms of commercial scientific exchange include:

- selling patents and licenses for the use of already introduced developments;
- selling technology;
- organizing foreign investments in scientific and industrial projects;
- engineering;
- creating joint ventures with foreign investors working on specific developments;
- leasing undertakings;
- international consulting.

Commercial scientific and technical exchange, in contrast to noncommercial, is based not on the transfer of theoretical knowledge that will serve to develop and create new technology, but on selling already created technology that has been introduced at enterprises. Commercial scientific and technical exchange is the practical use of new technology, which is understood as achieving new advantages in the competitive struggle. We believe that a theoretical and practical approach with a common goal will make it possible to identify the most efficient and promising developments existing in the world and introduce them at Azerbaijan’s enterprises. In this case, all organization processes regarding commercial scientific and technical exchange should be the responsibility of the state, thus making it possible to raise the competitiveness of the national economy.

**Conclusion**

The globalizing economy is increasingly distinguished by innovation characteristics, and the main thing in this respect is the development and use of new information-communication technology. This increases market competition, raises production efficiency, and helps to improve goods and services. State regulation plays a primary role in this process, as well as support of the innovation initiatives of business entities. This regulation occurs in many areas and requires institutional reforms in education and a special tax policy in the venture business. Significant changes have occurred in all spheres of economic life regarding the development of new technology. Information and knowledge have become an independent resource with a specific value. In the leading countries of the world in 2014, the share of spending on R&D of the innovation sector amounted to at least 1.8% of GDP of the corresponding country (America, Europe). What is more, the innovation sector and information are a powerful factor of socioeconomic development, growth, and dynamics today. The trajectories and mechanism of economic progress are also changing, because recently the emphasis is being placed on development of the information service sphere.

In this respect, the creation of an innovation economy in Azerbaijan is a vitally important task. It is precisely an increase in the amount of innovation technology used in the domestic economy that will make it possible to create a powerful mechanism for raising the competitiveness of the country’s economy. So state institutions, such as state innovation projects, business incubators, venture funds, technology centers, technology parks, joint scientific research centers, technology transfer centers, insuring innovation risks by means of a small scientific and technical business

development assistance fund, and so on, must be established for supporting the development of innovation technology in order to overcome the barrier between radical inventions and technological innovations. If all of this is put into practice, in the near future the most important provisions of the National Conception “Azerbaijan 2020: View to the Future” will be implemented, which envisage the development of information-communication technology and the information-innovation sector in the country in the next decade, as well as promote a scientific and technological leap for creating an innovation economy.
ETHNOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF THE LOUD MALE DHIKR IN INGUSH SOCIETY

Abstract

This article examines the ethnographic aspects of religious practice among the Ingush in the context of the ritual specifics of the Qadiriyya Tariqah. The author concentrates on the devotional act of loud dhikr (jahriya) in the Kunta-haji Kishiev brotherhood.

KEYWORDS: Islam, Sufism, Tariqah, vird (brotherhood), loud dhikr, Ingush, the Caucasus, Kunta-haji, ritual, rites.

Introduction

Today the Ingush are Sunni Muslim; in the sphere of dogmata, they belong to the school of Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari and in the sphere of law, to the school of Imam Ash-Shafi’i. They belong to two Sufi orders (Tariqahs)—Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya, divided, in turn, into brother-
hoods (virds). The adepts vow to follow the path indicated by the sheikh. The brotherhoods differ in the way they perform dhikr (a devotional act) and certain other rituals elaborated by the ustazes (founders of religious trends). However, at the end of the 18th century they were not stern followers of Islam.

The Caucasian peoples first learned about Islam from the Arabs, who invaded Daghestan in the 8th century. It took this religion nearly ten centuries, until the 19th century, to take root in the Caucasus. There are several mutually exclusive opinions about the time the Ingush and Chechens, the closest neighbors of Daghestan, embraced Islam. Some authors insist on the 7th century, when the Arabs brought Islam to the Caucasus, while others believe that Islamization began in the latter half of the 16th century.

There were several reasons why it took so long for Ingushetia to embrace Islam. The local people opposed the attempts to replace their pagan beliefs with a new religion, while the Christian missionaries working among the local people added their own efforts to the general opposition.

The Ingush became Muslims in the mid-19th century under the influence of Chechen Sheikh Kunta-haji Kishiev; his consistent missionary efforts consolidated the position of the new teaching in the Caucasus in the early 1860s in Chechnia, Ingushetia, and partly in Daghestan and Ossetia. The teaching of holy Sheikh Kunta-haji Kishiev, the Great Sufi of the Qadiriyya Tariqah, rests on a solid foundation of the key religious values: “If you want to love the Most High Allah, you must love fairness. Wish for your brother what you wish for yourself.”

According to legends, he was a quiet and smart boy; he learned Arabic grammar, could read the Koran, and was very religious. At the age of 18-19, he accompanied his father on a hajj to Mecca; when he returned home, he became a religious missionary and preacher. His sermons about peace, brotherhood, and support of the poor and orphans were consonant with the general feelings and spiritual mood of the people. He taught non-resistance to evil; he called on the people to stop fighting czarism, which was much stronger than the mountain dwellers anyway, and preached humility. Fully aware that continued persistent fighting might totally destroy his people, he called on them to discontinue the bloodshed and switch to peaceful occupations. The ideology of Dhikrism was opposed to the ideology of gazawat, which preached struggle until the final victory. Kunta-haji Kishiev used to say: “Allah bequeathed beads to me and I shall not handle either daggers or rifles.” Enraged with Kunta-haji’s anti-gazawat ideas, Shamil never stopped persecuting him and ended with banning his missionary activities.

After Shamil left the political scene, Kunta-haji’s popularity significantly rose. The followers of his teaching could be found in Daghestan, Chechnia, Ingushetia, Ossetia, and Kabarda. At the beginning of the 1860s, the number of his adherents topped 5 thousand, which made him a rival of the conformist-minded clergy. However, Kunta-haji was far from using dhikrism for military-political purposes and opposed any confrontation with the authorities. Nevertheless, the czarist authorities, concerned about such mass adoption of the Qadiriyya Tariqah, arrested Kunta-haji on 3 January, 1864 in the village of Serzhen-iurt. Almost nothing is known about his further fate in exile. The followers of Kunta-haji think that he has only gone into hiding and will

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4 Dhikrism is the term used in academic and special literature to describe the rite of loud dhikr.
The Qadiriyya Brotherhood in the Caucasus

Among those who accepted the blessing of Kunta-haji were Batal-haji Belkharoev from Surkhakhi, Hussein-haji from Plievo, Tarkkho-haji from Sagopsha, Ilez-Kjada Oziev from Gamuruziev, Teshal-haji Uzhakhov from Barsuki, Gayrbek-haji Evloev from Nasyr-Kort, and Busulb Arapkh from Geyrbik-Hurt, etc. After Kunta-haji was arrested, his followers—Bamat-Girey-haji and Ali Mitaev, Batal-haji Belkharoev, Hussein-haji Gardanov, Chim-Mirza Taumerzaev, Mani-sheikh Nazirov and Vis-haji Zagiev—created new brotherhoods (virds). These brotherhoods existed as closed groups, preaching their teachings in secret and performing religious rituals that differed in some ways in the devotional act of dhikr.

Each Qadiriyya brotherhood in the Caucasus has its own way of performing dhikr that distinguishes one from the other.

When performing dhikr, the Bamat-gireevites swing their heads back and forward, while hopping from one foot to another in place and repeating “La-illaha ill-Allah”.

The Batal-hajjites perform loud dhikr while standing in a circle, shifting from one foot to the other, rhythmically swaying in place and clapping their hands, and repeating, “La-illaha ill-Allah” or other religious anthems (nazym). The dhikr is shorter than among the Kunta-hajjites.

The Gardanovites perform a loud dhikr, like the Bamat-gireevites, swaying their heads back and forward and hopping from one foot to the other in place. The devotional act of dhikr differs only in that in the Hussein-haji Gardanov brotherhood, the murids might fall into a religious trance, whereas in the other brotherhoods, this is not allowed.

Mani-sheikh introduced periodic swaying of the head into the dhikr for the purpose of rapid entry into ecstasy. The devotional act of dhikr in its brotherhood is similar to that of the Bamat-gireevites.

The Chim-Mirzaites accompany their dhikr with beating on a large drum, arranging themselves in several circles. In the first circle are those who perform the dhikr with a zhirgla, while the second circle moves in the opposite direction. Approximately every ten minutes, everyone stops and, after a short break, begins moving in the opposite direction. Another distinguishing feature of this brotherhood is the white astrakhan hat that is a mandatory attribute of the ritual. Due to this they are called “white hats” among the people.

8 See: M.S.-G. Albogachieva, op. cit., p. 91.
The Vis-hajiites perform the dhikr in a similar way to the Kunta-hajiites and Chim-Mirzaites, but with the use of musical instruments. These are a percussion instrument called the zhirgIa and an old-time Chechen violin called adkhoku-pondur. The Vis-hajiites, like the Chim-Mirzaites, wear white astrakhan hats, due to which they are also called “white hats,” although really only the Chim-Mirzaites should have this name.10

Here we will note that in some of the brotherhoods, women were allowed to perform dhikr at wakes, but not at funerals. This is due to the prescription of Islam where the place and role of women is strictly stipulated in the funeral ritual. Only men go to the cemetery, women do not take part in the interment ceremony regardless of whether it is a man or woman being buried. These devotional acts can only be carried out by men, without women, in strict compliance with the practice established by the sheikh, but if the family wishes, women may be invited to the wake.

As can be seen from the above, types and variations of the loud dhikr devotional act were manifold even within one region and depended, it seems, on the personal mystical experience of the sheikh, his preferences, and the surrounding ethnocultural environment. Variations were based on different formulas, methods, and manner of their pronunciation.11 For adepts, precise and regular carrying out of the task given by the sheikh of the vird was important. Since this task is carried out collectively, the community of murids, united in common practice, bears the name of the vird with the addition of the teacher’s name. For example, there is the vird of Kunta-haji, the vird of Batal-haji, the vird of Hussein-haji, and so on.12 Today, the Qadiriyya Tariqah is the largest and most influential in Ingushetia in terms of number of followers.13

Joining a Brotherhood

At present, the right to accept a person into a brotherhood belongs to the imams of mosques and other clergy. As our field materials show, anyone wishing to adopt the vird of Kunta-haji can also do this independently by pronouncing the following formula: “I ask for the patronage of Kunta-haji and intend to read the vird of Kunta-haji,” and then say the shakhada.14 Researchers of the Sufi practices in the Caucasus also encountered other ways of joining a brotherhood. For instance, G. Khizrieva writes that symbolic communication with the sheikh is carried out by visiting his memorial sites (ziyarats): “For that it is enough to lay the right hand on his grave and say the tauhid, ‘La-illaha ill-Allah’ and ask the ustaz to accept the person who has come as a student, using the special formula said in the native or Arabic language.”15

Local Sufi Practices

Sufi ideas were widely spread throughout the entire Muslim world and a large role in this, as well as in the survival of Sufism for many centuries, was played by the fact that it easily imbibed the

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12 See: M. Vachagaev, op. cit.
14 Field material of the author 2014 (hereafter FMA).
local traditional folk cults and beliefs and transformed them into the Muslim style. This is precisely why many Islam experts tend to think that Sufism is not only a religious philosophy, but also a folk form of Islam that has its own special features in different regions.16

The male devotional act of loud dhikr we are examining underwent different changes in the Northern Caucasus, as well as throughout the Muslim world as a whole. A. Murtazaliev thinks that in local Sufi practice, dhikr combined three structural elements—salamiyya (pacifism), dynamic dhikr (ritual mysteries), and jigitovka (nizam). Whereas Egyptian and Turkish qadirites circle in place, and Indians sing and dance to the accompaniment of musical instruments, the Caucasian qadirites, while chanting the main formula of Islam “La-illaha ill-Allah,” clap their hands while sitting, standing, or running in a circle. However, all of these are outer differences. Of course, there are also small differences in the content of the teachings. But these outer differences in the forms of the mysteries and several nuances of content in no way affect the essence of the teaching itself.17 The strict discipline, order, and belief in Allah remain unchanged.

According to the generally accepted Sufi tradition, the student (murid in Arabic) follows the teacher (murshid, ustaz, sheikh in Arabic), observing the particular tradition of conveying Islamic knowledge in the Tariqah. He has a whole range of effective Sufi techniques at his disposal that help the Sufi to remain on the path and continue his ascent to God. The most well-known technique was and remains dhikr, remembrance of God, on which a different number of repetitions of a specific set of sacred formulas is based necessary for achieving a state in which the student feels he is coming close to the goal of cognition.18 Sufis reach this level when they enter a changed state of consciousness with the help of repeating the vird formulas that are common for both Tariqahs—Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya. The differences apply to the preparation for entering dhikr, learning the techniques of entering into this state, and retaining the ability to become immersed in it as soon as necessary. Each murid goes through this level individually and only after this begins practicing the collective male dhikr with its complicated movements and breathing techniques.

Participants in the Loud Dhikr

The murids comprise a very diverse group—from boys 10-12 years old to old men 70-80 years old. However, most of the participants in the dhikr are men aged between 20 and 60.

The professional composition of dhikr participants is also very diverse. The author had occasion to meet with blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, civil servants, scientists, and unemployed participants of the devotional act. The murids also differ in wealth—there are people with low and average incomes, and there are also very wealthy people. As we see, the boundaries of this unique local subculture are relatively vague—it includes intellectuals and unskilled workers, the young and old, the rich and poor. These people are brought together by their high level of spirituality, democracy, strict discipline, internal hierarchy, and aesthetic nature. These are people who, in their religious zeal, are ready to give up everything for the sake of their belief and who strive by means of a reverential life to come close to Allah, dissolve in him, and recognize him as the highest divine truth.19

18 See: G. Khizrieva, op. cit.
19 See: L.S. Vasiliev, Istoriia religii Vostoka, Moscow, 2000, p. 34.
As we know, not only a change in perception of the outside world and mythologization of the surrounding space occur in ritual setting, but also a dramatic change in the connection and relations between people. The roles of the participants in ritual differ fundamentally from those they perform in everyday life.  

As the data of interviews show, becoming acquainted with a brotherhood of murids takes place in different ways. One person saw loud dhikr being practiced in the family as a child and became acquainted with this ritual: “I was born into the family of followers of the teaching of Kunta-haji Kishiev and saw from an early age how my father invited murids to our home in order to perform dhikr, and when I turned 10, I asked my father to allow me to participate in the devotional act of dhikr. More than 50 years have passed since then, and I remain true to the chosen path.”  

There are others who became murids deliberately. For example, one respondent said that he came to the murids after the tragic death of his friend: “Seeing the performance of dhikr by the murids, I did not wonder about the motivation for their devotional act and was a bit skeptical about it. But that cold winter’s day when my friend died, who did not have any close relatives or close acquaintances to carry out the funeral and memorial procession with all the corresponding rituals, I felt horror and fear. What should I do? Who would help me? At that time a turkhk from our village appeared and said that he had informed all the murids and asked them to find people to dig a grave. At that time, local murids began coming into the deceased’s yard and performed all the rituals and buried my friend. When I asked how much I should pay those who had dug the grave and the murids themselves, they said: ‘All that we do we do for the sake of Allah and not for material gain.’ That night I first joined a dhikr circle and have never since missed one dhikr without a good reason.”  

Each person has his own reason for choosing this path.

Murids are known for engaging in collective dhikr, which is performed by groups of 3-4 to 1,000-1,500 people, but usually the number of participants varies from 10 to 40-50 people. If a very prestigious person or high-ranking spiritual figure dies, the number of murids might increase to 1,000 and more people. For example, there were more than 1,000 men from all over the Northern Caucasus at the funeral of Mussa Esmurziev, a theologian and religious figure well known in Ingushetia. There were 12-15 rows in the dhikr circle, each of which was composed of around 100 murids.

Each population settlement has its stable and permanently functioning groups of murids. Whole families are on friendly terms with each other, spend their free time together, and go visiting each other. As men who participate in dhikr say, nothing brings people together like group dhikr, where each participant must feel the state of the other so as not to violate this complicated ritual.

### Time, Place and Attributes of Murids

Men perform dhikr twice a week—in the small hours of Monday and in the small hours of Thursday. It is thought that these days are particularly honorable since the Prophet Mohammad was
born in the small hours of Monday, and Kunta-haji was born in the small hours of Thursday. Also dhikr is scheduled for religious holidays and on funeral and memorial days.

On these days, men perform dhikr after the evening namaz (markazh lamaz). Dhikr cannot be performed during any ordinary namaz, since namaz is one of the most important pillars of Islam. It should also be emphasized that night namaz does not have any precise time of completion, only that it be performed before morning prayer. So murids do not interrupt dhikr if they are deeply immersed in the devotional act and wish to prolong it. Sometimes dhikr lasts for several hours without stopping.

To make it easier to perform dhikr, murids put on special clothing, the so-called murid suit (murdy batskash). It is a modern modification of the Caucasian shift combined with classically cut trousers. The shift is worn loosely and is long enough so that the person feels comfortable in the mosque (that is, so that his back is not bared during prayer). The shift with standing collar or folded back can be open or have a deep slit on the chest closed with a button. The long sleeves, as a rule, have wide cuffs. In cold weather, a vest is usually worn on top of this suit. In the winter, it is usual to wear a warm jacket or coat.

Men should have their heads covered during the ritual. Most often caps (bettig) are used for this purpose.

Body cleanliness and perfume occupy an important place in the devotional act. In order to enter a state of ritual cleanliness, ritual washing must be performed. After this, murids read the corresponding prayers and enter a state of ritual cleanliness.

The murids rub themselves with aromatic oils that do not contain alcohol and are made from flowering plants or other plants with a pleasant smell (misk) to eliminate the smell of sweat that inevitably appears at the end of the devotional act.

Prayer beads play an important role in the performance of vird assignments. Beads in Islam, as in other world religions, represent a characteristic ritual detail that has existed for many centuries.

Prayer beads are used to help keep count of the number of prayers read and to concentrate the attention on performance of the assignment. It should be noted that some murids crack finger joints instead of prayer beads. The Prophet Mohammad spoke of the importance of cracking finger joints—count on your fingers, since fingers will be asked and Allah will give them the opportunity to speak. Those murids who use finger joints for counting are guided by this hadiths. At present, electronic prayer counters—tasbih—have become very popular, which can be bought in stores that sell Islamic wares. This kind of counter is placed on the thumb in order to record the number of prayers read. Nevertheless, most murids prefer to use the classic Muslim prayer beads.

A great role is also played by the room where dhikr is performed. It is known that Muslim cult buildings, called hanaka, have long been places for performing dhikr. However, there are no such cult buildings in the Northern Caucasus, they have been replaced with cathedral and district mosques, private homes, or any large open areas. But most followers of the Qadiriyya Tariqah have a special room in their homes or a separate place in the yard for performing dhikr. When building a house, reinforced floors are laid in one room. This requires planks of hard wood being placed on concrete stands or some other hard base. Rubber cut from the side of truck tiers that acts as a shock absorber is added to the bottom of these planks. This is done to prevent injury to the murids’ feet while performing dhikr.

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26 See: Collection of hadiths of the Prophet Mohammad, s.l., 2011, p. 67.
Ritual Practice

Dhikr is a devotional act in Islam, in which prayers glorifying God are repeatedly recited. Dhikr in Islam is basically the same as meditation practice in Sufism. Sufis call dhikr “the pillar on which the entire mystic Path rests.” The main difference among dhikrs is that Naqshbandiyya performs hafi dhikr only with the heart, while Qadiriyya performs jahriya dhikr with the heart, body, and tongue. The Qadiriyya dhikr can be viewed as a syncretic art, where the poetic word, story, gesticulation, mimic, body movement, as well as other ways of influence on those around interact harmoniously.

The advocates of loud and quiet rejoicing refer to the Quran, where it says: “Neither speak your Prayer aloud, nor speak it in a low tone, but seek a middle course” (surah 17, ayat 110). On this basis, the representatives of both Tariqahs are convinced that neither form of dhikr contradicts the Holy Scripture.

The main purpose of dhikr is to achieve a special transpersonal state and feel the close presence of God (including within yourself) by repeating aloud or in the mind a certain set of words or sound symbols. Essentially the phenomenon of dhikr is based on the interaction of neurophysiologic correlations of the consciousness, subconscious, and speech.28

During the remembrance of God, the main accent is placed on the degree of involvement and participation of the heart in reciting the formulas of dhikr based on the principle of purity of thought and sincerity during recitation. The degree of involvement of the heart, or, to put it another way, state of full concentration of attention together with outpouring of love for the target of concentration is made special mention of in mystical tradition, whereby the large number of repetitions is kept in mind, during which the heart must remain in the given state in order to achieve any results. It is a rather difficult task, so dhikr is usually divided into four stages as this state is accomplished.

“The first stage is the zero level of involvement of the heart in this process, that is, recitation is carried out for the sake of recitation. At the second stage, temporary involvement of the heart in the recitation process occurs with the help of willful efforts. At the third stage, the heart is already essentially fully embraced by dhikr, when it is essentially impossible to distract the heart from the process. At the fourth stage, the heart is fully engaged not in the outer form of dhikr, but in its inner essence—the target of remembrance itself, that is, the Almighty. At this final stage, spiritual connection with the divine world is established, which pulls the mystic into oneself, absorbing it.”29

During all these stages, murids are constantly moving around in a circle. It is thought that the dhikr of Kunta-hajites symbolizes the Universe. By making numerous circles around an invisible center, the members of the brotherhood are showing how they are small particles comprising a single whole of the Islamic universe, the ummah. No one under any circumstances should step over the invisible edge of the circle.30

Preparation for Dhikr

The participants in dhikr must prepare for performing this devotional act in compliance with the developed rules.

The first and most important thing for beginning dhikr is intention (niyat). All the participants must be in a state of ritual cleanliness, which begins after completing namaz.

In the brotherhood of Kunta-haji Kishiev, an important role both in the preparation and performance of dhikr is played by the tamada—the elder of the murids and his assistant-performer turkkh. In each population settlement there is only one tamada, but if the population settlement is large, there can be several turkkhs. Depending on the number of residents, a population settlement is divided into several micro areas, where one turkkh is elected for each district. In small villages, the number of murids might amount to several dozen, but in large and medium villages there are 100 or more for each district. The rights and duties of the tamada and turkkh are strictly regulated. The tamada’s duties include the marriage rite according to Muslim ritual, carrying out mawlid, devotional acts related to organizing dhikr every Thursday and Sunday, as well as informing the murids about the funeral of a resident and the entire funeral ritual.

The turkkh decides a whole range of questions relating to the ritual of dhikr. The turkkh stands at the entrance and only with his permission do the murids enter and leave the circle of dhikr participants. He supervises the dhikr, ensures order, and regulates the devotional acts from the very beginning until the end, following the order and sequence of dhikr performance and paying keen attention to the quality of performance of the religious singing.

The important role of religious singing (nazym) must be noted. This genre of cult music has been widely known among the Ingush from the second half of the 19th century in its variations, such as recitation of the Quran, Sufi dhikrs, although Muslims themselves do not consider them as separate types of musical art. However, forming physical-acoustical reality and the fact of melodization of the indicated types of confessional professionalism make it possible to classify them as musical genres.31

The performers of religious singing were essentially poets and singers, the professional performers of oral tradition. They were the first creators of musical-poetic art of the Ingush people. The following names of famous performers are known among contemporaries: Iunus Chadievich Albakov, Magomed Shovkhalovich Kharsiev, Magomed Denievich Evloev, Iakub Bashirovich Bogolov, and others. In the first third of the 20th century, the best known were residents of the village of Gadaborsh-Iurt (now the village of Kurtat of the Prigorodniy District of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania) from the Gadaborshev family—Aslangiri Khunievich, Savarbek Elmurzievich, Jabrail Abdulaeевич, and Iakhia Ortskhoevich, which numerous field materials give eloquent witness to.32

The performers are distinguished by their good memories, ear for music, and beautiful versatile voice capable of endowing religious singing with a unique flair that penetrates to the very heart of the listeners and performers of dhikr. How deeply a particular sermon touches the heart of the listeners depends on the voice of the performer. The singing is directed at raising the spirit above the material values of the world. Poetic works (bayt) also play an important role, with which dhikr begins and ends.

The male devotional act requires strict adherence to order and discipline. Each murid knows that he will be punished for any violation of the rules. Willful failure to attend dhikr without letting the turkkh or tamada know in advance is strictly punished. Punishment might take the form of helping orphans, childless or simply needy families. A violator might also be forced to clean up the mosque or cemetery. Along with physical work, there should also be spiritual cleansing, for which the violator must read 3,000-5,000 dhikr formulas or other prayers imposed on him for violating discipline.33

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33 FMA 2014.
The ritual of male dhikr is a very important and socially significant way to maintain general regulations and values of the Ingush people, since the complex system of ritual is related to symbol, imitation, and perception, that is, it is based on the dominants of the human psyche.

The Ritual of Dhikr

Preparation of this complicated devotional act begins precisely with the psychological readiness of the participants for the upcoming act. In order to achieve this, the mosque imam sits down by the mihrab before the beginning of dhikr and tells some edifying story from the life of the Prophet, his companions, or famous Sufi sheikhs. In a good voice, he tells of the commandments of sheikh Kunta-haji Kishiev and the special features of the vird assignments imposed by the sheikh on his adepts. Usually such stories prepare the ritual participants for the upcoming dhikr by creating a certain psychological mood. Then one of the participants of the dhikr begins reading, in a chanting voice, religious songs with glorifications of Allah, the Prophet, Kunta-haji, and so on. The men sitting in a circle begin swaying in time with the musical voice of the chanter and, as the rhythm quickens, they also quicken their body movements, rhythmically swaying in time from side to side. Gradually the tone of the chanter’s voice intensifies, while the ritual leader in a loud voice slowly pronounces the words, “La-illaha ill-Allah,” everyone repeats after him, and swaying in place in time with the singing, clap their hands.

At this time, the young participants of dhikr stand up and begin slowly moving in a circle, accompanied by rhythmic clapping. The movement in a circle gradually quickens, while the words “ulloh-ulloh” (Allah is one) are constantly and rhythmically repeated. Then all those who wish to take part in the collective loud dhikr join it. The murids stand close to each other, forming a circle. It is thought that the space inside the circle becomes a holy place, where Divine grace comes down. All the others present maintain the rhythm with loud applauding of the participants of dhikr. Observed objectively, it can be clearly seen that the running in a circle is not simply running, but a significant element of dhikr—the murids put their weight on the right leg and move around in a circle. The turkkh supervises the action of the murids. He stands outside the circle and makes sure that the sequence of actions and movements are correctly and precisely followed, so that tired and beginning murids do not violate the rhythm of the dhikr. In the circle is a dhikar khalkhe (literally first in the dhikr)—the participant who guides the dhikr. He periodically gives the command to change the speed and direction of movement. This is an experienced murid who knows how to correctly conduct the dhikr. He is chosen by the turkkh, who also keeps an eye on his actions. If the leader is tired, he leaves the circle and the turkkh informs another experienced participant of the dhikr that supervision of the dhikr is being passed to him. This notification is symbolic—the turkkh might clap the person to which supervision of the dhikr is being passed on the shoulder.

Men perform the circular dhikr first clockwise, and after 7-9 circles, they change directions, following the breathing technique. During performance of dhikr, the murids say or breath out sounds that are reminiscent of “Ullah.” It is known that when exhaling, a person eliminates negative influences, while positive vibrations of sacral words have a cleansing, vitalizing, and spirit-lifting effect. Breathing moves in harmony with the rhythm of the dhikr and depending on the regularity of repetition of the chant, it automatically adapts to the different rhythm. By harmonizing with a rhythm that

36 See: O.S. Pavlova, Chechensky etnos segodnia: cherty sotsialno-psikhologicheskogo portreta, Moscow, 2013, p. 316.
differs from one’s own, a person finds himself as an observer standing face to face with restrictions of all models built in his mind by his own false ego.  

Participants in dhikr note that it is impossible to convey the state they experience during performance of dhikr. Even sick and elderly participants of dhikr experience a spiritual uplift and relief when performing this devotional act. B.M. Babajanov, who studied the history and devotional acts of the Sufi brotherhoods in Central Asia, writes that the ritual of dhikr jahriya dhikr is often carried out to cure people from various diseases. Researchers who have studied the Qadiriyya Tariqah in Dagestan have noted: “The dynamism of dhikr amazes the imagination in some cases even today, elderly people among those giving their love to God, become amazingly transformed during these mysteries. Clapping the hands, sitting on prayer rugs, standing in the street, or running in a circle on a Maidan (a square), they are demonstrating a mystical perception of the world that clearly exceeds the physical many times. But for the true believer, this proof is insignificant, for he believes anyway that the universe was created by Allah according to a plan known only to Him. And only He is the reason of creation. From this are generated the amazing abilities to become transformed during the loud dhikr.”

Dhikr ends with a prayer addressed to Allah, in which everyone asks Him to give sheikh Kunta-haji the right of salvation and intercession on the Last Judgment Day, and forgiveness of sins committed by family and friends. Anyone who wishes may participate in dhikr, regardless of his national or confessional affiliation.

Feeding of the Murids

After the dhikr is over, the murids are fed boiled meat with bouillon or a special sauce (berkh), bread cakes with cheese (chapilg), and tea with pies, sweets, and honey. But in some villages, restrictions have been introduced and the murids are only treated to bread cakes and tea, without any meat. For example, in the village of Gamurzievo of the Nazran District, the murids made a decision by means of general voting that after the performance of dhikr they would not eat anything containing meat, since many families were unable to provide that kind of food. They introduced a common menu for all murids that consisted of bread cakes, Ingush homemade khalva, and tea.

Food is eaten sitting on the floor. For this long cloths are spread out around the perimeter of the room on which all the food is placed. Young men and adolescent boys act as servers, there are never any women in the room. They remain outside the room where the murids are eating, passing all the necessary products and dishes to the men who do the serving.

It is worth noting that the murids do not receive any payment for what they do. After performing dhikr, the men are fed, but they are not paid for the services they render. The entire male ritual practice is directed only at receiving Divine grace and has nothing to do with the material world. The murids are the custodians of religious and moral values, observing the established order and self-discipline. Social capital is more important for the murids, which, in fact, has always corresponded to the tradition of most Sufi brotherhoods.

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38 See: B. Babajanov, op. cit.

39 A. Murtazaliev, A. Sultanov-Barsov, op. cit., p. 78.


Geographical Range

The geographical range of the Qadiriyya Tariqah teaching in the Caucasus is as follows: the largest number of followers live in Chechnia and Ingushetia, while a small number (around 2,000 murids of sheikh Kunta-haji Kishiev and Vis-haji Zagiev) live in the Khasaviurt and Novolakskoe, Kiziliurt, Botlikh, Gumbetov, and Kazbek districts, in the town of Khasaviurt of Dagestan, in the Akhmet Region of Georgia, and in the Progorodniy District of Ossetia. The followers of sheikh Kunta-haji are also represented in North Ossetia, in the border region with Ingushetia. There are small Sufi brotherhoods in Karachaevo-Circassia.

According to the stories of elders, residents of Kabardino-Balkaria, the vird of Kunta-hajiites existed in Kabarda and Balkaria. But it was unable to take root there during the Soviet regime, when there was virulent atheism, it disappeared altogether.

At present, the geographical range of the Kunta-haji vird extends far beyond the Northern Caucasus. It is represented in Central Asia (in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan), where the followers of this vird are not always only Chechens and Ingush. Today, the teaching of sheikh Kunta-haji has become multinational—the Caucasians have been joined by Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz. Ingush and Chechens living in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Saratov, Astrakhan, Nizhnevartovsk, Novosibirsk, and other cities are opening mosques, where they are giving sermons based on traditional Islam and performing collective dhikr. Emigrants of the third wave who left for Europe at the end of the 20th century also began creating murid communities there. In Belgium, the followers of the teaching of Kunta-haji practice the loud dhikr on a permanent basis. This practice has also spread to France and Austria, but to a lesser extent.

Conclusion

Many ritual practices of the Ingush are purely mechanical, since Islamic traditions in Ingush society did not ultimately become established until the second half of the 19th century. It should be noted here that the authorities took repressive measures against spiritual leaders of the people; all the sheikhs of the Qadiriyya Tariqah were exiled in 1911. The civil war and revolution did nothing to reinforce the position of Islam either, although freedom of religion was declared. After the establishment of Soviet power, the fight against religion and religious figures became particularly severe. Mosques were closed down, and secular schools were organized in their buildings, while prominent theologians were subjected to repression. The Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and deportation of the Ingush in 1944 did not allow the Ingush to reinforce the spiritual foundations of religion. After the Chechen-Ingush Republic was restored in 1957, party and Soviet structures launched a widespread anti-religious campaign. The performance of all Muslim rituals was banned. The activity of the Sufi brotherhoods acquired an illegal nature, mullahs taught children and adolescents in their own homes and, if possible, in secret. The representatives of Soviet power provoked conflicts among different trends of Sufi Islam. Until the 1980s, there was not one active mosque in Ingushetia.

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45 See: M. Vachagaev, op. cit.
As a result, many prominent Muslim theologians who knew the spiritual foundations of the local forms of traditional Islam passed away without leaving detailed written descriptions of the devotional acts of the Sufi brotherhoods. For these and other objective reasons, many contemporary murids perform dhikr simply as a ritual, without delving into the basics of particular elements of the existing religious practices.

Nevertheless, collective practices of performing dhikr, nazym, and mawlid are alive and promote the preservation of local Muslim tradition and its transfer from generation to generation. A social component that serves as a binding fulcrum consolidating the local community can be clearly seen in these devotional acts.
(History of Ingushetia): “…some of the Ingush (Akkhiy, Fyappiy, and others) left the Kurtatsinskoe, Koban, and Sanibansko gorges, the territories later occupied by Iranian-speaking Ossets.” The same publication goes on to say, “There was a special closeness between the people living in the Armkhi Gorge known as the Fyappiy… and the Akkintsy traced in later written sources and ethno-genetic legends of the Ingush and Akkintsy.” The thesis remains dangling in mid-air—no written sources speak of the “special closeness” between the Fyappintsy and Akkintsy and no “ethnoge-netic legends” (there is only one Akkin legend) offer information about their kinship. Moreover, the legend was misinterpreted in the part related to the localization of the Akkintsy in the 16th century. Russian and local historiography, however, relies on folklore sources to write that in the 16th century the Akkintsy lived in the Darial and Armkhi gorges (despite its frequent and perfunctory use, the Jeyrakh Gorge as a substitution for the above is wrong), as well as in several adjacent districts.

I have posed myself the task of analyzing the available written and folklore sources that certain authors use when talking of the Darial and Armkhi gorges as the home country of the Akkintsy. This is important, first because the historical objectivity and factual reliability of what is being said on the subject demand verification. Second, a scientific analysis of this issue is just as important, since it serves as the foundation of a great number of ethnohistorical and ethnopolitical myths constructed by a group of “hardworking” pseudo-historians (obviously well organized and lavishly funded) who rubberstamp falsifications of the Ingush’ ethnic history in the media and especially on the Internet. Wittingly or unwittingly, some of the Ingush authors “play into their hands,” so closer attention to the few available historical sources is the only remedy. I will not go into the details of the so-called historical discoveries related to the region’s ancient and medieval history, or of the geopolitical reminiscences based on them lest to draw more (and unearned) attention to them. I will destroy them and their pseudohistorical foundation by going into the details of two sides of the same subject—the Akkintsy in the Darial Gorge and the Akkintsy in the Armkhi Gorge.

The Akkintsy and the Darial Gorge: Is There Any Connection Between Them?

Are there scientifically substantiated sources and reliable scholarly works to justify the statement that the Akkintsy lived in the Darial Gorge? A detailed analysis has provided an answer—there are no scientific systematized studies of the issue and, therefore, there is no substantiation. There are three apologies for the arguments, which rely on very dubious evidence of the presence of the Akkintsy in the area or their possession of it.

- The first argument rests on the story of an anonymous Chechen quoted by Bashir Dalgat in his “Pervobytnaia religia chechentsev” (The Primitive Religion of the Chechens) that appeared in the third issue of Terskiy sbornik (Terek Collection) with a reference to an earlier publication in the Terskiy vestnik newspaper in 1870 and, later, in the Sbornik svedeniy o Terskoy oblasti (Collected Information about the Terek Region). In 1974, it was published and commented on by Natalya Volkova; everything else is mere interpretations of this oral source.
- The second argument, likewise, relies on folklore sources, that is, a specific interpretation of scattered bits and pieces of recorded folklore that basically boil down to the conclusion that the aldars (princes) Dudarows from Lars were Akkintsy by origin.
The third argument, which passes for a document, is nothing more than a reproduction and straightforward interpretation of the letter Sultan Murza from Lars (the Darial Gorge) wrote to the Moscow czar published in 1889 by S.A. Belokurov in the first issue of his book Snoshenia Rossii s Kavkazom (Relationship between Russia and the Caucasus).

Let us have a closer look at the three arguments.

The first argument: a story told by an unknown Chechen that appeared in Terskiy vestnik in 1870 and was quoted by Bashir Dalgat in the third issue of Terskiy sbornik published as a Supplement to The 1894 Terskiy Calendar runs as follows: "Old Chechen men say that there are mountains closer to Bashlam, from which the rivers Assa, Fortanga, and Gekhi flow. They are the Aki-lam mountains populated now, or populated in the past in the time of our ancestors, by ‘lam-kristy’ (mountain Christians). This is our cradle and the cradle of all other Chechen clans."

The problems began when the name of the Bashlam mountain was arbitrarily reproduced in later Russian-language publications as Kazbek. Here is what we find in Natalya Volkova’s comments: “Another legend, which I recorded in 1971 among the Eastern Akkintsy (Aukhovtsy), also speaks of the movement of some of the Vainakhs from the west to the east. ‘In the past the Akkintsy who left Shami,’ says the legend, ‘settled under the Kazbek mountain, but being at daggers drawn with the Batsavi-gurji, they had to leave this locality for a place called Glula, which, according to the storyteller, one of the Akkintsy from the village of Boni-yurt, was situated on the upper reaches of the Armkhi or Assa rivers. Under Kalmyk pressure, they left Glula (compare with Guloykhi, the right tributary of River Assa) and settled on the Michik River. Attacked by Kalmyks (Glalmakkho), they moved into the mountains to the Yamansu River, where they built their settlements.”

Here the local name Bashlam was replaced with Russian Kazbek for no reason.

Earlier, the name of the mountain Bashlam, from which the Akkintsy (Aukhovtsy) had begun their exodus, was translated as Kazbek in disregard of what was said in these short legends. This error, probably “put into circulation” by translators, traveled from one publication to another and misled many researchers, who relied on well-known experts in Caucasian studies. Vladimir Boguslavskiy, for example, has written: “Until the 16th century, the Akkintsy lived in the basin of River Gekhi, yet we can suppose that earlier they lived to the west of the Gekhi in the area of the Darial Gorge.” The author is treading carefully and uses the verb “suppose” when writing about the Akkintsy’s possible presence in the area of the Darial Gorge.

The legend quoted by Dalgat mentions Bashlam (the name of the mountain had been written down in this form and was diligently reproduced); close to it there are the mountains from which the rivers Assa, Fortanga, and Gekhi flow. Nobody, however, paid attention to the geographical fact that neither the Assa, nor Fortanga, nor Gekhi start at the mountains close to Kazbek: the upper and middle reaches of the Assa are separated from the Darial Gorge by at least 40 km; the Fortanga by over 50 km, and the Gekhi by over 60 km; the distance between the Darial Gorge and their lower reaches is even greater. One finds it very strange that the author who spoke about these rivers said nothing about the famous Terek, which runs down from the Kazbek mountain. Any of the later researchers should have been alerted by this omission and thus saved from hasty conclusions—Kazbek and Terek (the Darial Gorge) are intimately connected.

The legend points to the place of the Akkintsy (Aukhovtsy) exodus as Aki-lam and says that these mountains are the cradle of the Akkintsy and also of other Chechen clans. According to ethno-

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3 Terskiy sbornik 1893—Terskiy sbornik. Prilozhenie k Terskomu kalendariu na 1894. Issue 3, published by the Terek Regional Statistical Committee; ed. by Committee Secretary G. Vertepov, Book Two, Print shop of the Terek Regional Board, Vladikavkaz, 1893, p. 45.


genetic legends, the Chechens consider Nashakh to be the place of their origin. This is the Galanchozh Gorge, the nearby areas of which were known as Aki-lam. The gorge and Kazbek are separated by at least 60 km as the crow flies. On the other hand, the rivers mentioned above start not far from the Galanchozh Gorge.

The legend published by Volkova says that, after leaving Shami, the Akkintsy settled under Kazbek. The name of the Bashlam mountain was erroneously taken for Kazbek, probably because there is a very similar place name—Bashloam—by which the Ingush call Kazbek. The error might go back to the informers—the Akkintsy (Aukhovtsy) probably took the Ingush name for Kazbek for Bashlam in the Aki-lam area. These very similar names stirred vague reminiscences, hence the replacement. Meanwhile, more than a century ago the reminiscences were less vague, which explains why Chechen U. Laudaev had no problems with identifying in the stories of the informers the area they had left (in his time it was part of the Argun District): “The Aukhovtsy are called Akkiy because when living in the Argun District they belonged to the Akkiy family. The poor land on which these people lived forced half of this family to move to Aukh, where the Kumyks and Russians called them Aukhovtsy; on the other hand, they preserved the old name Akkiy, as originating from Akki which they had taken from the Chechens.”

Ekaterina Kusheva, one of the best experts in the history of the Aukhovtsy, pointed out: “The Akkintsy are believed to have originated from the mountainous Vainakh society of Akkha, which late 18th-19th-century sources localized on the upper reaches of the Gekhi and Fortanga, the right tributaries of the River Sunzha.”

In his Toponimia Checheno-Ingushetii (Toponymics of Checheno-Ingushetia), Akhmad Suleymanov specified the location of the Akkha society, the landmarks and its borders with neighboring societies: “The AKKHA (Akkhiy). In the south, the Chechen society Akkha bordered on Key-Mokhk, in the north on Yalkhara, in the east on Galayn-Chozh, and in the west on Merja. The ethnonym is probably based on ‘akkhe (+vakhar), which meant hunting, to hunt, or people who hunted for a living. The Akkintsy are divided into lam-akkhiy and arenan-akkhiy (Karabulaks and Akkintsy-Aukhovtsy), but there was no direct kinship between them. These societies emerged independently of one another, in different climatic and other conditions. The Akkha society described here lived near the source of the Osu-khi, the left tributary of the Gekhi.”

The place where the mountain Akkintsy lived (Akki-lam) was well-known—it had nothing to do with the Darial and Armkhi gorges.

The fact that in the past the geographical names were confused is confirmed by a TV program showed in Grozny in 1991 when a Chechen (a muhajir descendant), who came from Turkey, said that his ancestors had gone to Turkey from a place near the Bashlam mountain. The slightly disappointed anchorman asked: Does this mean that you came from the upper reaches of the Terek, that is, from among the Ingush? The guest specifies that his family had been living near the river that flowed into the upper reaches of the Argun. This left the anchorman baffled—he had never heard of a mountain of that name (Bashlam) in Chechnia.

The Bashlam mountain in mountainous Chechnia will be identified below. The legend says that their far from friendly relations with Batsavi-gurji forced the Akkintsy to move to Glula, which, according to the narrator, was situated on the upper reaches of the Armkhi or Assa rivers. The Batsavi-gurji (that is, the Tsova-Tushins, Batsoy in the Ingush language) did not live anywhere close to Kazbek; they lived and are living to the east of Kazbek, from which they are separated by the territories of the Pkhovtsy (Khevsurs and Pshavs), Mtiuls, and Mokhevtses. Natalya Volkova drew our attention to the fact that the territory itself was situated near Guloi-khi, in the eastern part

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of mountainous Ingushetia, relatively close to the Galanchozh Gorge, that is, close to Aki-lam and the upper reaches of River Assa, and separated from the Darial Gorge and Kazbek by several dozen kilometers.

The source of the Armkhi River is situated far from Glula, while the narrator seems to be unsure of its location—either on the upper reaches of the Armkhi or the Assa rivers. It seems that he received information about the Armkhi from members of the Vappi ethnographic group who lived among the Aukhovtsy. He also knew that the Armkhi and the Assa were situated somewhere in Ingushetia, but was vague about their exact location. This was accepted because the Akkintsy (Aukhovtsy) and also part of the academic community connected the place of exodus of Akkintsy to Aukh with the Ingush. In 1891, I. Omelchenko pointed out: "The origins of the Cossacks mountain dwellers who were part of the Terek-Kiziliar Army are closely connected with the history of the emergence and settlement of the Terki town founded in 1588. The Ingush of the Akko tribe were among the first to settle there; Russian documents call them ‘Okonchen,’ who founded the so-called ‘Okonchen quarter’." Later, Professor Anatoly Genko pointed, among other things, to well-known Ingush specifics in the speech of the Akkintsy-Aukhovtsy from the villages of Chanka-yurt, Akbulat-yurt, Kara-su, Golayty, and Bilt-aul. Legends explain these specifics by the relatively recent Ingush origins of these peoples. Here we are not interested in the Akkintsy’s ethnic roots; what is more important is their knowledge of the Ingush rivers. The Vappintsy could reach Aukh not only from the Armkhi Gorge; more likely they came from the piedmont where they had lived before the joint Russian-Kabarda-Nogay march of 1562 that drove some of the Vappintsy to the mountains; the others moved to Aukh, where they sought protection of Shamkhalate of Tarki.

Even the basic knowledge of local geography and folklore is enough to recognize the Bashlam mountain in the legend recorded by Bashir Dalgat to become sure that it was not Kazbek. It was another mountain, the name of which was close to the Ingush name for Kazbek (Bashloam), which explains the mistranslations that buried, in the course of time, the original name (Bashlam). It, however, survived in the legends of Akkintsy-Aukhovtsy and also in Chechen folklore. To dot the i’s, I will cite here three more extracts from Aukh legends, which will help us locate the Bashlam mountain.

The collection of Chechen folk poems (illis) quotes an illi about Malsak of Nesarkhoy and Sadula, son of Betak, in which a certain Chechen complains to Imam Shamil: "O, Just Shamil, my life is bitter and the cause of this is frightening. Malsak of Nesarkhoy appeared with his band; you can see their white tents everywhere. They steal out cattle day and night; they deflower our beautiful virgins. Malsak of Nesarkhoy dropped on us like a sand slide and is suppressing us. We are pleading with you—drive Malsak from the Chekhkara land (footnote 23 in the original text.—I.S.) or take us with you beyond Bashlam (footnote 24.—I.S.) o, imam, o, Shamil."

Footnote 23 clarifies: the Chekhkara land (Chekhkari, Chekhkara—a valley in the piedmont area of Chechnia in the vicinity of Starye Atagi village). Footnote 24 says: "Bashlam is a mountain range which separated the Chechen lands from the Avars." Here is real Bashlam (wrongly called Kazbek) and its clear geographic localization, which has nothing in common with Kazbek and the Darial Gorge. The same illi mentions the Bashlam mountain once more. After defeating Malsak, Sadula said to the imam: "I return you, Shamil, brave Avars and you should go back to your land beyond Bashlam...”

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11 See: Istoria Ingushetii, p. 152.
13 Ibid., p. 125.
14 Ibid., p. 129.
Here is another fact taken from Chechen folklore. In a small book called Shutki Chory i Aligereya (Jokes by Chora and Aligerey), the wit Chora mocks a group of female dhikrists going from Chinkh to Ertin—to repay your dhikr, “I, as the man you have appointed in all sincerity, will give the reward to the Bashlam mountain, the mountain of the Sonakhois that is found lower (than Bashlam, Ed.) and to the mountain of the Khakkois, situated lower still…” He is speaking about the mountains Bashlam, the highest of them, the mountain of the Sonakhois (they are one of the Melkhin teips), and the lowest of them, the mountain of the Khakkois (a teip from Shatoy). These mountains are found in one and the same place situated higher than Aki-lam and to the south of it. They are enumerated from the south to the north, which means that Bashlam is the highest mountain in this part of the Caucasian Range (probably the mountain now called Tebulos-Mta (if this is true, then the original Bashlam was replaced with a Georgian name). I think, however, that this name was applied not to one mountain, but to the snow-covered mountain range in this part of the Caucasus.

Finally, there is irrefutable documentary evidence of a topographer, Johann Blaramberg, who in 1834 wrote down in his notebook: “Other Kistins (as distinct from ‘closer Kists’, that is, the Fappi, I.S.) live in the Caucasian mountains among the Akktins, Khevsurs, Lezghians, and Avars on both sides of the River Argun and on the slopes of Kori-lam, Bashlam, Shatoy-lam, Kachunt, and Gakhko.” The mountains are situated close to one another and are separated from the Dargai Gorge by at least 60 km and from the Armkhi Gorge by 40 kilometers.

This needs no further clarification, since the above disproves the first argument about the exodus of the Akktinsy from the Dargai Gorge close to Kazbek.

Let us investigate the second argument, which relies on scattered folklore information about the Dudarovs from Lars as ethnic Akktinsy. First, folklore texts about the movements of Dudar, head of the Dudarovs, contradict Natalia Volkova’s concept borrowed by the authors of Istoria Ingushetii, who wrote about the gradual movement of the Akktinsy from the west to the east (if we agree that they started from the Kazbek area) and the concepts supported by Chechen pseudo-historians who armed themselves with this argument. The legends, on the other hand, say that Dudar was moving in the opposite direction—from the east to the west. We cannot exclude the possibility that he finally reached Lars in the Dargai Gorge and that he was the forefather of the Ossetian and Ingush Dudarovs. This version calls for further verification. We have to establish here whether Dudar was an ethnic Akkin.

So far, an answer to this question, as well as to the question about the Akktinsy in the Dargai Gorge, the Armkhi, Kistin, Sanniban, and some other gorges, are sought for in folklore since no more or less careful scientific investigation has been carried out so far. All conclusions rely on arbitrary interpretation of tiny and unrelated legends or, rather, on the starting point of the Dudarovs and several other families and are, therefore, as bold as unsubstantiated. Scientifically substantiated conclusions call for methodologically correct analysis, which will reveal that the geographic names were confused. To disprove the second argument let us look into Dudar’s allegedly Akkin ethnic roots. The thesis that his descendants among the Ingush and Ossets belong to the Akktinsy and Chechens does not hold water and is not discussed here.

What arguments did the pseudo-historians use to fit Dudar and his descendants among the Akktinsy? They relied on the Russian-language copy of the Ingush legend “Pereseleniiu Dudara” (Re-

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15 Chora is the Chechen analogy of Nasreddin, a Central Asian hero of numerous adventures. In the 1970s, the play Shutki Chory (Chora’s Jokes) was extremely popular in Grozny; A. Deniev (Sutarbi), People’s Artist of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., played the central role (see: [http://www.kino-teatr.ru/teatr/acter/m/sov/18636/bio/]).

16 Shutki Chory i Aligireya, Grozny, 1969, p. 22.

17 See: Natalya Volkova wrote about them: “Today the Khakkoi teip lives in Shatoy; there are about 100 households in all” (Archives of the Institute of Ethnography (AIE), rec. gr. 7, f. 27, sheet 183. Materials of the 1971 expedition).

settlements of Dudar). It should be noted that there is not a single legend about Dudar among the Akkintsy, to whom he allegedly belonged! The legend says: “It is commonly believed that Dudar was born in the village of Kiy or Aki.”

This is what the Russian version says. The legend, however, was told and written down in Ingush; it was also published in the same language in the *Anthology of Ingush Folklore*: “Вахарца къаханъ хъавена Дудар: Дуккхачар дуваачох Дудар аьккхашки Кий яхаче юртара хъаваннав.” The correct translation runs as follows: “Most narrators of folk legends believe that Dudar was born in the village of Kiy in the direction of the Akkintsy.” It should be said that in the Ingush version, the word “аьккхашка” begins with a small letter; this means that it was not the name of a village but rather an indication of direction: “in the direction of the Akkintsy.” This word should be written in Ingush as “ьаккхашкахаара,” the way Zaurbek Malsagov wrote it in his time.

The Ingush version has no words “or Aki” present in the Russian text, probably because the translator was either careless or deliberately replaced Kiy with Aki (this is repeated throughout the entire text, as I will demonstrate below in the section dealing with the Akkintsy in the Armkhi Gorge). The fact of replacement is confirmed by the texts in Ingush and in Russian (which contains the notorious “or Aki”) published in the *Anthology of Ingush Folklore*.

There is another fragment of the translation of the second legend published by Leonid Semenov. “According to legend, Dudarov was a relative of the family of Akievs who lived in the Kiy village (information by Matiev).” Malsagov wrote down this information in Ingush: “Дудара-къонгий да аьккхашкахаара хавенна. Вонил долаж хиннав из Оаки-ьаккханца. Кий бахача.” His version invites a translation very different from that published by Leonid Semenov: “The ancestor of the Dudarovs came from the direction of the Akkintsy (from the east.—I.S.). He was brother of the Okiev family from Kiy (he was their family brother.—I.S.).” In the Russian translation, the Okievs (the family name derived from the personal name Ok) became the Akievs, which is a different name. Ok and his father Oki can be seen in the teip tree of Kiy, which means that Dudar belonged to the Kiyrkho (or Key) and not to the Akkintsy.

The next legend offers a clear statement: “Dudar originated from the village of Kiy.” The *Anthology* contains the original Ingush text, “Дудар ше Кий яхача юртара хъаваннав” and its adequate Russian translation. In other words, Dudar, hero of Ingush legends, who had found himself after all his movements in the village of Lars in the Darial Gorge and later became an Osset feudal lord, descended from the Kiy teip and did not belong to the Akkintsy. This buries the second argument.

The third argument relies on a literal interpretation of those parts of the “Stateyny spisok (Diary)” of Prince S. Zvenigorodskiy and State Official T. Antonov, which deal with their talks in the town of Terskiy in August 1589. The document says in part: “…and Saltan Murza was saying, I heard from peasants and my brother Shikh Murza of Okut that the Kabardinian princes had made obeisance to your czar; I also want to serve him until death like my brother Shikh Murza of Okut served and take part together with the military commanders of the czar and Kabardinian princes in marches against those who disobey the czar. I vow my allegiance and will accompany you to the Georgian lands and will send my son or brother to the town of Terskiy with you when you go from the Georgian lands.

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22 See: Ibid., pp. 33-34.


24 Z.K. Malsagov, op. cit.


“And when you reach your czar tell him that I want to serve him and ask him to give me a grant charter, according to which I will serve his state, like the one he sent to my brother Shikh Murza of Okut.”

The fact that Saltan Murza called Shikh Murza of Okut his “brother” led, or, rather, misled certain researchers to the conclusion that Usharom Murza, father of Shikh Murza, was also the father of Saltan Murza and that they were both “Okuts.” *Istoria Ingushetii* said without a shred of doubt: “When Shikh Murza received the deed from the Russian czar and his gifts, his brother Saltan Murza, the head of the aul Lars in the Darial Gorge, also applied to the czar with a request to make him a Russian subject.” One feudal lord called another a brother—it was a common practice of that time; even kings at war with each other used this term. The words, “I heard from peasants and my brother Shikh Murza of Okut,” were intended as confirmation of his status as higher than that of the peasants and equal to that of Shikh Murza.

Ekaterina Kusheva paid attention to this fact and, to avoid primitive conclusions, wrote: “Let me remind you that the “Stateynyi spisok of Prince S. Zvenigorodskiy” called Saltan Murza brother of Shikh Murza of Okut. If this means kinship between the two feudal lords, we can presume that Saltan Murza had Vainakh roots.” The author treaded cautiously when writing of their kinship; she did not contemplate the possibility that they were brothers born from the same father, which suggested that Saltan Murza had Vainakh roots. The Ingush roots of Saltan Murza and the Lars population of that period have been confirmed in numerous historical works and do not need further confirmation in the form of “blood kinship.” It seems that Kusheva interpreted the term “brother” as a brotherhood of feudal lords.

It seems that the above convinced the authors of *Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza* (History of the North Caucasian Peoples) that late in the 16th century, Saltan, who called himself brother of Shikh Murza, was murza of the aul Lars in the Darial Gorge. He “called himself” brother, but was not his brother. There is no objective evidence that they were brothers. The quoted text testifies to the fact that Shikh Murza and Saltan Murza were not relatives, since the latter wrote: “I also want to serve him until death like my brother Shikh Murza of Okut served and take part, along with the military commanders of the czar and Kabardinian princes, in the marches against those who disobey the czar. I vow my allegiance and will accompany you to the Georgian lands and will send my son or brother to the town of Terskiy with you…” If Shikh Murza was his brother there would have been no need to offer one more brother or a son as a pledge of loyalty. This makes it absolutely clear that they were brothers by the fact of being feudal lords.

This destroys the third argument in favor of the Akkintsy in the Darial Gorge thesis. By way of preliminary summing up, we can say that the Akkintsy (mountainous Akkintsy and Akkintsy-Aukhovtsy) had nothing to do with Kazbek and the Darial Gorge.

### The Akkintsy in the Armkhi Gorge: Fact or Fake?

Let’s take a closer look at the statement that the Akkintsy left a trace in the Armkhi Gorge; it is based on two arguments: (1) the Akkin origins of the people living in the Falkhan aul and (2) the

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28 *Istoria Ingushetii*, p. 15.

29 E.N. Kusheva, op. cit., p. 274.


31 *Istoria narodov Severnogo Kavkaza*..., p. 295.
identical place names in the Armkhi Gorge (the Kistin community or the Fappi shakhar) and among the Akkintsy. They should be discussed one by one.

The first so-called argument relies on folklore, or the only piece of information which said that people from the Falkhan aul originated from Akki supplied by Alikhan Murzabekov and published by Leonid Semenov. It was there that Kiy was replaced with Akki. As a direct ancestor of the founders of the aul Falkhan and a member of the Falkhanoi teip, I can rely on the clan legends of the elders, which said that “the Falkhans, who bravely fought with swords,” originated from Kiy. On the other hand, it remains to be established which of the two Kiys was meant—there was an aul and a locality of this name in the Assa Gorge and in Kiy-Mokhk (they might be genetically close). This deserves special investigation; here we can be rest assured that the Falkhans did not originate from the Akkintsy and that the contemporary Key people have nothing in common with them. The haplogroup of indigenous Falkhanois (Dzarakhovs and Sampievs) is J2 (M172), while the haplogroup of the Akkintsy from Galanchozh is J1 (M267); the Key people who live in Kiy have a L3 (M20) haplogroup. This means that the shameless statements, which litter Russian historical websites, of Chechen pseudo-historians who insist that the aul Falkhan was allegedly founded by the Akkintsy (Chechens) from Galanchozh are nothing but an ethnopolitical fake.

In the legends about Dudar, the translators on whom Semenov relied replaced Kiy with Aki. It should be said that this developed into a fairly consistent trend in the Ingush folklore and historical studies for no objective reasons. This is illustrated by the fairly careless treatment of terms in the Ingush sources that mislead academics who either do not know the Ingush language or are not experts in this particular issue. Shukri Dakhkilgov’s Proiskhozhdenie ingushskikh familiy (The Origins of Ingush Family Names) is, so far, the only ethnographic work dealing with the subject, the numerous pseudo-historical works on the same subject are left outside the scope of my article. The compiler of Dakhkilgov’s works has written that “some of the respondents might offer incorrect information, which means that mistakes are inevitable… Aware of this, Shukri Dakhkilgov invited the readers to offer corrections and additions.” The work, however, contains errors of a different nature caused by the author’s uncritical approach to ethnographic information.

The content-analysis of Shukri Dakhkilgov’s collection of Ingush family names shows that only fourteen out of the total 819 belonged, according to the author, to people from Akki. A more detailed investigation reveals that out of these fourteen families only three lived from time immemorial in the mountainous part of Ingushetia in the auls complete with towers and burial vaults: one in the Kistin community (Falkhans), one in the Tsonin (Chanievs from Pyaling), and one in the Kistin and later in Tsonin communities (Dudarovs). The other eleven families whom the author counted among the Akkintsy lived in the valley auls and were not Akkintsy. More information about them below; here we will look at the mountainous areas.

I have already exposed as false the thesis that the Dudarovs were Akkintsy who moved across the mountainous areas of Ingushetia and settled in the Darial Gorge; likewise, I have demonstrated that the Falkhans have nothing to do with the Akkintsy. From that it follows that the families that lived in the auls founded by people from Falkhan are unrelated to the Akkintsy. According to Bashir Dalgal, Falkhan, together with Erzi, was the oldest in the Metskhal (Kistin) community and, according to what the elders had to say, “all the auls of the Metskhal commu-

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nity (there were over 20 of them) originated from the people from Falkhan, which makes them more or less close relatives."

Professor Evgeny Krupnov, who followed V. Khristianovich, relied on genealogies of people from Falkhan and Shuan to conclude that these Ingush clan groups go back no less than 600 to 800 years. Falkhan, together with Targim, Egikal, and Khamkhi, has been recognized as one of the oldest Ingush auls and the cradle of Ingush culture. The legends date these four and some other auls to the time of Georgian Queen Tamar (12th century), which means that the people from Falkhan were unrelated to the Akkintsy.

Let us look at the genealogy of the Chanievs from Pyaling (even though they lived in the Tsorin mountain community, not in the Armkhi basin). According to Chaniev’s family legends written down by Leonid Semenov, their predecessor moved to Ingushetia from Kiy; according to information supplied by Red Partisan Chaniev in 1932, eleven generations had changed since that time. This means that the resettlement took place 500-600 years ago. Dakhkilgov wrote in his work about the Ingush family names: “Chanievs—patronymics Polonkhoy, originated from Akki, from the Kiy aul.” This happened because the author identified Akki with Kiy. He deliberately counted the Chanievs among the Akkintsy by identifying Kiy as Akki. An analysis of his works reveals that not only several Ingush names and not only people from the auls of the Kiy community, but also members of other mountain societies were deliberately identified as Akkintsy. In the same way, the translator, as well as his predecessors and followers, deliberately substituted Akki for Kiy in the legends about Duda and the Falkhans. In the work quoted above, Shukri Dakhkilgov counted the following peoples among the Akkintsy (without a shred of evidence): the Dakiev (Dokievs) from the Dokinche aul in mountainous Ingushetia situated along the Assa; the Dudurovs (Dudarovs) and their relatives from Kiy; the Yalkhoroevs (Elkharoevs) and Jakoevs from the Yalkhoroy community; the Kievs from Kiy, the Medovs from Kiy, the Nashkhoevs from the Nashakh community, etc.

The above suggests that the author either did not know or totally ignored the nomenclature of the mountainous communities as unacceptable. Meanwhile, it is presented in great detail, albeit with certain shortcomings, in Suleymanov’s Toponimia Checheno-Ingusheti. Shukri Dakhkilgov wrongly related the following communities (ethnographic groups) to the Akkintsy:

NASHKHA (Nashkho), the ethnic society that bordered on the aul Peshkha in the east, Tlerla in the south, Galay and Yalkhara in the west, and a valley in the north. It occupied the territory between the Gekhi and Roshti rivers and consisted of two conventional parts inherited from the past—Tlekhia Nashkha and Sekhia Nashkha, that is, Nashkha on the other side and Nashkha on this side, the southern and northern Nashkha.

YALKHARA (Yalkharoy), an ethnic group that lived for a long time between Merja in the west, Nashkha and Galay in the east, Akkhiy in the south, and Shalaji in the north; the local people considered the Basarcha-Yalkhara aul to be their spiritual and political center.

KEY (key), an ethnic society that bordered in the east on the Tlerla aul, in the west on the Ingush aul of Gula, in the northwest on the aul of Akkha, and in the north on Galay.

These societies, which had their own territories and borders and lived in several auls, were not Akkintsy, who, likewise, had their territories and borders.

38 Ibid., p. 150.
40 See: Ibid., p. 62.
42 Sh.E. Dakhkilgov, Proiskhozhdenie ingushskikh familii, p. 53.
44 See: Ibid., p. 105.
AKKHA (Akkhiy), an ethnic community that bordered in the south on Key-Mokkh, in the north on Yalkhara, in the east on Galayn-Chozh, and in the west on Merja. The ethnonym is probably derived from akkhe (+ vakhar)—hunt, hunting, or people who lived by hunting. The Akkintsy were divided into Lam-akkhiy and Arenan-akkhiy (Karabulaks and Akkintsy-Aukhovtsy), but they were not relatives. These societies appeared independently of each other in different climatic and other conditions. The Akkha society lived near the source of the Osu-Khi, the left tributary of the Gekhi.

The informers themselves were confused, a fact obvious to serious researchers. Natalya Volkova specifically pointed out: “the Ingush confuse the Chechens with the mountainous Akkintsy. They consider Yalkhoroy and also Maysta and Malkhista to be Akkin areas. This error is explained by the territorial closeness between the Akkintsy and Orstkhoitsy and created a certain confusion of tribal affiliation of the people living in certain parts along the Gekhi and Fortanga. Some of the Galgaevs describe the Tsechoevs as Akkintsy. The Tsechoevs sometimes relate the Tsechiakhk, Merjoi, and Yalkhoroy teips to the Akkintsy… Sometimes Chechens… believe that they (Akkintsy.—I.S.) lived there permanently and for a long time.”

Historians should be aware of this confusion and assess the information in view of the factors related to this issue. In any case, no scholar has the right to present as true facts based only on a shaky foundation of information supplied by people who can be wrong, confused, forgetful, or even deliberate distorters of historical or ethnographic data. It is absolutely unacceptable to interpret at will or cheat with terms because of political or tribal considerations.

The first argument about the Akkintsy origins of the people living in the Falkhan aul has been refuted: the Akkintsy never lived in Falkhan, in the Armkhi Gorge, or in the Galgay and Tsorin mountainous communities.

The second argument in favor of the Akkintsy in the Armkhi Gorge rests on identical toponymics in the Armkhi Gorge (the Kistin community—Fappi shakhar) and the Akkintsy community. It relies on what Volkova wrote in one of her books: “There are probably other facts that confirm the movement of the Akkintsy from the west to the east. The aul of Kerbite was known in the Jerakh Gorge next to the village of Erzi, the people of which believed that they originated from Kerbite, and also in the mountains in the Akkin society. There was the village of Ozmi in Akki, which in the 19th century was situated on the lower reaches of the Armkhi.”

Let us first clarify the Kerbite and Ozmi place names that allegedly existed in the Armkhi Gorge and in the Akkin society. There are places of these names in the Armkhi Gorge, however their correct pronunciation is somewhat different. The former is К1ермете derived from к1ер—hawk and мете—place; the latter comes from Эзми, the place where reed grows.

An analysis of local micro-toponymics demonstrates that these names were absent from the Akkin society.

There were the following more or less similar toponymics:

Kkhierietla (Kkhierietla) was at a crossroads, 4 km to the southeast of Akkha. The name is derived from the word Kkhiera, stone (on the stone), which means that the etymology of the two compared toponymics is different.

\[\text{Kkhierietla} \quad \text{Kkhierietla}\]

The Orzume-kkhyalla (Orzume-kkhyalla), Orzume (?) settlement, is found at the crossroads of the village of Akka… Akhura-Mazda—the names of gods of evil and good. These images penetrat-
ed into Greek culture as Ormuz; many centuries later they returned to the Vainakhs in the form of Ormuz, Orzumie.”51 This etymology has nothing in common with Ezmi (Ozmi).

The above has proved beyond doubt that there were no identical toponymics in the Armkhi Gorge (the Kistin community) and Akkin society, which kills the second thesis speaking about Akkin traces in the Armkhi Gorge as unfounded.

**Conclusion**

A critical analysis of the available written and folklore sources that certain authors have used to insist that the Akkintsy originated from the Darial and Armkhi Gorge has proven that:

— The Akkintsy never lived in these gorges;
— Dudar, a hero of Ingush legends who found himself, after long travels along the Darial in the village of Lars where he became an Ossetian feudal lord, was not an Akkin;
— An analysis of the “Stateyny spisok of Prince S. Zvenigorodskiy and State Official T. Antonov” which is, in fact, a diary of their talks in the Terskiy town in August 1589, gives us no reason to insist that Saltan Murza from the medieval Ingush village of Lars was the brother of Shikh Murza of Okot and son of Usharom Murza; this means that he did not belong to the Akkintsy;
— Those talking about the Akkin origins of the people who lived in Falkhan and other auls of the Kistin society are wrong. What is more, there were no people of Akkin origins in the gorge of the Armkhi or in the Galgaev and Tsorin mountainous communities;
— It is not correct to say that there are identical place names in the Armkhi Gorge and in the Akkin society (they can prove nothing at all anyway).

To sum up, the constructs about the Akkintsy in the Darial and Armkhi Gorge can be best described as false and should, therefore, be removed from the body of Caucasian studies. I am convinced that this analysis can be used as a pattern to denounce other historical and ethnopolitical myths.

51 Ibid., p. 117.
CAUCASIAN ÉMIGRÉS
IN THE RUSSIAN MASONIC LODGES IN FRANCE
(1922-1939)¹

Abstract

This article, which is based on materials found in three French archives, looks at several scientific questions relating to the activities of Caucasian émigrés in France in the 1920-1930s. The author concludes that Russians preferred to invite émigrés from the Caucasus to their Masonic lodges who had either served in the Russian army, been employed as civil servants, or been elected to legislative bodies, and also took into account their attitude to Russia, the Russian culture, and the future of the Caucasus as part of the Russian Empire.

Keywords: Caucasian émigrés, Russian Masonic lodges, France, the Russian statehood, monarchy, national politics.

¹ I would like to thank the Fondation Maison des sciences de l’homme, France for the opportunity to work in the French archives and libraries (2009-2014).
The exodus from the Caucasus of those members of the local peoples who failed to reconcile themselves with Soviet power was fairly impressive even though historical science has been concentrating on the emigration of Russians from the Russian Empire. France, which gave shelter to Russian émigrés and émigrés from other parts of the former empire, including the Caucasus, was the choice of many. Quite a few of those who arrived from the Northern and Central Caucasus initiated strong sociopolitical movements.

Many of those Russians who found themselves in emigration had a vast experience of membership in the Masonic lodges of the Russian Empire. When in emigration, starting approximately in the early 1920s, they revived their lodges mainly within two French lodges called the Grande Loge de France and the Grand Orient de France. It was Russian freemasons who first paid attention to the sociopolitical potential of the Caucasian émigrés in order to close their ranks within a Masonic lodge to engage in a common struggle (as a united Russian Empire) against the Soviet Union. The Russian freemasons in France were determined to remove the national barriers to create a single political front of struggle for new Russia.

This article is based on the materials I found in three French archives, the Archive of the Grande Loge de France (Paris, Rue Puteaux), the Archive of the Grand Orient de France (Paris, Rue Cadet), and the Manuscript Department of the Mitterrand Bibliothèque nationale de France. I relied on these documents to find answers to the following questions related to the activities of Caucasian émigrés in France in the 1920s-1930s: How were these people drawn into the Russian Masonic lodges of France in the early 1920s? What was the purpose of their participation in the Russian Masonic lodges? To which extent were the Caucasian émigrés able to overcome their national aspirations and contribute to a unified political and philosophic platform within the framework of certain lodges? What were the main forms of their activities in the Russian Masonic lodges? What were the results of their activities in the Russian Masonic lodges?

The Astrea Freemason Lodge

The Astrea Lodge was the first to invite Caucasian émigrés into its ranks. It was set up in Paris in 1922 and had prominent Russian political figures (L. Kandaurov, P. Bobrinsky, E. Bennigsen, and others) among its members. According to the General Rite of the Astrea Lodge, its aim was to set up a “group of brothers spiritually strong, homogenous, and unknown to the profane world, the force and influence of whom, both in the Masonic and profane world, should be greater than before due to their selflessness, unity, discipline, and spiritual like-mindedness,” its slogan being Wisdom-Beauty-Strength. According to Leonty Kandaurov, the aim of Russian freemasonry in France was “involvement of the masons in restoring life in Russia.”

According to its General Rite, “the lodge should not strive to increase the number of brothers but, rather, upgrade their qualities, by which not only intellect, education, and knowledge are meant, but also the ability to imbibe Masonic sentiments and brotherhood, unification in the spirit of the General Rite, as well as decency, faithfulness to the word, self-sacrifice, and active love of people.” Yet, as Pavel Buryshkin later wrote, the lodge was “rapidly augmenting its membership:” the number of members increased from sixty at the end of 1922 to 100 two years later.

3 Les Archives de la Grande Loge de France, Paris, Box 3.
5 Les Archives de la Grande Loge de France, Box 3.
6 P.A. Buryshkin, op. cit., p. 25.
During formation of this lodge and its activity, its leaders turned their attention to people from the Caucasus who had found themselves in emigration along with Russians. Nine Caucasian émigrés joined the lodge in the first two years: four of them represented the Northern Caucasus (K. Khagondokov, I. Shakov, T. Shakmanov, and M. Kuriev); three were Georgians (A. Amilakhvari, A. Andronnikov, and I. Vachnadze), and two were Armenians (S. Lianozov and A. Shakh-Nazarov).7

I found the following materials relating to the above-mentioned representatives of the Caucasus and how they joined the lodge, with the exception of S. Lianozov and A. Shakh-Nazarov, who joined the lodge much earlier than the others:

(1) a request for initiation of those who wanted to join the lodge;
(2) an interview on political issues;
(3) an interview on philosophical and religious issues;
(4) a general talk about the applicant’s biography to identify his personal traits.

First, I will describe how the Caucasian émigrés were adopted into the Masonic lodge to better understand “the invitation process.”

Stepan Lianozov,8 a Moscow Armenian, was the first; according to the list of members, he was initiated on 11 November, 1922. It should be said that by late 1923 he had reached third (master) grade. He started in first (pupil) grade on 11 November, 1922. There is no more information about him in the archives.

Konstantin Khagondokov from Kabarda also wanted to join the lodge.9 His application was dated 24 May, 1923; he was recommended by Petr Polovtsov,10 one of the founders of the Astrea lodge.

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8 Stepan Lianozov (9 August, 1872, Moscow-10 August, 1949, Paris), buried in the Passy Cemetery in Paris. He was a lawyer and worked in the oil sector; graduated from the departments of natural science and law, Moscow University; was the assistant of a lawyer in the Moscow Chamber of Law. In 1901, he moved to Baku to go into the oil business; was managing director and sat on over twenty boards of directors of oil and other companies; was among the organizers of the Russian General Oil Corporation. After 1917, he moved to Finland to become one of the organizers of anti-Bolshevik movement; was a member and a financial manager of the Political Congress under General Yudenich. During Yudenich’s march on Petrograd in August 1919, he chaired the Council of Ministers and was first minister of finance and, later, foreign minister of the Northwestern Government. In 1920, he emigrated to Paris.
9 Konstantin Khagondokov (14/16 September, 1871, Pyatigorsk, Vladikavkaz Gubernia-2 December, 1958, Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois, buried in the local cemetery), was Major General of the General Staff; graduated from the 2nd Cadet Corps and Konstantinovsky Military College; took part in suppressing the Boxer Uprising in China in 1900; graduated from the Nikolaevskaya Academy of the General Staff; took part in the Russo-Japanese war. During World War I, commanded a brigade of the Caucasian Native Mountainous Division (also known as Savage Division); was awarded the St. George Order and the Gold Sword for Bravery. In 1916, he served as military governor of the Amur Region and hetman in the interim of the Amur Cossacks troops.
10 Petr Polovtsov (Polovtsev) (30 May/12 June, 1874, Tsarskoe selo, Petersburg Gubernia-9 February, 1964, Monte Carlo, Monaco); Lieutenant General, public figure and writer; studied at the Historical-Philological Institute, served in actual military service; passed an officer exam at the Nikolaevsky Cavalry College; served as officer of the life-guards of the Grodno regiment.
lodge. Both were approximately of the same age; both were military men and graduated from the Nikolaevskaya Academy of the General Staff, which meant that their acquaintance went a long way back into the past. Konstantin Khagondokov was interviewed by P. Polovtsev, M. Kazarinov, and E. Bennigsen on 7 and 14 June and was initiated on 23 June, 1923 into the first (pupil) grade.

Lezghian Ibrahim-bek Gaydarov was the second member from the Northern Caucasus. He applied on 30 October, 1923 and was rec-

Hussar Regiment. Later he graduated from the Nikolaevskaya Academy of the General Staff; fought in the Russo-Japanese war; in 1905, was assistant of the military agent in London. In 1906, he served in the Main Department of the General Staff; during World War I, commanded the Tatar Regiment, later a brigade of the Savage Division; was head of staff of the Caucasian Corps; was awarded the St. George Gold Sword for Bravery and the Cross of St. George. In 1917, commanded troops of the Petrograd military district; served as military governor of the Terek Region; commanded the troops of the Terek-Daghestan Territory; was undersecretary of the foreign minister of the Provisional Government. Lived in France after 1919; was an industrialist and one of the directors of a casino in Monte Carlo.

Ibrahim-bek Gaydarov (23 August, 1879, Derbent—date of death is unknown); railway engineer, member of the Third State Duma, where he represented the Daghestan Region. In 1917, was elected member of the Central Committee of the Union of the United Mountain People; commissar of the Daghestan region. Minister of Post and Telegraph of the Mountain Republic; in 1919, participated in the Versailles Peace Conference in France, in 1921, emigrated to Paris where he worked as a draftsman at the Renault factory. In the mid-1920s, moved to Turkey where he started his own business as a railway engineer.

Les Archives de la Grande Loge de France, Box 5.
ommended by P. Polovtsev and L. Kandaurov and interviewed by P. Polovtsev, D. Sheremetev, and V. Vyazemsky (on 2 and 15 November); was initiated on 15 December, 1923 into the first (pupil) grade.

He was followed by two men from Nalchik (Kabarda) and one from Nazran, whom Khagondokov, born in Kabarda, knew well: they were Izmail Shakov from Kabarda,¹³ Balkarian Tau-Sultan Shakmanov,¹⁴ and Ingush Murzala Kuriev.¹⁵ K. Khagondokov recommended them all. It seems that they were initiated on the same day. Izmail Shakov was recommended by D. Sheremetev, however there were two unofficial recommendations from Khagondokov and Gaydarov; S. Novoselov, one of the interviewers, mentioned this in his report. Shakov applied on 8 June, 1924 and was interviewed on 8 and 9 July, 1924 by D. Sheremetev, S. Novoselov, and K. Khagondokov. Ingush Murzala Kuriev applied on 14 June, 1924. He was officially recommended by D. Shereme-

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¹³ Izmail Shakov (6 April, 1878, Nalchik Area, Terek Region-no later than 1945 in France?). Doctor of Medicine, specialized in gynecology and obstetrics; freemason; graduated from the medical faculty of Kiev University; worked in the provinces, graduated from a surgery course at the Red Cross hospital in Elisavetgrad. In 1914-1917, owned a surgical hospital in Grozny. In 1920, emigrated to Constantinople, in 1923 moved to Paris.

¹⁴ Tau-Sultan Shakmanov (3 July, 1885, Nalchik, Terek Region-date and place of death unknown), a lawyer, public and political figure, freemason; studied at the Kharkov Institute of Technology; graduated from the Department of Law, Moscow University; worked in Vladikavkaz as an assistant of a lawyer; was involved in the Central Committee of the Union of the United Mountain People; chaired the Kabarda National Committee; in the Civil War, fought in the ranks of the Kabarda Brigade of the Volunteer Army; emigrated to Constantinople; in 1924, moved to France and lived in Paris and environs.

¹⁵ Murzala Kuriev (26 November, 1882, Nazran, Terek Region-7 September, 1952, Munich, Germany); colonel of the Ingush Regiment, industrialist, freemason; graduated from the Tiflis Military College; fought in the Russo-Japanese war; during World War I, fought in the Chechen Cavalry Regiment, which was part of the Savage Division; during the Civil War, commanded the Ingush Regiment but was not involved in the actual fighting; owned oil-rich areas. In 1920, he emigrated to Constantinople; in 1921, he moved to Paris.
tev and interviewed by A. Mamontov, V. Vyazemsky, and V. Lyshchinsky-Troekurov on 8 and 9 July, 1924. Tau-Sultan (Kelemet) Shakmanov was recommended by K. Khagondokov and D. Sheremetev.\textsuperscript{16} He applied on 20 June, 1924 and was interviewed by D. Sheremetev, A. Mordvinov, and S. Novoselov on 3 and 10 July, 1924.\textsuperscript{17} The three new members from the Northern Caucasus were initiated on the same day, 12 July, 1924.

During 1923-1924, three Georgians were initiated: A. Amilakhvari, who was the second after K. Khagondokov, A. Vachnadze, and A. Andronnikov. A. Amilakhvari filed his application on 11 June, 1923\textsuperscript{18}; he was recommended by P. Polovtsov and interviewed on 17 June and 22 September, 1923

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Photo 5}
K. Khagondokov’s recommendation to T. Shakmanov.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} Dmitry Sheremetev, Count (20 May/1 June, 1885, St. Petersburg-23 December, 1963, Paris, buried in the Sainte-Genèvieve-des-Bois Cemetery), Gentleman of the Bedchamber at the Supreme Court, businessman; studied at the law department of St. Petersburg University; served in the Horse Guards Regiment; during World War I, served in the headquarters of the Northern Front; in 1919, emigrated to Constantinople; the next year arrived in France, where he lived in Paris.

\textsuperscript{17} Les Archives de la Grande Loge de France, Box 6.

\textsuperscript{18} Alexander Amilakhvari, Prince (20 November, 1879, Gori, Georgia-21 August, 1968, New York), colonel of the guards, freemason; graduated from the Tiflis Cadet Corps and the Corps of Pages; in World War I, fought with the Kabarda
by P. Polovtsev, V. Dezobri, and I. Tkhorzhevsky.\textsuperscript{19} He was initiated on 29 September, 1923 into the first (pupil) grade. Alexander Vachnadze\textsuperscript{20} applied on 15 February, 1924.\textsuperscript{21} He was recommended by V. Vyazemsky and interviewed by V. Vyazemsky, V. Lyshchinsky-Troekurov, and B. Furstenberg on 3 April and 4 May, 1924; he was initiated together with new members from the Northern Caucasus on 12 July, 1924. Archil Andronnikov, another Georgian, applied on 16 March, 1924\textsuperscript{22}; he was recommended by D. Sheremetev and T. Maksheev, interviewed on 2 and 8 May by P. Bobrinsky, D. Sheremetev, and A. Mamontov, and initiated on 10 May, 1924.

For a better understanding of why these people were elected for membership in the lodge, we need to look deeper into their political and religious-philosophical views.

### Political Views of the Caucasian Freemasons

I have already quoted Leonty Kandaurov, who saw the aim of Russian freemasonry in France as “involvement of the masons in restoring life in Russia.”\textsuperscript{23} This means that the views and opinions about Russia, the future form of governance in Russia, and the attitude to the future of national regions of the former Russian Empire, the Caucasus included, were the central political issue among the freemasons.

When describing the gist of Russian freemasonry of the Scottish Rite in emigration, Petr Buryshkin specifically stressed that “it is a national Russian organization … the contacts of which with the traditions and spirituality of Russian freemasonry of the past are very much alive.”\textsuperscript{24} He further specified: “I said that Russian masonry was national. This should not be taken to mean that it is intolerant of other nations. Members of all tribes and peoples of the Russian state conglomerate were actively involved in the Masonic lodge set up by the Russians—there were Great Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Poles, Russian Germans, nationalities (the word was replaced with people born in the Caucasus.—I.B.) of the Caucasus and others who had the great Russian culture (here and hereafter italics mine.—I.B.) and their moral and political rejection of the Bolsheviks in common.”\textsuperscript{25} This means that the main condition of membership in the Astrea Lodge was a positive attitude to Russia, the Russian Empire, and the Russian culture.

Petr Polovtsov stressed that Profane Khagondokov “has wide political views that combined reasonable Russian patriotism with deep-seated devotion to his native Kabarda tribe.” The Profane believed that in the future, “the peoples living on the peripheries of Russia will have to reunite with it for economic and political reasons.” The fact that “after the revolution too few people in the Caucasus can think at the state level” was one of the key political factors in the region. Konstantin

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\textsuperscript{19} Les Archives de la Grande Loge de France, Box 7.
\textsuperscript{20} Alexander-Irakly (Irakly-Alexander Vachnadze), Prince (6 March 1885, Tiflis Gubernia-October 1957, France, buried in the Sainte-Genèvieve-des-Bois Cemetery); captain, studied in the Oriental Languages Department, St. Petersburg University; graduated from the Alexeevskoe Military College and the automobile school in St. Petersburg; fought in World War I, was awarded a St. George Order; emigrated in 1920; lived in Paris from 1924.
\textsuperscript{21} Les Archives de la Grande Loge de France, Box 7.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{23} P.A. Buryshkin, op. cit., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{24} P.A. Buryshkin, Istoria Russkogo Masonstva v emigratsii, Handwritten rough copy, Les Archives de la Grande Loge de France, Box 3, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 13.
Khagondokov believed that the monarchy was the only acceptable form of governance for Russia, “since only a strong monarchic government will pacify Russia,” although he also recognized parliamentarianism. He said that new Russia should acquire an “all-imperial sejm,” in which all and every person should have the right to speak out and which should be based on disproportionate representation. He argued that “the voices of the smaller peoples,” by which he meant the North Caucasian peoples in particular, “will remain unheard in the masses of Russian representation” in conditions of proportionate representation. He further wrote that the national peripheries, Turkestan, Siberia, and the Caucasus, need broad local self-administration, of which they had been deprived in the Russian Empire (it was an “over-centralized” country, the harm of which was obvious). M. Kazarin also wrote that Khagondokov believed that “the Caucasian tribes cannot live separately and independently from Russia and that for historical, economic, and geographic considerations, their unification with Russia is inevitable.”

26

Tau-Sultan Shakmanov, likewise, stressed that all peoples should be involved in governing new Russia. When talking to Sheremetev, he stressed that “the regime [of Russia] should be representative, irrespective of whether the country is a monarchy or a democratic republic… It should be educating for the masses and create the best possible conditions for the majority of its population… When talking about future relations between the Caucasus and Russia, he sees them not as a new conquest by the use of force, but as a federation with a clear understanding by the Caucasus of its place and role in this federation. The Profane believes that these federative relations will be practiced in Russia ruled by law.” Shakmanov “does not attach great importance to the state order, since it is nothing more than a method of realization and depends on the historical reasons and special features of any given nationality.” He attached great importance to the ideas and aims pursued by the State and the methods it employed. “When talking about Russia, he remains convinced that not only the Caucasus cannot exist without Russia, but also that the Caucasus needs Russian culture per se. In the past there was the danger of Turkic influence, but having dealt with the Turks at closer range, the Caucasus lost its respect for them, being aware that they were totally uncultured. On the other hand, Russian culture became blended with the Caucasus and it cannot flourish without it.” Konstantin Khagondokov, who also spoke to Shakmanov, wrote in his recommendations of 8 July, 1923 that Shakmanov “had and has no evil designs against Russia and its interests” and that he was prepared to carry out social work “among the mountain people of the Caucasus, not only in the narrow national sense, but also in the wider sense of Russia’s state interests, which contains within its boundaries many millions of so-called inorodtsy (non-Russian.—Ed.).”

27

Dmitry Sheremetev pointed out that Ibrahim-bek Gaydarov was convinced that Russia needed a strong centralized government and that not only Russia, but also all other peoples should be granted the right of extensive self-administration. “He, as an Inorodets, will probably be forced to fight against this government, depending on what it is, that is, he thinks that complete unification with the Russian State will be possible only if it is organized strongly and reasonably … but local self-administration should be extended.” In the Caucasus, “schools and religion should be very special. The Muslims, who are the second largest group after the Russians, should play a greater role and serve as a link between Russia and the Muslim world.” Gaydarov deemed it necessary to specify: “Daghestan needs special governance, but this should be connected with the common governance of the State. The Caucasus is economically connected with Russia and the idea of its independence is utopian. The interests of the populations of Daghestan and Azerbaijan are common, which means that they may have common representatives in Moscow… When talking about sympathy toward Turkey, he was convinced that despite this sympathy, Russian culture is higher than...
Turkish culture, and it has become rooted in people’s minds to the extent that it will always enjoy greater influence.”

The interview with Shakov on political issues was less positive—he was more “nationalist-minded;” he placed “the historically developed culture of the Kabardins and its moral principles” very high and feared that the continued existence of the Kabardins in Russia would speed up their assimilation. On the other hand, he said “that a flower turns toward the light, which shines for Kabarda from the North. Kabarda never rejected Russian statehood,” while association with Turkey did not correspond to its immediate interests. It is interesting to note that Shakov was not ready to revise the status of women and stressed “the chivalry toward women among the Kabardins, who never contemplated women’s equality.”

In his recommendation to Murzala Kuriev, A. Mamontov deemed it necessary to stress that the “Kuriev family has been well-known in their tribe from time immemorial because of its loyalty to Russia and service in the Russian Army.” Kuriev’s great grandfather, grandfather, and father served in the Imperial Escort. Mamontov wrote that Kuriev himself “has all the best features of the North Caucasian mountain people, which were eloquently described by our writers and poets, namely, honesty, straightforwardness, and noble convictions. The Profane is a Russian patriot and is eager to restore Great Russia.” Meanwhile, Kuriev believed that “in future Russia, all nationalities should be equal, including the Jews. Russian culture exerts a very positive impact on the Caucasian peoples; the Caucasus should remain within Russia with an autonomous status.”

Alexander Amilakhvari was also convinced that in the future, Russia should become “a free state with representative bodies and a federative organization.” Monarchy was a very much needed principle, which kept Russia together. “Relations between the nationalities should rest on equality and mutual respect;” this also included the Jews. “The peripheries tend in a very natural way toward Russia, while the federative structure will not only not interfere with, but add to the strength of our state ties if the single throne, common army, and unified international relations survive.”

Talking to Archil Andronnikov on 29 April, 1924, Mamontov pointed out that the Profane “was an ardent Georgian nationalist. As a member of one of the most prominent families with many centuries of serving the interests of Russia behind it, he cannot imagine Georgia and the Caucasus in general without close economic, cultural, and state ties with future Russia. He wants to see Georgia as an autonomous part of Russia. The Profane is a great Russian patriot. The future Russian state should be built on the equality of all citizens, Jews included. The Profane favors local self-administration.”

The political ideas of Irakly-Alexander Vachnadze32 received the most detailed coverage. He believed that a revolution in Russia could not be avoided and that the Bolsheviks “played a great role in the political education of the peasants. The masses were responsive, albeit mechanically, to their consistent and persistent propaganda,” therefore, the Profane thought, “constitutional monarchy was the best form of governance for Russia, since, he believed, the Russian people prefer undivided authority, which was represented by Lenin under the Bolsheviks. The Profane said that in Russia the personality of the monarch was much more important than the form of monarchy. He said that he did not see a person who could become a monarch of the cultural type and concluded that Russia should become a federative republic with extensive presidential powers.” He also added that “the huge territory of Russia and the patchwork nature of its population call for a federative republic.” New states, Georgia and others, cannot survive on their own; they will inevitably reunite with Russia on federative principles. They have already revealed their political inconsistency (the only result of activity of the Georgian Menshevik rulers is chauvinism, which is previously unheard of and alien to the Georgians).”

29 Les Archives de la Grande Loge de France, Box 5.
30 Ibidem.
31 Ibid., Box 7.
32 Ibidem.
The above confirms that all new members were loyal to Russia; they wanted to live in Russia; they accepted Russian culture even though practically all of them said that the Caucasus should enjoy more freedom.  

### Religious Convictions of the Caucasian Freemasons

According to the General Rite of the Astrea Lodge, “each and every one who joins the ranks of Russian Freemasons confirms that he cannot and should not be a non-believer or an atheist; he becomes a fighter for the spirit and the freedom of spirit against materialism and godlessness.” Pavel Buryshkin, in turn, wrote that Russian Masonry belonged to a “category of spiritual-religious formations.” The initiation procedure presupposed an oath on the Bible. This made the religious idea of the Lodge’s potential members highly important, which explains why the aspirants were interviewed about their religious-philosophical ideas or, rather, about their religious views, since the above-mentioned profanes had practically no philosophical ideas to speak of.

In his interview with Bennigsen, Khagondokov pointed out that he “belonged to Greek Orthodoxy” despite his Muslim parents. Gaydarov, Shakmanov, Shakov, and Kuriyev were Muslims. T. Shakmanov admitted that he knew next to nothing about Islam and was ready “to study the fundamentals of the world religions and world culture.” I. Shakov, “who being a Muslim, the faith the form and meaning of which he respected, had profound respect for all religions and was convinced that God is one for all people and that religion is a method of moving closer to the Divine Being.” The situation with M. Kuriyev was much more complicated. V. Lyschinsky-Troekurov wrote that Kuriyev “is a faithful Muslim who performs all religious rites and who believes that faith is the foundation of morals,” which meant that he would hardly agree to take an oath on the Bible. P. Polovtsov wrote the following about I. Gaydarov: “He places his Muslim religion very high and is convinced that when correctly interpreted it supplies man with a lofty ideal… There should be no separation of the Church from the state in a Muslim country because Islam rules schools, courts of justice, etc. Any Dagestani feels comfortable with the Shari’a and adats as a code of laws and will hardly understand anything else.” When talking about pan-Islamism, which was very popular at that time, Gaydarov pointed to Kemal Pasha, who was guided by its principles. “Pan-Islamism cannot be viewed as a factor of history since historical traditions differ from country to country while Islam allows all of its followers to find a common language of spiritual communication.” He approved of “certain reforms in the Muslim faith related, in particular, to the status of women, distorted by the mullahs.” Petr Polovtsev recommended him with the words: “His faith will not interfere with membership in the lodge but, on the contrary, will help him become a good freemason.”

There were no religious problems with the Georgians, who were Orthodox Christians tolerant of other religions. A. Andronnikov, for example, said that “he is familiar with Islam and thinks
highly of the Koran.” A. Amilakhvari said that “Orthodoxy meets all his requirements, but he respects all other religions and is deeply tolerant.”

The opinions of the interviewers of the future freemasons. Here is what the interviewers wrote about the people from the North and South Caucasus invited to the lodge: “material suitable for further perfection” (V. Lyshchinsky about I. Vachnadze); “there is a good potential in him” (V. Vyazemsky about I. Vachnadze); “good material for further improvement” (D. Sheremetev about A. Andronnikov); and “rather raw, but promising” (B. Dezobri about A. Amilakhvari). V. Vyazemsky wrote the following about I. Gaydarov: “A good, but still half savage nature … material for moving from what is promising to something more real that is there” and about M. Kuriev: “My first impression was far from favorable—a very reserved and passive person. My further acquaintance convinced me that it would be wrong to measure him by the Russian ‘Slavic’ standards. I am inclined to think that his purely Oriental apathy and indifference conceals a whole-hearted and good nature. He is not a star, but might prove to be a reliable stone.”

How did people from the Caucasus explain their desire to join the lodge? Here are their answers to the interviewers. I. Vachnadze stressed that “he wants to join us in the hope of finding support and development of his spiritual and moral requirements [wrote V. Vyazemsky]; he does not like political parties and for this reason has not joined any of them.” B. Dezobri pointed out that A. Amilakhvari “is seeking contacts with strong and united people who, as he sees it, are the only ones who can create the foundations for building Russia. He wants to serve his motherland and he expects that freemasonry will give him a chance to choose the right road where he can be as useful as possible for

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42 Les Archives de la Grande Loge de France, Box 7.
43 Ibid., Box 5.
future Russia and masonry.” In the course of his interview, K. Khagondokov said about M. Kazarin that “the Profane regards masonry as a means for Russia’s revival.”

Activities of the Astrea Lodge and of its Caucasian Members. The lodge functioned through reports, collective work, fulfillment of individual tasks, helping brothers, and taking care of them. The reports dealt with the past, present, and future of Russia. On 23 May, 1923, the lodge initiated a conference called *Russia’s Civilizational Actions in the Caucasus*.

Achievements of the Caucasian members—moving from lower grades to higher. Armenian S. Lianozov, Kabardin K. Khagondokov, Lezghian I. Gaydarov and Georgian A. Amilakhvari showed the best results—they reached the third (master) grade; the latter three were made masters on the same day, 15 November, 1924. I. Shakov, T. Shakmanov and M. Kuriev remained in the lower (pupil) grade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>First Grade</th>
<th>Second Grade</th>
<th>Third Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>26.05.1923</td>
<td>26.05.1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Khagondokov</td>
<td>23.06.1923</td>
<td>29.05.1924</td>
<td>15.11.1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Gaydarov</td>
<td>15.12.1923</td>
<td>25.10.1924</td>
<td>15.11.1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Amilakhvari</td>
<td>29.09.1923</td>
<td>29.05.1924</td>
<td>15.11.1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Andronnikov</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>M. Kuriev</td>
<td>12.07.1924</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Shakov</td>
<td>12.07.1924</td>
<td></td>
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<td>T. Shakmanov</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Vachnadze</td>
<td>12.07.1924</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Lodge of the Golden Fleece

The lodge started its history from the preliminary stage when on 12 November, 1924 it was decided to set up a lodge under the slightly different title of Symbolique à l’Or. In later documents drawn up in December 1924, the lodge was referred to as the Lodge of the Golden Fleece. Its 19 members (nearly all of them from the Caucasus) used to belong to the Astrea Lodge: L. Kandaurov (the founder), K. Khagondokov, D. Sheremetev, I. Gaydarov, E. Lianozov, I. Shakov, and S. Rotinov born in Tiflis, V. Kochubey and A. Shakh-Nazarov (the Caucasus), M. Kuriev, T. Shakmanov, and Yu. Semenov born in the Caucasus, I. Vachnadze, A. Seydeler, and P. Steingel born in Vladikavkaz, N. Goleevsky (military expert in Oriental studies), A. Andronnikov, A. Amilakhvari, and S. Zilberstein (born in Odessa). There were several new members—Alexander S. Shakh-Nazarov, an Armenian

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44 Ibidem.
45 Ibid., Box 3.
46 Pavel Steingel, Baron (2 July, 1880, Vladikavkaz, Terek Region-24 August, 1965, Château d’Abondant, outside Paris, buried in the cemetery in Chaville), engineer technologist, built a tile factory in Grozny; was involved in the oil business; organized an irrigation system on the lower Terek; fought in the Civil War; reached France via Constantinople; lived in Paris from 1920.
from Moscow, who used to belong to the Garibaldi Lodge. According to the lists of members of the Lodge of the Golden Fleece, he was admitted to the Garibaldi Lodge on 7 June, 1922; on 4 April, 1923 he was awarded the second, and on 13 April, 1924, the fourth grade. The offices were distributed in the following way: Master—L. Kandaurov, Orator—N. Goleevsky, First Sentinel—D. Sheremetev; Treasurer—Yu. Semenov; Second Sentinel—I. Gaydarov; Secretary—A. Seydeler; Hosp (the lowest and so far unclarified office)—S. Lianozov. This means that there were two members with third grades who had offices in the new lodge. There is another document in which A. Amilakhvari, K. Khagondokov and A. Shakh-Nazarov are listed as holding certain lower offices.

According to the document the new Lodge of the Golden Fleece was registered in the Grande Loge de France on 16 January, 1925; the final decision was passed on 25 January, 1925.

The lists that appeared at on the Virtual Website of Dmitry Galkovsky allow us to say that in the two years of the lodge’s existence, the following people from the Caucasus were involved in its functioning: 8 members from the Northern Caucasus: Ajigoev Pkhemat (initiated on 26.12.1925; retired from the lodge on 31.12.1926); Bammat Gaydar (initiated on 29.4.1925; raised to second grade on 10.10.1925, to third grade on 4.8.1926; retired on 31.12.1926); Baduev (Badi) Abduk-Mejid (initiated on 28.2.1925; raised to the second grade on 27.6.1925, to the third grade on 28.1.1926; retired on 31.12.1926); Dalgat Aziz-Girei (initiated on 26.12.1925; retired on 26.12.1926); Janbekov Ruslan Aliievich (initiated on 29.4.1925; retired on 26.12.1926); Namitok Aytek Alievich (initiated on 29.4.1925; raised to the second grade on 10.10.1925, to the third grade on 4.8.1926; retired on 31.12.1926); Chermoev Osman (initiated on 28.11.1925; retired on 31.12.1926); Shipshev Jembakh Temirkhan (initiated on 29.4.1925; raised to the second grade on 24.4.1926; retired on 31.12.1926); 5 Georgians: Gvazava Geogy (initiated on 27.3.1926; retired on 31.12.1926); Gobechia Iosif (initiated on 29.5.1926; retired on 31.12.1926); Karamudze Shalva (initiated on 31.1.1925; worked under the guidance of D. Sheremetev; retired on 31.12.1926); Kobiev Ter-Mikelovich (initiated around 28.11.1925); Khachalava Yakov (initiated on 27.3.1926; retired on 31.12.1926); 2 Armenians: Gurjian Akop (initiated on 27.3.1926); Ter-Osipov Pavel (initiated on 31.1.1925; raised to the second grade on 27.6.1925; worked under the guidance of Yu. Semenov); 4 Azeris: Gajinsky Sadyk Bek (initiated on 29.4.1925); Kassim-zade Kassim (initiated on 31.1.1925; retired on 31.12.1926); Mir-Kasimov Abidin (initiated on 29.4.1925; worked under the guidance of L. Kandaurov; retired on 31.12.1926); and Khajibeyli Jeykhann (initiated on 28.2.1925). Nearly all of them were initiated during 1925.

We can rely on this list to see how far those members of the Caucasus who belonged to the Astrea Lodge moved:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Second grade</th>
<th>Third grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Andronnikov</td>
<td>27.06.1925</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Kuriev</td>
<td>28.03.1925</td>
<td>23.05.1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. Shakmanov</td>
<td>28.03.1925</td>
<td>23.05.1925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

47 Alexander Semenovich Shakh-Nazarov (10 August, 1896 [20 July, 1895 according to other sources]-17 January, 1933, lived in Paris, buried in the Thiais Cemetery), officer, cinema actor and director; graduated from the Nikolaevskoe Cavalry College; fought in World War I in the Zaamursky Cavalry Regiment and later in the Alexandriysky Hussars Regiment, took part in the Civil War; emigrated to France.
48 Les Archives de la Grande Loge de France, Box 5.
49 [http://samizdat.com].
50 Sadyk Bek Gajinsky (23 April, 1890, Baku-20 April, 1929, France), worked in the oil business, emigrated to France after 1917.
The grades of other “old members” did not change.

The history of the lodge (history of the Jupiter and Prometheus lodges) is clearly described in two important documents found in two archives:


These documents cited 25 January, 1925 as the foundation date of the lodge.

“The lodge was set up to bring the French Masonic light into the milieu of people from the Caucasus and give them a chance to set up their own Franco-Masonic lodges later, in their homeland. The following inorodtsy were meant: Georgians, Armenians, the mountain people of the Northern Caucasus, and Azeris. The Russian and inorodtsy founders of the lodge (the latter were initiated in the Astrea Lodge) agreed that the former would remain members of the lodge for two years and were expected to educate the inorodtsy in Freemasonry and instruct them, after which the brothers would leave the Golden Fleece Lodge to start their own; if they stayed, the Russians would leave.” In 1925, L. Kandaurov was appointed Worshipful Master, in 1926, the title went to Sheremetev. It seems that the lodge was a “school in masonry” set up to educate its members from the Caucasus rather than a functioning Masonic lodge.

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51 Archives of the Etoile du Nord Lodge, Box FM 8-4, The Manuscript Department of the Mitterrand Bibliothèque nationale de France.

Those Caucasian members (25 people in all) who retired from the Lodge of the Golden Fleece set up a Prometheus Lodge with the consent and approval and under the jurisdiction of La Grande Loge de France.

According to the initial plan, the lodge functioned for two years, from 1925 to 1926. Leonty Kandaurov wrote the following in this respect: “After two years the first alternative proved to be the only acceptable one because the Armenian members did not want to separate from the Russians, although other inorodtsy formulated different or even contradictory demands. The impression was created that they did not know what they really wanted. In December 1926, after suitable parental persuasion these brothers lodged their resignations from the Golden Fleece Lodge. They were accepted, but several Russian members also left. After that the lodge was given the new name Jupiter.”

In his Notes, Pavel Buryshkin said the same and offered a very important comment: “This experience of joint work between the Russians and representatives of the Caucasian peoples failed. No cohesion between the Russian and Caucasian members was achieved; the non-Russian part of the lodge was split by tension and disagreements especially between the Armenians and Georgians. Long talks brought no agreement” and the lodge fell apart.53

There were two types of disagreements in the lodge:

1. between the Russian and Caucasian members and
2. between the Armenians (S. Lianozov and A. Shakh-Nazarov) and the Georgians (A. Amilakhvari, I. Vachnadze, and A. Andronnikov).

Since at some later date the Armenians preferred to side with the Russians rather than with the Caucasian members, we can conclude that they disagreed over Russia, its future, and the place of the Caucasus in new Russia.

53 See: P.A. Buryshkin, Istoria russikh masonsikh lozh, p. 29.
The following fact speaks volumes. Pavel Buryshkin wrote that “people who belong to all national groups, profess different religions, and have different political convictions meet at Russian Masonic gatherings as brothers. Against the background of emigrant turbulence, this makes masonry an oasis of tranquility and peaceful construction even of the most contradictory elements of emigration. Throughout the entire history of the Russian lodges, there was not a single religious or political clash, not a single manifestation of intolerance or lack of respect for the convictions of others.”

The author deliberately passed over in silence the history of the Caucasian lodge and, most importantly, referred to it as insignificant. It should be said that when the author gathered materials for his Notes, he left the materials on the Caucasian lodge aside. We can rely on the opinions of Leonty Kandaurov, who headed the lodge and compiled the first history of the lodges in 1928-1929.

The Jupiter Lodge

The Armenians remained with the Russians in the Golden Fleece Lodge, which retained its registration number (536) and changed its name to Jupiter. Armenian Stepan Lianozov, about whom Buryshkin wrote in his Notes that “he was very successful,” was appointed its head. The North Caucasian members, together with Russians and Jews, set up the Prometheus Lodge.

This means that the following people should have remained in the Jupiter Lodge: S. Lianozov, A. Shakh-Nazarov, A. Gurjian, and P. Ter-Osipov. In fact, A. Shakh-Nazarov moved to the Prometheus Lodge together with the North Caucasian members. S. Lianozov joined the new lodge and, as a founding member, acquired the title of Worshipful Master from the very first day of its existence. He left it in late 1927. Armenians A. Gurjian and P. Ter-Osipov also belonged to this lodge. However, Ter-Osipov left together with Lianozov, while Gurjian remained its member until 1935 and left it after reaching the third grade. One Armenian (I. Galamian) and one Azeri joined the lodge; it met in the Russian Masonic House at 29, Rue Yvette.

The Prometheus Lodge

Twenty-five non-Russian members who left the Lodge of the Golden Fleece set up the Prometheus Lodge under the jurisdiction of La Grande Loge de France; all the Caucasian members joined it, except those who preferred to stay behind. S. Zilberstein became the Worshipful Master, since none of the Caucasian members had the required three years of membership on their records. The Lodge was instituted on 19 January, 1927; it closely cooperated with La Grande Loge de France under No. 558 according to the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry; it was set up to train people to join masonry in the Caucasus.

According to Buryshkin, “at first the Lodge was very active.” In 1927, several more people from the Caucasus joined it. They were Azeris Ayub-Semgog Amin (initiated on 21.5.1927; raised to the second grade on 17.12.1927); Zeki Abdullah (initiated on 5.6.1927; raised to the second grade on 17.12.1927 and to the third grade on 28.7.1928); Sultan-Zade Khosrau-Bey (initiated on 19.2.1927); Georgian Shirtladze David (initiated on 19.2.1927); people from the Northern Caucasus Tukaev Saiid Amin (initiated on 16.4.1927); Chermoev Abdul-Mejid (initiated on 2.4.1927); Chermoev Abu-Bakar (initiated on 5.3.1927; raised to the second grade on 17.12.1927); and Chermoev Magomet (initiated on 18.6.1927). The lodge was funded by Abdul-Mejid Chermoev. A year later, early in 1928, an outflow of Georgians and some of the North Caucasian members began. In 1928, the lodge was still functioning with K. Khagondokov as its Master. It was finally closed early in 1930.

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55 P.A. Buryshkin, Istoria russkh masonskikh lozh, p. 29.
So far, no materials related to its functioning in 1927 have been found and the nature of its activities remains unknown. We can rely on a comment by Leonty Kandaurov: “This is temporary failure caused by the miscalculations of those who set up the Golden Fleece Lodge as an independent Franco-Masonry composed of inorodtsy from among the Caucasian nationalities. The founders had overestimated the brothers, whom they planned to educate in only two years. This task probably required a much longer period of supervision. The present author remains convinced that it is too early to conclude that this supervision is doomed to a failure… There are elements among the Caucasian nationalities responsive to the ideas of freemasonry.”

There is only one document related to T. Shakmanov, which says that he was expelled from the lodge on 14 January, 1930 for non-payment of membership dues. The document speaks of the Prometheus Lodge as part of the Astrea Lodge, which means that Prometheus largely continued the traditions of the “school of masonry” rather than functioning as a full-fledged independent lodge.

Further Lives of the Caucasian Freemasons within the Masonic Context

The fate of Ibrahim-bek Gaydarov was very interesting. He left the Prometheus Lodge in 1928 to go to Turkey where he joined a Turkish Masonic lodge; there is a corresponding document from the Grand Lodge of Turkey dated 1935.

Petr Polovtsev opened a new school called Aurore Boréale, of which he was master in 1925-1926. Its membership partly consisted of the former members of Astrea. K. Khagondokov, who was a member of the North Caucasian lodge, started visiting it in 1924; he became Tyler (Outer Guard) and later Grand Standard Bearer; he left late in 1929.

The Friends of Philosophy Lodge was founded in 1925 and functioned in the Russian Masonic House on Rue Yvette. It was headed by P. Bobrinsky, another member of the Astrea Lodge; L. Kandaurov was its member, along with several people from the Caucasus, including S. Liashov. He remained its member until 1938 and was raised to several consecutive grades: the fourth on 9.01.1935; the ninth on 8.5.1935; the thirteenth on 11.12.1935; and the fourteenth on 27.5.1936. K. Khagondokov also joined the lodge (raised to the fourteenth grade on 15.12.1927 and was made the Second Inner Guard in 1929). Throughout 1927, K. Khagondokov recommended three people from the Northern Caucasus: I. Shakov, with whom Khagondokov had been member of the Astrea Lodge; G. Bammat (raised to the fourth grade in 1927); and A. Namitok (raised to the fourth grade in 1927).

The L’Etoile du Nord lodge proved to be a long-liver—set up in Paris in 1924 it survived until the late 1960s; Armenians were especially active in it; Gayto Gazdanov, a prominent Osset writer and the lodge’s last Master, was also its member (more details in the next article).

Conclusion

The materials from the French archives related to the history of Russian masonry revealed that at the first stage of drawing people from the Caucasus to the Russian Masonic lodges in France, it was prominent Russian masons with great pre-revolutionary Masonic experience in Russia who played a great role.

Future members from the Caucasus were selected on the basis of their attitude to Russia, the Russian Empire, Russian culture, Russian politics in the national peripheries, relations with the peoples of Russia, and the future of the Caucasus as part of Russia. This means that at the first stage the Caucasian members demonstrated a pro-Russian orientation; it was much more pronounced among those

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56 Archives of l’Etoile du Nord Loge, Box FM8-4.
who had “worked” for the Russian Empire. It was not easy for the Caucasian émigrés in France to correlate their political and ethnic identities; in many cases their political orientation prevailed.\(^\text{57}\)

At the first stage, the aims of the Russian and Caucasian masons were very different. The Russian masons wanted to “educate” their Caucasian colleagues, to overcome their nationalist convictions, and to draw them into active work within the lodge. The Caucasian members, in turn, looked at their membership as a form of their adaptation to emigration, the quest for new forms of public activities being less important. Practically none of them had their own inner reasons to join a lodge; many of them joined lodges after they settled in Paris.

\textit{At the second stage}, those who had already tasted masonry invited their compatriots whom they had known at home, in the Caucasus. At that stage, their ideas or their involvement in public life were not so important, their Caucasian origin being the main criterion.

The archives of the Russian Masonic lodges and two histories (Kandaurov’s of 1929 and Buryshkin’s of 1952) offer enough information about the first stage of the Caucasian Masonic membership and practically no information about the second stage. The two histories merely say that the experience of setting up a Caucasian Masonic lodge failed.

It seems that the Caucasian members could not overcome their nationalist feelings to arrive at a single political and philosophical platform within these lodges. They occupied themselves with writing reports on the situation in the Caucasus; the main results of their activity in the Russian Masonic lodges were enriching the Russian sociopolitical movement in France with the experience of certain Caucasian leaders, while the Caucasian sociopolitical movement developed the spiritual life of their compatriots and deepened their public political ideas.

Introduction

Georgian-Baltic relations have a history of more than ten centuries; however, until recently they have not been a subject of monographic study.

Over the past five years, I have written a number of articles in Georgian and English, exploring the principal facts reflecting the millennium-long history of military and political, commercial, economic, and scientific-cultural relations of the Georgian and Baltic peoples. In 2011, Tbilisi University Press published my monograph Essays on the History of Georgian-Baltic Relations.

Georgia and the Baltics are geographically distant from each other. From the anthropological and ethnolinguistic standpoint, Georgians differ considerably both from Estonians and their interrelated nations, Latvians and Lithuanians; however, these peoples have much in common ideologically. They resemble each other with respect to their aspiration for freedom and selfless patriotism.

Georgian-Baltic relations have always been relatively strong and, specifically, have at times been of an interstate nature and at other times not. Owing to historical misfortunes, at different times, some Georgians have acted in the territory of the Baltic states not as military or civil servants of Georgia, but rather of other states (mostly as those of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and Germany). Some Baltic nationals have also visited Georgia at different times on similar missions. Irrespective of that, their activities must be studied in order to have a view of the epoch in question.

This paper explores the activities of the Georgian (or of Georgian decent) generals and officers (who later became generals) of the Russian army who either served in the Baltic countries beginning in the late 17th century until World War I, or were associated with the region.

The paper is divided into 11 sub-chapters.

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In 1697-1698, Russian Czar Peter I (from 1721 Emperor of Russia) visited European countries to become acquainted with artillery and shipbuilding. This was known as the Great Embassy. It has been dealt with by the following scholars—N. Ustrialov,⁴ M. Bogoslovskiy,⁵ N. Pavlenko,⁶ J. Vateishvili,⁷ etc.

At the beginning of March 1697, the Great Embassy departed from Moscow. Prince Alexander (in Georgian—Alexandre) A. Bagration-Imeretinskiy (1674-1711) occupied a respectful position among the closest associates of Peter I. He was the son and heir of Archil II (1646-1713), King of Imereti and Kakheti, and, simultaneously, a Georgian cultural activist, writer, and leader of the new Georgian settlement in Moscow.

It should also be noted that the Bagrationi dynasty reigned in Georgia from the 9th century to the early 19th century.⁸

During the Great Embassy mission, Peter I was enrolled in the 2nd squad of volunteers and Alexander in the 3rd squad.⁹

N. Pavlenko noted: “Initially, the squad of volunteers numbered 30 people and was divided into three groups of ten led by foremen. Later, the squad was joined by five more people, among them Imeretian Prince Alexander and volunteers Alexander and Gavriil Menshikov, Alexander Kikin, and Fedosey Skliaev. Prince Alexander would later become a renowned associate of Peter the Great.”¹⁰

On 2 March, 1687, the vanguard departed from Moscow, followed, a week later, by the core of the Embassy: more than 250 people, including a suite and subservients (doctors, cooks, servants, jesters). The Embassy was supplied with a squad of so-called volunteers of 35 people, made up of representatives from various strata of society associated with the court circles. It was headed by Commander Prince A.M. Cherkasskiy, whose subordinates included the king himself, participating in the Embassy incognito as one of the three “foremen”-volunteers, as “striker Peter Mikhailov,” and two of the volunteers who were directly associated with the monarch. They were Alexander Bagrationi and Alexander Menshikov—perhaps the closest people to Peter I.

Participation in the Russian Great Embassy to Western Europe by Alexander Bagrationi and his suite consisting of three Georgians (his servants, their identity was not established) was an extraordinary event, perhaps even unprecedented in terms of not only the history of Russian-Georgian relations, but also the history of Georgia and the Georgian-Western European relations.

Alexander was an independent official member of the Russian Embassy to Western Europe, having been endowed with well-defined powers and duties as a high-ranking and active member of the Embassy.¹¹

On 22 March, the Great Embassy arrived in Pskov. On 25 March, it crossed the Russian-Swedish border. On the border, it was welcomed and accompanied by representatives of Erik Dahlberg, Governor-General of Riga.

On 31 March, the Great Embassy arrived in Riga. When entering the town, the Embassy was granted luxurious coaches; among the greeters were 36 representatives of the Riga Brotherhood of

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⁵ See: M.M. Bogoslovskiy, Petr I. Materiały dla biografi, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1941, pp. 36-37.
⁸ See: N. Sychev, Kniga dinastii, Moscow, 2006, pp. 611-622.
¹⁰ N. Pavlenko, op. cit., pp. 60, 69.
Blackheads in full dress. The ambassadors’ entry into Riga was accompanied by the firing of cannons and playing of trumpets; the procession was escorted to the designated apartments for ambassadors by the infantry squads and burghers. Peter seemed to have been happy with the welcome, as is clear from his letter to A.A. Vinius on 1 April, 1697.12

Because of thin ice and the coming ice drift on the River Dvina, the Embassy had to stay in Riga for a week, leaving it on 8 April.

Peter was not very happy with the visit to Riga because the welcome was cold and unfriendly. The king’s unpleasant impression was somehow smoothed by the hospitality extended to him in Mitau (present-day Jelgava)—the capital of the Duchy of Courland, where he arrived on 14 April. There they were welcomed by Duke of Courland Friedrich Casimir, who invited the honorable guests to his palace and extended them an excellent welcome. As it traveled around various towns of Courland, the Embassy was welcomed with honor. It stayed in Courland for a week.13

“Stateyny list” rendered the hospitality in Mitau as follows: “...during the stay of the great and plenipotentiary ambassadors in Mitau, great and plenipotentiary ambassadors were courted by the principal’s bailiffs every day.”

However, Mitau did not boast of any power, industry, artillery park, or educational institutions. The king paid a visit to the local pharmacy, where he was shown a salamander kept in alcohol. However, he purchased one thing in Mitau, of which he notified Prince Caesar: “I could not find anything here appropriate for your personality; I am only sending something to Your Majesty for taking vengeance on your enemies.” “The thing” sent to Romodanovskiy was an ax, as can be seen from the reply of Prince Caesar to the king: the ax was tried out in practice; it was used to behead two criminals.14

On 22 April, together with volunteers and 70 soldiers, Peter the Great headed for Libau (present-day Liepāja). The rest of the suite was left in Mitau.15

On 2 May, accompanied by his friend, Peter the Great sailed on St George to Koenigsberg and saw the Baltic Sea for the first time.16

Prince Alexander stayed in Europe until the end of 1699. The young man, dressed in Georgian national costume, attracted overwhelming attention.17 At various times, he lived in Prussia (Koenigsberg), Holland (the Hague, Utrecht, Amsterdam), and Great Britain (London, Deptford, Woolwich), where he furthered his knowledge in martial arts. He was particularly keen on artillery.

On 19 May, 1700, A. Bagration-Imeretinskiy was appointed the first commander of the Russian artillery—General Feldzeugmeister.18

On 19 November, 1700, in the battle near Narva, the Russian army was severely defeated. The day after, together with other generals of the Russian army (Ya. Dolgorukiy, A. Golovin, I. Buturlin, A. Veide, I. Troubetskoy, and others), the Swedes imprisoned General Feldzeugmeister.

Peter the Great did his best to save his closest friend from imprisonment. The Swedes initially demanded 10 barrels of gold for the release of the Georgian prince and, later, the release of 60 Swedes imprisoned by Russians.19

The Russian king asked Alexander Bagrationi to share his opinion about the Swedish proposal. In his reply to Peter the Great on 6 September, 1710, the Georgian prince wrote: “The thought of any...

12 See: N. Pavlenko, op. cit., p. 64.
14 See: N. Pavlenko, op. cit., p. 66.
16 See: D.L. Vateishvili, op. cit.
19 See: M. Gonikishvilil, op. cit.
damage to the state, not only because of me but even because of them who are a thousand times better than me, is furthest from my mind. We must be patient and sacrifice our lives for the king and state interests.”

The ten years he spent in prison had an indelible effect on his health. On 3 February, 1711, when he was on his way to Russia following his release, he died on Piteå. At the age of 37, he died in the arms of Georgian monk Pancrateus (in the worldly life—Bagrat Sologashvili). The prince’s body was taken to Moscow and buried in the Don Monastery.

Thus, from 31 March to 22 April, 1697, Prince Alexander Bagration-Imeretinskiy was in the territory of Livland and Courland. He was the first representative of the Bagrationi dynasty who visited the Baltic countries.

2. Prince Afanasi L. Bagrationi and Prince George V. Bagrationi

Owing to the very complicated political situation in Kartli (central Georgia) by 1724, King Vakhtang VI (1675-1737), accompanied by a large (1,200 men) suite, fled to Russia. The imperial government provided for the upkeep of the members of the Georgian royal suite, most of whom stayed in Russia and lived and worked there.

Among those who settled in Russia were representatives of the Kartlian branch of the Bagrationi dynasty—Prince Afanasi (in Georgian—Adarnase) L. Bagrationi (1707-1784) and Prince George (in Georgian—Giorgi) V. Bagrationi (1712-1786).

Afanasi was the younger brother of King Vakhtang VI and George was the younger son of the monarch.

Beginning in the 1720s, the princes, like the majority of the Georgian royal suite, took active part in Russia’s military campaigns.

A. Bagrationi served in the Preobrazhenskiy and Ingermanland regiments. In 1755, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general, and, in 1771, to the rank of general-in-chief. In 1761, he was appointed a commandant of Moscow and, in 1764, a chief commandant. He was awarded the Order of St Andrew the First Called.

In 1755, Adarnase’s nephew, George Bagrationi, was promoted to the rank of major-general, in 1766, to the rank of lieutenant-general, and, later, of general-in-chief. On his grave in the Don Monastery, there was an inscription: “General-in-Chief and knight of various orders, Prince George the Georgian.”

G. Bagrationi took part in the Russia-Sweden war (1741-1743); this is what the press of the time wrote about his return: “On October 4, Georgian Prince George returned to Saint-Petersburg after the fortuitous ending of the campaign in Finland. He was in the navy.”

N. Shpilevskiy said that G. Bagrationi, who was the major-general of the Russian imperial army, led the grenadier and musketeer landing from galleys.
In 1747-1748, Prince A. Bagrationi and Prince G. Bagrationi took part in the Rheine campaign. G. Bagrationi was assigned to organize the galley navy to provide for a landing of troops from Kronstadt to Mitau.28

Thus, in 1747-1748, Prince Afanasi Bagrationi and Prince George Bagrationi fought in the territory of Courland.29

3. The Warfare of the Regiment of Georgian Hussars in the Baltics

Following the death of Vakhtang VI, most Georgian emigrants, with no hope of returning to Georgia, were obliged to become citizens of the Russian Empire.

On 8 June, 1738, the Russian Cabinet of Ministers approved a draft law submitted by the Senate on the establishment of “the squadron of Georgian hussars.”

In 1741, the said squadron was transformed into the Regiment of Georgian Hussars, enrolling up to 500 Georgians. Prominent poet David Guramishvili (1705-1792) was among them.

The Regiment of Georgian Hussars led by Colonel (later Lieutenant-General) Prince Elise (in Georgian—Edisher) P. Amilakhvari (died in 1767) took part in the Russia-Prussia war (1756-1762).

On 18 June, 1757, together with other units of the Russian armed forces, the Regiment of Georgian Hussars crossed the rivers Vil and Neman. Initially, they settled in the town of Kovna (Kaunas) and, later, in Schadow. Following that, they occupied Benzagol, Krokena, Rudsyuna, and Olita. On 25 June, they took Memel and, the day after, Gumbin. On 27 June, they took over the Prussians near Pichken Forest.30

Thus, in the seven year-long Russia-Prussia war (1756-1762), the Regiment of Georgian Hussars led by Prince Elise Amilakhvari and part of the Russian armed forces fought in the territory of Lithuania in June 1757.31

4. Prince Paul Tsitsianov/Tsitsishvili

In 1794, the Russian imperial army led by Alexander Suvorov campaigned in Poland. His army included Major-General (since 1793) Paul (in Georgian—Pavle) D. Tsitsianov (1754-1806), whose grandfather, Prince Paata Tsitsishvili, followed the suite of Vakhtang VI to Russia and settled there.

P. Tsitsianov became famous during a number of battles in that military campaign, particularly, during the capture of Vilna, for which he received a lot of awards. Specifically, he was awarded the Order of St George Third Class, a gold sword with diamonds and the inscription “For Courage,” and a homestead in the Minsk province with 1,500 serfs.32

The document issued on 15 September, 1794 stated that P. Tsitsianov was awarded the Order of St George: “In honor of his diligent service and great courage, ensuring the capture of the fortifica-

29 See: N. Javakhishvili, “Trace of Georgians in the Baltic Area (From the end of the 17th century to the first half of the 19th century),” pp. 242-243.
31 See: N. Javakhishvili, “Trace of Georgians in the Baltic Area (From the end of the 17th century to the first half of the 19th century),” pp. 244-245.
tions and the city of Vilna, where, leading the troops, he defeated the enemy and participated in the victory.\textsuperscript{33}

Immigrant writer Shalva Amirejibi (1886-1943) wrote: “During the wars against Poland, Tsitsishvili, already a general, was awarded the Order of St George for the capture of the entrenchments of Vilna. Empress Catherine II the Great addressed him as ‘My General.’ When still young, he gained such an authority that, while near Warsaw, excellent Suvorov issued an order ‘Fight like courageous Prince Tsitsianov!’”\textsuperscript{34}

In 1801, P. Tsitsianov was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general and in 1804 to infantry general. In 1802, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian troops deployed in Georgia and, in 1804, of those deployed in the Caucasus.

5. Prince Peter I. Bagrationi

One of the most renowned commanders of the Russian imperial army, infantry general, recipient of numerous honorary awards, Peter (in Georgian—Petre) I. Bagrationi (1766-1812) was a direct descendant of King of Kartli Iese (reigning in 1714-1716 and 1724-1727).\textsuperscript{35} He gained fame by taking part in Russia’s numerous military campaigns, including the military expeditions in 1799 in Italy and Switzerland.\textsuperscript{36}

In April 1800, for his great contribution to the aforementioned campaign, Russian Emperor Paul I granted P. Bagrationi a rich village situated in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{37}

The famous commander was an essential soldier. The principal area of his activities was the battlefield. Therefore, he was not attracted by the Emperor’s award—homestead and serfs, which he did not even visit. He was fond of a wealthy and luxurious life, owing to which he constantly had to borrow money.

In 1802, P. Bagrationi chose six young serfs from his Lithuanian homestead and took them with him; then he sold the village to Russia’s state treasury.\textsuperscript{38} When he sold his estates, he paid his debt back.\textsuperscript{39}

It should be noted that, ten years later, the dying general, having been wounded in Borodino battle, granted freedom to his Lithuanian serfs.\textsuperscript{40}

6. Prince Gregory Orbeliani

Prince Gregory (in Georgian—Grigol) Orbeliani (1804-1883) was an officer in the Russian army deployed in the Baltic countries; later, he became a well-known poet and public figure.

He was the great grandson of Erekle II. He took part in the Russo-Persian (1826-1828), Russo-Turkish (1828-1829), and Crimean (1853-1856) wars, as well as in the military campaign to take over the North Caucasus.

\textsuperscript{33} M. Gogitidze, op. cit., p. 258.
\textsuperscript{34} Sh. Amirejibi, “The Persons and Business,” \textit{Kavkasioni} (Paris), No. 4, 1930 (in Georgian).
\textsuperscript{37} See: V. Gribanov, \textit{Bagration v Peterburge}. Leningrad, 1979, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{38} See: V. Gribanov, op. cit., p. 72.
\textsuperscript{39} See: M. Gonikishvili, op. cit., pp. 51-57.
\textsuperscript{40} See: N. Javakhishvili, “Trace of Georgians in the Baltic Area (From the end of the 17th century to the first half of the 19th century),” pp. 245-256.
In 1834-1837, G. Orbeliani served in the cities of the Livland province: Riga, Wenden (present-day Cesis), Valka, the city of Bausk of the Courland province, the cities in Vilna province: Vilna (Vilnius), Kovna (Kaunas), Birze, etc.

While in the Baltics, the poet composed a number of his wonderful poems.\(^{41}\)

The letters sent by G. Orbeliani from the Baltics to Georgia contain noteworthy information about the way of life in the said region of that time.

On 22 May, 1834, in the letter sent from the town of Valka to Georgia, G. Orbeliani wrote to his brother Zakaria: “The head of the regiment received me well and is giving me as a military unit, a company. Officers of the regiment are good; most of them are local Germans. I visited wonderful Wenden Castle, belonging to Count Sievers. Wenden is a small beautiful town. The old, destroyed towers of the castle look down sternly at beautiful and tender new houses of the town... Every evening, I went up to one, totally surviving tower from which a nice landscape was visible... While in Wenden, I live in the house of Baron Storch... Local churches have a rooster upon them instead of a cross... Livland peasants wear bast shoes resembling ours... Today, I got acquainted with an aged respectful gentleman Baron Wrangel.”\(^{42}\)

Since 1828, General Karl Wrangel (1794-1874) was in charge of the regiment of Uhlans of Poland, and, since 1835—dragoons of the life guards.

In his letter sent from Vilna on 20 July, 1834, G. Orbeliani wrote to his brother: “Yesterday, we set up camp in Vilna where we will stay until September... Here, there is a theatre and a famous organ in the church.”\(^{43}\)

G. Orbeliani liked the Baltic countries since they reminded him his homeland.

In his letter sent from Birze on 23 March, 1835, G. Orbeliani wrote to his relative Salome Orbeliani: “With its location, Livland is very much like Georgia... I visited the wonderful city of Riga where I was well received by my division and the head of the brigade...

“Riga is lovely to see on a summer evening when sunbeams shine gold on the river where ships and boats sail with singing people on board.”\(^{44}\)

The husband of aforementioned S. Orbeliani was a romanticist poet, Lieutenant-General Prince Alexandre G. Chavchavadze (1786-1846), the son of the ambassador of Georgian kings Erekle II and Georgi XII to Russia. He was born in St. Petersburg and was christened by Empress Catherine II the Great. In early 1813, A. Chavchavadze came to General Philip Paulucci (1779-1849) in Riga in order to participate in an international campaign of the Russian army.\(^{45}\)

In his letters, G. Orbeliani frequently noted the beauty of the Baltic women.

In his letter sent from Birze on 11 April, 1835, he wrote to Nino Andronikashvili: “I am in Vilna province, that is, in the country of Poles. I got acquainted with local aristocrats who are hospitable and well-to-do. Local women are well-bred, educated, and, meanwhile, they are bold in their behavior and courting... I visit them frequently and time passes happily while playing the piano, dancing and singing, promenade and other entertainments. Recently, I visited Riga.”\(^{46}\)

In a letter dated the same day, G. Orbeliani informed his brother that, beginning on 19 April, their regiment was starting the construction of the road from Riga to Mitau.\(^{47}\)


\(^{43}\) Ibid., pp. 17-18.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., pp. 24-25.


\(^{47}\) See: Ibid., p. 28.
On 25 July, 1834, G. Orbeliani, while in Riga hospital, wrote to S. Orbeliani: “I live in Skro-
ndebude, 17 versts from Riga... I am well... Whenever I find free time, I gallop to Riga to visit my
acquaintances... Recently, one of our colonels—Weisinghoff organized a ball where he invited re-
spectful natives of Riga. Among them, there was a very beautiful women, a daughter of General
Driesen, commandant of Riga.”

In his letter sent from Kovna on 16 September, 1836, G. Orbeliani wrote to his brother Ilia
Orbeliani: “This winter, I will be near Birze, Vilna Province, in Panevėžys County... Field-Marshal
Paskevich checked us on 14-15 September and acknowledged... The ceremonial march was excellent.
The Emperor sent General-Adjutant Prince Lobanov-Rostovskiy to attend it... Whenever you decide
to write, here is my address: first write my name, then ‘to Mr. Lieutenant and Commander of the
Naval Regiment in Riga’.

G. Orbeliani’s “Diary of 1836” is remarkable, telling stories of the time he spent in the Baltic
countries. As is seen from the diary, the villages near the town of Panevėžys reminded him of
Georgia.

In 1835, G. Orbeliani recorded a noteworthy story heard in a Riga hospital.

G. Orbeliani was a friend of Eduard Holmblad, a Baltic baron of Swedish origin, manager of
the Caucasus medical unit, who settled in Georgia. His grandson (daughter’s son) was Zurab Aval-
ishvili (1875-1944), an outstanding scholar and diplomat.

After finishing his service in the Baltics, G. Orbeliani was very successful in the military
sphere. Specifically, in 1835 he was promoted to the rank of major-general, in 1856 to lieutenant-
general, in 1859 to general-adjutant, and in 1862 to infantry general. In 1871, he was awarded the
Order of St Apostle Andrew the First Called.

Thus, G. Orbeliani served in the Baltic countries in 1834-1837. During his stay there, he com-
posed many wonderful poems and kept a diary which, together with his letters sent to Georgia, con-
tains noteworthy information about the Baltics of that time.

7. Prince Vladimir Iashvili

In 1863-1864, the military governor of Vilna was a Georgian prince by origin, Major-General
Vladimir V. Iashvili (1815-1864). His father, Major-General Vladimir M. Iashvili (1764-1815), took
direct part in the assassination of Russian Emperor Paul I on March 11, 1801.

V. Iashvili graduated from artillery school (1834). He participated in the military operations in
the Caucasus. In 1849, he was promoted to the rank of colonel and was appointed a commander of
the life guards of the Hussar regiment. In 1858, he was promoted to the rank of major-general. He
was a member of the suite of Emperor Alexander II.
8. Prince Nikolay Bagration-Imeretinskiy

In 1863-1864, highly educated Prince Nikolay K. Bagrationi (1830-1894), grandson of King of Imereti David II (reigned in 1784-1789), served as the head of the Vilna District. After graduating from the Corps of Pages, he served in the life guards of the Preobrazhenskiy Regiment. He graduated from the Academy of the General Staff (1862). He was a member of the emperor’s suite (since 1872), leader of the nobility of Volin Province (1866-1869), and deputy Ataman of the Don Cossacks (1870-1874). In 1872, he was promoted to the rank of major-general and, in 1881 to lieutenant-general. In 1875-1881, he was included in the mission of the Russian Empire to Bern (Switzerland). He was engaged in literary activities.58

9. Prince Peter R. Bagrationi

A famous scholar, Lieutenant-General Peter (in Georgian—Petre) R. Bagrationi (1818-1876) served in the Baltics in 1868-1870. He was an immediate descendant of Iese, King of Kartli and, simultaneously, the nephew of aforementioned Petre I. Bagrationi.59

P. Bagrationi was close to the Russian imperial court. Specifically, at various times, he was an aide-de-camp (1845-1852) of Duke Maximilian Leichtenberg, a son-in-law of Emperor Nicholas I; Flügeladjutant of the emperor (since 1852); commandant of the imperial palace and head of the security (since 1854); and head of the emperor’s personal suite (since 1857). In 1862-1868, P. Bagrationi was the governor of Tver Province, and, in 1868-1870, an assistant for civil affairs of Potapov, governor-general of Vilna, and then the governor of the Vitebsk and Mogilev provinces.

On 22 September, 1870, P. Bagrationi was appointed general-governor of Livland, Estland, and Courland (that is, Ostsee), and moved to Riga where he worked until his death.

In addition to his state and military service, P. Bagrationi was a productive scholar. He wrote significant studies in physics and chemistry, earning recognition from the international scholarly community (particularly, Cyanide teaching which has been the industry standard method for recovering gold.—N.J.) and numerous honorary awards from various countries.60

He was decorated with the following awards of the Russian Empire: St Ana First Class (with a crown), St Stanislaw First, Second, Third Class, St Vladimir First, Second, Third Class; besides, with the following European awards: Cross of Sweden’s St Olaf’s Chivalric Order (1849); Portugal’s Military Order of Christ (1850); Neapolitan St Francis Order (1852); Bavarian Order of St Michael (1852); Hesse Order of St Philip the Magnanimous (1852), and Order of the Zähringer Lion (1852).61

P. Bagrationi was to work as general-governor at a very difficult time for the Baltic countries. At that time, Russia’s czardom was actively fighting to eliminate the German influence in the area. The authorities implemented reforms aimed at establishing Russian influence in the region. Beginning in 1867, all office documentation at state institutions was to be compiled in Russian instead of German as before.

Naturally enough, P. Bagrationi, as a Russian statesman, pursued a policy dictated by the imperial authorities, but, meanwhile, he acted rather carefully and reasonably.62

59 See: Ibid., pp. 50-51.
60 See: V. Parkadze, Peter Bagrationi, Tbilisi, 1970 (in Georgian).
Academician Jānis Stradiņš justly noted: “P. Bagrationi, as Governor-General, implemented the innovations outlined by the government, despite the opposition of the local German community. Being a supporter of the Russification of the Baltics, he, at the same time, was a rather flexible and cautious politician; first of all, he sought to moderate the passions, which reached their peak at the time of his accession to office. For the sake of this, he went on to make certain concessions to the Ostsee community in order to more aggressively realize the planned program.”

In accordance with the regulations of Riga Polytechnical College, its curator was considered a person holding the position of general-governor of the Baltics. It should also be noted that the college, founded in 1862, was the oldest polytechnic higher school in the Russian Empire, having played a special role in the training of highly-qualified scientific-technical professionals. The college significantly contributed to the development of various domains of science and engineering, chemistry, and mathematics.

P. Bagrationi made an enormous contribution to Riga Polytechnical College, which was still at the early stage of its development. Owing to his support, the significance of the college gradually increased.

In 1879, the Polytechnical College moved to another facility, to which a second building was added earlier, in 1875-1877. The building housed a preparatory school, agricultural department, and “an experimental station.”

Following P. Bagrationi’s initiative, the college, which, as a private institution was based on the cities, aristocracy, merchants, and entrepreneurs of the Baltics, was allocated an annual budget allowance of 10,000 rubles, which helped to cover significant expenses.

Previously, graduates of the college were employed by private entrepreneurs, while state employers (for instance, in the construction of bridges, railways, etc.) did not regard them as diplomaed engineers.

Based on P. Bagrationi’s order, since 1875, the status of the graduates of the engineering, machine-building, and architecture departments of Riga Polytechnical College became equal to that of the civil engineers of St. Petersburg Railway Institute. Since then, they were able to be employed in appropriate positions in the state sector throughout the Baltic Province. The governor-general greatly contributed to equipping the young institute with the relevant devices, collections, and books. Annually, he presented the institute with books on mathematics, engineering, and arts, as well as with rare minerals and scientific equipment.

P. Bagrationi was particularly mindful of the engineering and machine-building specialties being decisive for the economy of the Baltics. Local capitalists appreciated his merits.

In order to commemorate the fame of the governor-general who took care of the development of education, Rigan banker Geiman donated 4,000 rubles, establishing “a trustee scholarship” for excellent students of the Riga Polytechnical Institute. For many decades, this scholarship was granted mainly to students of the Faculty of Machine-building.

P. Bagrationi was a friend of the first director of Riga Polytechnical College, Professor of Physics Ernest Nauk (1819-1875), whose leadership had been truly a role model.

As J. Stradiņš states: “Endeavors of P. Bagration, as a curator of the Riga Polytechnical College, should be viewed as the first steps towards transforming the College into the Riga State Polytechnical Institute, with all the official rights of teachers and graduates. P. Bagration’s endeavours deserve some positive assessment, although as Governor-General, he conducted a policy of autocracy in the Baltics. It is noteworthy that the merits of P. Bagration, as a trustee of the Riga Polytechnical Institute, have

65 See: V. Parkadze, op. cit., p. 16.
been acknowledged even by Baltic-German historiography, which, in general, assesses him with restraint.  

During his work in the Baltic countries, P. Bagrationi gained such authority that even the emperor no longer interfered in the domestic affairs of the province. 

On 17 January, 1876, while in St. Petersburg on business, P. Bagrationi died of asthma. He is buried in Novodevichy Convent of Voskresensk. On the day of his burial, mourning was declared at the Riga Polytechnical Institute.

On 25 January, 1876, that is, just a few days after the death of P. Bagrationi, the position he held was abolished. 

Thus, the administrative center of the Baltics moved from Riga to St. Petersburg, which was the following stage of merging this region with Russia. This was when the so far clandestine intentions of the Russian imperialists were unveiled. While P. Bagrationi tried to adapt and integrate the Baltics into the Russian Empire gradually, by means of cautious steps, after his death, the process became more salient.

The press of the Russian Empire at that time published a lot of articles about the deceased general-governor. Among them were newspapers published both in Russian and in German, Latvian, and Estonian.

The newspaper *Rizhskiy vestnik*, published in Riga, wrote: “The abolition of the Governor-General’s position could be predicted a long time ago. It has been known that Prince Bagration often said: ‘I am the last one in this position.’ The abolition of the Novorossiysk Governor-General’s position, the abolition of governorship of the Kingdom of Poland, the separation of Mogilev and Vitebsk provinces from Vilna Province—all these were salient aspects of a maturely considered domestic policy seeking to smooth fragmentation of the state system and abolish exceptions, bringing them under general rules that weaken isolation, and distribute the rule of common laws... Now a new period will start for the Baltic enclave of Russia: a period of communication and normal fusion with the interests of Russia.”

The newspaper *Iliustrirovannaia gazeta*, published in St. Petersburg, stated: “The six year-long rule by Prince P. Bagrationi produced a diversely excellent period in Baltic history. In the late 1860s, the dominant classes in the Baltic provinces did not support reforms, either in terms of the state or the local population. The rather irritating debates in newspapers, supported by Germanophiles, were aimed against Russia. The office, held by Prince P. Bagrationi, was full of controversies.

“A ruler of the Baltics should, first of all, act as a reconciliator, to weaken the German impact, temper nationalistic aspirations, and solve highly significant state issues. All of this takes a certain amount of time, first of all.

“Prince P. Bagrationi’s reasonable and balanced activities for six years appeared quite sufficient. During that time, nationalistic aspirations were tempered and much attention was paid both to the local life of the region and the resolution of state issues in general. Thus, during the time Prince Bagrationi was Governor-General, the foundation was laid for the implementation of both court and civil reforms: introduction of voluntary teaching of Russian in Revel and Mitau provinces, weakening of the German impact, and others, which was realized after the death of Bagrationi. Finally, Bagrationi’s activities are significant with respect to the fact that the peoples ... turned toward Russia for friendship. Everything happened owing to the peaceful, reconciliatory system and policy successfully pursued by the deceased governor-general.”

The Baltic press listed P. Bagrationi’s merits.

69 Rizhskiy vestnik, No. 27, 1876.
70 Iliustrirovannaia gazeta, Saint-Petersburg, 8 February, 1876.
The Latvian newspaper *Baltijas Zemkopis* hoped that, despite the death of the governor-general, the reforms initiated by him would be continued.\(^{71}\)

The Estonian newspaper *Perno Postimees*, published by the famous Estonian public figure J.V. Jannsen, printed an obituary to P. Bagrationi, including a rather comprehensive description of his life. The newspaper stated that, despite his bad health, P. Bagrationi performed his duties with great responsibility and honesty.\(^{72}\)

The death of P. Bagrationi was an irreplaceable loss for the Riga Polytechnical College, which was deprived of a rather influential patron. The governor of Livland, who was appointed the new trustee, did not enjoy the same influence in the imperial authorities as his predecessor, this having a detrimental effect on the resolution of critical problems at the college. Due to that, its transformation into the State Polytechnical Institute did not become possible for another 20 years—in 1896.\(^{73}\)

### 10. Nobleman George Kazbegi

Nobleman George (in Georgian—Giorgi) N. Kazbegi/Chopikashvili (1840-1921) was an infantry general (since 1905) who served in the Baltics and was in charge of the 51st Infantry Regiment of Latvia.\(^{74}\)

He graduated from the Academy of the General Staff (1870). He served as the chief-of-staff of Warsaw Castle (1891-1899), commandant of the Ivangorod Garrison, chief-of-staff of Warsaw’s fortified district (1902-1905), Governor-General of Khabarovsk, and military commandant of Vladivostok (1905-1906). He was the chairperson of the *Society for the Spread of Literacy among Georgians* (1908-1921).\(^{75}\)

### 11. Georgian Generals in the Baltic Countries during WWI

**David Guntsadze, Alexander Mikeladze, and Alexander Zakariadze**

During World War I, many Georgian officers served in the Baltics. Three of them were promoted to the rank of general.

The 97th Regiment of Infantry of Livland deployed in the town of Dvinsk (Daugavpils), Vitebsk Province, was commanded by Colonel Nobleman David K. Guntsadze (1861-1922). In 1915-1917, he was in charge of the 53rd Infantry Division. In 1914, he was promoted to the rank of major-general and, in 1917, to the rank of lieutenant-general. Along with other awards, he was decorated with the Order of St George Fourth Class and the Honorary Sword.\(^{76}\)

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\(^{71}\) See: *Baltijas Zemkopis*, No. 4, 1876.

\(^{72}\) See: *Perno Postimees*, No. 6-7, 1876.


\(^{76}\) See: M. Gogitidze, op. cit., p. 110.
A participant in the Chinese campaign (1900-1901) and Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), Major-General Prince Alexander (in Georgian—Alexandre) K. Mikeladze (1863-1919) was in charge of a cavalry brigade on the western front during World War I. For some time, he was a commandant of the city of Vilna.\textsuperscript{77}

Since 1912, Alexander (in Georgian—Alexandre) K. Zakariadze (1884-1957) served in the 2nd rifle brigade of Lithuania and, in January of the same year, he was appointed chief-of-staff of the brigade.

A. Zakariadze graduated from the Academy of the General Staff (1912). He took part in the Russo-Japanese (1904-1905) war and World War I. In 1915, he was promoted to the rank of colonel. He was in charge of the 5th Zemgalskiy Unit of Latvia.

In September 1917, he was awarded St George Order Fourth Class Decorated with Laurel Leaves for his courage during the battles in the district of Rodenpois (present-day—Ropaži), Riga Region.

\begin{itemize}
\item A. Zakariadze recollected: “I was chief-of-staff of the 2nd Latvian Division on the northern front in the vicinity of the city of Riga. I had already received an order to begin arrangement of the staff of the Latvian corps when, on 27 October, I was offered a move to the Georgian corps. I certainly agreed immediately.”\textsuperscript{78}
\item On 23 November of the same year, he returned to his homeland. He served in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Georgia as deputy chief of the General Staff in the rank of general.
\item In 1921, A. Zakariadze emigrated and settled in Poland.\textsuperscript{79} He continued his military service in the army of that country, where he was promoted to the rank of brigade general (1923) and then division general (1927).
\item In September 1939, the command of the invading German army in Poland captured Division General of Poland Army Alexander Zakariadze and declared him “the last to defend Poland.”\textsuperscript{80}
\end{itemize}

**Conclusion**

Georgian-Baltic relations have a history of more than a millennium. These relations have always been relatively strong, at times of an interstate nature and at other times not.

Owing to historical misfortunes, at different times, some Georgians have acted in the territory of the Baltic states not as military or civil servants of Georgia, but of another state—the Russian Empire. Irrespective of that, their activities must be studied in order to have a view of the epoch in question.

\textsuperscript{77} See: Ibid., p. 193.
\textsuperscript{80} N. Javakhishvili, *Georgian Swordsmen under the Polish Banner (A Study of Polish-Georgian Military and Political Relations)*, Tbilisi, 1998, p. 23 (in Georgian and in English).
The author goes into the history of one of the Jevanshir (Cavanşir in Azeri) clans of the khans of the Karabakh Khanate, a feudal state and fragment of the vast empire of Nadir Shah Afshar (1736-1747) that existed in Northern Azerbaijan from 1747 to 1822. In 1805, the khans became vassals of the Russian Empire; in November 1822, the power of the khans was abolished, while the khanate became one of the empire’s territories ruled from St. Petersburg.

**KEYWORDS:** the Karabakh Khanate, Shusha, the Jevanshir clan, Panah Ali Khan, Ibrahim Khalil Khan, Mekhti Quli Khan, Jafar Quli Agha, transfer to Russia, murder of the second khan of Karabakh, abolition of power of the khans, heir to the Karabakh Khanate, head of the khan house of Karabakh.

**Introduction**

My previous article “The Khans of Karabakh”¹ looks at the history of the Jevanshir khans, the story of unification of the khanate with the Russian Empire, the death of the second khan of Karabakh, the abolition of power of the khans, and the introduction of Russia’s direct rule.

The present paper traces the fates of all the generations of the clan’s elder line ascending from Ibrahim Khalil Khan’s elder son Muhammad Hasan Agha, who became the heir to the Karabakh Khanate under the treaty signed on 14 May, 1805 by Ibrahim Khalil Khan and Infantry General Prince Tsitsianov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian troops in Georgia, who acted in the name of Emperor Alexander I.

Here you will not find detailed biographies of the Karabakh khans that figured in the previous article. I concentrated on the life story of Muhammad Hasan Agha’s elder son Jafar Quli Agha, who remained the legal heir to the Karabakh Khanate until the power of the khans was abolished in 1822. His descendants are the elders of the clan of Karabakh khans.

In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the descendants of the khans of Karabakh who lived in the Russian Empire began using the Russified version of their clan name Jevanshir; this name became officially registered by the Shusha Bek Commission, which worked in Karabakh in 1870-1874; members of the younger lines of the same Karabakh family used the names of Panakhkhanovs (Panakhanovs), Begbudovs, Saryjalinskys, etc.

In May 1870, Second Captain of Cavalry Ahmed-bek Jevanshir, the author of political history of the Karabakh Khanate, pointed out in his application to the Shusha Bek Commission that the family name Jevanshir had belonged to Panah Ali Khan, the founder of the clan and to his descendants. The Ruling Senate registered this family name “on the strength of the firman that we presented to the Senate; it had been granted by Shah of Persia Karim Khan Zand to Mehrali-bek, one of our common ancestors, as the Beglyarbek, that is, the ruler of the Karabakh Khanate.” The reference is to the youngest of Panah Ali Khan’s sons who ruled the khanate while his father was fighting in Urmia together with his army and stayed in Shiraz.

He further wrote: “The fact that this name belonged to our ancestors is confirmed by the inscriptions on the tombstones of many of our ancestors that can still be seen at the cemetery in Agdam, other historical documents issued by Persian shahs kept in the family, quoted in Persian and Turkish history books about the events in which our ancestors were involved and, finally, the names of our relatives who descended from our common ancestor Panah Khan and who now live in Persia.”

Ahmed-bek Jevanshir pointed out that his family name was translated into Russian as “young lion” and that there were many legends (some of them contradictory) about the origins of his family name. According to one of them, the name Jevanshir was a distorted Mongolian military term “javan-gar,” meaning the right wing of the army. According to another legend, the title “young lion” was conferred on one of his ancestors by Persian shahs in recognition of “his special bravery in battle.”

He concluded his application to the commission with, “Anyway, this name belongs only to those members of the khan family who directly descend from Panah Ali Khan,” and pointed out that “we reject an appropriation of this name by any other relatives descending by the female line from Panah Khan or his relatives as unfair and if our claims are recognized we will never accept this.”

Under Soviet power, the name Jevanshir became Jevanshirov; in the 1920s the members of the elder line of the khan family began using this (Russified.—Ed.) version (more of them below). In the latter half of the twentieth century, the previous spelling Jevanshirov was changed to Javanshirov, to match the Azeri spelling. Below I will keep to the following pattern: from the seventeenth century to the 1920s—Jevanshir; from the 1920s to the 1950s—Jevanshirov, and from the 1950s to the present—Javanshirov.

The male descendants of Ibrahim Khalil Khan who lived in the Russian Empire in the nineteenth-early twentieth centuries were, as a rule, titled Agha; their wives and daughters were called Begum; and the descendants of Ibrahim Khalil Khan’s brothers were “beks” and “khanums,” respectively.

The Elder Line of the Khans of Karabakh by Generations

My previous article “The Khans of Karabakh” contains an ascending genealogy of the khans of Karabakh presented as a Table with four versions of the first generations of the Jevanshirs.

Three of the versions were borrowed from printed sources, namely, the work of Mirza Adigezal-bek, an Azeri historian of the first half of the nineteenth century, called Karabakh-name; “Rodo-

2 The State Historical Archives of the Azerbaijan Republic (hereinafter GIAAR), rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6 (On the request of Abas-bek and Agha-bek Jevanshirov to count them as belonging to the bek estate, 5 April, 1870-31 January, 1873), sheets 6-11rev.
...slovnaja Ibrahim-khana i ego detey” (Genealogy of Ibrahim Khan and His Children) published in Vol. II of Akty kavkazskoy arkheograficheskoy komissii (Acts of the Caucasian Archeographic Commission); and Genealogicheskaiia tablitsa Karabakhskikh khanov (The Genealogical Table of the Karabakh Khans) compiled by E. Shukur-zade, a Soviet Azeri historian of the latter half of the twentieth century.

The fourth version is my own genealogical reconstruction based on primary sources: Iskender-bek Munshi’s list of the emirs of 1628 and information derived from the firman of 1672/1673 quoted by Mir Mekhti Khazani in Kitabi-Tarixi Qarabağ.

I have already written in the previous article that the four versions of the genealogy of the first four generations of the Jevanshirs have only one position in common—the name of Ibrahim Khalil Agha (II), father of Panah Ali Khan, the first khan of Karabakh—of the third generation. The genealogical table published in Vol. II of the Akty and the Table compiled by Shukur-zade share the name of Panah Ali Khan’s grandfather, who belonged to the second generation.

The Genealogical Table of the Khans of Karabakh, which I compiled and published in the present article (see pp. 160-161), contains all versions of the first two generations. I start my generation-by-generation description from the third generation.

The first figure that appears before the name in the generation-by-generation description points to the person’s ordinal number in the Table, and the second to the ordinal number of his (her) father.

III Generation

- 3/2. Ibrahim Khalil Agha (II).
  - Head of the Jevanshir tribe and Otuziki mahal by inheritance.

- 4/2. Iskender-bek.
  - Younger brother of Ibrahim Khalil Agha (II); the descendants of his two sons—Mirza Khan-bek and Amir Khan-bek used the family name of Saryjalinsky since the mid-nineteenth century (not shown in the present Table).

IV Generation

  - Elder son of Ibrahim Khalil Agha (II); served Nadir Shakh (1736-1747) as “eshigagasi” (an official who supervised the palace) and was murdered.

  - Founder and the first khan of the Karabakh Khanate in 1747-1759.
  - He was married to a sister of Sekhl Ali-bek, head of the Kebirlu clan.

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3 GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 23 (On a request of the people living in the Shusha District Pasha-bek ogly Jevanshio, Ahmed-bek Husseyn-bek ogly to include them in the bek estate, 5-23 May, 1870).
5 This date is quoted in the book of Firudin of Shusha without specifying the source (see: F. Shushinsky, Shusha, Baku, 1968).
6 Not infrequently, the date of his death is cited as 1762, yet according to the tombstone, today kept at the National Museum of History of Azerbaijan, Panah Ali Khan died precisely in July/August 1759 (see footnote by E. Shukyur-zade on p. 102 of A.-B. Javanshir, O politicheskom suschestvovanii Karabakhskogo khanstva (s 1747 po 1805 god), Baku, 1961).

Brother of Panah Ali Khan⁸; since the mid-nineteenth century the descendants of his three sons—Abdus Samed-bek, Mirza Ali-bek and Kasum-bek—have been using the names of Jevan-shir, Begbutovs and Rustambekovs⁹ (not shown in the present genealogical table).

V Generation

8/6. Ibrahim Khalil Khan (c. 1726-27 May, 1806).

Elder son of Panah Ali Khan.
Khan of Karabakh in 1760-1806.

On 14 May, 1805, he signed an agreement on the transfer of the Karabakh Khanate to the Russian Empire. Under the treaty he preserved complete autonomy and recognized the supreme power of the Russian emperor.

In turn, “His Imperial Majesty … promises in his name and the names of his heirs … to keep His High Dignity Ibrahim Khan and the house of his heirs and descendants as khans of Shusha.”¹⁰

On 8 July, 1805, Ibrahim Khalil Khan was promoted to Lieutenant-General by a royal decree.¹¹

In the small hours of 27 May, 1806, Ibrahim Khalil Khan, one of his wives, two small children, and thirteen courtiers died in an attack on their camp (four versts from Shusha) ordered by Major Lisanevich and carried out by the chasseurs of the 17th regiment.¹² The details are found in the previous article.

A.-K. Bakikhanov described Ibrahim Khalil Khan as “an enterprising, openhearted, and just man who could be cruelly strict.”¹³

Mirza Jamal Jevanshir, the last vizier of the Karabakh Khanate, wrote about Ibrahim Khalil Khan as a “hospitable man who helped foreigners, patronized orphans, and looked after [his] subjects. [He was] energetic, brave, and generous, as a benefactor he distributed grants among big seids and the poor and patronized ulems and seids. He helped all those who sought refuge with him. The khans and beks of the nearby [districts] and vilayets of Azerbaijan, Shirvan etc. relied on his favors; he tried to help them and fulfill their wishes. He was especially fond of the company of beautiful women.”¹⁴

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⁸ The Russian State Historical Archives (hereinafter RGIA), rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b (On the proposal of Vicegerent of the Caucasus Adjutant General Prince Vorontsov to grant certain persons who belong to khan families beyond the Caucasus real estate in this territory and on declining this proposal because these families had been granted life rent, 26 December, 1847-29 July, 1865), sheets 104rev.-105.
¹² See: P.O. Bobilevsky, Istoria 13-go leyb-grenaderskogo Erivanskogo Ego Velichestva polka za 250 let, Part III, St. Petersburg, 1893, p. 245.
¹⁴ A.-K. Bakikhanov, Golestan-e Eram (The Blooming Flower Garden), ed. by Z.M. Buniyatov with his commentaries, notes and indices, Baku, 1991, p. 188.
¹⁵ Mirza Jamal Jevanshir Karabakhsky, op. cit., p. 103.
Wives of Ibrahim Khalil Khan:

(1) Khanum Agha (*Khanum Khanuma*), daughter of minbashi Nabi Kalantar Jevanshir; her sons are entered under Nos. 16 and 17;

(2) Tutu Begum (1740-1760), daughter of Shakhverdi Khan II of Ganja, sister of Javad Khan of Ganja (died childless and was buried in Ganja);

(3) (from 1761) Khurshid Begum (1743-?), daughter of Shakhverdi Khan II of Ganja; sister of Javad Khan of Ganja (her son is entered under No. 18 and two daughters under Nos. 29 and 30);

(4) Bike Khanum (Bakhtika) (born after 1744), daughter of Muhammad Nutsal IV, Khan of Avaria; sister of Umma Khan (Omar Khan) of Avaria (her sons are entered under Nos. 20 and 22 and daughter under No. 34);

(5) N.-Khanum, daughter of Allahyar-bek Ungutlinsky (her son is entered under No. 21);

(6) (since 1783) Jevahir Khanum (Sofia), daughter of Prince Evgeniy Abashidze (her son is entered under No. 25 and daughter under No. 35);

(7) Shakhnisa Khanum, daughter of Badyr Khan Shahsevenskiy (of Ardebil); (her daughters are entered under Nos. 31, 32 and 33);

(8) Muressie Khanum, daughter of Gul Mali-bek Saryjalinsky (her daughter is entered under No. 37);

(9) Tuba Khanum (?-27 May, 1806), sister of Selim Khan of Sheki;

(10) Khurizat Khanum, daughter of Melik Shahnazar Varandskiy (died childless);

(11) N.-Khanum, daughter of Mirza Rabi, vizier of King Irakly II of Kakheta; (her daughter is entered under No. 36);

(12) Khatay Khanum, daughter of Melik Bakhtam of Dizak (her sons are entered under Nos. 23 and 24);

(13) Rugam (Khanum) (her son is entered under No. 19)—“an Armenian girl from the Nakhchivanik village” “temporary wife” (probably concubine);

(14) Khadija (Khanum) (her son is entered under No. 26)—“a Tatar girl from Shamshadil,” an Azeri girl from the village of Begramlu, “temporary wife”;

(15) Sona Khanum (?-after 1844) (her son is entered under No. 27)—“an Armenian girl from the village of Tug,” “temporary wife”;

(16) Ana Khanum (her son is entered under No. 28)—“daughter of Haji Kerim from Shusha,” “temporary wife.”

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Son of Panah Ali Khan; in 1759 ruled the Karabakh Khanate in the absence of his father and elder brother; murdered by Ahmed-bek, son of Agasi Khan of Shirvan. His descendants had the family names of Jevanshir or Jevanshirovs.


Sons of Panah Ali Khan; when the Karabakh Khanate became part of the Russian Empire, their descendants had the family names of Jevanshir, Jevanshirovs, Panakhkhanovs (not shown in the present genealogical table).

VI Generation


Elder son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan, died young.


Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by his “first legal and permanent wife” Khanum Agha of Jevanshir.

When, on 14 May, 1805, his father signed a treaty under which the Karabakh Khanate became part of the Russian Empire, Muhammad Hasan Agha was recognized as the legal heir to the khanate. Prince Tsitsianov, who commanded the Russian troops in Georgia, suggested that he be promoted to Major General and awarded a gold medal with diamonds and a ligature “For Loyalty.”

On 8 July, 1805, he was promoted to Major General by a royal decree “with full salary.” The decree reached Prince Tsitsianov in Tiflis on 17 August, 1805; it was sent to Muhammad Hasan Agha much later, on 1 October, 1805, together with a letter of congratulations from Prince Tsitsianov which contained information that the medal was being made at the cabinet of H.I.M.

In August 1805, Muhammad Hasan Agha fell gravely ill and died on 19 November, 1805 of tuberculosis. The death of Muhammad Hasan Agha, of whom Prince Tsitsianov wrote as “the most devoted and the most loyal slave” of the emperor, deprived the Russians of their “best support in Karabakh” since none of the khan family was “more loyal to Russia and served better than he.”

In June 1823, when Karabakh became one of the provinces of the Russian Empire, General Yermolov granted an annual pension of 250 silver rubles to the mother of late Major General Muhammad Hasan Agha, an old woman who had lost her eyesight.

17 See: A.-B. Javanshir, O politcheskom suschestvovanii Karabakhskogo khanstva (s 1747 po 1805 god), p. 60.
19 GIAR, rec. gr. 290, inv. 2, f. 1046; Genealogy of Ibrahim Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.
22 Ibid., pp. 718-719, Doc. No. 1471.
The wives of Muhammad Hasan Agha\(^27\) were:

(1) Heyr Nisa Begum (Heyr En Nisa Begyum), daughter of Shakhverdi Khan II of Ganja; sister of Javad Khan of Ganja (her sons are entered under Nos. 44, 45, 46 and the daughter under No. 47);

(2) Magi Sharef Khanum, sister of Jafar Quli Khan Khoysky (her son is entered under No. 48).

“To reward the diligence and loyalty of late Mamed Hasan Agha, his salary of Major General, as it was late in 1806, was granted in equal shares to his widows—Heyr Nisa Begum and Magi Sharef Khanum.”\(^28\)

\[18/8.\] \textbf{Mekhti Quli Khan} (c. 1763 or c. 1772-14 May, 1845, Agdam).

Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Hurshid Begum of Ganja.\(^29\) According to the report submitted by Prince Tsitsianov, he was 33 in November 1805.\(^30\)

Khan of Karabakh in 1806-1822.

In May 1805, when his father signed a treaty on the transfer of the Karabakh Khanate to the Russian Empire, Mekhti Quli Agha was promoted to Major General by a royal decree of 8 July, 1805 at the suggestion of Commander-in-Chief in Georgia Prince Tsitsianov.\(^31\)

Early in September 1806, after the murder of Ibrahim Khalil Khan, Mekhti Quli Agha was confirmed as the khan of Karabakh\(^32\) on a recommendation of the Russian military command in the Caucasus; Jafar Quli Agha, son of the elder brother of Major General Muhammad Hasan Agha, an heir apparent, was pushed aside.

On 11 November, 1806, Major General Mekhti Quli Khan came to Tiflis, where he swore allegiance to Emperor Alexander I in the presence of Commander-in-Chief of the Georgia Infantry General Gudovich.\(^33\) After the ceremony, Count Gudovich handed Mekhti Quli Khan the royal deed the czar had signed early in September 1806, which confirmed his new status.\(^34\)

On 7 January, 1807, Foreign Minister of Russia Baron Budberg wrote to Count Gudovich that according to the wishes of Emperor Alexander I, the symbols of khan power—a banner with the Russian imperial insignia and a sword with precious stones intended for late Ibrahim Khalil Khan—dispatched after Prince Tsitsianov’s death, should be handed to Major General Mekhti Quli Khan of Karabakh.\(^35\)

In 1816-1827, General Yermolov, as the Vicegerent of the Caucasus, posed himself the task of depriving the Azeri khans of their possessions.\(^36\) On 21 November, 1822, Mekhti Quli Khan had to flee to Persia; soon thereafter, in December 1822, the power of the khans in Karabakh was abolished.

On 9 December, 1822, his wives were sent out of Karabakh.\(^37\) Mekhti Quli Khan crossed the border of the Erivan Khanate and, together with his family, reached Nakhchivan via the mahal of Sharur.\(^38\)

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\(^27\) See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415; [Hajji Khamid Efendi, Mufti of Transcaucasia,] Genealogy of the khans of Ganja, pp. 905-906.


\(^29\) See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.


\(^31\) See: Ibid., pp. 712-713, Doc. No. 1456.


\(^33\) See: Ibid., p. 338, Doc. No. 618.


\(^36\) See: Ibid., Vol. VI, Part I, p. V.


\(^38\) See: Ibid., pp. 860-861, Doc. No. 1314.
The Persian government gave Mekhti Quli Khan an annual salary of 6 thousand tumans and leased out to him the incomes from the Gerger Province.\(^{39}\)

In March 1827, at the height of the Second Russo-Persian War of 1826-1828, Infantry General Ivan Paskevich replaced General Yermolov as Commander of the Separate Caucasian Corps and head of the Caucasian Area.\(^{40}\) The newly appointed official deemed it politically expedient to lure the former khan of Karabakh onto Russia’s side “to stem discontent in the border region, where people were displeased with the humiliation of their former ruler.” The Russian general hoped to rely on Mekhti Quli Khan’s “vast friendly contacts and kinship with the most important people in Persia or even with the shah through Mekhti Quli Khan’s sister, who was one of the khan’s favorite wives.”\(^{41}\)

Negotiations were entrusted to Colonel Prince Ivan Abkhazov, who had replaced General Madatov as military chief of the Muslim provinces. Sub-lieutenant Mirza Adigezak-bek (the future author of Karabakh-name (History of Karabakh) and Prince Ivan Melikov, who served under Prince Abkhazov, were selected for the most responsible and hazardous part of the mission, viz. direct contacts, and coped brilliantly. Early in June 1827, General Paskevich reported to Chief of Staff Count Dibich, “I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the talks about pulling Mekhti Quli Khan onto our side were successful… On the 8th of this month, I received a dispatch from Karabakh that the khan had returned. On the way back, he was pursued by Persian cavalry, lost all of his carts, but safely reached Ak Karavanserai, where our troops met him. Three thousand nomadic families are following him from Daralagez to our domains.”\(^{42}\)

Vasily Potto quoted one of the members of the Russian unit who met Mekhti Quli Khan at Ak Karavanserai: “He was met with honors and brought to the tent of General Pankratiev.” The eyewitnesses said that “he was an old man of 60 with a short and thin grey beard, dull and lifeless eyes, tall and thin, and carried himself proudly, a habit learned when he was the real ruler of Karabakh.”\(^{43}\)

There are earlier descriptions of his appearance. In his memoirs, Spaniard Juan Van Halen, who as a major of the Nizhny Novgorod Dragoon Regiment (1819-1820) fought in the Caucasus, wrote that in 1820 Mekhti Quli Khan “looked like a man of forty or fifty; he was rather tall, his face, eyes, and beard were the same color as that of most Tatars (Azeris.—E.I.); half of his nose was missing, which he lost as a young man when fighting the Persians. In May, the khan left the capital to live outside it in a beautiful tower that stood in the mountains close to the road to Shahbulag; his harem was also there.”\(^{44}\)

On 7 July, 1827, under a royal decree, Mekhti Quli Khan received an annual grant of 4 thousand chervontsy and the right to administer the families who had come with him from Persia.\(^{45}\)

In the same year, he was restored in his military rank of Major General and got back his personal land (1,315 households with the land attached to them); the emperor gave him a diamond pen.\(^{46}\)

On 30 April, 1838, “according to information supplied by the Chief Commander in Georgia about his outstanding services to Russia and loyalty to the Throne of All Russia and to

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\(^{40}\) See: Ibid., p. 1.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., pp. 453-455, Doc. No. 402.

\(^{42}\) Ibidem.


The wives of Mekhti Quli Khan were:

1. Khankhanum Begum, daughter of his uncle Mehrali-bek Jevanshir (see No. 42/9);
2. Sarai Khanum, daughter of Ahmed Khan Karachorlinsky;
3. Magi Sharef Khanum Khoyskaya, widow of his elder brother Muhammad Hasan Agha;
4. Badir Jahan Begum (1802-1861), daughter of Ugurlu Khan (III) of Ganja (she gave birth to daughter Khurshid Banu Begum Natavan, more details below).

After the death of her husband, Badir Jahan Begum was granted an annual life pension of one thousand chervontsy by a royal decree of 3 September, 1846; she remained the owner of the landed property she had received from Mekhti Quli Khan under their marriage contract. In 1861, after her death, their daughter Khurshid Banu inherited it.

According to information related to 1849-1851, “Badyr Jan Begum, widow of Lieutenant General Mekhti Quli Khan” (a slip of the pen; it should be “widow of Major General”), was a member of the Shemakha Department of the St. Nina Female Charity.


Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Ragan Khanum.

In 1796, when Russian troops led by General Zubov had occupied several big towns in Azerbaijan and Daghestan, Ibrahim Khalil Khan sent his son Abulfat Agha to the Russian camp. Mirza Jamal Jevanshir, the last vizier of the Karabakh Khanate, left us a description of this mission: “While Agha Muhammad Shah was still at Fars and Khorasan, General-in-Chief Count Valerian Zubov, on the orders of Her Majesty Empress Catherine, arrived with a large unit in the Derbent area, captured the Derbent fortress, and, after approaching the city of Shemakha, set up camp. Ibrahim Khan, on his own free will, sent his son Abulfat Khan and sons of several beks of Karabakh to Valerian Zubov with presents and pure-bred horses expressing his obedience and sincere feelings to the high Russian state. He had also written a request in which he expressed his loyalty to Her Majesty the Empress.”

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47 See: Sankt-Peterburgskie senatskie vedomosti, No. 22, 28 May, 1838.
48 GAAAR, rec. gr. 77, inv. 1, f. 6, sheets 3-9.
51 RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 85rev.-89.
52 GAAAR, rec. gr. 123, inv. 1, f. 4 (Correspondence with the Tiflis Court on land disagreements that appeared during land-surveying of Hankendi, domain of the khan’s daughter Khurshidbanu Begum… 1 September, 1870-9 October, 1874), sheet 6rev.
53 See: Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1849 god, Tiflis, 1848, p. 63; Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1850 god, Tiflis, 1849, p. 48; Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1851 god, Tiflis, 1850, p. 53.
54 See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.
“They were all ready to become the loyal subjects of the great power when the empress suddenly died. Commander-in-Chief Zubov let Abulfat Khan, as well as the sons of the beks and elders of Karabakh, go back home with great honors and presents and informed Ibrahim Khan [through them] that he was returning [to Russia] on an order from Emperor Paul.”

In 1797, Ibrahim Khalil Khan had to agree to marry his daughter Agha Begum Agha to Fatali Shah and sent his son Abulfat Agha to the court of the shah, who “treated him as one of his noble emirs. After making him [one of] his closest interlocutors, he invariably lavished honors on him.”

Later Abulfat Agha was made khan and headed the Persian units, in particular during the First Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813.

Under the Treaty of Gulistan signed on 12 October, 1813, part of the Karabakh territory (Kapan, Gyuney, Meghri, and Chugundur mahals with up to 4 thousand families) remained in Persia. Abulfat Agha became their ruler (the Gyuney and Meghri mahals had been transferred to him earlier by his father Ibrahim Khalil Khan).

In June 1820, General Yermolov wrote to Foreign Minister Count Nesselrode that Mekhti Quli Khan, who at that time had no children, would like to see his younger brother Abulfat Khan his heir. He had repeatedly asked General Yermolov to let his brother come back. The general, who feared that Prince Abbas Mirza had too much influence on Abulfat Khan, who “enjoyed the special benevolence of Abbas Mirza,” refused.

Abulfat Agha also fought in the Second Russo-Persian War of 1826-1828, which deprived him of his lands occupied by Russia.

He was also known under the pseudonym Tuti, which he used as the author of poems and ghazals in Azeri and Persian. He died in Persia and was buried in the city of Qum (Iran).

He was married to Nisa Khanum, daughter of Mirza Rabi, vizier of King Irakly II of Kakhetia and to Badir Khanum, daughter of Ismail Khan Agha Jevanshir; he had one daughter Govhar Nisa Begum and six sons: Muhammad Ali Khan, Abbas Quli Khan, Muhammad Quli Khan, Muhammad Tagi Khan, Abdul Hussein Khan, and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Jevanshir (his descendants lived in Persia and are not shown in the present genealogical table).

20/8. Khanlar Agha (c. 1785-1832).

Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Bike Khanum of Avaria. According to Prince Tsitsianov’s report he was 20 in November 1805.

Under the royal decree of 8 July, 1805, which followed the treaty of May 1805 signed by his father under which the Karabakh Khanate became part of the Russian Empire, Khanlar Agha was promoted to a colonel.
On 27 May, 1806, Khanlar Agha and his father were in a summer camp where the latter was killed during a sudden attack by Major Lisanevich’s chasseurs. “Frightened by this unexpected attack, Khanlar Agha fled to Persia where he remained until newly appointed Commander-in-Chief in Georgia Count Gudovich arrived in Tiflis. As soon as the new Commander-in-Chief reached Tiflis, Khanlar Agha approached him through his brother Mekhti Quli Khan ‘to ask for forgiveness for his act and for permission to return to Karabakh’. He was forgiven and could immediately return to Karabakh, where on 16 April, 1807, he renewed his oath of allegiance, was restored to his old rank of lieutenant colonel, and started drawing his salary.\(^{67}\)

Until 1823, Lieutenant Colonel Khanlar Agha could draw on the taxes derived from two leased budget items: \textit{rakhdar khane}—trade in silk, alum, common madder, cotton, iron, steel and copper, hides, burkas, cloth, lambskin, petrol, Persian fruit, as well as commodities sold in villages (\textit{khavai-pulu}) and the slaughter house: trade in horned and small cattle. In 1823, General Yermolov transferred the slaughter house and \textit{rakhdar khane} to the treasury, which leased it off to private persons.\(^{68}\)

Colonel Khanlar Agha was rewarded with an annual pension of 371.44 silver rubles; by the time the power of the khans was abolished the colonel owned ten villages and nomadic lands, inherited with the permission of Russian authorities; all of his possessions (except the annual pension) were inherited after his death in 1832 by his half-brother Ahmed Agha.\(^{69}\)

\[21/8. \text{Muhammad Kasum Agha (Mamed Kasum Agha, Mamed Kasim Agha) (?-before 1843).}\]

Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by daughter of Allahyar-bek Ungutlinsky.\(^{70}\) Even if he had not been with his father when he was murdered by Major Lisanevich’s chasseurs, he deemed it wise to follow the example of his elder brother Khanlar Agha; he fled to Persia and returned in the fall of 1807 under new Commander-in-Chief in Georgia Count Gudovich (1806-1809), was pardoned, and could resume his oath of allegiance.\(^{71}\)

By December 1822, when the power of the Karabakh khans was abolished, he owned twelve villages and nomad lands; the Russian government confirmed his rights of inheritance.\(^{72}\)

On 24 December, 1823, “on the strength of a report of Commander of the Separate Caucasian Corps Infantry General Yermolov on Muhammad Kasum Agha loyalty to the Russian Government and his well-intentioned behavior,” he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel with an annual salary of 600 silver rubles.\(^{73}\)

Half of the salary was stopped after his death; the other half was paid to his heirs under a royal order of 28 October, 1843\(^{74}\) and instructions of the Department of State Treasury of the Shemakha Treasury Chamber of 4 March, 1844.\(^{75}\)

Muhammad Kasum Agha was married to Khadija Begum, daughter of his uncle Mehrali-bek Jevanshir (see No. 43/9)\(^{76}\) and to Gyusni Jahan Khanum. He had four sons—\textit{Najaf Quli Agha, Pasha Agha} (c. 1820-?), \textit{Kerim Agha} (1826-1907), and \textit{Kasum Agha} (c. 1834-?) and two


\(^{69}\) See: RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, pp. 89rev.-90.

\(^{70}\) See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.


\(^{72}\) The National Archives of Georgia (hereinafter NAG), rec. gr. 3, inv. 2, f. 120 (Correspondence … on continued support of members of the khan families, 20.05.1844-28.05.1845), sheets 190rev.-191.


\(^{74}\) NAG, rec. gr. 3, inv. 2, f. 120, sheets 190rev.-191.

\(^{75}\) RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 102rev.-105.

\(^{76}\) See: Mirza Jamil Jevanshir Karabakhsky, op. cit., p. 105; Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.
daughters—Jahan Khanum and Bala Khanum Jevanshir\(^{77}\) (not shown in the present genealogical table). Pasha Agha’s grandson, called Begbud Agha Jevanshir (c. 1879-18.07.1921, Istanbul), stands apart from the rest of the descendants. He graduated from the Freiberg Mining Academy in Germany, was elected to the parliament during the Azerbaijan Republic of 1918-1920, and served as minister of the interior and minister of trade and economics in the second Cabinet. He was murdered in Istanbul by an Armenian terrorist, member of the Dashnaksutium Party.

> **22.8. Ahmed Agha** (c. 1793 or c. 1795-died not later than 1851).
> Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Bike Khanum of Avaria.\(^{78}\)
> According to Prince Tsitsianov’s report, he was 10 in November 1805.\(^{79}\)
> The financial survey of the beks of Shusha compiled in 1848 cited his age as 55.\(^{80}\)
> By the time the power of the khans was abolished in December 1822, Ahmed Agha had four villages and nomad lands in his possession, the rights to which had been granted by the Russian government; later he inherited the lands of his mother and his brother Colonel Khanlar Agha.\(^{81}\)
>
> Ahmed Agha was married to Gyuri Jahan Begum (c. 1820-?), daughter of Yusif Khan of Shamshadli; she bore him a son Khanlar Agha and a daughter Bike Agha Jevanshir\(^{82}\) (not shown in the present genealogical table). After her husband’s death, Gyuri Jahan Begum married his nephew Lieutenant Colonel Suleyman Khan of Sheki (c. 1803-1858), son of Tuti Begum (see No. 32/8). They had one child, daughter Tuti Begum, born about 1852\(^{83}\); this means that Ahmed Agha Jevanshir died before 1851.
>
> His daughter Bike Agha was married to General Hasan-bek Agalarov (1815-after 1881), the last commander of the Transcaucasian Muslim Cavalry Regiment, Knight of the Order of St. George Fourth Class, and of all Russian orders up to St. Vladimir Second Class with swords.\(^{84}\)

> Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Khatay Khanum of Dizak.\(^{85}\)
> According to the description of the Karabakh province compiled on orders of General Yermolov, in 1823 Hussein Quli Agha had the Zengish Ali nomadic lands and a small income created by the budget items leased to him by Mekhti Quli Khan. General Yermolov left the lands under his management and in June 1823 replaced the income from the leased budget items with an annual pension of 450 silver rubles.\(^{86}\)
>
> He was married to Khurizat Khanum, daughter of Namaz-bek Saryjalinsky.\(^{87}\)

> **24/8. Sefi Quli Agha** (?-after 1862).
> Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Khatay Khanum of Dizak.\(^{88}\)

\(^{77}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheets 63-65; RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 102rev.-105.

\(^{78}\) Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.


\(^{80}\) See: GIAAR, rec. gr. 10, inv. 1, f. 9 (Financial survey of the town of Shusha and a list of beks living in the town of Shusha compiled in 1848).

\(^{81}\) NAG, rec. gr. 3, inv. 1, f. 120, sheets 190rev.-191.

\(^{82}\) RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 89rev.-90.

\(^{83}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheets 29rev.-30, 73, 109-110rev.

\(^{84}\) See: E.E. Ismailov, Georgievskie kavalery-azerbaidzhantsy, Moscow, 2005, pp. 77-86.

\(^{85}\) See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.


\(^{87}\) See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.

\(^{88}\) See: Ibidem.
In December 1822, when the power of khans was abolished, Sefi Quli Agha had two villages in his possession. They were transferred to the treasury in 1822 when he and his elder brother Mekhti Quli Khan fled to Persia. After returning from Persia, his elder son inherited an estate left to him in the last will and testament by Hussein Quli Agha, the elder brother of Sefi Quli Agha.89

In 1847, according to available information, he was widowed; he had eight sons: Ismail Agha (c. 1820-?), Mustafa Agha (c. 1825-?), Gashim Agha (c. 1835-?), Mamed Agha (c. 1849-?), Hussein Quli Agha (c. 1850-?), Teymur Agha (c. 1855-?), Ashraf Agha (c. 1860-?), Hamza Agha Jevanshirs (c. 1862-?) and one daughter Zakhra Nisa Khanum Jevanshir90 (not shown in the present genealogical table).


Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Princess Abashidze.91

Murdered at the age of 11 together with his father by chasseurs of Major Lisanevich.92


Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Khadija Khanum.93

According to the description of the Karabakh province compiled on the orders of General Yermolov, in 1823 Sheikh Ali Agha possessed the Kullar nomad lands. In June 1823, General Yermolov let Sheikh Ali Agha look after his former possessions and established an annual pension of 300 silver rubles.94

Sheikh Ali Agha was married to Nigar Khanum, who bore him seven sons: Hussein Ali Agha (c. 1820-?), Selim Agha (c. 1830-?), Ragim Agha (c. 1840-?), Geray Agha (c. 1845-?), Mamed Tagi Agha, Hasan Agha, Kyazum Agha (c. 1847-?) Jevanshirs and daughter Ayna Khanum Jevanshir95 (not shown in the present genealogical table).


Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Sona Khanum.96

By the time the power of the khans was abolished in December 1822, Suleyman Agha had seven villages inherited on the strength of the rights confirmed by the Russian government.97

He was married to Tyukezban Khanum, who bore him two sons, Shir Khan Agha (c. 1820-?) and Aslan Agha Jevanshirs98 (not shown in this work).


Son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Ana Khanum.99

Daughter of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Khurshid Begum of Ganja; was married to Fezi-bek100 (Fevzi-bek).


Daughter of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Khurshid Begum of Ganja.101

In 1798, she married Fatali Shah Qajar.

Mirza Jamal Jevanshir, the last vizier of the Karabakh Khanate, wrote about the marriage of the Persian shah to one of the daughters of Ibrahim Khalil Khan: Fatali Shah “…sent Ibrahim Khan a robe and a saber, transferred to him Karadag and its incomes, and expressed his desire to become his relative. He said, ‘In the interests of tranquility of both sides [the khan] should believe that his dear daughter Agha Begum Agha is worthy of our harem; let her be the head of our harem.’ After a talk [this proposal] was accepted. The shah sent noble khans with precious presents to fetch the bride and solemnly married her and made her his respectable wife and the head of the harem…”102

Agha Begum Agha wrote poetry in Azeri and Persian; she died childless and was buried in Qum (Iran).103


Daughter of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Shakhnisa Khanum Shahsevan; was married to Farajullah Khan Shahsevan (of Ardabil).104

32/8. Tuti Begum.

Daughter of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Shakhnisa Khanum Shahsevan; was married to Selim Khan of Sheki105; they had one son, Suleyman Khan of Sheki.106


Daughter of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Shakhnisa Khanum Shahsevan; was married to Mirza Muhammad Khan, beglyarbek of Tehran.107


Daughter of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Bike Khanum of Avaria108; was killed together with her father by chasseurs of Major Lisanevich.109


Daughter of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Princess Abashidze.110

100 See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.
102 Mirza Jamal Jevanshir Karabakhsky, op. cit., p. 81.
103 See: Бацай Мамадов, op. cit.
104 See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.
106 RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 93rev.-94.
107 See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.
110 See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.
Was married twice—to Jafar Quli Khan Khoysky (?-1814) and, after his death, to her
cousin Khan Kishi-bek Jevanshir (see No. 40/9).

Until 1823, she derived money from a farmed-off tax called *darga-bazaar*, under which
she was obliged to keep guards in the shops, make sure there was enough lighting, and answer
for any robberies at night. *Darga-bazaar* brought revenues in kind from each batch of water-
melons, melons, vegetables, fruit, fish, firewood, and coal; money from each head of slaughtered
cattle and monthly income from all the shops. In 1823, General Yermolov transferred this tax
to the budget, which farmed it off to private persons, while Gevhar Agha could count on remu-
neration.\(^{111}\)

In December 1822, when the power of the khans was abolished, Gevhar Agha owned ten
villages and nomadic lands, her inheritance rights being confirmed by the Russian government;
under an imperial decree of 10 March, 1831, she received an annual pension of 952.38 silver
rubles as a recompense for the lost *darga-bazaar* income.\(^{112}\)

She spent her money on religious buildings and helped restore the big Friday mosque in
Shusha built in 1182 Hegira (that is, in 1768/69), which was falling apart. Mirza Jamal Jevanshir,
the last vizier of the Karabakh Khanate, wrote that the restored mosque “became even more
beautiful.”\(^{113}\) The Arabic inscription on the main façade of the mosque says that restoration was
completed in 1302 (1884/85) under the last will and testament of Gevhar Agha; since that
time, it has been known as the Gevhar Agha mosque. She paid for the newly built upper and
lower mosques and two madrassahs in Shusha in 1865/1866.\(^{114}\) According to waqf name, the text
of which is carved on the main façade, in 1866/1867 Gevhar Agha bequeathed her real estate
(land, orchards, and shops) to two mosques and two madrassahs for charitable purposes. She
used the waqfs money to open a hospital for sick vagrants called Dar ul-Shafa, paid the bills of
the madrassahs, and bought books on the Shari’a and social sciences for their libraries.\(^{115}\)

According to information for 1852-1860, *Gevgar Agha, daughter of Lieutenant General Ibrahim
Khan*, belonged to the Shemakha Department of the St. Nina Female Charity.\(^{116}\)


Daughter of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Mirza Rabi;\(^{117}\) was married to Capitan Abuturab Khan
(Abra Khan) Khoysky; had one son *Ata Khan* and three daughters *Begum Khanum, Sharaf Ja-
han Begum*, and *Tubu Begum Abrakhanovs*.\(^{118}\)

Until 1823, Azad Begum derived 3,500 *panabadi* every year from the farmed-off tax
(*kapan*) brought by each batch of flour, raisins, fruit, water melons and melons, cotton and
slaughtered or live cattle either sold in the city or exported from Karabakh. She was entitled
to tobacco money (400 *panabadi* every year); under this item, tobacco trade was limited to the
lease holder or agents. In 1823, these items, like all others, were transferred to the treasury and
from that time on the treasury farmed-off the taxes to private persons on the orders of General


\(^{112}\) NAG, rec. gr. 3, inv. 2, f. 120, sheets 191rev.-192.


\(^{114}\) See: M. Neimat, “Epigraficheskie pamiatiuki Karabakha,” International Azeri Journal IRS-Nasledie, No. 2-3 (14-15),

\(^{115}\) See: M. Neimat, “Epigraficheskie pamiatiuki Karabakha,” International Azeri Journal IRS-Nasledie, No. 2-3 (14-15),


\(^{117}\) See: M. Neimat, “Epigraficheskie pamiatiuki Karabakha,” International Azeri Journal IRS-Nasledie, No. 2-3 (14-15),

\(^{118}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 77, inv. 1, f. 14 (Reports…), sheet 37; RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 98rev.-99.
Yermolov; Azad Begum was entitled to remuneration. Her lost income was replaced by an annual pension of 619.80 silver rubles; she owned nine villages and nomad lands.


Daughter of Ibrahim Khalil Khan by Muressa Khanum Saryjalinskaya; was married to her second cousin Ali-bek Mirza Ali-bek, grandson of Begbut Ali-bek (see No. 7/3); they had two sons Bala-bek and Abbas-bek and daughter Beyuk Khanum.

38/9. Muhammad-bek (c. 1762-1797).

Son of Mehrali-bek, grandson of Panah Ali Khan. Muhammad-bek seized power in the Karabakh Khanate after the murder of Agha Muhammad Shah in Shusha on 17 June, 1797 and remained in power until Ibrahim Khalil Khan returned; then he fled to the Sheki Khanate, but was “transferred to his deadly enemy Mustafa Khan of Shirvan, who killed him to avenge the death of his father and brothers…”

When the Karabakh Khanate became part of the Russian Empire, his descendants became Jevanshirs (not shown in the present genealogical table). Two of his descendants stood apart—grandson Second Captain of Cavalry Ahmed-bek Jevanshir (2 March, 1828, Kekhrizli village-9 January, 1903, Kekhrizli village), the author of Politicheskaia istoria Karabakhskogo Khanstva (Political History of the Karabakh Khanate) and Ahmed-bek’s daughter Khamidu Khanum Jevanshir (6/19 January, 1873, Kekhrizli village-6 February, 1955, Baku), one of the first women enlighteners in Azerbaijan.


Children of Mehrali-bek, grandchildren of Panah Ali Khan.

When the Karabakh Khanate became part of the Russian Empire, they assumed the family name of Jevanshir (not shown in the present genealogical table).

VII Generation

44/17. Jafar Quli Agha (Khan) (c. 1782/1783 or c. 1787, Shusha-3 December, 1866, Shusha).

Elder son of Muhammad Hasan Agha, heir to the Karabakh Khanate by Heyr Nisa Begum of Ganja; this means that he was grandson of Ibrahim Khalil Khan of Karabakh and Shahverdi Khan II of Ganja.

According to Prince Tsitsianov’s report, he was 18 in November 1805. According to the lists of the beks who lived in Shusha compiled in 1848, he was 66.

References:

120 RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 98rev.-100.
121 See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.
122 RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 104rev.-105.
123 A.-K. Bakikhanov, op. cit., p. 179.
124 See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415; [Hajji Khamid Efendi, Mufti of Transcaucasia,] Genealogy of the khans of Ganja, pp. 905-906.
126 GIAAR, rec. gr. 10, inv. 1, f. 9.
According to the lists of the beks of Shusha compiled in 1860, he was 77.\textsuperscript{127}

In November 1805, after the death of his father, he “was recognized by the Russian Government as the legal heir to the Karabakh Khanate and became owner of all the estates left after the death of his father.”\textsuperscript{128}

In August 1806, however, new Commander-in-Chief in Georgia Infantry General Count Gudovich recommended Foreign Minister Infantry General Baron Budberg to confirm Major General Mekhtı Quli Agha as the Khan of Karabakh on the strength of reports supplied by Major General Nesvetaev, interim commander of the Russian troops in Transcaucasia and Major General Nebolsin, Chief of the Troitsky Musketeer Regiment.\textsuperscript{129}

Jafar Quli Agha distinguished himself at the beginning of the First Russo-Persian War (1804-1813). In December 1805, after the death of his father Major General Muhammad Hasan Agha, who was heir to Karabakh, he was dispatched by his granddad Ibrahim Khalil Khan at the head of a Karabakh cavalry unit to punish the Karadag Kurds “for their inroads into Karabakh villages;” Jafar Quli Agha routed them and captured several thousand heads of cattle.\textsuperscript{130}

Later, after his granddad was murdered, his cavalry twice fought side by side with the chasseurs of Major Lisanevich and defeated the Iranian troops. In particular, the day after the murder, Persian troops appeared two versts away from the Shusha fortress. Major Lisanevich with 150 chasseurs and Jafar Quli Agha’s cavalry moved toward the Persians, pushed them back, and returned the people from several Karabakh villages who had followed the Persian unit.\textsuperscript{131}

On 16 June, 1806, Jafar Quli Agha, at the head of a unit of 250 mounted Azeris and 200 Armenian infantrymen, joined the 900-strong unit of Major Lisanevich’s chasseurs; together they left Shusha and moved on a forced march to the Nakhchivan border. On 20 June, they caught up with the Persians at Ordubad, defeated them, and pushed them beyond the Arax. In his report to Major General Nebolsin, Major Lisanevich deemed it necessary to write, “Jafar Quli and his officers showed exceptional bravery.”\textsuperscript{132}

In October 1806, Jafar Quli Agha set off for Tiflis where he planned to lodge a complaint against his uncle Mekhtı Quli Khan to Count Gudovich.\textsuperscript{133}

Count Gudovich reached Tiflis in late October 1806; on 11 November, Mekhtı Quli Khan turned up there to swear eternal allegiance to His Imperial Majesty in the presence of Count Gudovich.\textsuperscript{134}

While still in Georgievsk, Count Gudovich finally received the medal made for Major General Muhammad Hasan Agha, father of Jafar Quli Agha, and instructions to hand the medal to the heirs. In full conformity with the instructions given to Foreign Minister Baron Budberg dated 22 October, 1806, Count Gudovich planned to hand the medal to Jafar Quli Agha as soon as he reached Tiflis, “on the condition that he will not wear it without permission from His Majesty.”\textsuperscript{135}

Finally, in the latter half of November 1806, he received Jafar Quli Khan in Tiflis and, after obtaining his firm promise to recognize Mekhtı Quli Khan’s power, which “had been given to him by His Majesty together with the title of khan, and obey him as long as Mekhtı Quli Khan himself remains in due obedience to His Imperial Majesty,”\textsuperscript{136} Count Gudovich prob-

\textsuperscript{127} GIAAR, rec. gr. 10, inv. 1, f. 77 (List of beks, meliks, agalars and officials of Shusha in 1860), sheet 1.
\textsuperscript{128} RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 107rev.-108.
\textsuperscript{131} See: Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 334-335, Doc. No. 610.
\textsuperscript{132} P.O. Bobrovsky, op. cit., pp. 246-248; Mirza Jamal Jevanshir Karabakhsky, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
\textsuperscript{134} See: Ibid., p. 338, Doc. No. 618.
\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 348, Doc. No. 642.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., pp. 339-340, Doc. No. 621.
ably gave Jafar Quli Agha the gold medal encrusted with diamonds and bearing an inscription on the obverse: “To Karabakh Heir Mamad Asan Agha” and “For Loyalty 1805” on the reverse.

On 2 January, 1807, on Count Gudovich’s recommendation, Jafar Quli Agha was promoted to colonel, bypassing intermediate ranks, by an imperial rescript with an annual salary of 1,072.50 silver rubles.137


“You diligence and loyalty to Our Imperial Throne attracted Our Most Gracious Attention. We express our recognition and Our Special Benevolence by granting you the rank of Colonel of Russia accompanied by a corresponding remuneration in silver from Our State Treasury and remain firmly convinced that Our Benevolence will increase your zeal and will add your praiseworthy loyalty to Our High Imperial Throne. I remain well-disposed toward you. Signed ‘Alexander’.”138

In November 1811 (Zil-Kaade 1226 Hegira), Crown Prince of Persia Abbas Mirza signed a document to the name of Jafar Quli Agha, in which he promised “signs of his attention and benevolence,” including the promise to confer on him the title of hakim.139

The Iranian courier who carried the document was captured; after familiarizing himself with the document, Lieutenant General Marquise Philip Osipovich Paulucci, who served as Commander-in-Chief in Georgia from September 1811 to March 1812, suspected Colonel Jafar Quli Agha of contacts with Iranians and ordered that he should be arrested and sent to Tiflis.

When crossing the River Terter on the way to Tiflis, Jafar Quli Agha snatched the horse reins from the hands of one of the guards, pushed the other who sat behind him into the river, and fled to his estate and the Jebraillu tribe.140

Marquise Paulucci ordered for Heyr Nisa Begum, mother of the fugitive colonel, to be brought to Tiflis where he offered her a choice: “either permanent exile” in Russia or a fine of 150 thousand silver rubles—the sum Jafar Quli Agha had allegedly received from Persians. She preferred the second option and pledged to transfer her jewelry to the treasury, including that which had belonged to Agha Muhammad Shah Qajar murdered in Shusha.141

In his letter to Marquise Paulucci, Jafar Quli Agha insisted that the “Persians acted in their own interests” when sending him the document to deprive him of benevolence of the Commander-in-Chief; that he had never written to Prince Abbas, never sent messengers to him, never gotten the accursed document, had not known anything about it, and, most important, had never acted as traitor.142

After learning that Jafar Quli Agha had fled, Prince Abbas Mirza and his troops crossed the Arax and moved to Sultan-Bud defended by a battalion of the Troitsky Regiment and a small unit of Mekhti Quli Khan’s cavalry. Later Mekhti Quli Khan wrote to Marquise Paulucci to push responsibility for Prince Abbas Mirza’s march onto “ill-intentioned scoundrel Jafar Quli Agha” and his intrigues.143

On 1 February, 1812, the battalion of the Troitsky Regiment was completely routed; many were killed, and those who survived were taken prisoner. Mekhti Quli Khan accompanied by several of his nukers fled for their lives. Prince Abbas Mirza ordered Jafar Quli Agha to move.

137 RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 107rev.-108.
143 See: Ibid., pp. 135-139, Doc. No. 203.
the Jebraillu tribe beyond the Arax, conferred on him the title of khan, and moved part of the Karabakh Khanate under his rule.144

Meanwhile, Commander-in-Chief in Georgia (1812-1816) Infantry General Nikolay Rtishchev in his letter of 16 May, 1815 wrote to Acting Foreign Minister (1814-1816) Privy Councilor Ivan Weydemeyer that immediately after his flight, Jafar Quli Agha, who for three years “enjoyed the personal respect of the Persian Government and received 12,000 silver rubles every year,” had been seeking, through General Rtishchev, permission to return to Karabakh. While in Persia, wrote the general, Jafar Quli Agha had never agreed to take part in the inroads on Karabakh, even though “his knowledge of the roads, his popularity among the greater part of the local people, and his personal presence could have helped the Persians to succeed and completely ravage the khanate.” His mother, Heyr Nisa Begum, kept under military guard in Tiflis, in turn asked for permission for her son to return to Karabakh. Finally, when the Gulistan Peace Treaty was signed on 12 October, 1813 and ratified in May 1814 by Emperor Alexander I, General Rtishchev could send his representative to Persia to present the treaty to Fatali Shah and to obtain permission from the Persians for Jafar Quli Agha to return. Late in 1814, Jafar Quli Agha, after obtaining permission to return to Karabakh together with 300 families of his subjects, immediately went to Tiflis where he renewed his oath of allegiance to Emperor Alexander I in the presence of General Rtishchev.145

In February 1815, he was permitted to come back to Karabakh, his landed property and the salary of a colonel of the Russian army restored to him; he also acquired “complete protection against encroachments of Mekhti Quli Khan; his subjects were removed from the power of Mekhti Quli Khan to take command only from their landlord. None of the owners and landlords of Karabakh had similar rights.”146

The most important decision was made on 17 March, 1815 when General Rtishchev, on the strength of the Manifesto of 30 August, 1814, confirmed, in writing the right of Jafar Quli Agha to the title of the heir of the Karabakh Khanate and “all advantages and honors” he had had before his flight to Persia.147

These privileges were short-lived. In his report to Emperor Alexander I, newly appointed Commander-in-Chief in Georgia (1816-1827) Lieutenant General Alexey Yermolov asked him not to confirm Colonel Jafar Quli Agha’s title of the heir of the Karabakh Khanate because he, General Yermolov, would find enough “plausible reasons to keep him away from the throne.”148

Moreover, the general piled the guilt for the defeat of the battalion of the Troitsky Regiment in February 1812 on Jafar Quli Agha.149

The general, however, never hesitated when appointing Colonel Jafar Quli Agha commander of the Karabakh cavalry, which took part in the 1819 military expedition of the Russian army in southern Daghestan.

Jafar Quli Agha’s outstanding service under the command of Major General Madatov, Chief of the Military Districts of the Sheki, Shirvan and Karabakh khanates, was rewarded with a Gold Saber incrusted with diamonds.

General Madatov’s regiment included two infantry battalions of the Sevastopol and Troitsky regiments (1,500 people in all), three hundred Cossacks of the line, and eight pieces of artillery. “Fully aware that these forces were inadequate for the coming battles in Daghestan,

146 RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 110-111.
148 This was described in detail in the previous article (see: E. Ismailov, “The Khans of Karabakh: The Roots, Subordination to the Russian Empire, and Liquidation of the Khanate,” p. 161).
Madatov decided to use its influence in the Muslim provinces entrusted to his administration to convince the khans to strengthen his expedition with mounted units of hunters chasseurs formed in each of the khanates. Very soon several hundreds of excellent Asian cavalrymen arrived from Karabakh, Shirvan, and Sheki.\textsuperscript{150} In his Zapiski (Diaries), General Yermolov wrote that “this cavalry could considerably strengthen the expedition; it was no less useful as a guarantee of the khans’ good behavior.”\textsuperscript{151}

In August 1819, General Madatov and his expeditionary corps subjugated Tabasaran, and in September-October 1819, Karakaytag.\textsuperscript{152} In November, General Madatov was ordered to go on a forced march to the borders of the Akusha community; the main forces of the Russian army (nine infantry battalions and artillery) under General Yermolov himself were moving in the same direction.\textsuperscript{153} On 19 December, 1819, they took the village of Lavashi by force, and on 21 December, they seized the Akusha community.\textsuperscript{154} On 27 December, 1819, the “Tatar” cavalry gathered in Azeri khanates was disbanded.\textsuperscript{155}

On 20 February, 1820, in his residence in Tsarskoe Selo, Emperor Alexander I signed a decree to the Chapter of Russian Orders: “To reward the outstanding bravery demonstrated in battles with the Lezghians and in defeating Akusha on 19 December, 1819, I Most Graciously award the Order of Great Martyr St. George the Victorious Fourth Class to Colonel Aslan Khan of the Kyura Khanate; Order of St. Prince Vladimir Equal to the Apostles Fourth Class with Great Ribbon to Major Hasan Agha of the same khanate; Gold Saber incrusted with precious stones and an inscription “For Bravery” to Colonel Jafar Quli Agha of the Karabakh Khanate. We order the Chapter of the Russian Orders on the strength of our decree to the Ruling Senate of 24 April, 1816 to supply them with documents and orders; the gold saber should be taken from Our Cabinet.”\textsuperscript{156}

Newspapers wrote that Colonel Jafar Quli Agha had been awarded a Gold Saber incrusted with diamonds.\textsuperscript{157} Colonel Jafar Quli Agha was the first Azeri and the second Muslim to receive this military “general” award.\textsuperscript{158} Only two more Muslim officers (both Azeri) were awarded the Gold Saber incrusted with diamonds: Major General Kelbali Khan of Nakhchivan on 8 December, 1878 and Lieutenant General Samed-bek Mekhmandarov on 14 February, 1914.\textsuperscript{159}

Early in the 1820s, not without the efforts of General Madatov, the enmity between Jafar Quli Agha and his uncle Mekhti Quli Khan flared up. Contrary to what was said in the official correspondence, in particular in Administrator of Civilian Affairs in Georgia General Velyaminnov’s letter of 12 July, 1821 to Jafar Quli Agha, namely that all members of the Caucasian administration “were aggrieved” by the renewed disagreements between him and his uncle, which “many times in the past had caused the government to worry about the prospect of the unpleas-

\textsuperscript{150} V. Potto, Kavkazskaia voyna v otdelnykh ocherakh, epizodakh, legendakh i biografiiakh, Vol. II, Yermolovskoe vremya, Issue II, St. Petersburg, 1888, p. 229.
\textsuperscript{151} “Zapiski generala Yermolova vo vremia upravleniia Gruziiyu,” in: Zapiski Alekseia Petrovicha Yermolova. Sprilozenieimi. 1816-1827, Published by N.P. Yermolov, Part II, Moscow, 1868, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{153} See: Ibid., pp. 252-253.
\textsuperscript{154} See: Ibid., pp. 259-260, 263.
\textsuperscript{155} See: “Zapiski generala Yermolova...,” p. 102.
\textsuperscript{156} The Russian State Military-Historical Archives (hereinafter RGVIA), rec. gr. 29, inv. 1/153v, f. 162a, Part 132, sheet 5.
\textsuperscript{157} See: Russkiy invalid or Voennye vedomosti, No. 55, 6 March, 1820; Moskovskie vedomosti, No. 21, 13 March, 1820.
\textsuperscript{158} Colonel Aslan Khan of the Kyura Khanate of the Lak Kazi-Kumuk khan family was the first Muslim who received the Gold Saber incrusted with diamonds for his “distinctive service in fighting mountaineers” on 17 February, 1819 (see: E. Ismailov, Zolotoe orzhechie s nadpisju “Za khрабrost”. Spiski kavalerov. 1788-1913, Moscow, 2007, p. 171).
\textsuperscript{159} See: Ibid., pp. 8, 172, 305.
ant examination of mutual claims,” General Yermolov, who wanted to liquidate the power of the khans, very much approved of these “disagreements,” which supplied him with a “plausible reason” to prevent Colonel Jafar Quli Agha from becoming the khan.

Those who investigated the attempt on the life of Colonel Jafar Quli Agha carried out by General Madatov in November 1822 when Mekhti Quli Khan fled the khanate, which was transferred to the direct rule of Russia, supplied General Yermolov with “plausible reasons.” “This and the very bad attitude toward Jafar Quli Agha in Karabakh and the fact that he was a traitor in the past forced me to remove him to Russia…” On 26 December, 1822, former heir to the Karabakh Khanate Colonel Jafar Quli Agha was exiled to Simbirsk on the Volga.

Here is what prominent Russian military commander Nikolay Muravyev, who had seen everything with his own eyes and who disagreed with what Yermolov had written about how people of Karabakh treated Jafar Quli Agha, wrote in his memoirs:

“Before leaving Shusha I, on the same day, after saying goodbye to Alexey Petrovich [Yermolov], went to Lieutenant Colonel Reut (commander of the 42nd regiment of chasseurs.—E.I). His house was encircled with infantrymen; I went in and saw Jafar Quli Agha of Karabakh sitting on the bed and taking leave of his children and mother…

“Jafar Quli Agha, with the right to the khanate, was loved by the people of Karabakh and was an enemy of the khan. When the khan fled, he, expecting to replace him as the khan of Karabakh, wounded himself in the arm… to spread rumors that before leaving the khan had tried to kill him but merely wounded him. I think that it was Madatov who advised him in order to acquire a plausible reason to send him to Russia and appropriate the khanate. I cannot understand how he was persuaded to keep silence about Madatov’s advice; he was probably afraid because he kept telling me that he had been wounded by the khan’s servants when the khan fled.

“Jafar Quli Agha is a young man, very fit, sharp, and fairly educated… He was captured in Reut’s apartment, to which he had been lured under a false pretext. He was given two hours to pack and say farewell to his relatives…

“He looked extremely bewildered. There was also his son Kerim aged 15 who studied in Tiflis and was leaving with him. People who loved him were gathering in the squares and streets to talk about his fate.

“I left Shusha the same day and spent the night at the Pojalinsky outpost where I met Councilor of State Mogilevsky and P.N. Yermolov on their way to Shusha to compile an inventory of the khanate, count the income, and introduce our administration. Jafar Quli Agha arrived the same night with his son Kerim accompanied by mounted Cossacks and infantrymen.

“I spent the second night in Terter; Jafar Quli Agha and his Cossack guard also spent the night there. I went with him to Tiflis; in the evenings we played chess. He was very worried about his future and kept asking me where he was being taken and whether he would be allowed to go to St. Petersburg to enter military service and preserve his rank of a colonel. I knew nothing about this and could not answer his questions; I tried to console him as best as I could; the evenings we spent together at the stations were fairly pleasant.

“On the third day I arrived in Elisavetpol, where I spent two days… On 31st (December 1822.—Ed.) I left the city and in Shamkhor met Jafar Quli Agha accompanied by Cossack Lieutenant Colonel Dolotin, who traveling with him as far as Demurgasov where he was replaced by interpreter Major Nazarov who took Jafar Quli Agha to Russia and, after bringing him to Simbirsk, returned him the saber awarded by the Czar…”

161 “Zapiski generala Yermolova…,” pp. 138-140.
Jafar Quli Agha arrived in Simbirsk on 14 March, 1823; he was given an annual pension of 12,000 in paper money (in the 1820s, it was equal to 3,000 silver rubles); under the royal decree of 21 July, 1823, he also received 1,200 rubles a year in paper money to rent an apartment.\textsuperscript{164}

His estate in Karabakh was transferred to the state: according to General Yermolov, there were 1,047 peasant families; Jafar Quli Agha owned two houses—in Shusha and not far from the village of Aglis-kend, which stood in an orchard; his herd of horses counted 56 fillies and 36 stallions; he had a herd of 423 heads of horned and small cattle and 27 camels. The house with the orchard was given to the colonel’s younger brother Shukyur Agha; 20 fillies and 3 stallions were moved to the state stud farm; the rest was transferred to Jafar Quli Agha’s second brother Khanjan Agha, who pledged to pay all of the elder brother’s debts.\textsuperscript{165}

On top of this Jafar Quli Agha was entitled to the farmed-off dyeing tax; he received 24,620 \textit{panabadi} a year from the leaseholders (which amounted to 3,693 silver rubles—1 \textit{panabadi} was equal to 15 to 16 kopeks). Under this item, the leaseholders drew money from the sales of dyed silk and cotton. In 1823, this practice was discontinued; the tax was removed to the treasury, which farmed it off to private businessmen.\textsuperscript{166}

Colonel Jafar Quli Agha seized the opportunity presented by Emperor Alexander I’s short stay in Simbirsk to lodge a request to return him his Karabakh estate, allow him to reside in St. Petersburg, and let his son join the army. On 28 August, 1825, by “an imperial order,” Colonel Jafar Quli Agha was allowed to live in St. Petersburg; his annual pension was increased by 12,000 rubles in paper money.\textsuperscript{167}

In this way, his annual budget in St. Petersburg was 24,000 ruble in paper money (that is, 6,000 silver rubles); in 1823, when the tax farmed-off to him was returned to the treasury, the annual pension for his mother and younger brothers was increased by 700 silver rubles over the pension of 1,118.02 rubles for Heyr Nisa Begum, 500 silver rubles for Khanjan Agha, and 400 silver rubles for Shukyur Agha. In 1824, Jafar Quli Agha’s landed possessions and tax brought in 9,385.45 silver rubles.\textsuperscript{168}

In 1826 and 1827, Colonel Jafar Quli Agha lodged several requests to Emperor Nicholas I asking for the return of his landed possessions and permission to return to Karabakh. The imperial order issued on 6 August, 1829 said that “Jafar Quli Agha, a smart man who has adjusted to life in Russia and became member of St. Petersburg English Club,” could go back to his homeland. He returned in 1830 and settled in the city of Shusha. His property and his estate (with the exception of the farmed-off tax) were returned to him, “as well as the income produced by his possessions during the time he resided in Russia.”\textsuperscript{169}

His salary, suspended during his exile in Simbirsk, was not restored; on 1 January, 1846, he started drawing 2,500 silver rubles a year from the Shusha District revenue office in replacement of the money produced by the farmed-off tax.\textsuperscript{170}

Vasily Potto, Russian military historian (1836-1911), briefly mentioned Jafar Quli Agha in the chapter dealing with Mekhti Quli Khan’s return to Karabakh: “It should be said here that somewhat later Jafar Quli Agha, nephew of Mekhti Quli Khan, also returned to Karabakh. He played a great historical role in the fate of his motherland. Exiled to Simbirsk by General Yermolov, he managed to obtain permission to move to St. Petersburg during the reign of Alexan-
der 1; his sons were studying there, while Kerim was serving in the life guard lancer regiment. As soon as Yermolov left the Caucasus, Jafar Quli Agha asked for permission to return and join the army. The czar deemed it necessary to consult Paskevich. Count Nesselrode wrote to Paskevich: “The petitioner is brave and gallant because he was promoted to the rank of a colonel and awarded with a gold saber incrusted with diamonds; yet before that he had been as gallant and as brave fighting us on the Persian side.” Paskevich found it embarrassing to have two blood enemies—the nephew and the uncle—in one and the same place, which could have caused discontent in the province. He no longer trusted either of them. Jafar Quli Agha lost his chance to fight in the Persian war. He came back in 1830 and, like his uncle, lived his last years in Karabakh as a private person.”

In 1831, when irregular mounted Muslim regiments conscripted in Azerbaijan were used, after a long interval, in military expeditions of the Russian army to Daghestan and Chechnia, it was planned to appoint Colonel Jafar Quli Agha commander of the First Mounted Muslim Regiment staffed with people from the former Karabakh Khanate. This probably never happened. Anyway there is not enough information to confirm his involvement in the military campaigns of Russian army of the early 1830s in Daghestan and Chechnia.

Later, by an imperial decree of 18 October, 1848, “Colonel Jafar Quli Agha, who lives in the Shusha District of the Shemakha Gubernia,” was awarded the Order of St. Anne Second Class “for special efforts he demonstrated, according to Vicegerent of the Caucasus, when capturing highwaymen.”

On 6 December, 1850, by an imperial order, Colonel Jafar Quli Agha of the Separate Caucasian Corps was promoted to Major General “for distinguished service.”

The printed lists of generals by seniority mentioned Major General Jafar Quli Agha (his family name was never mentioned in these lists and imperial orders) as belonging to the Separate Caucasian Corps for political reasons.

By an imperial decree of 17 February, 1859, Major General Jafar Quli Agha of the Caucasian Army (the Separate Caucasian Corps had been transformed into the Caucasian Army in December 1857) was awarded the Order of St. Vladimir Third Class (with a special sign for non-Christians) “for his excellent and diligent service confirmed by his superiors.”

On a request from the Chief Commander of the Caucasian Army, Major General Jafar Quli Agha of the Cavalry was awarded the Order of St. Stanislav First Class (18.05.1861) “for his excellent and diligent service.”

According to information for the 1850s-1860s, Major General Jafar Quli Agha did not serve and lived in the city of Shusha.

According to Kavkazskiy kalendar (Caucasian Calendar), in 1852-1853 Major General Jafar Quli Agha was Honorary Supervisor of the Shemakha District School; he also belonged to the Caucasian Agricultural Society from its first year (1850) until his death in 1866. The

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172 GIAAR, rec. gr. 130, inv. 1, f. 26, sheets 239-240.
173 Russkii invalid, No. 246, 6 November, 1848.
174 Russkii invalid, No. 268, 8 December, 1850.
175 See, for example: Spisok generalam po starshinstvu. Ispravleno po 13-e iyulia, St. Petersburg, 1855, p. 346; Spisok generalam po starshinstvu. Ispravleno po 7-e iunia, St. Petersburg, 1856, p. 455.
176 Sankt-Peterburgskie senatskie vedomosti. No. 50, 23 June, 1859.
177 GIAAR, rec. gr. 44, inv. 1, f. 590a (Lists of officers who lived in the Shemakha Gubernia, 370 people in all and the band-roll of the same officers, 1854-1893), sheet 21; Kavkaz. No. 48, 22 June, 1861.
178 GIAAR, rec. gr. 44, inv. 1, f. 590a, sheet 21.
179 See: Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1852 god, p. 595; Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1853 god, p. 552.
180 See: Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1851 god, p. 57; Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1852 god, p. 608; Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1853 god, p. 569; Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1855 god, p. 676; Kavkazskiy kalendar na 1856 god, p. 667; Kavkazskiy kalendar
Caucasian Agricultural Society was set up in Tiflis and confirmed by an imperial decree of 27 February, 1850, which described its main aim as “pooling private efforts to popularize in the Caucasian and Transcaucasian territories useful knowledge, novelties, and improvements in all agricultural branches.” Landowners and people living in the Caucasus, as well as officials “known for their knowledge and experiments in agriculture or scholarly works related to the Society’s aim,” could be elected full members.181

Major General Jafar Quli Agha died on 3 December, 1866.182

By an imperial order of 11 January, 1867, Major General Jafar Quli Agha of the Cavalry was excluded from the lists as dead.183

The wives of Jafar Quli Agha were:

1. Ajaib Nisa (Khanum), daughter of Tuni-bek, “an Armenian girl from the village of Banazur,” “temporary wife” (she bore him two sons—Nos. 50 and 51)184;
2. Etar Khanum (Eter Khanum), daughter of Hussein Quli-bek (her son No. 52).185

He was frequently mentioned by his contemporaries, both historians and travelers who visited the Caucasus during his lifetime.

Mir-Mohsun Navvab (1833-1918), prominent Azeri artist, calligrapher, theorist of music, and poet mentioned Jafar Quli Agha in his Tezkirey-i-Navvab, which contains biographical information about over 100 of nineteen-century Karabakh poets. He met Jafar Quli Agha when he was over 80 and described him as a tall and well-built man obviously very strong in his youth. Jafar Quli Agha liked poetry and wrote under the penname Arif. Mir-Mohsun Navvab quoted some of his poems in his book. Jafar Quli Agha played several musical instruments and was a keen connoisseur of the Azeri classic Mugham. He gathered musical and literary mejlises at home and loved competitions between local and visiting wrestlers, performances of conjurers and jesters, camel and goat races, and dog and cock fights.186

Prussian official Baron August von Haxthausen (1792-1866) traveled in the Caucasus in August-October 1843; in 1849 he wrote and in 1857 published a work called Studien über die innern Zustände, das Volksleben und insbesondere die ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands (shortened English translation The Russian Empire: Its People, Institutions and Resources). He relied not only on his notes made during the journey, but also on stories and reminiscences of Russian officials he heard in 1849 and later. He described Jafar Quli Agha’s house and personal life.

“My companion Herr Aderkas presented to him (Jafar Quli Agha.—E.I.) in Shusha was invited for a cup of tea. He saw a very strange mixture of eastern and European customs and life style. His house looked very much like the houses of other rich Tatars (Azeris.—E.I.) in Shusha. Inside there was a big hall in the European style—mirrors on the walls, a chandelier hanging from the ceiling, walls lined with elegant redwood furniture, sofas, armchairs, tables, and chairs. There were pictures on the papered walls; in short, there were all signs of European comfort and

182 GIAAR, rec. gr. 44, inv. 1, f. 590a, sheet 21.
183 See: Kavkaz, No. 12, 9/21 February, 1867; Russkiy invalid, No. 12, 12/24 January, 1867.
184 GIAAR, rec. gr. 290, inv. 2, f. 1059; Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.
185 GIAAR, rec. gr. 290, inv. 2, f. 1046.
luxury. Jaffar, in the uniform of a Russian general with numerous orders greeted his guests, Herr Aderkas and other Europeans, in European style. He is a handsome, tall, and well-built man with a noble and very attractive face, proud bearing, and still very strong. They all sat at the table; then came his oriental relatives and guests who sat cross-legged oriental fashion on the sofa, smoked pipes, drank tea, and spoke when addressed. Mirza Chamal was among them, the former minister of Ibrahim, who advised him to seek support of the Russians (Mirza Jamal Jevanshir, the last vizier of the Karabakh Khanate and author of Karabakh-name, he died in 1853. Since Jafar Quli Agha was promoted to Major General in December 1850, the meeting took place between 1850 and 1853.—E.I.). Servants in European liveries served tea, cakes, jams, punch, sherbet, and ice cream; other servants were dressed in Tatar and Circassian clothes. An expensive Vienna clock played an overture from the opera La muette de Portici! Jaffar kept a big harem, had numerous children, whom the guests, however, did not notice."

In 1891, the Russkiy arkhiv journal published the memoirs of Andrey Fadeev (1789-1867), who served for a long time as a member of the Council of the Main Administration and administrator of the expedition of state property of Transcaucasia. In the summer of 1848, he went to Shusha where, accompanied by the head of the Shusha district, he “paid visits to the respected leaders of local aristocracy: the rich widow of Mekhti Quli Khan, Colonel Jafar Quli Khan, and elderly dowager Javahir Khanum.” The Russian official described the widow as “a fairly educated woman, or even a woman of the world Oriental style; she was very hospitable with the guests and even presented them with an excellent carpet, which she had made herself.” Her daughter Khurshid Banu Begum, “a pretty woman called the Rose of Karabakh because of her beauty,” lived with her. Andrey Fadeev had the following to say about Colonel Jafar Quli Agha: “He lived in Shusha in European style with a strong Tatar accent.” He invited Fadeev to dinner, “which turned out to be a great feast with Asian entertainments, dances, music, and singing and, naturally, champagne; in the evening there were card games which lasted well into the night…” The author described Georgian Princess dowager Javahir Khanum, widow of Ibrahim Khalil Khan, as “a very important Tatar lady of advanced years” who “carefully preserved her khan dignity…”

In his history of the Caucasian war, Vasily Potto wrote: “One of the travelers who saw Jafar in 1857 says that he was a venerable old man who still amazed with his attractive typically (Caucasian) face with a full beard and a huge figure bent under the weight of years, yet still showing its former vitality and force. His composure, proud bearing, and tallness distinguished him from the crowd of honorable beks, also tall and prominent people, who looked very different from the common Tatars. In the East, tallness and a proud bearing are the signs of good blood and aristocratic origins. This was one of the strongest human characters that never bends under the weight of circumstances and hardly succumbs to the years.”

In 1864, Vasily Vereshchagin (1842-1904), Russian war artist and writer, visited the Caucasus for the first time. He published his travel notes in 1870 in the Vsemirny puteshestvennik journal, in which he described his meeting with Jafar Quli Agha, two years before his death.

“…In Shusha I saw a Jebrail horse (from a small settlement close to Shusha)... The best horses I saw in Shusha belonged to the stud farm of the same Jafar Quli Khan... There were few of them, but all were excellent. Jafar bought them from other beks. I did not know whether he was an expert on horses or merely lucky, but, let me repeat, I had never seen anything similar.

I painted one of the studs. Jafar Quli Agha Khan told me that in the past he had been the first among the horse breeders in the quantity and quality of his horses and that he had lost half of the stud farm and half of the income because he was frequently away, sometimes for a long time.

“Jafar Quli Khan is a respectable man and no fool. He lived a lot in society; he saw a lot and heard a lot, which made him an interesting interlocutor. I met him at one of the evening spectacles he gave at home in the yard. …In the first nine days of moharem, rich and faithful Muslims usually organize performances reproducing the last sufferings of the imam. Normally they are given either at home or in the yard or in front of the house. They invite actors; the performances attract relatives, friends, and acquaintances. I was lucky enough to be invited as a traveler interested in the city’s sights.

“I found the master of the house laying on pillows in front of the window that looked onto the balcony and the street. He started talking to me in pure Russian, apologized for not getting up, and kindly repeated his invitation to the evening performance. It was a copy of those I had seen before, therefore I wasn’t interested. I was much more interested in the master of the house.

“He was an old man with an intelligent and expressive face; his long red beard reached his chest. Bedridden for a long time, he was a shadow of the brave Jafar of the past. He had been one of the contenders to the Karabakh throne, but his bravery, courage, and determination had made him too dangerous—he spent many years in exile. A handsome, young, and rich man, he had been very popular in fashionable Petersburg society where he lived a dissipated life. Today, he probably tries to atone for his past sins with good deeds.

“One of the rooms is decorated in the Western style; there is an old piano there; sometimes he is brought up to it (he cannot walk without support) and plays old melodies with his shaking fingers. I tried to talk to him about his life, which had been full of adventures, but he did not like to recollect the past. He liked my sketches and portraits of people we both knew, but his enthusiasm reached the highest point when he saw my sketches of horses. He could barely believe that they had been done in pencil without other means.”

45/17. Shukyur Agha (c. 1789-before 1844).
Son of Muhammad Hasan Agha by Heyr Nisa Begum of Ganja.

According to Prince Tsitsianov’s report, he was 16 in November 1805.

By December 1822, when the power of khans was liquidated, he owned seven villages and nomad lands, his right of inheritance also being confirmed by the Russian government.

He had one son Ismail Agha Jevanshir (c. 1807-?) (not shown in the present genealogical table).

46/17. Khanjan Agha (c. 1793-before 1844).
Son of Muhammad Hasan Agha by Heyr Nisa Begum of Ganja.

According to Prince Tsitsianov’s report, he was 12 in November 1805.

By December 1822, when the power of khans was liquidated, Khanjan Agha owned five villages and nomad lands, his right of inheritance also being confirmed by the Russian govern-
ment; until 1840 he drew a quarter of the income produced by the farmed-off dyeing tax in Shusha.\(^{197}\)

He was married to Zogra Khanum and had three sons and three daughters: Mahmud Agha (c. 1818-?); Agha Khan, Abbas Quli Agha (c. 1834-?); Gyulli Begum, Shirin Begum and Kichik Begum Jevanshir.\(^{198}\) (not shown in the present genealogical table). Isfendiyar Javanshiro, grandson of Mahmud Agha Jevanshir, was People’s Artist of Azerbaijan S.S.R. since 1943, soloist of the State Philharmonic of Azerbaijan (pseudonym Khan of Susha [Shushinsky]) born on 20.08.1901 in Shusha, died on 18.03.1979 in Baku.

\(\Rightarrow 47/17.\) Tubi Begum.

Daughter of Muhammad Hasan Agha by Heyr Nisa Begum of Ganja.\(^{199}\)

\(\Rightarrow 48/17.\) Beyuk Khan (c. 1804-after 1844).

Son of Muhammad Hasan Agha by Magi Sharef Begum Khoyskaya.\(^{200}\)

By December 1822, when the power of the khans was liquidated, Beyuk Khan owned nine villages and nomad lands, his right of inheritance also being confirmed by the Russian government.\(^{201}\)

He was married to Shagra Bani, who bore him four sons and four daughters: Gashim Agha (c. 1830-21.12.1889); Kasum Agha (c. 1835-?); Selim Agha (c. 1837-?); Sadykh Agha (c. 1840-?); Pyusta Khanum, Nabat Khanum, Sheker Khanum and Begum Khanum Jevanshir (not shown in the present genealogical table).

\(\Rightarrow 49/18.\) Khurshid Banu Begum (penname Natavan) (August 1832, Shusha-2 October, 1897, Shusha).

Prominent Azeri poetess, artist, and public figure.

The only daughter of Mekhti Quli Khan, the last sovereign khan of Karabakh by his marriage to Badir Jakhan Begum of Ganja.\(^{203}\)

In January 1846, after the death of Mekhti Quli Khan on 15 May, 1845, the Civilian Administration of the Transcaucasian Territory offered Khurshid Banu Begum an estate of 1,315 households, as inherited possessions, in 41 nomad lands and 7 villages, which her father possessed for life.\(^{204}\) The Caucasian Committee was prepared to transfer these possessions to the khan’s daughter as estate for life; it specified that the “question of the type of ownership of the so-called bek estates has not yet been resolved; this makes it impossible to transfer Mekhti Quli Agha’s estates for life to his daughter as inherited possessions on principles that have been not accepted as final.” This was confirmed by Emperor Nicholas I on 3 September, 1846; on 6 December, 1846, however, the emperor signed a rescript On Confirming the Right of the Khans, beks and Agalars to the Lands they Owned when the Caucasus was Joined to Russia as Inherited Possessions. Khurshid Banu Begum acquired the right to the real estate of her father Major General Mekhti Quli Khan of Karabakh.\(^{205}\)

\(^{197}\) NAG, rec. gr. 3, inv. 2, f. 120, sheets 190rev.-191.

\(^{198}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheet 32rev.; RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 101rev.-103.

\(^{199}\) See: Genealogy of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his children, Doc. No. 1415.

\(^{200}\) See: Ibidem.

\(^{201}\) NAG, rec. gr. 3, inv. 2, f. 120, sheets 10rev.-190.

\(^{202}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheets 51-51rev.; RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 105rev.-106rev.

\(^{203}\) See: [Hajji Khamid Efendi, Mufti of Transcaucasia,] Genealogy of the khans of Ganja, pp. 905-906.

\(^{204}\) See: Ibid., pp. 47-48.
Early in the 1870s, the real estate in the Jevanshir, Varand, Zangezur, Kebirli, and Chelyabyurd parts of the Shusha District consisted of 53 villages (1,778 households). In 1861, Khurshid Banu Begum inherited 9 villages of 185 households from her mother.\footnote{206 GIAAR, rec. gr. 123, inv. 1, f. 4, sheets 2-6rev.}

Khurshid Banu Begum received her primary education at home where she studied Farsi and Persian literature; later she lived for a while in Tiflis,\footnote{207 See: A. Jafarzade, “Khurshid Banu Natavan—poetessa i khudozhnitsa Azerbaidzhana XIX veka,” Trudy respublikanskogo rukopisnogo fonda, Vol. I, Baku, 1961, pp. 43-54.} where she probably met Russian officer, Kumyk, Prince Khasay Musaevich Utsmiev (22 March, 1808-21 April, 1867). In his genealogy of the khans of Ganja, Haji Hamid Efendi wrongly dated their marriage as 1853.\footnote{208 See: [Haji Khamid Efendi, Mufti of Transcaucasia,] Genealogy of the khans of Ganja, pp. 905-906.} They were probably married in 1847, since the name of Lieutenant Colonel Khasay Utsmiev appeared in the 1848 list of members of the Shusha privileged social group.\footnote{209 GIAAR, rec. gr. 10, inv. 1, f. 9.}

The marriage between the heiress to the vast possessions of the last khan of Karabakh and a Russian officer, member of an influential Kumyk family, probably played into the hands of the Caucasian Administration and was approved by Vicegerent of the Caucasus Adjutant General Prince Vorontsov. Khurshid Banu Begum and Major General (promoted in 1862) Prince Utsmiev had two children: son Prince Mekhti Quli Khan Utsmiev (1855, Shusha-1900, Tiflis) and daughter Princess Khan Bike Utsmieva (1856 Shusha-1921, Agdam).\footnote{210 See: E.E. Ismailov, “Princes Utsmievs in Azerbaijan,” (in Russian), in: Azərbaycan Tarixi Şəcərə Cəmiyyətinin Xəbərləri. 6-cı buraxılış, Bakı, 2007. S. 7-42.}

After the death of her first husband, Khurshid Banu Begum married a commoner Seiid Hussein; by that time she had become a famous poetess, well known in Karabakh and also in Azerbaijan. This is confirmed by the caustic responses of poets of Shirvan, Baku, Quba, Karabakh, and Sheki to poet Abdullah-bek Asi, who dared to reproach her for her marriage to a commoner.\footnote{211 See: A. Jafarzade, op. cit., pp. 43-44.}

It was in 1868 that information about Khurshid Banu Begum appeared in academic publications\footnote{212 See: Poety Azerbaidzhana, Leningrad, 1970, p. 422.} in the book Dichtungen transkaukasischer Sänger des XVIII. und XIX. Jahrhunderts in adserbeidshanischer Mundart, gesammelt von Adolph Bergé, which contains none of her poems; there is, however, a poem by Kasum-bek Zakir (pp. 99-100) entitled in Farsi “Dər səna-ye doxtər-e Mehdiqulu xan Xurşid banu bəgim qofte əst,” which means “Written as a Sign of Gratitude to Khurshid Banu Begum, Daughter of Mekhti Quli Khan.”\footnote{213 See: Бəйлəр Мəммəдов, op. cit.}

She wrote numerous lyric songs (ghazels) performed with great skill and widely known in her lifetime in manuscripts. Her poems were repeatedly published in her native language; the first Russian edition appeared in 1937. The first collection of her poems translated into Russian by A. Plavnik was published in Baku in 1982.\footnote{214 See: Natavan. Lirika, Russian translation, Baku, 1982.}

In 1872, she gathered the poets of Karabakh into a literary society called Myajlisi uns (Gathering of Friends) in Shusha. She was very active in public life and charities. In 1873, she paid for the first water-supply system in Shusha known as Khan gyzy bulagy (The Spring of Khan’s Daughter).\footnote{215 See: A. Jafarzade, op. cit., pp. 43-44.}

Her second husband and their children—three sons and two daughters: Mir Abbas Agha (1868-1885), Mir Hasan Agha (1870-1903), Mir Jafar Agha (?-1914?) and Sara Begum and Khajar Bike (1869-?)—since the late 1870s-early 1880s used the family name Agamirovs. Her husband Seiid Hussein (c. 1833-?) was registered among the members of the privileged social
group of Shusha in 1886 in the rank of a gubernia secretary who filled the post of supervisor of
the Elisavetpol Grammar School.  

Until her death in 1897, the poetess was officially called either Utsmieva, daughter of a
khan of Karabakh, or went by the title and family name of her first husband Princess Utsmieva.
On 5 October, 1888, when Emperor Alexander III traveled across the Caucasus, “he Most Gra-
ciously presented a brooch to Daughter of Karabakh Khan Utsmieva on an intercession of the
General Director of Civilian Administration of the Caucasus.”

Khurshid Banu Begum died in Shusha in the month of rabi us-sani 1314 (September-8
October 1897) and was buried in the family vault in Agdam.

The present author has compiled and published an ascending genealogy of Khurshid Banu
Begum and made an approach to a genealogical table of her descendants. I have already writ-
ten that she had a son and a daughter in her first marriage and three sons and three daughters in
her second marriage. She had 16 grandchildren, 39 great grandchildren, etc. A far from complete
genealogical table contains over 150 names of the poetess’ descendants from her two marriag-
es (her children and descendants, who belonged to other family names, are not shown in the
present genealogical table).

VIII Generation

- 50/44. Abdulla Pasha (c. 1803-died before 1860).
  Elder son of Jafar Quli Agha Jevanshir by Ajaib Nisa Khanum.
  The financial inventory of the beks living in the city of Shusha compiled in 1848 cites his age as 45.
  His name is absent from the 1860 list of Shusha beks, which means that he probably died before that date.
  He was married to his cousin Gyulli Begum, daughter of Khanjan Agha Jevanshir (No. 46/17).
  According to the General Family List of All Members of the Khan Family of the Karabakh Khanate compiled in 1870 and attached to the file of the Shusha Bek Commission, Abdulla Pasha had five daughters.

- 51/44. Kerim Agha (c. 1807-died after 1851 and before 1860).
  Second son of Jafar Quli Agha Jevanshir, heir to the Karabakh Khanate, by Ajaib Nisa Khanum.
  The financial inventory of the beks living in the city of Shusha compiled in 1848 cites his age as 40.
His name is absent from the 1860 list of Shusha beks, which means that he probably died before that date.228

Until 1822 he studied at a Tiflis college; in December 1822, when the power of the khans had been liquidated in Karabakh, he was exiled with his father to Simbirsk. His father, Colonel Jafar Quli Agha, directly applied to Emperor Alexander I during his short stay in Simbirsk with a request to return him his landed possessions in Karabakh, allow him to move to St. Petersbourg, and let his son join the military service.229

By an imperial order of 9 August, 1825, Kerim Agha was registered as a cornet of the Life Guards Uhlan Regiment.230

According to document No. 627, Foreign Minister Privy Councilor Count Karl Nesselrode sent on 28 August, 1825 to Chief of the General Staff Infantry General Baron Dibich, “imperial permission was given for the above-mentioned Kerim to use the title and the name of Prince Kerim Javansher.”231

From that time on, Kerim Agha was mentioned in all the handbooks, documents, and correspondence as Prince Kerim-Jevandzhir, Jevanshir Prince Kerim or Kerim, Prince of Jevanshir. He is the only member of the family of the Karabakh khans who had an official title of prince in the Russian Empire.

Under the imperial decree of 22 September, 1825, he acquired an annual salary of 4,000 rubles and 4,000 rubles more to buy uniforms and equipment.232

According to the list of service of 1 April, 1831, he was 25 (in his request for resignation because of an illness issued on 4 February, 1831, he cited his age as 24); “he can read and write in Russian, French, Persian, Georgian, Armenian, and Tatar (Azeri.—E.I.), knows arithmetic and mathematics;” he never took part in military expeditions and battles; he was never punished for negligence, was worthy of his promotion, was not married.

On 28 January, 1828, he was promoted to lieutenant of the same regiment.

Together with other field and subaltern officers of the Life Guard Uhlan Regiment, he received Supreme Benevolence233 for reviews of troops, military exercises, parades, and maneuvers carried out on 15 and 18 December, 1825, 20 March, 2, 7 and 11 July, 14 October, 1826, 5 May, 16, 24 and 28 June, 7, 10, 12, 16, 22 and 24 July, 27 August and 23 September, 1827 in the Emperor’s presence.

From 16 May, 1830 he was on leave.

On 28 January, 1828, he was promoted to lieutenant of the same regiment.

On 4 February, 1831 Kerim Agha submitted his resignation. According to the document issued on 4 February, 1831 by the Tiflis Military Hospital Prince Kerim Jevansher could no longer remain in military service for health reasons.234

On 25 June, 1831, Kerim Prince Javansher, son of Colonel Jafar Quli Agha of Karabakh, was dismissed from service for health reasons with the next rank of second captain of cavalry.235

According to the List of Generals and Field Officers from among the Asians of 1 January, 1852, “Jevanshir Prince Kerim” was promoted to major on 28 July, 1833.236 According to the

228 GIAR, rec. gr. 10, inv. 1, f. 77, sheet 1.
230 RGVIA, rec. gr. 395, inv. 20, f. 294, sheets 5-6.
231 RGVIA, rec. gr. 395, inv. 80, f. 131, sheet 1.
233 Supreme Benevolence was one of the awards in the Russian Empire. Supreme Benevolence (or Gratitude) could be general, that is, awarded to a military unit, department or ministry and personalized, awarded to individuals. It was announced in rescripts in the name of the people awarded or in imperial decrees.
234 RGVIA, rec. gr. 395, inv. 20, f. 294, sheets 2-8.
236 RGVIA, rec. gr. 407, inv. 1, f. 948, sheets 16.rev.-162.
printed list of majors in 1840, “Prince Kerim Jevandzhir” served in the cavalry in the rank of major since 23 June, 1831.  

According to the table of ranks, the rank of second captain of cavalry corresponded to the rank of major in the army. It seems that in 1833 Kerim Agha Jevanshir was enlisted in military service in the rank of major and was attached to the cavalry of the Separate Caucasian Corps.

On the recommendation of Commander of the Separate Caucasian Corps Infantry General E. Golovin, Major Prince Kerim Jevanshir was sent into retirement for health reasons by an imperial order of 8 February, 1840, “but remained registered in the cavalry and was not discharged from service because this retirement would have insulted his father … very much respected by the Muslims who would have interpreted this as disgrace.”

According to information related to July 1840, he was “on leave abroad until complete recovery.”

His name was mentioned for the last time in the archival List of Generals and Field Officers from among the Asians of 1 January, 1852, in which his name was crossed out. After 1852 his name was not mentioned in the printed lists of majors by seniority, which probably means that he died around 1852. 

He had no children.

52/44. Hidayat Agha (I) (c. 1823-died between 1886 and 1888).

Son of Jafar Quli Agha Jevanshir, heir to the Karabakh Khanate, by Eter Khanum. 

The financial list of beks of the city of Shusha compiled in 1848 shows his age as 25. The list of Shusha beks of 1860 shows his age as 36. The list of Hidayat Agha Jevanshir’s family submitted in April 1870 to the Shusha Bek Commission shows his age as 48. 

The list of the privileged social group of Shusha compiled in 1886 shows his age as 63. 

His father died in 1866 (his two elder brothers died earlier with no heirs) leaving Hidayat Agha Jevanshir the eldest member among the descendants of the khans of Karabakh and a de facto head of the House of the Khans of Karabakh. This is indirectly confirmed by the Total Family List of All Members of the Khan Family of the Karabakh Khanate based on family lists presented by members of the family to the Shusha Bek Commission in 1870. 

In the Total Family List the family of Hidayat, Agha Jevanshir is entered under No. 2 after the name of Khurshid Banu Begum, the only daughter of the last khan of Karabakh. Other members of different lines of the descendants of the khans of Karabakh are classified according

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237 See: List of Majors by Seniority, Corrected by 26 July, 1840, St. Petersburg, 1840, p. 304.
238 RGVIA, rec. gr. 395, inv. 148, f. 248, sheets 4-5, 16-16rev.
239 List of Majors…, p. 304.
240 See, for example: List of Majors by Seniority, Corrected by 6 July, 1852, St. Petersburg, 1852.
241 GIAAR, rec. gr. 290, inv. 2, f. 1046.
242 GIAAR, rec. gr. 10, inv. 1, f. 9.
243 GIAAR, rec. gr. 407, inv. 1, f. 948, sheets 161rev.-162.
244 For example: List of Majors by Seniority, Corrected by 6 July, 1852, St. Petersburg, 1852.
245 GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheets 42.
246 GIAAR, rec. gr. 43, inv. 2, f. 7344, sheets 159rev.-160.
247 GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheets 32-36rev.
to the degree of their kinship with Hidayat Agha Jevanshir. They are listed as cousins, second, or third cousins of Hidayat Agha or cousins and second cousins once removed, etc.

The document of the Shusha Bek Commission pointed out that “Hidayat Agha and all other male members of the family are registered under No. 1 as members of the Khan family in the lists of Shusha beks compiled in 1860.” The reference is to the List of Meliks, Agalars, Officials, Bekss, and the Muslim Clergy of the City of Shusha compiled in 1860, in which Hidayat Agha is listed as a member of the family of his father Major General Jafar Quli Agha. It should be said that in the last list of this sort compiled in 1886, the family of Hidayat Agha was entered under number 1 among other members who also belonged to the khan social group.

Hidayat Agha Jevanshir was an elected member of the Shusha Bek Commission. (There were 24 elected members in each commission, who represented the upper social crust of each gubernia. The Shusha Bek Commission began functioning in 1870 in Shusha with the aim of identifying the personal rights of the upper social group of the Shusha and Zangezur districts. It was then moved to the city of Nukha (Sheki) where it established the personal rights of an upper social group of the Nukha and Aresh Districts. It was closed in 1874.) In April 1870, Hidayat Agha entrusted his elder son Javad Agha Jevanshir with the task of placing a request to the Shusha Bek Commission to register his family name Jevanshir as “his family name which belonged to my ancestors who distinguished themselves in battles at the time of the khanate. The word itself means a ‘young lion’.” The request was supplied with a family list of 73 villages in the Shusha, Elisavetpol, and Zangezur districts of the Elisavetpol Gubernia, which belonged to Hidayat Agha Jevanshir.249

This means that Hidayat Agha Jevanshir was the biggest landowner of the Elisavetpol Gubernia. According to the document On the Villages and Nomad Lands of the Shusha Uezd which belong to Princess Khurshid Banu Begum Utsmieva compiled in the early 1870s, the only daughter of the last Karabakh khan inherited the lands of 53 villages from her father and the lands of nine more villages from her mother.250

On 24 September, 1871, Hidayat Agha Jevanshir was awarded an Order of St. Stanislav Second Class to mark the presence of Emperor Alexander II in Transcaucasia.251 He was probably awarded the Order of St. Stanislav Third Class and St. Anne Third Class, but this has not been established.

According to the data for 1886, Hidayat Agha Jevanshir lived in Shusha in his own two-story house.252

He was married to Sharaf Jahan Begum (c. 1836-?), his father’s cousin, daughter of Abra Khan Khoysky253 by Azad Begum of Karabakh (see 36/8).244

On 5 October, 1888, when traveling in the Caucasus, Emperor Alexander III “Most Graciously presented … widow of Hidayat Agha Jevanshirsky Sharaf Jagan Begum Jevanshir a gold bracelet incrusted with 3 emeralds and 12 diamonds” on the recommendation of the Chief Civilian Administrator of the Caucasus.255

This means that Hidayat Agha (I) Jevanshir died between 1886, when his name was still on the list of the privileged social group of Shusha, and October 1888, when his wife was a widow. So far, I have not established a more exact date of his death.

249 GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheets 41-44rev., 49-49rev., 82-84rev.
251 See: Kavkaz, No. 119, 10 October, 1871.
252 GIAAR, rec. gr. 43, inv. 2, f. 7344, sheets 159rev.-160.
253 GIAAR, rec. gr. 290, inv. 2, f. 1046.
254 GIAAR, rec. gr. 77, inv. 1, f. 14 (Reports…), sheet 37.
255 GIAAR, rec. gr. 62, inv. 1, f. 25, sheets 5-6.
IX Generation

53/50. Segra Begum (Seray Begum) (born prior to 1847-?).
Daughter of Abdulla Pasha by Gyulli Begum.256

54/50. Telli Begum (born prior to 1847-?).
Daughter of Abdulla Pasha by Gyulli Begum.257

55/50. Begum Jan Begum (Begum Jan Begum Abdulla Pasha Kuzy Jevanshir) (c. 1840-?).
Daughter of Abdulla Pasha by Gyulli Begum.258
She was married to her father’s cousin Colonel of Life Guards Cossack Regiment (promoted in 1879) Gashim Khan Jevanshir (c. 1830-21 December, 1889), son of Beyuk Khan (see No. 48/17). They had three sons and one daughter: Panah Khan (c. 1865-?), Hasan Khan (c. 1869-?), Ibrahim Khan and Pusta Begum (c. 1867-?) Jevanshirs.259

56/50. Fatma Begum.
Daughter of Abdulla Pasha.260

57/50. Tubu Begum.
Daughter of Abdulla Pasha.261

58/52. Javad Agha (5 August, 1851, Shusha-December 1930, Shemakha).
Eldest son of Hidayat Agha Jevanshir by Sharaf Jahan Begum Khoysky; according to the birth certificate issued by the Transcaucasian Shi’a Spiritual Administration, he was born on 5 August, 1851.262
On the 1860 list of Shusha beks, he is registered as 8 years old.263
On the list of family members his father Hidayat Agha Jevanshir presented to the Shusha Bek Commission in April 1870, he was registered as 18 years old.264
On the list of members of the privileged social group of Shusha for 1886, he was registered as 35 years old.265
According to the service list compiled on 1 January, 1868, he was 19 (in fact, in January 1868, he was 16 years old). “From the khan clan, grandson of late Major General Jafar Quliagha (as written.—E.I.), Muslim, literate, single.”
On 19 May, 1867, he joined the military service as an armor bearer in the 4th (Muslim) Unit of Life Guards Caucasian Squadron of His Majesty Escort; on 30 October, 1867 was promoted to cadet.

256 GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheet 32; RGIA, rec. gr. 1268, inv. 2, f. 731b, sheets 107rev.-108rev.
257 Ibidem.
258 Ibidem.
259 GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheet 51; RGVIA, rec. gr. 400 (Service Records of Officers of the Russian Army), inv. 12, f. 18348, sheets 2-6, 18-20.
260 GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheet 32.
261 Ibidem.
262 GIAAR, rec. gr. 290, inv. 2, f. 1046.
263 GIAAR, rec. gr. 10, inv. 1, f. 77, sheet 1.
264 GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheet 42.
265 GIAAR, rec. gr. 43, inv. 2, f. 7344, sheets 159rev.-160.
According to the information, as of 1 January, 1868, he had no fines, had been never brought to court, had never taken part in military expeditions or fighting, and had no orders or insignia.266

The Life Guards Caucasian Squadron of His Majesty Escort set up in November 1856 comprised four units. The 4th (Muslim) Unit was staffed by members “of the most noble families of khans and beks of Transcaucasia,” that is, by Azeris. It was intended as a “vehicle of peaceful ideas of culture and civilization among the members of their people and of respect and obedience to the Russian throne.” Many members of the noble Caucasian families served in it. It was a source of able administrators who, after serving the obligatory four years in the escort, were promoted to cadets of cavalry. Since 1869, after two years of service in the escort, the cadets could pass officer exams; those who failed were discharged from service in the rank of ensign of militia.267

I could not find the name of Javad Agha Jevanshir either on the list of those who had been promoted to cadets or ensigns of militia. In April 1870, he was in Shusha where, under a letter of attorney issued by his father and in his name, he applied to the Shusha Bek Commission.268 It seems that for some reason he was discharged from service without promotion to an officer rank; on the 1886 list of members of the privileged social group of Shusha, he was registered among the members of his father Hidayat Agha Jevanshir family without military or civilian ranks.269 He should not be confused with his namesakes—two other great grandsons of Ibrahim Khalil Khan.270

There is a photograph of Javad Agha Jevanshir made when he was still in the army wearing the uniform of a cadet of the 4th (Muslim) Unit, now kept at the Institute of Manuscripts of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan.271

There is no other information about his military service.

After the death of his father, Javad Agha Jevanshir became the de facto head of the House of the Karabakh Khans.

Javad Agha Jevanshir was married to Persian Princess Saray el Malik Khanum Qajar (20 October, 1868-August 1942), daughter of Major General (promoted in 1883) Prince Riza Quli Mirza (1837-1894), who between 1862 and 1873 was Commander of the 4th (Muslim) Unit of the Life Guard Caucasian Squadron of His Majesty’s Escort.272

When Soviet power was established in Azerbaijan in 1920, Javad Agha Jevanshir and his descendants acquired the family name of Jevanshiros or Javanshiros (Cavanshirovs in Azeri).
59/52. Hussein Agha (8 March, 1854, Shusha-?).

Second son of Hidayat Agha Jevanshir by Sharaf Jahan Begum Khoysky; according to the birth certificate issued by the Transcaucasian Shi’a Spiritual Administration, he was born on 8 March, 1854.\(^{273}\)

On the 1860 list of the Shusha beks, he was registered as 6 years old.\(^ {274}\)
On the family list which his father Hidayat Agha Jevanshir presented to the Shusha Bek Commission in April 1870, he was shown as 15 years old.\(^ {275}\)
On the list of the members of the privileged social group of Shusha for 1886, he was registered as 33 years old.\(^ {276}\)

He had two sons and one daughter: Mamed Hasan Agha\(^ {277}\) (c. 1885-?), Firuz Agha\(^ {278}\) (12 November, 1886-November 1925) and Sudaba Begum\(^ {279}\) (22 January, 1893, Jebrail-15 May, 1969, Baku) Jevanshirov\(^ {280}\) (not shown in the present genealogical table).

60/52. Najaf Quli Agha (19 July, 1858, Shusha-?).

Third son of Hidayat Agha Jevanshir by Sharaf Jahan Begum Khoysky; according to the birth certificate issued by the Transcaucasian Shi’a Spiritual Administration, he was born on 19 July, 1858.\(^ {279}\)

He was registered as one year old on the list of Shusha beks for 1860.\(^ {280}\)
On the family list which his father Hidayat Agha Jevanshir presented to the Shusha Bek Commission in April 1870, he was registered as 10 years old.\(^ {281}\)
On the list of the members of the privileged social group of Shusha for 1886, he was registered as 28 years old.\(^ {282}\)

He was married to Malik Jakhan Khanum Nurieva (1870, Shusha-1927, Shemakha), daughter of Second Lieutenant of Militia Beyuk-bek Nuri-bek Ogly by Persian Princess Rahshanda Sultan Khanum Qajar. He had five sons and one daughter: Abulfat Agha\(^ {283}\) (c. 1879-?), Allhyar Agha, Takhmaz Agha, Shukyur Agha, Abbas Quli Agha\(^ {284}\) (1942, Evlakh) and Dovlet Begum\(^ {285}\) (16 November, 1905, Shusha-1 April, 1957, Baku) Jevanshirov (not shown in the present genealogical table).

61/52. Begum Khanum (c. 1858-20 December, 1910).

On the family list which his father Hidayat Agha Jevanshir presented to the Shusha Bek Commission in April 1870, she was registered as 12 years old.\(^ {284}\)
She is buried in the cemetery of a religious complex Imamzade in the city of Barda. According to the tombstone, she died on 16 zi-l-Hegira 1328 (20 December, 1910); she was married to her father’s second cousin Kelbali Agha Shir Khan Agha Ogly Jevanshir,\(^ {285}\) grandson of

\(^{273}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 290, inv. 2, f. 1046.

\(^{274}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 10, inv. 1, f. 77, sheet 1.

\(^{275}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheet 42.

\(^{276}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 43, inv. 2, f. 7344, sheets 159rev.-160.

\(^{277}\) Ibidem.

\(^{278}\) Ibidem.

\(^{279}\) A notebook with dates of birth and death of family members made by hand by Key Kavus Agha Jevanshirov (see No. 64/58) and continued by his son. Family Archives of Hidayat Agha (III) Jevanshirov.

\(^{280}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 290, inv. 2, f. 1046.

\(^{281}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 10, inv. 1, f. 77, sheet 1.

\(^{282}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheet 42.

\(^{283}\) GIAAR, rec. gr. 43, inv. 2, f. 7344, sheets 159rev.-160.

\(^{284}\) Ibidem.

Suleyman Agha Jevanshir (No. 27/8); according to the available information, he was 12 in 1870, which means that he was born in approximately 1858.286

➤ 62/52. Agha Begum Agha (c. 1865-?).

On the family list which his father Hidayat Agha Jevanshir presented to the Shusha Bek Commission in April 1870, she was registered as 5 years old.287

X Generation


Elder son of Javad Agha Jevanshir by Princess Saray el Malik Khanum Qajar.

“Killed at the Kivertsi railway station at the Austrian border.”288 Today, Kivertsi is an administrative center of the Kivertsi District in the Volhynia Region of Ukraine. Before 1917, it was an important railway hub on the western border of the Russian Empire. It remains unclear how he found himself on the western border where Russian forces, including the Tatar Mounted Regiment of the Caucasian Native Mounted Division, were fighting. He was probably one of the soldiers of the Caucasian Division, but his name has not been found so far on its lists.


Son of Javad Agha Jevanshir by Princess Saray el Malik Khanum Qajar.

When Azerbaijan became part of the Soviet Union in 1920, Key Kavus Agha Jevanshirov worked in the town of Evlakh where he drove an ambulance.

After the death of his father in 1930 Key Kavus Agha Jevanshirov became the de facto head of the House of the Karabakh Khans.

He was married to his cousin Sudaba Begum (22 January, 1893, Jebrail—15 May, 1969, Baku), who was the daughter of Hussein Agha Jevanshir (see No. 59/52).289

➤ 65/58. Vallya Begum (27 April, 1898, Shusha-21 February, 1960, Baku).

Daughter of Javad Agha Jevanshir by Princess Saray el Malik Khanum Qajar, was married to her cousin Firuz Agha Jevanshir, son of Hussein Agha Jevanshir (see No. 59/52); they had one daughter Sharaf Jahan Begim Javanshirova (31 December, 1916, Karyagino (Fizuli)-4 July, 1991, Baku).290


Daughter of Javad Agha Jevanshir by Princess Saray el Malik Khanum Qajar; was married to her relative Surkhay Agha Jevanshirov; they had two daughters: Leyla Begum (10 April, 1920, Karyagino (Fizuli)-?) and Sanubyar Begum (21 March, 1924, Karyagino (Fizuli)-?) Javanshirov.291

286 GIAAR, rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 6, sheet 71.
287 Ibid., sheet 42.
288 A notebook with dates of birth and death of family members made by hand by Key Kavus Agha Jevanshirov.
289 Ibidem.
290 Ibidem.
291 Ibidem.
Daughter of Javad Agha Jevanshir by Princess Saray el Malik Khanum Qajar; was married to Asad Mirzoev; they had no children.292

Son of Javad Agha Jevanshir by Princess Saray el Malik Khanum Qajar; buried in the city of Barda in the cemetery of the Imamzade religious complex. He had no children.293

XI Generation

69/64. Ilyas Agha (18 July, 1914, Vank Gorge, Karyagino District-1942?).
Eldest son of Key Kavus Agha Jevanshir by Sudaba Begum Jevanshirova, fought in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945; according to information available to the family, he was reported missing during the battle of Stalingrad.294

70/64. Idris Agha (Idris Key-Kyausovich Jevanshirov) (29 November, 1916, Karyagino (Fizuli)-21 February, 1975, Baku).
Son of Key Kavus Agha Jevanshir by Sudaba Begum Jevanshirova. Fought in the Great Patriotic War from 1941 to January 1943, in the 202nd rifle regiment; between January 1943 and June 1943, he served in the 184th battalion of airfield maintenance and supply; between June 1943 and June 1946, he served as driver of the headquarters of the 306th Assault Air Nizhnedneprovskaya Division.

“For perfect fulfillment of combat tasks on the front of the struggle against German occupants,” he was awarded with two medals “For Fighting Merits” No. 897059 on 14 April, 1944296 and No. 2152645 on 3 June, 1945297 by orders of commanders of the 306th Assault Air Nizhnedneprovskaya Division.

He was also awarded medals “For Defense of Stalingrad” (presented on 15 June, 1945),298 “For Capture of Budapest” (presented on 9 November, 1945),299 “For Capture of Vienna” (presented on 31 January, 1946)300 and “Victory over Germany” (presented on 12 January, 1946).301

After demobilization, he worked as driver in Evlakh and Baku, died in a car crash.
After the death of his father in 1952, Idris Agha Jevanshior became the de facto head of the House of the Karabakh Khan.

He was married to Shafiga Meshadi Isa Gyzy Najafova (born on 31 December, 1937).

292 Ibidem.
293 Ibidem.
294 Ibidem.
296 Temporary certificate A No. 644499, Family Archives of Hidayat Agha (III) Javanshirov.
297 Temporary certificate D No. 298112, Family Archives of Hidayat Agha (III) Javanshirov.
298 Certificate O No. 05660, Family Archives of Hidayat Agha (III) Javanshirov.
299 Certificate A No. 001025, Family Archives of Hidayat Agha (III) Javanshirov.
300 Certificate A No. 009221, Family Archives of Hidayat Agha (III) Javanshirov.
301 Certificate without number, Family Archives of Hidayat Agha (III) Javanshirov.
THE GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE KHANS OF KARABAKH
Origins, Variants of the First Two Generations, Descendants of the Elder Line

I Generation

The variant of the first two generations according to Mirza Adigezal-bek

Panah Ali-bek
Head of the Jevanshir Tribe

Saryja Ali-bek
Head of the Jevanshir Tribe

Ibrahim Khalil Agha (I)
Head of the Jevanshir Tribe and the Otuziki mahal in the early 17th cent.

The variant of the first two generations based on the firman 1672/1673 quoted by Mir Mekhti Hazani

Budag Sultan (Otar Sultan?)
Head of the Jevanshir Tribe and the Otuziki mahal

II

Ibrahim Khalil Agha (I)
Head of the Jevanshir Tribe and the Otuziki mahal in the early 17th cent.

Ibrahim Sultan Budag Sultan Ogly
Head of the Jevanshir Tribe and the Otuziki mahal in 1672

III

Ibrahim Khalil Agha (II)
Head of the Jevanshir Tribe

Iskender-bek

IV

Panah Ali Khan
Khan of Karabakh in 1747-1759

Begbut Ali-bek

V

Ibrahim Khalil Khan
Khan of Karabakh

Mehrali-bek

Talyb Khan-bek

Kelbali-bek

Agasi-bek

Almadat-bek

Nasir-bek

Alipasha-bek

VI

Javad Agha
Khan of Karabakh

Mekhti Quli Khan
Khan of Karabakh

Ahmed Agha
Khan of Karabakh

Sefi Quli Agha

Sheikh Ali Agha

Fatali Agha

Agha Begum Agha

Tuti Begum

Soltanat Begum

Shah Nisa Khanum

Muhammad Hasan Agha
Heir to the Karabakh Khanate

Abulfat Agha

Muhammad Kasum Agha

Hussein Quli Agha

Abbas Quli Agha

Suleyman Agha

Tubi Begum

Bakhshi Khanum

Kichik Khnum

Gevhar Agha

Shah Nisa Khanum
The Genealogical Table of the Khans of Karabakh (continued)

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**VII**
- **Jafar Quli Agha**
  - c. 1782/1783 or 1787-1866
  - heir to the Karabakh Khanate
- **Shukyur Agha**
  - c. 1789-before 1844
- **Khanjan Agha**
  - c. 1793-before 1844
- **Tubi Begum**
  - c. 1804-after 1844
- **Beyuk Khan**
  - c. 1804
- **Khurshid Banu Begum**
  - Natavan
  - 1832-1897

**VIII**
- **Jafar Quli Agha**
  - c. 1782/1783 or 1787-1866
  - heir to the Karabakh Khanate
- **Shukyur Agha**
  - c. 1789-before 1844
- **Khanjan Agha**
  - c. 1793-before 1844
- **Tubi Begum**
  - c. 1804-after 1844
- **Beyuk Khan**
  - c. 1804
- **Khurshid Banu Begum**
  - Natavan
  - 1832-1897

**IX**
- **Segra Begum**
  - c. 1803-before 1860
- **Tell Begum**
  - c. 1807-before 1860
- **Begum Jan Begum**
  - c. 1840
- **Fatma Begum**
  - c. 1840
- **Tubu Begum**
  - c. 1840
- **Javad Agha**
  - 1851-1930
- **Hussein Agha**
  - 1854
- **Amina Begum**
  - 1854

**X**
- **Hidayat Agha (II)**
  - 1890-1916
- **Key Kavus Agha**
  - 1894-1952
- **Valiya Begum**
  - 1898-1960
- **Adylya Begum**
  - 1900-1956
- **Amina Begum**
  - 1904-1973
- **Davud Agha**
  - 1907-1972

**XI**
- **Ilyas Agha**
  - 1914-1942
- **Idris Agha**
  - 1916-1975

**XII**
- **Ilyas Agha**
  - 1914-1942
- **Idris Agha**
  - 1916-1975

- **Zemfira Begum**
  - born 1955
- **Hidayat Agha (III)**
  - born 1956
- **Shakim Agha**
  - born 1959

**XIII**
- **Javid Agha**
  - born 1986
- **Jeykhun Agha**
  - born 1989
- **Namina Begum**
  - born 1984

**XIV**
- **Mekhrigan Begum**
  - born 2012
- **Jamal Agha**
  - born 2015

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XII Generation

- **71/70. Zemfira Begum** (born on 28 September, 1955, Evlakh).
  Daughter of Idris Agha Jevanshirov by Shafiga Najafova, was married to Ali Hussein Khanbalaev, they had two children, son Ilham and daughter Aziza Khanbalaeva.

- **72/70. Hidayat Agha (III) (IDADAT IDRIS OGLY JAVANSHIROV)** (born on 11 November, 1956, Evlakh).
  Son of Idris Agha Jevanshirov by Shafiga Najafova.
  Since 1975, he has been the de facto head of the House of the Khans of Karabakh.
  Graduated from the Department of Biology, State University of Azerbaijan.
  He is married to Mekhriban Zakhid Gyzy Karalova (born on 22 September, 1961, Dmanisi, Georgia); she graduated from the State Medical Institute of Azerbaijan, specialized in pediatrics (1984); on 26 December, 2012 was awarded the honorary title of Merited Doctor by an order of the President of the Azerbaijan Republic.

- **73/70. Shakhin Agha** (born on 16 June, 1959, Baku).
  Son of Idris Agha Jevanshirov by Shafiga Najafova.
  He lives and works in Moscow, is married to Tamara Jabbarovna Alieva (born on 18 May, 1956).

XIII Generation

  Eldest son of Hidayat Agha Javanshirov by Mekhriban Karalova; graduated from the State Economic University of Azerbaijan, Department of International Economic Relations in 2008.
  He is married to Gyunel Niaz Gyzy Abdullaeva (born on 1 March, 1987).

  Younger son of Hidayat Agha Javanshirov by Mekhriban Karalova; graduated from the State Economic University of Azerbaijan. Department of Administration; holds a bachelor degree in the Organization of Customs Service (2011).

- **76/73. Narmina Begum** (born on 23 April, 1984, Moscow).
  The only daughter of Shakhin Agha Javanshirov by Tamara Alieva; graduated from the Dashkova Moscow Humanitarian Institute, lives in Moscow, married with one son.

XIV Generation

  Daughter of Javid Agha Javanshirov by Gyunel Abdullaeva.

  Son of Javid Agha Javanshirov by Gyunel Abdullaeva.
Conclusion

This is a detailed generation-by-generation genealogy of only one of the branches of the numerous descendants of the Jevanshir clan. Representatives of this line of the clan, Muhammad Hasan Agha, the eldest son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and Jafar Quli Agha, eldest son of Muhammad Hasan Agha, were legal heirs to the khanate until the power of the khans was abolished in Karabakh in 1822.

After the death of Mekhti Quli Khan, former head of Karabakh, in 1845, Jafar Quli Agha and, after him, Hidayat Agha were recognized as the de facto heads of the House of the Karabakh Khans. This was described in detail above, in particular based on the files of the Shusha Bek Commission.

For this reason, I am putting the title of the Head of the House of Karabakh Khans into circulation, which was never accepted de jure. I applied this term to Hidayat Agha Jevanshir, son of the last legal heir of Karabakh, and his direct male descendants up to the present.

The genealogy of the Jevanshirs of the early 17th-early 18th centuries (the first three generations shown in this article), when the members of the Jevanshir clan headed the Karabakh mahal (tribal union) Otuziki and were titled emirs and sultans, calls for further investigation on the basis of new and probably not yet studied sources.

Oleg KUZNETSOV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Associate Professor, Deputy Rector for Research, Higher School of Social and Managerial Consulting (Institute) (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

NATIONAL-RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND POLITICAL TERROR OF NATIONALISTS AS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE ETHNOGENESIS OF ARMENIAN ETHNICITY (ESSAY ON SOCIAL-POLITICAL HISTORY)

Abstract

The author traces the ethnogenesis of the Armenian people and analyzes its content to demonstrate how organized national and religious extremism, political terror, and terrorism affected the vector and intensity of social modernization of Armenian ethnicity between the last quarter of the nineteenth and the late twentieth century.
Introduction

Until 1991, the Armenians did not have full-fledged national statehood. This means that from the point of view of most of the classical and contemporary teachings about the state and law they, at no time, were a political nation, that is, a state-forming ethnicity. Deliberate ruin of the Soviet Union partially orchestrated from abroad gave the Armenians the opportunity to form the sovereign Republic of Armenia, which has been functioning for a quarter of a century now.

Two-and-a-half thousand years ago, the Kingdom of Greater Armenia existed, a fact confirmed by numerous artifacts recovered by an archeological endeavor in the western part of Asia Minor. To my mind, the Republic of Armenia of our days with its formally democratic regime cannot be described as a legal heir to theocratic Greater Armenia in the same way as Israel, the contemporary Jewish state, is not an heir to Hellenic Judea. Both republics differ in many respects from their semi-legendary theocratic predecessors of antiquity. There are cultural, spiritual, and religious ties between the past and present, but this should not be taken to mean that there was or is legal succession between these two Armenian states, which allegedly establishes the right of the Armenians to territories outside the state borders of the Republic of Armenia recognized by international law.

The Dashnak Republic of Armenia of 1918-1920 can be hardly regarded as a more or less comprehensible effort at building and maintaining the national statehood of the Armenians. From the first day of its existence (28 May, 1918), it was no more than the seat of a regional armed conflict, which it stirred up itself by moving against its neighbors one by one. With no more or less adequate structure of state administration and more or less coordinated economic infrastructure, the leaders of Dashnaktsutiun, after seizing power in the new state, launched a military campaign against the republic’s neighbors in an effort to resolve domestic problems by taking their property and resources. Armenians acted in the best traditions of the nomadic armies led by Genghis Khan. In the seventeenth century, Wallenstien, Austrian field marshal, did not hesitate to plunder subjugated peoples to feed his own armies, either. This proves beyond a doubt that at that time the Republic of Armenia had no even marginally efficient state institutions.

Here is proof of the above. In November-December 1918, the Armenians moved against the Georgians to gain control over Samtskhe Javakhetia and Akhalkalaki, its center. Beaten off by the Georgians (who, to tell the truth, had Germany and later the U.K. on their side), they retreated. In mid-May 1919, having failed in Georgia, the Armenian nationalists moved toward Nakhchivan, part of the recently proclaimed Araz Republic, liquidated by the Armenian forces after a month of fighting. Local clashes continued from mid-May to 10 August, 1919 when the sides signed a truce, under which Azerbaijan restored its military control over Nakhchivan. Hostilities were rekindled in March 1920 in Zangezur and Nagorno-Karabakh where Armenians and Azeris lived side by side. After 28 April, regular units of Soviet Russia joined the struggle on the side of the Azeris. As could be expected, the Dashnaks were defeated in early August and the territory of the contemporary Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic returned to the jurisdiction of Soviet Azerbaijan according to a letter of Chairman of Nakhchivan Revolutionary Committee M. Bektashev to Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Nariman Narimanov. Defeated in the east, the government of Arme-
nia composed of members of Dashnaksutuim sealed its fate. Turkey, which until the Sovietization of Azerbaijan was guarantor of its security and state sovereignty, attacked Armenia in the south and returned the lands Armenia had occupied in 1918 to Turkey’s jurisdiction. In the war with Turkey, which lasted from 23 September to 2 December, 1920, the Republic of Armenia ruled by the Dashnaks suffered a crushing military and political defeat. The Armenians avoided just retribution from their Transcaucasian neighbors (which had earlier been victims of Armenian attacks) by removing from power the terrorists of Dashnaksutuim (its member Drastamat Kanaian, Defense Minister of Armenia, was involved in the assassination in 1905 of Prince Nakashidze, Governor of the Baku Province and, in 1907, of Maksud Alikhanov-Avarskeiy, Governor-General of the Tiflis Province). On 2-3 December, 1920, Armenia became part of Soviet Russia, thus saving its administrative legal sovereignty and avoiding the fate of a Caucasian nation without a legal status because of its small numerical strength.¹

The defeats the Dashnak Republic of Armenia suffered in the wars of 1918-1920 were determined by the level of social development of the Armenian ethnicity of the early twentieth century. At that time, social organization of the Armenians was not developed enough to build an efficient statehood. This, in turn, can be explained by the social history of the Armenians in the Middle Ages and Modern Times, when practically all the leading political nations of our time were taking shape.

Millet at-Arman in the Medieval History of the Muslim East

In the fifth century, the Armenians began living in diasporas spread across the entire Muslim ecumene: Persia, the Ottoman Empire, including the territories now occupied by the Balkan states (from the late fourteenth century onwards they belonged to the Ottoman Empire), those areas of North Africa that remained under the empire’s protectorate, and the Crimean Khanate, one of the vassals of the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman and the Crimean-Tatar administrations considered the Armenians to be millet at-Arman, a self-administered group of non-Muslims or zimmi. In the Ottoman Empire, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, and Jews belonged to the same category; they formed their own millets (a religious corporation of Orthodox Christians who were subjects of the Empire was called millet at-Rum). In other words, in the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian, just as the East- or West European and Judean, identity was rooted in confessional rather than national affiliation—not blood, but religious kinship, and the corresponding church rites.

Under the Shari’a, the legal cornerstone of the Ottoman and Persian empires, non-Muslims (zimmi) could not own land and fill official posts relating to feudal land ownership. They were excluded from civil service, be it administrative, military, fiscal, quartermasters, etc. and were obliged to pay jizya (the money thus collected was used to maintain the army and buy weapons). At first (at the time Muslims had conquered certain territories), jizya was interpreted as “redemption money” paid by zimmi. As the Islamic state was gradually becoming a centralized hierarchical structure, jizya acquired the meaning specified above. In this way, the interests of the state and its non-Muslim population were counterbalanced—the state kept its janissary troops, which protected all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of their faith, while the non-Muslims preserved their religions.

and independent churches by helping maintain the armed forces or local administrations that had
janissary units under their command.

Jizya was strictly per capita and was collected in all Islamic countries. To guarantee its collection,
it was gathered by the hierarchs of religious corporations who were duty bound to keep the lists
of their co-religionists living either in the empire or its individual districts. In other words, fiscal
obligations were officially imposed upon any church (there are no churches in Islam) either Orthodox,
Catholic, or Armenian Apostolic—it had to register its followers and collect annual jizya, which went
either to the treasury of the sultan (in Istanbul and in Rûm, the empire’s European domains in the
Balkans), or to the treasuries of walis or pasha, rulers of provinces (vilayets) who were accountable
to the sultan for the way the money was used. This made the non-Muslim clergy in the Islamic coun-
tries an intermediary of sorts between official power and their religious communities, that is, a sem-
blance of administrative power.

This meant that non-Muslims in the Muslim countries lived under administrative and police
control of the local authorities not favorably disposed to non-Muslims; on the other hand, they were
legally subordinated to their own clergy—the material prosperity of each member of non-Muslim
confessions and that of his family directly depended on the clergy. This prompted the conclusion that
in the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate, the non-Muslim clergy had much wider powers and
rights than their Muslim colleagues; they were much more involved in state and public life of the
empire than the clergy in the Christian countries. The Armenian Apostolic priest elected or invited
by the community fulfilled the following three functions: his priestly functions, which made him part
of the church hierarchy; administrative functions as the headman directly involved in the develop-
ments inside the community; and fiscal functions as the official who contacted local Muslim admin-
istrations through tax collection. He controlled all channels of interaction between the local ethnic-
religious community and the outside world. In plain words, its members totally depended on him.
This pattern of everyday life of the Armenian ethnicity in the Ottoman Empire survived for at least
five centuries, which explains the exceptionally great role of the Armenian Apostolic clergy in every-
day and public life of the Armenians as members of one of the millets of the Ottoman Empire.

In the Persian Empire, the Armenian Apostolic clergy had much less power—with few excep-
tions (a fairly small sect of Zoroastrians), jizya was collected by the local administrations according
to the lists supplied by Armenian priests. It was a per capita and, partly, an income tax (at least in the
eighteenth century). The Christian areas of Eastern Transcaucasia (Kartli-Kakhetia and Guria), though
vassals of the Persian shahs, were completely autonomous in the administrative and religious respect
and, therefore, paid no jizya. This explains why tax collection among the Armenians living in the
inner areas of the Persian Empire was administratively similar to tax collection in other parts of the
empire. The role of the Armenian clergy was limited to supplying lists of their co-religionists. This
also meant that, as subjects of the Persian shah, the Armenians had much wider opportunities for
social and economic development than the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire.

The Armenians were absolutely free in the domains of the Crimean khans, which stretched to
contemporary Transnistria and Malaya Kabarda. In his *Tahiri-i Kyrym* (History of Crimea), Ottoman
statesman and writer of the latter half of the eighteenth century El Haj Muhammed As Seyyid Nejati
Effendi (during the 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish War he served as quartermaster of the Crimea Corps
routed in the fall of 1772) described everyday life of the local people. Each Armenian had to pay jizya
of one kurush (one piaster) a year; it was, in fact, a business license. After buying it, an Armenian
could go into any type of economic activity, including slave trade and communal baths. Under the
Karasubazar Pearce Treaty of 1 November, 1772, Crimea became a vassal of the Russian Empire, its

from the Turkish and introduced by V. Smirnov”, *Russkaya starina*, 1894, Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 113-114; No. 4, pp. 179-208;
No. 5, pp. 144-169 (here quoted from: *Russkaya starina*, No. 4, p. 183).
Armenian population being forced to move to the vicinities of Rostov-on-Don where they founded the city of Armavir. The Russian Empire acquired a large group of traders and artisans; after losing its Armenian trading and working population, the Crimean Khanate joined or was joined to Russia in 1783.

The above concise historical and ethnographic survey shows that in the Islamic ecumene, the Armenians were not a united people, but rather a multinational religious sect that brought together people from different ethnic and social groups. They lived in different countries and throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gradually moved to the Russian Empire. Massive and organized resettlement of Armenians from Persia to the Russian part of Transcaucasia after the war of 1826-1828 and from the Ottoman Empire after the war of 1828-1829 can be described as part of the contribution the countries defeated by the Separate Caucasian Corps had to pay Russia. The change of the country did not affect either the morality or way of life of the members of this religious corporation. This interpretation of emigration of the Armenians living in different Muslim countries to Russia suggests that they preserved very specific relations inside the corporation rooted in many generations who had lived in these countries. Armenians remained loyal to them when dealing with the local Russian (Cossack or Malorussian) populations and never bothered to establish contacts with co-religionists who arrived from other Muslim countries.

The Armenian immigrants brought their way of life, customs, and beliefs, which differed greatly from the local ones, to their new homeland on the Don, in Taman, the Northern Caucasus, and Transcaucasia (Akhalkalaki and the Lori valley). This attracted much academic and administrative interest. In Volume 1 (Part 2) of his multivolume Istoria voyny i vladychestva Russkikh na Kavkaze (A History of War and Russia’s Rule in the Caucasus), Lieutenant General Nikolay Dubrovin, an outstanding military historian, ethnographer, Perpetual Secretary of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Military-Teaching Committee at the General Staff of the Russian Imperial Army, had the following to say about the everyday life and habits of the Transcaucasian Armenians:

“The Armenians who settled among the Tatars cannot be put into the same category with the Armenians who belong to the educated class scattered across the world or even with those who live in Georgian cities. The Armenians of the Muslim provinces differ but little from the Tatars, except in their religion. The majority of the Armenian villages look like groups of holes in the earth covered by earth and dug without any attempt at order; they are separated from one another by heaps of dung or stinking puddles; there are paths meandering between the holes, an excuse for homes, or going across their roofs. In some places, lower in the mountains there are orchards and small groves which cover up the mud and dirt of these villages. Very much like Tatars, the Armenians live in their underground holes together with their cattle and are obviously not bothered by their natural functions and habits. These Armenian homes serve as a cattle-shed and a place where children grow up. Hens and loud cocks roost there; at night they are especially unpleasant. Swarms of all sorts of disgusting insects greet everyone at the entrance to the saklia.”

We can hardly doubt the evidence of one of the heads of the Russian Academy of Sciences. This confirms what was said above about the social, regional, and probably ethnic diversity of the Armenian ethnicity in Russia in the 1860s, which survived during the next two or even three decades. The above also confirms that most of the Armenians of Transcaucasia who had moved there from the Ottoman Empire two generations earlier were still living at the tribal level. In his book, Nikolay Dubrovin described the Armenians who lived in the territory now occupied by the Republic of Armenia as remaining at the lowest level of social evolution for about a century-and-a-half and who constituted the majority of the Armenians living at that time in the Russian Empire. Let me clarify—in 1830-1831, Russian troops moved up to a third of a million Armenians from the Ottoman Empire

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to Russian Transcaucasia; two years earlier, in 1828, about 50 thousand were moved out of Persia; half a century earlier, no more than 15 thousand were moved out of Crimea. In this way, the Erivan Khanate (a Russian province since 1828) acquired a predominantly Armenian population. The same can be said about Samtske Javakhetia (now part of Georgia), previously homeland of the Muslim Mingreis.

The Armenians and Muslims had much in common with respect to their lifestyle and habits, although the Armenians were much more religious. In the last third of the nineteenth century, their religious identity was the only thing that distinguished them from the semi-nomadic Muslim peoples whose primitive lifestyle and primitive economic activities were more or less similar to their own. This raised the authority of the Armenian Apostolic clergy even higher than in the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. In Russia, they organized relations between their multinational congregation and the local authorities; after settling in Russia, the Armenians remained a polyethnic religious sect guided by their clergy and its hierarchy. This situation was further consolidated by the fact that a large part of the autochthonous Turkic population of Transcaucasia was officially “Armenized,” so to speak. This primarily refers to the numerically smaller peoples (Tats and Udins) who belonged to the Armenian Apostolic Church long before the arrival of Armenians from the Ottoman and Persian empires.

According to Marx, “social being determines consciousness”; this can be fully applied to the nature and content of the religious world outlook of the Transcaucasian Armenians in the last third of the nineteenth century. Unaware of the Marxian formula, Nikolay Dubrovin followed it when describing the religious rites of the Transcaucasian Armenians: according to what he wrote, a century-and-a-half ago, the Armenians were not “classical” Gregorian Armenians but common pagans who worshipped a pantheon of gods. Obligated to follow the rules and norms of official and bureaucratic political correctness prominent in the past very much like today, Nikolay Dubrovin wrote:

“Even though the Armenians embraced Christianity long ago, they moved certain traits of pagan rituals to the newly acquired religion. They made sacrifices to Mihr, patron of heroes fighting in the war who brought victory to the most courageous and daring... In our days, the Armenians celebrate Mihr either on the day of the Meeting of the Lord or on the eve. The feast is celebrated either inside the church or outside it, in the open...

“Many of the Armenians worship the sun, called Arev in Armenian. No matter what, there are still people who call themselves arevardi, that is, sons of the sun. Dying people are laid so that they face the east; the same applies to the dead when they are laid in the coffin. Burials are performed before sunset. Armenians also worship Anahita, the goddess of wisdom and glory who, as believed, patronized the Armenian Kingdom. Every year, when the roses are in full bloom, the Armenians celebrated the day of this goddess. This is called Vartavar. On that day, the Armenians decorated temples, statues, public places, and even themselves. Today, the Armenians honor the goddess by decorating altars and sprinkling people gathered in the church with holy rose water.”

This was what happened in the Armenian countryside (today the territory of the Republic of Armenia) in the last third of the nineteenth century!

Anyone who loves the Armenians and knows enough of the humanities may object to the above by saying that this phenomenon called syncretism was typical not only of the Armenians, but of practically all Christian churches. This is true. In his Yazchestvo drevnikh slavian (Paganism among Ancient Slavs), Academician Boris Rybakov wrote that religious syncretism was prominent during the transition from clans and tribes to the state when the upper crust embraced a monotheist religion

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as its ideology, while the grass roots remained pagan. This was typical of the Eastern Slavs in the tenth and up to the fourteenth century, the period when pre-Mongol and Golden Horde Rus was gradually becoming Christian. The same went on among the Transcaucasian Armenians in the mid-nineteenth century. This meant that earlier in their history they had no experience of national statehood, which makes Armenian deliberations about the lost Greater Armenia an ideological myth. The Armenian religious leaders have been using it for the last few centuries to establish and maintain their moral and financial control over their co-religionists. Christian and Armenian syncretism are very different in one respect—the former is a cult of a sacrifice. “So God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him should not perish, but have eternal life” (John: 3:16). This means that Christianity requires no material, let alone human, sacrifices. The cult of Mihr, the Armenian analogue of the great Olympian god of war Ares or Roman Mars, requires sacrifices, which contradicts Christianity and Christian ethics. Armenian theologians, past masters of scholastics, knew that, but either accepted or deliberately encouraged this practice that coincided with their corporate interests.

My conclusion about the Armenians as a polyethnic religious sect or an ethnoreligious corporation that existed throughout the nineteenth and even in the early twentieth century was supported by Procurator of the Etchmiadzin Synod A. Frenkel, who presented his well-known memorandum about the state of affairs among the Armenians of the Russian Empire to the Holy Governing Synod in 1907. There is no reason to doubt his competence—his post presupposed that he performed the functions of a state inspector of the administrative and economic activities of the hierarchs and clergy of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the territory of Russia. In other words, he knew much more than any other official of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Empire (between 1836 and 1917, the Armenian Apostolic Church was administratively guided by the Ministry’s Department of Foreign Faiths). There is no reason to doubt what he wrote about the social structure of the Transcaucasian Armenians in the early twentieth century.

“Historically, Greater Armenia adopted Christianity in the fourth century; in the fifth century, it lost its political independence and was ruled for some time by Persians (Zoroastrians), Byzantium, Arabs, Seljuk Turks, and other conquerors. Different parts of what was Greater Armenia were divided among conquerors and lived, developed, and created their own special and Church relations maximally adjusted to the state order of their rulers. They gradually lost contact among themselves; for this reason each part insisted on the purity and unaltered nature of the dogmata of the Armenian Apostolic faith; the language, rights, and customs lost much of their national traits. In fact, the Turkish, Egyptian, Persian, and Indian Armenians, even if we look at our Transcaucasia alone, demonstrate a very interesting fact—the Armenians of Tiflis (Georgian influence), the Armenians of Akulis, Elissavetpol, and Karabakh (Persian influence) and the Armenians of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki (Turkish influence) can barely understand each other; marriages between them are very rare.

“The historical fate of the Armenian nation has proven incontrovertibly the complete inability of this nation to create its own independent state, a state organism; its absolute inability to perceive the true principles of higher civilization, since for several millennia not one luminary of science and art has been registered. Greater Armenia of the old times did not leave us a single code of national laws, not counting the Code of Laws of learned monk Mkhitar Gosh, a pathetic compilation of the laws of Moses, Byzantine, and bits and pieces of Armenian folk customs.”

6 Russian State Historical Archives (hereinafter RGIA), rec. gr. 821 “Department of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Faiths of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Empire,” inv. 7 “Armenian Apostolic Faith. 1836-1917,” f. 96 (180/139) “Notes and Information about the Armenian Apostolic Church in Russia and Its Clergy, about the Activities of the Etchmiadzin Synod and the Attitude to It of the Catholicoses of All Armenians, about the Property and Religious Structures, etc. 1864-1911),” sheet 254.
The Place Held by the Armenian Apostolic Clergy in the Life of Armenian Ethnicity

The state of affairs described above can primarily be explained by the very specific social and legal status of the corporation of the Armenian Apostolic clergy in the social system of Armenian religious-ethnic society, which exhibited two very specific features that distinguished it from its colleagues of other churches and confessions. First, membership in this corporation was never hereditary because of strict celibacy. The priests of the Armenian Apostolic Church had no legal children; this means that there were no hereditary Armenian Apostolic priests in the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian empires, in which the principles and norms of the feudal law were strictly observed. The corporation reproduced itself by drawing fresh forces from all the social groups of the Armenian religious community (millet). Priests of any confessions were expected to be well versed in the religious affairs and know much more than the basics of literacy and bits and pieces of science. Knowledge of the dogmata of the faiths and church services were a sort of educational census that distinguished the priests from the other members of the same Church—the congregation and the laity, which depended on their much more educated spiritual pastors. Adequate education required and requires today a fairly long period of learning—from five to ten years; this means that ordinary people who had no money to support themselves while studying stood no chance of becoming priests. For centuries, the corporation of Armenian Apostolic priests was replenished with younger sons or nephews of trading families, that is, the social group that concentrated the wealth of the Armenian ethnoreligious corporation, the prototype of the Armenian ethnicity. This explains why throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Armenian clergy was replenished from among the trade and usury social stratum across the Russian Empire, particularly the Transcaucasian provinces and districts.

The social status and way of life of the Armenian clergy was strongly affected by the fact that by the early twentieth century it had accumulated public property of the Armenians (not as an ethnicity but as a religious sect) in the form of legal right to this property or direct and indirect management. Not infrequently, Armenian families entrusted their property to the clergy or agents of the Church hierarchy. This property was unrelated to either religious or any other confessional activities; it was, in contemporary terms, commercial real estate set up to derive profit. Transferred to the Church, it was exempt from taxation, which increased its profitability. This meant that Armenian industrialists and traders were functioning under much better conditions than the other entities of business activities, particularly the Russian national bourgeoisie taking shape at the turn of the twentieth century. This practice was not invented in Russia—it was brought to it by Armenian migrants from the countries where they had lived for many centuries. According to contemporary Armenian authors, early in the twentieth century the Armenian Apostolic Church owned property in the Russian Empire amounting to the huge sum of 113 million rubles, mainly formed by private donations or exploitation of commercial real estate.

In 1901, Chief Commander in the Caucasus Infantry General Prince Golitsyn pointed to this glaring injustice, which was damaging the economy of his region and the fiscal policy of the state in this part of the empire. He initiated a draft law On the Introduction of Direct Administrative Fiscal Control of the Russian Empire over the Property of the Armenian Apostolic Church not used for religious purposes and unrelated to the life of the clergy or burial rituals. For a year-and-a-half, he pushed his draft law through the corridors of power so that it should be approved and adopted by Emperor Nicholas II. On 12 June, 1903, the imperial law was enacted—it presupposed transfer of a great part of property and money of the Armenian Apostolic Church to state control. Formally,

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the law was a document of the Committee of Ministers confirmed by His Imperial Majesty, its full title being On Concentration of Management of the Property of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Russia in Government Departments and on the Transfer of Means and Property of This Church Used to Ensure the Functioning of the Armenian Apostolic Church Schools to the Ministry of Public Education. 

Under this law, the Russian state established its direct control over the real estate and money that belonged to the Armenian Apostolic Church by transferring them “from the management of the clergy and spiritual structures of this confession” to the management of the Minister of Agriculture and State Property (the real estate) and the Ministry of the Interior (finances); the “Armenian Apostolic Church preserved its right to this property and capital.” Translated into common language, this meant that the government had finally decided to revise the property not taken into account before in order to avoid possible financial machinations by the uncontrolled Armenian clergy. The law transferred “the property and capital of the Armenian Apostolic churches, monasteries, spiritual organizations, and educational establishments”, that is, the property of the churches, consistory, eparchies, schools, and other church structures to state control. The property enumerated in the law did not co-incide with its religious character. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and State Property was expected to assume management of “lands populated and unpopulated, irrespective of their status, as well as individual forests, meadows, pastures, fisheries, etc.,” as well as “all houses and structures that belong to the Armenian Apostolic churches, clergy, and spiritual structures of this confession and are not needed for everyday use by the clergy and the above-mentioned structures.” In other words, the state established control over all “non-core assets” unrelated to religious activities of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

The law of 12 June, 1903 demonstrates that in the early twentieth century the Armenian Apostolic Church was a feudal landowner that concentrated in its hands the right of property (if not the right of ownership then the right of using and disposing) on at least part of the basic means of subsistence of the agricultural population that belonged to all sorts of Armenian territorial religious communities. In fact, throughout its functioning under the jurisdiction of the Russian imperial powers (that is, starting with the second third of the nineteenth century), the church hierarchy represented a social organization of the Armenian ethno-religious corporation patterned on late feudal society. As distinct from the Ottoman and Persian empires, in the Russian Empire, the clergy of the Armenian Apostolic Church not only fulfilled administrative and fiscal functions when dealing with the official authorities, but was also the owner of land and other real estate of commercial nature. This means that de facto it played a social and economic role typical of that played by the beks and agalarlış, hereditary landed aristocracy among the Transcaucasian Muslims. In fact, the Armenian monks differed but little from moafaş in terms of their legal status; priests in ordinary, from agalarlış; deans of churches, from beks; hierarchs (bishops and archbishops) from khans with the functions of a naib (administrator of provinces and districts). This means that in the Russian Empire the Armenian Apostolic Church not only symbolized but was the feudal hierarchy of the Armenian religious corporation within which the congregation—villagers and not very numerous city dwellers—were re-

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9 Moafs in Azerbaijan were small landowners freed from taxes in exchange of military service with their own equipment; weapons were supplied by the state. In this respect they were similar to the Cossacks of Russia.
duced to the role of serfs in the countryside or tax-paying population in cities and towns obliged to work for the state and the Church.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Armenian Apostolic Church functioned as a banking and usury structure for its own ethnicity. It regulated money flows and accumulated the financial surplus of the Armenian people not necessarily by legal means. The following place in the law of 12 June, 1903 hints that the Russian authorities knew about these financial irregularities: “The above order should also be established in the sphere of property and capital donated or bequeathed to these structures.” The Armenian Apostolic Church observed and continues to observe celibacy. This meant that in the absence of direct and legal heirs, it had to appoint members of large rich families to religious posts which donated large sums to the church. This was tax evasion pure and simple, since the money transferred (donated) by a merchant to a priest never left the same family. In fact, at the turn of the twentieth century, the Armenian clergy members were not only feudal lords or even big landowners, but also typical members of the bourgeoisie who shamelessly used the church capital accumulated from donations of the credulous congregation to make themselves and their relatives rich. In this respect, the holy order of an Armenian Apostolic priest opened up wide vistas of commercial activity uncontrolled either by the state or the ethno-religious corporation of the Armenians, who were nothing short of slaves for their priests anyway. Taken together this guaranteed prompt enrichment.

The transfer of Church money to state control deprived the top crust of the Armenian ethnicity of more or less legal methods of tax evasion; from that time on the Armenian Apostolic clergy could no longer use Church money for commercial purposes, which transformed them from “masters of life” with a dominant influence into common bureaucrats kept by the state on an equal footing with the clergy of all other confessions of the Russian Empire. In other words, the law of 12 June, 1903 deprived the Armenian Apostolic clergy of the exclusive social and economic status to which it had been accustomed and also brought about two very important consequences. On the one hand, the clergy called on its congregation to fight the Government of the Russian state to force it annul the offending law and restore the status quo ante bellum. This raised the first wave of Armenian national religious terror.

On the other hand, adoption and implementation of the law of 12 June, 1903 made it impossible for the Armenian Apostolic clergy to combine two social and economic principles—feudal (landowner) and bourgeois (trade). In the changed social and political conditions, this dualism slowed down the development of the Armenians as an ethno-religious corporation by inviting administrative sanctions and even repressions, to say nothing of criminal extra-economic activities of a small group of Armenians (which took shape in the late nineteenth century) who justly considered the Armenian Apostolic Church to be an impediment to national development and progress.

**Nationalists Snatch Control over the Armenian Ethnicity from the Church**

Chronologically, secularization of Church property coincided with an upsurge of the Armenian anti-government movement in the Ottoman Empire. Its first shoots became obvious in the 1890s. It was not the Armenian Apostolic Church that organized and inspired protests—its privileged position gave it no reason to be displeased with the imperial authorities. The breeding discontent was the doing of fighters of all sorts of Armenian national-revolutionary organizations that appeared late in the nineteenth century not without help from Britain, Russia, and France. I am referring in particular to Gnchak (Bell), a Social Democratic party set up in 1887 in Geneva by a group of Armenian students from Russia and Dashnaktsutiun, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation set up in 1890 at a constituent congress in Tiflis out of basically extremist groups of Armenian members of Narodnaya Volya, Marxists, and anarchists. There was also the Armenikan party set up in the Ottoman Empire
in 1885 in the city of Van. These parties were determined to establish an Armenian republic in Eastern Anatolia (the Ottoman Empire’s Asian part) using every possible means and methods, including terror against the Turks in Transcaucasia and Hither Asia and those members of the Armenian religious corporation who refused to cooperate with them.

Points 8 and 11 of the section entitled “The Means [of revolutionary struggle]” of the first version (1884) of the Dashnaktsutiun political program looked at terror as one of the important instruments of revolutionary change. The program invited to “expose the members of power structures, turncoats, traitors, usurers, and all sorts of exploiters to terror” and “plunder and ruin government offices.” The documents of the Ginchak party differed but little from the above and defined the aims as “propaganda, agitation, terror, organization, and peasant and worker activities.” From the very beginning, the Armenian nationalists considered terror to be the most effective and most frequently used instrument of revolutionary struggle for Armenian national statehood in Eastern Anatolia. It implied that it should be used against the Turks and Armenians who sided with the Turks. This was not a slip of the tongue—in the specific economic, social, and political conditions of the early twentieth century, in which the Armenians lived and developed their ethnicity (the process described above in greater detail), terror was the most efficient method to push Armenians into revolutionary struggle.

In his 1907 memo mentioned above, Procurator of the Etchmiadzin Synod A. Frenkel wrote:

“Until the eighteenth century when Russia started moving into the Near Muslim East, the absolute majority of the Armenians divided between Turkey and Persia never objected to Muslim power. Their situation was not worse than that of all other subjects of the sultan and the shah. The Armenians promptly found their niches in the ruling and financial spheres of their conquerors and practically monopolized trade and crediting.

“The Muslim rulers recognized the sovereignty of the Armenian catholicoses in the religious sphere. Armenian history knows many patriarchs who, supported by Turkish zaptys and Persian far-rashes (tax collectors.—O.K.), extorted huge sums from their congregation. One can imagine that this very specific arrangement flattered the Armenians’ national pride since the omnipotent Catholicos created an illusion of the head of the people.

“Neither the Turks nor Persians interfered in the common Armenian law and order of self-administration of small units.

“The first third of the nineteenth century marked by a rise in the national awareness of many numerically small peoples could not but leave its mark on the Armenians. This is supported by the following: the series of successful wars Russia waged against Turkey and Persia, which ended in the alienation of several provinces with an Armenian population, kindled the hope among the Armenians of finally shedding the Muslim yoke. National self-awareness among the Armenians developed along the lines common to all other subjugated peoples. Patriots and public figures concentrated on restoring and creating literature, national theater, and art and stirring up national pride through examples (albeit apocryphal) of the courage of ancestors, etc.”

The above suggests that neither in the Ottoman nor Persian empires were the Armenians assimilated in the administrative and religious respect. What is more, they were fully integrated into the empires’ economic life and even monopolized several economic branches. We should bear in mind, however, that the social and economic success of members of the Armenian religious corporation was limited to families of traders and usurers closely related to the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Since these entrepreneurs and industrialists also used Church money in their commercial activities, they enriched the Church hierarchy. The latter did nothing to educate the congregation.
morally or intellectually—the ignorance and social backwardness of the ordinary people guaranteed their domination over the co-religionists, the cornerstone of their economic (trade and usury) might.

The Armenian clergy and the merchants and usurers connected with them were not ready to pay for realizing the idea of an Armenian republic in Eastern Anatolia, which would have buried their theocracy and plutocracy. Violence and extra-economic coercion were the most adequate instruments to be used to push them onto the road of struggle for this idea. By this I mean methods of personal terror that could be described as terrorism if aimed at state or public figures (the Armenian Church hierarchs belonged to the latter category). The Armenian nationalist revolutionaries were fully aware that to set up an Armenian republic in Eastern Anatolia they must fight the Ottoman Empire and primarily the bigotry and all the other negative traits of the ethno-religious mentality of the Armenians. The revolutionaries were open about their choice of terror as the main instrument of shaping and educating the Armenian ethnicity.

To be realized, Armenian national statehood with a republican form of governance in Turkish Transcaucasia needed civil society as the social cornerstone of a new mono-ethnic state. To achieve this, it was necessary to transform the polyethnic Armenian religious corporation or sect into a united people brought together not by religious, but by a qualitatively different (material) principle unrelated to religious metaphysics. The road to it lay through an alternative reality of the Armenians being free from the omnipresent and omnipotent Armenian Apostolic Church. In other words, the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries had to invent and realize a method through which they could replace the Armenian Apostolic Church in the Armenian ethno-religious corporation. In this way, they would gain two strategic advantages. On the one hand, this plan did not require additional forces and assets. It was enough to replace the members of one social corporation (Church) with the members of a political corporation to destroy the old and erect a new social structure. The competence of the leaders and those whom they led remained practically the same. On the other hand, control over the congregation would give the revolutionaries control over the Church hierarchs and Church property (at least the part unrelated to religious functions and activities). In fact, the Armenian revolutionaries intending to realize their political ideal of an Armenian national state had to pursue an administrative policy in relation to the Armenian Church similar to the one the Russian Empire pursued in the Caucasus in line with the law of 12 June, 1903.

The above suggests that to succeed the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries had to completely modernize the Armenians to transform them from a polyethnic religious sect still living in the late nineteenth century into a full-fledged ethnicity or people, the self-identification of whom rested on social and political rather than religious dominants. At that time, the Armenians had no dominants that could be used as common moral (or, at least, intellectual) landmarks. The revolutionaries had to formulate them and impose them on the Armenians (still a religious sect) in order to rule out all possible social-political alternatives to a mono-national republic in Transcaucasia. Destruction of the Armenian way of life in the Muslim environment was the first step toward the desired goal; a blood feud between Armenians and Muslims was stirred up; the Armenian territorial religious communities forgot their local specifics and self-sufficiency to pool forces, this time not for religious reasons. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Armenians began closing ranks in the face of collective responsibility for the atrocities committed by their co-religionists against the Muslims in the Ottoman, Russian, and Persian empires. So-called blind terror was used to replace religious with national consolidation. In 1895-1907, the Armenian nationalist fighters of the Gncak and Dashnaktsutiun parties ignited religious and ethnic clashes in the Armenian settlements; they attacked Muslim villages, plundered them and, at opportune moments, killed the local people, mainly women, children, and old people, the easiest prey.

The list of crimes of this sort is well known; it appeared in numerous publications of Turkish and Azeri authors,12 so there is not much sense in quoting it here. These crimes had several common

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12 See: R. Mustafaev, Prestupleniia armianskikh terroristicheskikh i banditskikh formirovany protiv cheholuzhestva (XIX-XX vv.): kratkaia khronologicheskaia entsiklopedia, Elm, Baku, 2002; B. Najafov, Litso vraga. Istoria armianskogo
or even typical features which, taken together, can be described as “criminal specifics” that pointed to the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries and distinguished them from similar crimes perpetrated by political extremists (anarchists, members of Narodnaya Volya, Revolutionary Social Democrats, and others) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historical evidence points to five important typical features present in all crimes of the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries known to history, which they committed in the relatively short period of time.

First, they operated in the Ottoman and Russian empires in localities where Armenians lived in compact communities and where the share of Muslims was relatively small (no more than 10 to 15 percent). There were no Muslim pogroms in the Erivan Province of the Russian Empire with a predominantly Armenian population. This meant that the Gnchak and Dashnaktsutiun fighters preferred localities where Armenians were on their side, albeit unwillingly, and could be subjected to administrative and military repressions, which they were unable to resist, for helping criminals. Villages with predominantly Muslim populations were shelled or set on fire; local people were killed in great numbers with exceptional or even deliberate cruelty; the troops dispatched to restore law and order were shelled from Armenian villages. The earliest provocations of Armenian nationalists took place in the Ottoman Empire and go back to July-August 1894 when they stirred up an Armenian-Turkish conflict in Sason, a mountainous area of what is now Turkish Kurdistan. On 18 September, 1895, massacres, in which small arms were used, flared up in Bab Ali, an exclusive area of Istanbul where the palace of Sultan Abdul Hamid II was located. A month later, clashes between Armenians and Turks and pogroms shattered the environs of Akhisar, Trabzon, Bayburt, Bitlis, and Erzurum in Eastern Anatolia (Turkish Transcaucasia). It was at the same time that Armenians rioted in Zeytun (today Süleymanlı on the southern Mediterranean coast of Turkey); a month later, Armenians clashed with Turks and Kurds in the southeastern provinces (vilayets) of the Asian part of the Ottoman Empire—Diyarbakir, Arapgir, Urfa, Malatya, Kharberd, Sivas, Ayntap, and Marash.

The ideologists of Armenian nationalism from among the leaders of Gnchak and Dashnaktsutiun expected that these crimes would isolate the Armenians from the other local peoples and invite retributions from their Muslim neighbors and repressions from the imperial authorities. The Armenians had to stop feeling like part of the local social landscape to become aware of their responsibility for the crimes committed by others. The feeling of religious conformism, highly developed among the Armenians, was replaced with a feeling of collective involvement in criminal activities and collective responsibility for them, no longer as members of a religious corporation, but as an ethnicity. In fact, these crimes should have changed the paradigm of the Armenians’ national-religious self-awareness and taught them to regard themselves as a new social and political entity, a people led by a party of nationalists.

I do not claim the honor of pioneering the thesis that the crimes of the Armenian nationalists in villages, towns, and large cities with predominantly Muslim populations and seemingly accidental murders of peaceful people were intended as provocations in the hope of invoking repressions against the Armenians to widen the gap and stir up antagonism between them and the local people. This honor belongs to William L. Langer, an American who wrote The Diplomacy of Imperialism published in 1951, in which he argued that the revolutionary leaders of Armenians probably expected to draw attention to the Armenian question through the sufferings of the Armenians caused by their terrorist activities.13 Half a century later, Walter Laqueur said the same in his Age of Terrorism and The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. He has concretized the idea that the Армянская национальная революция в Закавказье в конце XIX—начале XX в. Эльм, Баку, 1993; Правонарушения армянских террористических формирований против человечества: XIX—XX вв.: хрестоматия криминологических энциклопедии, Институт прав человека НАН Азербайджана, Эльм, Баку, 2013; F.P. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991; The Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism, Assembly of Turkish-American Association, Washington, 1999.

menian revolutionaries of the 1880s-1890s expected that their attacks on the Turks would invite cruel reprisals which, in turn, would radicalize the Armenians and probably invite a West European intervention of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{14} I completely agree with both authors—they put in a nutshell the tactics of the Armenian nationalists of the turn of the twentieth century and correctly identified their place among the other methods of struggle in the context of the ethnogenesis of the Armenians among the other peoples of the Ottoman Empire.

Second, the fighters of Gnchak and Dashnaktsutiun committed their crimes (at least in the Russian Empire) in places populated by Armenians who had moved in the 1830s from the Persian Empire or who earlier belonged to its political orbit. This is confirmed by the so-called Armenian-Tatar massacre of 1905-1906; the term belongs to Vladimir Mayevskiy, an official of the Foreign Ministry of Russia, who between the 1880s and 1914 served as vice-consul in several administrative centers in Eastern Anatolia. In this capacity, he could observe the inner mechanisms of the notorious Armenian Question present in the domestic and foreign policies of the Russian and Ottoman empires. During World War I, as an official for special missions in the office of the quartermaster general at the headquarters of the Caucasian Front, he consulted the Russian military command on how to rule the occupied territories of the Ottoman Empire. In 1915 he published his book \textit{Armiano-tatarskaia smuta na Kavkaze kak odin iz fazisov Armianskogo voprosa}\textsuperscript{15} (The Armenian-Tatar Discord in the Caucasus as One of the Aspects of the Armenian Question), in which he arranged the facts and looked into the causes of the Armenian-Azeri conflict of the early twentieth century. (Until 1926, the Azeris of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were officially called Transcaucasian Tatars.)

The tragic events of that time claimed about two thousand lives; the harshest clashes took place in Baku in February and August 1905 and in Nakhchivan in May 1905. Armenians and Azeris also clashed in Tiflis (Tbilisi), Elisavetpol (Ganja), and Shusha, that is, in areas populated by Armenians who moved there in the 1830s from Persia. They refused to regard the Erivan Armenians who had come from the Ottoman Empire and replenished the ranks of Dashnaktsutiun fighters as belonging to the same ethnicity or even as their co-religionists.\textsuperscript{16} The nationalists of Gnchak and Dashnaktsutiun worked hard to draw them into the orbit of terror; they were much crueler than in the Ottoman Empire, where the enmity between the Armenians and Turks was much more obvious than in the Russian part of Transcaucasia. Those who moved to the Central Caucasus from Persia were higher up the social ladder in Persia; after moving to Russia, they remained higher socially, culturally, and economically than the former Turkish Armenians. They did not need the Armenian Apostolic Church to fit into the region’s social and economic context. This meant that this part of the Armenian ethnicity (which can be conventionally called Baku-Karabakh) remained isolated in its everyday life. In order to draw it into the new emerging ethnicity, the ideologists and fighters of Gnchak and Dashnaktsutiun provoked clashes between Armenians and Azeris. Though highly damaging (in 1905, according to American Turcologist Tadeusz Świętochowski, the clashes in the territory that is now the Azerbaijan Republic ruined 158 Azeri and 128 Armenian settlements\textsuperscript{17}), they were not enough. A series of murders of


\textsuperscript{15} See: V.F. Mayevskiy, \textit{Armiano-tatarskaia smuta na Kavkaze kak odin iz fazisov Armianskogo voprosa}, Printed in the Print shop of the Caucasian Military District, Tiflis, 1915.

\textsuperscript{16} This is explained by the continued existence in the early twentieth century of several religious centers with the functions of autonomous administration of individual parts of the ecumene of this ethno-religious sect. There was the Etchmiadzin Catholicosate, formally the leading element in the structure of the Armenian Apostolic Church; there were also autocephalous Sis Catholicosate and Istanbul Administration of the Bishopric (for more details, see: P. Werth, “Glava tserkvi, poddanny imperatora: Armianskiy katolikos na perekrestke vnutrenney i vneshney politiki imperii, 1828-1914,” in: \textit{Konfessia, Imperia, natsia: Religija i problema raznoobraziia v istorii postsovetskogo prostranstva}, Compiled and edited by I. Gerasimov, M. Mogilner, A. Semenov, Novoe izdatelstvo, Moscow, 2012, pp. 165-206).

highly placed Russian officials, which transformed the ethnic regional conflict into a nationwide one, did the job.

Third, at the turn of the twentieth century, hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church conspired with the Armenian nationalists to organize criminal acts in the Ottoman and Russian empires for the sake of transforming the Armenian ethno-religious corporation into a single nation. Church officials allowed fighters of Gncchak and Dashnaktsutiu and those who paid them to use churches and houses belonging to the Church and rented them out to keep weapons and explosives. The earliest fact of this cooperation is dated 18 June, 1890, when the Ottoman gendarmes found a store of small arms in the Surb Astvatsatsin (Holy Mother of God) Church in Erzurum. In an effort to prevent the discovery of the crime, local Armenian extremists killed one of the gendarmes and lost 20 of their fighters in an exchange of fire. In 1903, in the course of the inventory of the possessions of the Armenian Apostolic Church under the law of 12 June, weapon storages were found in Armenian churches. The first of them was discovered purely by chance by officials of the Ministry of State Property on 2 September, 1903 at the Cathedral of Surb Grigor Lusavorich in Baku. The find confirmed the suspicion that the Armenian hierarchs were prepared to commit the bloodiest of crimes to preserve the property they owned or managed. They were prepared to arm and raise their congregation against the Russian Empire, the officials of which were benevolently disposed to them.

The Armenian Church, which allowed the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries to draw it into anti-government activities and which rebuffed the attempts of the imperial government to establish control over Church property and money through large-scale Armenian Muslim pogroms in Russian Transcaucasia, lost much more than it gained. After allowing Gncchak and Dashnaktsutiu to use churches and commercial real estate, the Church could not re-establish its control, even though in 1907 the law of 12 June, 1903 had been annulled on the insistence of Vicegerent of the Caucasus Count Vorontsov-Dashkov. The Armenian revolutionaries established their control over the Church’s property and money in a way similar to what the Russian Empire supposed to do. The types of control differed in one very important respect—the Russian Empire preserved de jure and de facto the Church’s right to property on real estate and money and merely demanded detailed reports of their use. The functionaries and fighters of Gncchak and Dashnaktsutiu pushed the Church aside and used its real estate and money as they saw it fit. Moreover, the leaders of political groups of Armenian nationalists snatched the status of spiritual and intellectual leader of the Armenians from the Armenian Apostolic Church. The Church was left with the function of a representative of the Armenian ethnicity, which it lost when the Russian and Ottoman empires were replaced with secular Bolshevist Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey. Ideological domination was moved from the Church to the political institutions of the Armenians, an inevitable and civilizationally determined shift. Moreover, it meant that the process of social transformation of the polyethnic religious corporation of Armenians into a new ethnicity had been completed. This happened after World War I, which supplied the Armenian people with another unificatory idea of a collective tragedy caused by military and political repressions of the Ottoman Empire in 1915-1916 against their ethno-religious corporation, later described as “Armenian genocide.”

Fourth, the local structures of Gncchak and Dashnaktsutiu combined revolutionary radicalism, national religious extremism, and political terrorism with crimes against property—racketing, plundering, and extortions. Contemporary Armenian authors do not hesitate to write about this. L. Karapetian, for example, in his painstakingly researched article “Iz istorii armianskikh politicheskikh partiy na Kubani v nachale XX veka” (From the History of Armenian Political Parties in the Kuban Area in the Early Twentieth Century) offers amazing facts about the criminal activities of the Armenians in this region of the Russian Empire: “Expropriations and terror figured prominently in the tactics of Dashnaktsutiu. There is a lot of archival information about the extortion of large sums. If
the victims refused to pay, they were exposed to extreme measures. On 22 June, 1906, in Armavir, Ambartsum Ovnatov killed merchant N. Shakhnazarov who refused to pay 10 thousand rubles… In the Bezymianny District, Agasin encouraged expropriations from Russians. The committee received no more than half of the sum (this means that the extortionists retained the second half as compensation for their troubles.—O.K.)… The ranks of expropriators were swelling with provocateurs and blackmailers, which did nothing for the party’s image. This explains why in 1907 the problems of expropriations were repeatedly discussed at party meetings. However, it was decided to continue the expropriations under the Party’s strict control, otherwise those who violated the rules of expropriation should either be expelled from the party or punished by death. In the summer of 1907, an unknown Armenian fell victim to this decision. Enokh Ter-Avetisiants, one of the members of the Armavir group, was punished by death for appropriating party money. This means that in the early twentieth century, revolutionary activities were funded by racketeering and extortion of money from their co-religionists and people of other nationalities who had the misfortune to be their neighbors. The fighters also lived on this “income.”

The anti-government actions and the crimes of the Armenian nationalists of the late nineteenth-first decade of the twentieth century were of dual nature, which set them apart from other types of revolutionary activity of the time. On the one hand, they were ethnocentric, while on the other, transnational. This is explained by the fact that for a long time the Armenian ethnoreligious corporation remained scattered across many countries and was partly kept together by the ideological leadership of the Armenian Apostolic Church. This meant that potential fighters could be found anywhere in the world to commit crimes to alienate the local Armenian community from local society.

Not infrequently, Armenian fighters born in Russian Transcaucasia committed crimes in the Ottoman or Persian empires. There are also documents saying that in the early twentieth century ethnic Armenians, citizens of the United States, came to the Caucasus to teach local fighters how to make and use explosives. The earliest incident of this sort is dated 29 August, 1903, when an Armenian John Nakhikian, an American citizen, came to Kars where in the apartment of a certain Tanoev, not far from the barracks of the 155th infantry Quba Regiment, he killed himself and the apartment owner when making hand grenades out of hand-made explosives. The history of Armenian terrorism brims with similar examples. I selected this particular incident to demonstrate that, from the earliest days, Armenian terrorist revolutionary activities were of a transnational nature, state borders being no impediment. Procurator of the Etchmiadzin Synod of the Armenian Apostolic Church A. Frenkel had the following to say about this in 1907: “There are reasons to believe that between the thirties and eighties of the last century, our government at least ignored or probably found profitable close ties between the Armenian organizations of Russia and Turkey. Weapons, ammunition, huge sums of money, and Armenian volunteers freely crossed the border from Russia to Turkey.

“Political Armenian refugees found shelter in our border areas; today there are over 50,000 such refugees in the Caucasus. Half of these uninvited guests have no legal documents; most of the criminals in the Eastern Caucasus are Turkic Armenians. Indifference to the solidarity between the Russian and Turkic Armenian organizations has produced other dangerous fruit. For seventy years, three or four generations of Armenian youth were brought up on the idea of opposition to the government (even though it was the Turkish government); they were taught to think politically and became accustomed to the idea that struggle against the authorities was possible and even legitimate. When Armenian schools in the Caucasus were closed down, Armenian young people moved to Switzerland and Germany in huge numbers to return as accomplished socialists. The ideas of socialism are very popular among urban Armenians; an Armenian living in a city has no motherland to be proud of, only the bitter realization that his people remained in slavery for 1,300 years and that he is hated by all

as a parasite. This historical legacy and national baggage make it easy to move to the International and preaching of unity of proletarians of all countries. The Armenian revolutionaries have acquired a pretext. In the 80s-90s, it became clear that dangerous ideas were planted in Armenian schools; it was noticed that there was an interconnection between the Etchmiadzin Patriarchate and the non-Russian autochthonous and foreign revolutionary organizations, as well as defects in managing the Armenian church and monastery properties.

"Those who ruled the Caucasus at that time passed the well-known decision to close down Armenian schools; for the same reason, the Patriarch was deprived of his personal right to deal with questions of marriage, language, oaths of allegiance, expropriation of church property, etc. This was enough to raise the Armenian masses against the Russian government. By that time, the Armenian revolutionary forces had been trained well enough and were ready both morally and materially. In their leaflets, they merely replaced 'Turkey' with 'Russia.' Today, Turkish Armenians (fidais) cross the Russo-Turkish border into Russia very much like several years ago when the Russian Armenians brought weapons and moved volunteers into Turkey."

Two factors made Armenian political criminal activity transnational. First, the Armenian nationalists could count on support and encouragement from the Russian Empire and many of the West European countries (France and Britain in particular). Seen from their capitals, Armenian political extremism looked like an organized force that could undermine the military, strategic, and geopolitical position of the Ottoman Empire in Hither Asia and the Middle East to open the doors for consolidated European influence. Second, the Armenian Apostolic Church did a lot to consolidate the ranks of Armenian extremists: at the turn of the twentieth century, it transferred the revenue created from its property or the property it managed to Gnchak, which operated mainly in the Ottoman Empire, and to Dashnaktsutiun, which preferred to operate in the Russian Empire. These two extremist organizations would have hardly been successful without Church money. Encouragement of Armenian national extremism or at least the laisser-faire policy of the Russian Administration in the Caucasus ended with the Armenian-Tatar massacre of 1905-1906, which tarnished the political image of Russia in the Muslim world and damaged the economy of Transcaucasia practically beyond repair.

**Armenian Genocide as a Unifying Factor**

During World War I and immediately after it, the Armenians became completely isolated from their neighbors in the social and economic structure of Transcaucasia (both Russian and Turkish). This is explained by the armed conflicts the Republic of Armenia led by Dashnaktsutiun was waging with its neighbors. The regular armed units of the Armenian nationalists were not so much fighting the regular armies of their enemies as murdering local Muslims in great numbers and plundering their property. They were especially active in Turkey and Azerbaijan. I will not cite facts and figures here to support the above; instead I refer my readers to other authors.

21 RGIA, rec. gr. 821, inv. 7, f. 96, sheets 260-261.

war and its results. Later, these repressions and the related deportation of Armenians from the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Marmara coasts to the desert areas of Northern Iraq were described as “genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.” This, however, causes doubts for several reasons.

Without going into legal technicalities (at that time there was no legal term “genocide,” therefore suppression of mutinous population was not banned by international law), let me point out that the military-police operation began on 24 April, 1915, on the eve of an operation of the Entente in the Mediterranean. On 25 April, 1915, the united French, British, and Russian navy landed the Australian-New Zealand Army Corps of the British colonial armed forces on the Gallipoli peninsula. It was expected to move toward the European part of Istanbul. Soldiers of the Armenian worker detachments in the Ottoman marine fortresses and forts along the Dardanelles had been instructed to riot and block the coastal batteries to allow the united Navy of the Entente to enter the Sea of Marmara. On 19 April, German military intelligence informed the Turks about this. It was decided to act using military and police forces to prevent a riot and liquidate the organizers. This was done outside Istanbul and later around the largest coastal cities—Trabzon, Sinop, and Izmir.\(^\text{23}\) This meant that the military and police operation against the Armenians in April 1915 was carried out to prevent an armed riot in support of the approaching enemy. Presented by Armenian authors, it was an act of malice against peaceful population.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, the so-called “Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire” developed into an Armenian unificatory idea that produced two important results in the course of Armenian ethnogenesis and final consolidation of Armenians. On the one hand, the idea created the dominant of ethnic or even ethnopolitical self-identification of the Armenians, no matter where they lived. On the other, the subject of the notorious genocide replaced the previously dominant idea of ethnoreligious unity of all Armenians. In this way, the Armenian ethnicity acquired a new organizational structure—the ARF Dashnaktsutiun moved into the place occupied by the Armenian Apostolic Church, the consolidating structure until the early twentieth century. In 1920, Dashnaktsutiun won the battle with the Ginchak functionaries and the Armenian clergy for the right to dominate the Armenian ethnicity. In this way, the Armenians discarded the old garbs of sectarian religious unity typical of feudalism and moved toward political unity under the leadership of a political institution, a party of organized minority that imposed its will on the non-organized majority, a natural and, therefore, inalienable part of the bourgeois world order.

For three quarters of a century, punishment of the Turkic people for the Armenian nationalists’ own inability to acquire national statehood in 1910-1920s remained their idée fixe and the criterion of the political mainstream, against which the subjective (individual) or even collective adequacy were measured. In other words, all those who accepted “Armenian genocide” as part of the contemporary history of the Turkic Republic were hailed as friends of the Armenian ethnicity, while those who refused to accept this idea were subjected to intellectual or even financial obstruction. This preserved the monochrome “friend-foe” idea of the world, another confirmation of the rigidity of the psychological ethnosocial attitudes of the bulk of the Armenian ethnicity. At the same time, other peoples acquired an image of Armenians that they found hard to accept. The Armenians became even more isolated and lost all chance of becoming assimilated with the rest of the world. In fact, this is a new stage in the evolution of the ethnic psychology of the Armenians. In the past, the feeling of collective responsibility for the crimes committed by a small and closely knit corporation of nationalist revolutionaries against Muslim people was artificially imposed on the entire nation. Today, there is a feeling of collective resentment of the retribution for the earlier crimes.

The idea of “Armenian genocide” has another important feature, which moves it from the social political to the historical criminological sphere. Practically throughout the entire twentieth century, from the early 1920s to the early 1990s to be more exact, the Armenians exploited the mythologeme to justify their continued terrorist and other criminal activities, not only against the Turkish Republic and its citizens, but also against those countries and nations of Europe that fought and punished the Armenian nationalists. This meant that propaganda of the responsibility of the Turks and Azeris for the so-called Armenian genocide that allegedly took place in the 1910s justified and still justifies and even encourages terrorism of Armenian nationalists. In the last twenty-five years of the twentieth century, they committed 300 crimes (not counting the military crimes committed during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh). This contradicts Art 1 of the Federal Law of the RF on Opposition to Extremist Activities of 25 July, 2002 No. 114-FZ, which describes “public justification of terrorism” as extremism. This makes the thesis of “Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire” an outcrop of extremism; indeed, it remains prominent in the history of the Transcaucasian peoples and for many years has been provoking nationalist Armenian terrorism in many countries.

Those who study the propaganda of this thesis should pay attention to its commercial aspect, which has not yet received the attention it deserves. Closer scrutiny will reveal certain absolutely legal mechanisms of funding Armenian extremist activities and its self-reproduction as any other successful commercial enterprise. A fundamental work by Candan Badem Bibliography of Turkish-Armenian Question published in two languages offers a survey of the efforts poured into the propaganda of the “Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire” all over the world. The author has collected and annotated 4,450 titles in Turkish, Russian, English, French, German, Armenian, and several other languages published in different countries between the end of the nineteenth century and 2006 dealing with various aspects of Armenian-Turkish confrontation in the Ottoman Empire, which is described as the Turkish-Armenian Question in contemporary Turkish historiography (an alternative to the Armenian thesis of “genocide”).

An analysis of the materials collected between the two covers shows that nearly half of the books (over 2,200 titles) dealing with the Turkish-Armenian Question/Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire were published between 1975 and 1995, the years when ASALA (The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) and JCAG (Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide) were especially active. It was during these two decades that one book per week on the history or contemporary state of Turkic-Armenian and Armenian-Turkic confrontation was published somewhere in the world. This can be described as the biggest propaganda operation that brought money to those who organized it, the ideological impact of which, however, being much more modest. The ASALA and JCAG terrorist activities made the books, which explained the reasons behind the terror, very popular; books by different authors were published in huge numbers, which made the publishers and authors rich. It seems that several scores of acts of terror, which cost very little, produced an impressive commercial effect in the form of over two thousand books on this very special subject. Placed in the context of macroeconomics, this was one of the most efficient global promotion campaigns of commercial products of media and printing industry in the history of mankind.

It is hardly moral to look at Armenian terrorism as a commercial enterprise—this will insult the memory of its victims. However, the fact that the ASALA and JCAG terrorist activities added to the commercial success of these books confirms that Armenian terror was used not only for ideological and political purposes, but also (unintentionally) for social and economic purposes, including those that brought money. The ASALA and JCAG cannot be likened to ethnic criminal groups of the Cosa

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26 See: C. Badem, Turk-Ermeni Sorunu Bibliyografyası (in Turkish) and Bibliography of Turkish-Armenian Question, Aras, Istanbul, 2007.
Nostra or Camorra type—these were purely economic enterprises without ideological or political ambitions (even though the ethnic traditions of the autochthonous population of Naples and Sicily were very prominent). The ASALA and JCAG fighters structuralized the diaspora and the relations inside it; on the other hand, they built a social hierarchy dependent on social origins and services to the ethnicity as a whole and the social groups inside it.

By the latter quarter of the twentieth century, political terrorism had developed into a consolidating factor. The Armenian diaspora had to close ranks around the transnational organizational structures of Gnchak and Dashmaksutuun, which provided the ideological (“responsibility of the Turks for the Armenian genocide of 1915”) and political protection of the illegal activities of ASALA and JCAG. In this way, the diaspora was transformed from a network of local marginal communities, which hoped to preserve their national and cultural identity, into a global political corporation strong enough to address the centuries-old task of building a mono-ethnic Armenian state in Transcaucasia. It had the main social prerequisite—structurally organized people ready to fight for its statehood and the corresponding status of a political nation. A war of terror as an instrument used to address this geopolitical task was launched by the diaspora’s fighters first against the official authorities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. (1988-1989) and, later, against the Azeri people and the developing social structures of the Azerbaijan Republic (1990-1991). After a while this war developed into a full-scale conflict between the two states (1991-1994); the hostilities were suspended, but the causes and repercussions (Armenian occupation of a large part of the territory of the Azerbaijan republic) have not yet been defused by political and diplomatic means. The Armenian aggression of 1988-1994 against Azerbaijan can be described as an apogee of the process of social transformation of the Armenian people from a polyethnic religious sect (the century-long social development of which remained at the level of clan and tribal relations) to the state of a fully-fledged political nation, which set up and preserved for a fairly long time its mono-ethnic statehood.

**Conclusion**

By way of summing up the above, we should recognize that for a century-and-a-half, the Armenian political nation took shape to the accompaniment of shooting and explosions, a road dotted by political assassinations and terrorist acts. Social transformation and modernization of the Armenian people were driven by national religious extremism and political terror; otherwise, it could not have leapt from the Early Middle Ages into industrial society within one century, a very short period by historical dimensions. This feat of unrivaled or even revolutionary intensity claimed hundreds of thousands Armenian, Muslim and European lives.

This was an objective historical process that cannot be described as bad or even reprehensible—each political nation has travelled its own path and exhibited its own specific features, which set it aside from all others. The Russian nation developed through passionate Orthodox messianism coupled with the idea of reviving the empire of Genghis Khan under the scepter of a Christian monarch. The German nation was built “by iron and blood,” as the first Chancellor of German Empire Otto von Bismarck put it. The American nation is, in fact, a mercantile conglomerate of European émigrés, British slave traders, and the slaves they gradually brought to North America. The Armenian nation, as we know it, appeared on the political map of the world twenty-five years ago. It is a logical product of national religious extremism and political terrorism consistently carried out from the last quarter of the nineteenth to the late twentieth century. This is how it will be described in all textbooks of recent political history some fifty years from now.
ARMENIAN VOLUNTEERS ON THE CAUCASIAN FRONT (1914-1916)

Abstract

The author analyzes the events that took place 100 years ago on the Caucasian Front of World War I. He points out that the attempts of the great powers, the Russian Empire in particular, to use the Armenians against the Ottoman Empire created a seat of tension that remains prominent for over a century now. He relies on the documents of the Russian State Archives of Military History, many of which are being put into academic circulation for the first time.

Keywords: Caucasian Front of World War I, the Eastern Question, Greater Armenia, Armenian volunteer squads, Armenian card.

Introduction

By the early twentieth century, the contradictions between the great powers determined to expand their spheres of influence had reached the highest point, while their practical moves in this direction divided the continent into two military blocs, thus bringing the Great War nearer.

The so-called Eastern Question figured prominently on the agenda of World War I, which broke out in 1914 and pushed the Russian and Ottoman empires against one another on the Caucasian Front. Armenians saw the clash between two empires as a chance to finally set up Greater Armenia. So-called Armenian volunteer squads never stopped at assassinations, murders, and plunder in Eastern Anatolia to realize the myth about the Great Armenian state. Instigated by the Russian Empire, the Armenians who fought in the Caucasus in 1914-1916 created a permanent seat of conflicts in the region.

Today, 100 years later, we should look into the past to find objective answers to many debatable issues of today.

Hostilities on the Caucasian Front and Russia’s “Armenian Card”

World War I began in the summer of 1914 and soon spread across the Middle East and the Caucasus. In September 1914, Russian Ambassador to Turkey Mikhail Girs reported from Istanbul:
“It seems that the war cannot be avoided.”¹ On 17 September, 1914, a day after this notification was received, Czar Nicholas II issued a proclamation to the Armenians that said: “Russia is proud to remember its glorious sons. The Lazarevs, Melikovs, and others fought together with their brothers for the grandeur of their Motherland. Your centuries-long loyalty is a guarantee of your contribution to the ultimate success of our armies and our rightness. Oh, Armenians! Together with your blood brothers under the scepter of the tsar you will finally fully feel the delights of freedom and justice.”²

In late October 1914, after the proclamation of Russian Czar Nicholas II, the commanders of the Caucasian Front drafted an address to the Turkish Armenians which said, in particular, that if the Armenian squads formed in Etchmiadzin entered Turkey, “the sovereign of the Russian land guaranteed that the Armenian people would set up, under the strong protectorate of Great Russia, an autonomous Armenia within the six Armenian vilayets and Cilicia connected with them.”³

Russia’s declaration of war to Turkey was accompanied by open anti-Muslim calls. Calls to make short work of Muslims were heard at the Duma rostrum, meetings of intelligentsia, chauvinistic-nationalistic press, etc. Christian ministers cursed “Basurmans” from ambo. Ali Mardan bey Topchibashev’s (a prominent Muslim figure, head of the Muslim faction in the Russian First State Duma) archives had a text of appeal of Orenburg bishop Mathew to Orthodox parishioners. In his severe appeal the bishop referred to Attila, Genghis Khan, Emir Teymur and “Christian blood shed by the above” as saying that it was high time to take vengeance “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy spirit” and called Russian orthodox believers to set out for the last fight to liberate the holy land in the East and proceed with this war until a cross was hoisted in the temple of St. Sophia in Tsargrad, and “the holy lands” in Asia fell under control of Russian and Greek Orthodox Church. Inspired by the czar’s promise, Armenians began forming volunteer squads. In the fall of 1914, the Armenian volunteers from Transcaucasia fought on the side of Russia against the Ottoman Army.⁴

By the latter half of 1914, the Armenians became convinced that the world war would help them realize their national idea. They never “concealed their claims to the lands stretching from Trabzon to Cilicia and from Angora to Urmia.”⁵ In September 1914, they launched a conscription campaign, which ignited enthusiasm among the Turkish Armenians and also the Armenians “from Transcaucasia, the Northern Caucasus, Rostov on Don, and Nakhchivan, Crimea and Bessarabia, the trans-Caspian region and Turkestan, Rumania and Bulgaria, Egypt and far-away America—enthusiastic young people from these places strove to reach Tiflis to join the squads.”⁶ On 20 November, when the hostilities had already begun, General Quartermaster of the Caucasian Army Bolkhovitinov wrote that “deputations of Armenians and Kurds come to our commanders to assure them of their loyalty.”⁷ In their instructions to the department of supplies of the Caucasian Army of 5 October, 1914, Generals Yudenich and Bolkhovitinov pointed out that “the chief commander ordered that 120 Mannlicher rifles and 200 live rounds per each rifle be issued for the Etchmiadzin monastery. They should be transferred through attorney of law Samson Arutunov, who lives in Tiflis (23, Griboedov Str.). He

¹ Secret telegram of Ambassador to Constantinople Mikhail Girs. 16.09.1914, Russian State Archives of Military History (RGVIA), rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 535, sheet 116 (hereinafter all documents are in Russian unless otherwise stated).
² Address of the Czar to the Armenians. 17.09.1914, Archives of Political Documents at the Administration of the President of Azerbaijan Republic (APD UDP AR), rec. gr. 276, inv. 8, f. 463, sheet 18.
³ Report of General L. Bolkhovitinov to the Assistant for Military Affairs at the Caucasian Vicegerent. 11.12.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 49.
⁴ See: Address of Bishop Mathew of Orenburg to Orthodox Christians. 1914, State Archives of Azerbaijan Republic (GAAR), rec. gr. 3172, inv. 1, f. 2, sheets 1—2.
⁵ On the Question of Buying Off Armenian Lands in the Areas of Persia and Turkey Bordering on the Caucasus. 23.05.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 169.
⁶ Report of General L. Bolkhovitinov to the Assistant for Military Affairs at the Caucasian Vicegerent. 11.12.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 52.
⁷ Secret Report from General Leonid Bolkhovitinov to the Assistant at the Military Governor in the Caucasus. 20.11.1914, RGVIA, rec. gr. 13134, inv. 1, f. 82, sheet 16.
has been instructed to contact you about this.” In his report to the Chief of Staff, Bolkhovitinov pointed out that “the Catholicos of All Armenians asked for 250 rifles and live rounds to distribute them as he saw it fit.”

Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Army General Nikolay Yudenich agreed and entrusted Mayor of Tiflis Alexander Khatisov with the task of delivering the weapons to the Catholicos. In this way, during the first months of the war, at least 45 Armenian villages of the Alexandropol (Gumri) District (most of the villages marked on the list had Turkic names) acquired 1,200 Berdan rifles and 24,000 live rounds.

Russia not only distributed rifles among the Transcaucasian Armenians, it also armed those who lived in Turkey and were subjects of the Ottoman Empire. In a secret telegram that Caucasian Vicegerent Count Vorontsov-Dashkov sent on 6 February, 1915 to the Foreign Ministry of Russia said in part: “Recently, representatives of the Armenians of Zeytun came to the Staff of the Caucasian Army to inform them that about fifteen thousand Armenians were ready to attack Turkish communication lines, but could not do this for lack of rifles and ammunition. In view of the fact that Zeytun is situated on the communication lines of the Turkish Erzurum Army, it seems advisable to deliver the necessary number of rifles and live rounds to Alexandretta, where the Armenians will collect them. I believe that it is desirable to contact the French or English governments, which will also profit from what the Zeytun Armenians plan to accomplish, with a request to deliver French and British rifles and ammunition to Alexandretta by French and English ships, because of the urgency of the question and because we cannot deliver the weapons directly to the Armenians.”

After receiving the telegram, the Foreign Ministry immediately instructed Russian Ambassador in London Benkendorf and Russian Ambassador in Paris Izvolskiy to study the routes along which weapons could be delivered to the Zeytun Armenians. In mid-1915, Artem Gasparian, head of one of the Armenian squads, was dispatched from Tiflis to the United States to gather volunteer squads of American Armenians in order to raise the Zeytun Armenians against Turkey. He, however, had to return because the sea routes across the ocean were controlled by Germany. In his letter to the governor of Tiflis, he wrote that “the English government agreed to help stir up a riot in Zeytun.”

Armenian churches in different countries were the main organizers of the Armenian volunteer squads. On 25 August, 1915, a Russian diplomat stationed in Cairo wrote in his secret telegram to Tiflis that “some of the Armenian Turkish citizens in Egypt who carry Egyptian passports and are recommended by the Armenian Bishop in Cairo want to join the volunteers in the Caucasus and are ready to travel at their own expense.” The telegram sent on 7 September from Tiflis to Petrograd asked for permission to allow these volunteers to join the Caucasian Army.

A single telegram of the Russian diplomatic representative in Bucharest contained the following figures: 137 Turkish subjects wanted to join the volunteer squads in the Caucasus; 94 of them being members of Dashnaktsutiun and 43 of Ginchak parties.

In his report to the Special Department of the Office of the Caucasian vicegerent, head of the Tiflis province gendarmerie, Colonel Pastriulin, wrote that “over a short period from the fall of
1914 to February 1915 about 520,000 rubles were expended for maintenance of Armenian volunteer squads.”

Even before 3 July, 1914, the day Turkey joined the war, when there was still no fighting, young Armenians asked the Staff of the Caucasian Army to supply them with arms. In a secret letter to the head of Kagyzman District of the Kars Province, Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Army pointed out: “Young Armenians want to be organized into a squad, they want to carry arms and ask for weapons.”

The Greek and Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire sent similar addresses to the Black Sea governor, who, on 20 November, 1914, informed the Caucasian Vicegerent about them.

On 4 August, 1914, head of the Kagyzman military district informed the commanders of the Caucasian Army that “there is a secret organization among the Armenians in Turkey, which in case of war between Turkey and Russia plans to organize special squads to fight in the Turkish rear; if the plan fails they plan to move over to Russia to continue fighting together with the Russian army.”

On 26 August, 1914, the Foreign Ministry of Russia, in its response to an inquiry of the Caucasian Vicegerent, pointed out that it was expedient to arm Armenians and organize them into volunteer squads. As soon as the hostilities began, Ensign Badmaev of the Novocherkasskiy regiment, an experienced soldier (at that time under medical treatment in Petrograd), who had fought in the Russo-Japanese War, applied to the Ministry of War “for permission to organize Armenian volunteers into a guerilla squad against the Turks.”

Even Baku Armenians raised voluntary donations in favor of Turkish Armenians. Agents’ reports of earlier 1915 to the Baku gendarmerie said that the main task of the Central Committee of the Dashnaksutium Party in Baku was to “raise money for Turkish Armenians to fight against Kurdish oppressors and in favor of Armenian refugees; besides, the Dashnaksutium was engaged in recruiting Armenian volunteers to start fighting against Turkey.”

Pagos Nubar Pasha was one of those who received special powers from the Catholicos of All Armenians and who funded Armenian volunteer squads; in particular, he sent $2,500 to the Catholicos. Those who commanded the Armenian squads wrote to the so-called Armenian national defense committee: “You should no longer send money to the Catholicos, who never sends it to us. You would do better to send the money directly to us.”

Eritassard Hayastan, the central organ of the Gncchak Party in the U.S., sent 5,359 rubles to the six squads formed out of party members. On the whole, the Armenian volunteers were displeased with Catholicos Gevork V. Vramian, who arrived from Boston, wrote to Kh. Darpinian, the editor of the Ayrenik newspaper: “You know quite well that the Catholicos is a very weak person, this he is guided by those near him and that he is very different from Izmirlian (Catholicos Matteos II.—J.H.), Khrimian (Catholicos Mkrtich I.—J.H.) or Ormanian (Catholicos Makar I.—J.H.); he is a weak and colorless old man who is filling this post at the wrong time.”

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17 Secret Report of General Leonid Bolkhovitinov to the Head of the Kagyzman District, Kars Province. 03.07.1914, RGVIA, rec. gr. 13134, inv. 1, f. 82, sheet 3.
18 See: A Letter of the Black Sea Governor to the Czarist Vicegerent in the Caucasus. 20.11.1914, RGVIA, rec. gr. 1300, inv. 1, f. 890, sheet 16.
19 From a Letter of the Head of the Kagyzman District. 04.08.1914, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 528, sheet 2.
20 See: Telegram of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Vicegerent in the Caucasus. 26.08.2014. RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 505, sheet 32.
21 Request of Ensign Badmaev to the Ministry of War. 05.10.1914, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 729, sheet 16.
22 Information Supplied by Agents in Early 1915 to the Baku Provincial Gendarmerie. 1915, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 276, inv. 8, f. 498, sheet 19.
24 See: From the Central Committee of the 6th Armenian Squad to the Leading Organ of the Social-Democratic Gncchak Party in America, 15.09.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 133.
The Formation of Armenian “Volunteer Squads” and Exacerbation of Interethnic Disagreements in the Region

But, some Armenians perfectly understood that these actions would not cast a positive light on Armenians. University professor and Councillor of State Egiazarov wrote to Arakelian, editor of the Tiflis-headquartered newspaper Mshak: “In my view, Armenians started very badly. If they volunteered for the Russian army, this would mean that they fulfilled their civil obligations to the state. Turkey declared war and they undertook to defend their motherland. However, Armenians set up detached forces and started fighting with Turkey. Aside from this, Armenians of Turkey rose against their government. In return, Turkey, like any other state, began punishing rioters... Hence, Armenian leaders cast prudence to the winds.”

The tragic plight of these actions is known: mass murder of the Turks in Eastern Anatolia led to the deportation of Armenians. Though Armenians try to present these tragic events as “genocide” against them only, the historical truth proves the contrary. As viewed by some analysts, two flows of refugees ran into each other in Eastern Turkey: Muslims running from the Caucasus to escape from Armenian armed gang units; and Armenians running from Turkey to Russia. It was the confrontation of two refugee flows that resulted in the tragedy that echoed to our days. However, the confrontation of this sort mismatches the concept of genocide because in the reviewed period the Armenians of the western provinces of Turkey lived safe and sound.

General Bolkhovitinov warned against unquestioned acceptance of the huge number of victims quoted by Armenians: “It is extremely difficult … to establish a real number of victims of Muslim vehemence. In any case, we should bear in mind the penchant to exaggeration typical of Armenians when it comes to the scope of misfortunes from which they suffered in Turkey and treat their figures of losses and casualties with caution.”

Tragic consequences of this policy were put on debates at the Duma. In the frontline towns of Kars and Batum the Russian troops encouraged by Armenians committed illegal actions against Muslims in December 1914 and January 1915. In connection with these developments the Muslim faction of the Duma made a special statement titled “On the Situation around Muslims in the Caucasian Front.”

Deputy M.Yu. Jafarov headed for Kars and Ardahan where he witnessed atrocities committed by the Russian army. He detailed about these tragic events in his report forwarded to the Emperor Nicholas II.

To clarify the true nature of events in the Eastern Anatolia of 1914-1915, suffice it to familiarize with a secret report of the Deputy Chief of the General Headquarters of the Caucasian front of Russia, General L.M. Bolkhovitinov, to the czar, and look through reports of the Russian diplomat V.F. Mayevsky. In his report “Correspondence about the Armenian Squad, its Organization and

26 Letter of Councillor of State S.A. Egiazarov to Arakelian, Editor of the Mshak Newspaper. 10.09.1915, APD UDP AR, rec. gr. 276, inv. 8, f. 463, sheet 45.
Activity," sent to the deputy vicegerent for military affairs, General Bolkhovitinov noted that in October-November 1894 "bloody massacres broke out in vilayets of Asian Turkey—Trabzon, Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Harput, Urfa, Adana, and Haleb—initiated mostly by Armenians themselves."31

Note that Armenian paramilitary units, particularly the first Armenian squad headed by notorious Andranik; the second squad under the command of the Russian subject, Armenian Dro; the third squad headed by Amazasp; and the fourth squad led by Keri acted as "fidains" in 1914-1915 and brutally massacred the civilian Turkish population.32

The start of combat operations in the Caucasian front strengthened Russian authorities’ sympathies to the Armenians. The Elizavetpol governor personally wellcomed squads of Armenian volunteers specially arranged to fight Turks, and this caused serious anxiety of local Muslim population. Prof. J. Baberovski wrote that a part of these Armenians believed that the war against Turkey would end with measures to slaughter the Muslim population of the province.33 With due regard for these negative developments, Ali Mardan bey Topchibashev noted the growing hatred of Caucasian Turks against the Russian Empire during World War I, as well as the awakening of the will to independence. He pointed out that after the start of the war the Muslims looked confident though their hearts were full of anger and aspiration to throw off century-long yoke. Ali Mardan bey believed that future historians should be psychologists to identify alarm and expectations in the life of the Caucasian Muslims caused by the war.34

Three out of the four ringleaders of the so-called volunteer squads figured in criminal cases. One of them (Amazasp) had been serving his term in a forced labor camp before the decision of 12 June, 1914. From 24 October, 1910, Dro, another leader, had been on the Wanted lists of the Police Department for his involvement in several acts of terror. Since 1910, the Iranian police had been looking for Keri, a close comrade-in-arms of head of the Iranian police Efrim. In the summer of 1914, however, they were moved under the patronage of the Caucasian Vicegerent; their crimes were forgotten and they acquired immunity.35 One of the orders of the Commander of the Caucasian Army states that “no repressions for past criminal actions should be instituted against Dashnaktsutiun members for the period of war with Turkey.”36 Those who fought in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th squads were mainly Turkish subjects; one of the squads was staffed with Turkish Armenians. The list of 346 volunteers contained information about their place of birth, age, and social status.37 In April 1914, Dro, an Armenian from Iğdır, was entrusted with the task of forming a “band out of Armenians of all districts with the exception of Alexandropol.” In his telegram of 19 April, which he sent from Erivan to General Myshlayevskiy in Tiflis, he reported that he had started to fulfill this task.38 On 23 October, 1914, General Yudenich, Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Army wrote in a telegram to Commander of the Russian military formations in Iğdır General Abatsiev: “Please order Dro and his squad to move to...

31 Report of General L. Bolkhovitinov to the Assistant for Military Affairs at the Caucasian Vicegerent. 11.12.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 46.
32 See: Ibid., sheets 53rev.-54.
36 From the Chancellery of the Caucasian Vicegerent to the Chief of the Caucasian Army Field Headquarters. 29.01.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 558, sheets 170-171.
38 See: Telegram from Erivan to Tiflis, to General Myshlayevskiy. 19.04.1914, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 722, sheets 4-5.
Beyazit for joint action with the detachment of General Nikolayev. Armen Garo from Erzurum, who was a member of the Turkish parliament, was deputy commander of the second squad of Dro. On 11 November, General Bolkhovitinov informed the commander of the Julfa-Khoisk military group General Voropanov that the commander of the first volunteer squad had sent 100 volunteers armed with Mauser pistols to Andranik’s squad. He wanted to know whether there had been enough Mauser ammunition among the weapons captured from the Turks.

On 6 April, 1915, Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Front approved the list of Armenians that served the foundation for reestablishment, on 11 April, of six Armenian squads of 700 men each. According to what Maslovskiy reported to the Staff of the Caucasian Army, by late 1914, six Armenian squads had been set up within the First Caucasian Corps, three in the Azerbaijan-Van military unit, and one in the Chorokh unit. Each squad consisted of four regiments with 235 rank-and-file volunteers in each. According to the established numerical strength, there should be one sergeant-major, one quartermaster sergeant, four senior and 16 junior warrant-officers, and 20 corporals. According to the documents of the Department of Supplies of the Caucasian Army, “each volunteer was entitled to 10 rubles per month” unofficially. On 18 October, 1914, General Yudenich issued a special order to General Voropanov, which said in part: “Starting on 10 October, you should give Samson a sum equal to 10 rubles per person every month for the Armenians of your unit out of the money you get as an advance.” A day before General Yudenich had given orders for the Armenian volunteers and also the local Armenians loyal to Samson, one of the Armenian ring-leaders, to be armed. In his letter to General Voropanov, he wrote: “Arm Samson and the local people loyal to him.” Starting on 28 October, 1914, in full accordance with the order, the commanders of the units in which Armenian squads had been formed calculated the amount of money needed every month and requested the needed sums from the corps commissary. If the latter did not have enough money, the needed sum could be requested from the district commissars, who could turn to the Main Administration of Supplies of the Caucasian Army. For example, former head of the 6th squad Gasparian pointed out in his statement addressed to the Headquarters of the Caucasian Army that he “received 2,500 rubles for the squad under his command” from the Chief of Staff of the Kars Fortress. No expense reports were needed.

In the first months of the war, the government of Russia allocated 242,900 rubles to arm the Turkish Armenians and stir up their riots in the rear of the Turkish army. As soon as a riot began, the Armenian volunteer squads were expected to break through the Turkish front and join forces with the rioters. No final report on how the money had been spent was presented. On 23 July, 1915, the Commissary Department of the Caucasian Military District reported to the Headquarters of the Caucasian

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40 See: Telegram of General Bolkhovitinov to General Voropanov. 25.11.1914, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 505, sheet 242.
41 See: Report of Ensign Prokhorov to the Military Commander of the Kars Fortress. 03.05.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 558, sheet 302.
42 See: Telegram of Maslovskiy to the Army Headquarters, to Lieutenant Colonel Saveliev. 1914, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 29.
44 See: Main Administration of Supplies of the Caucasian Army to the Quartermaster of the Headquarters of Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army. 28.02.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 558, sheet 212.
45 Telegram of General Yudenich to General Voropanov. 18.10.1914, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 505, sheet 143.
46 Telegram of General Yudenich to General Voropanov. 17.10.1914, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 505, sheet 140.
47 See: Main Administration of Supplies of the Caucasian Army to the Quartermaster of the Headquarters Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army. 22.02.1915, sheet 217.
48 See: Lieutenant General Saveliev to the Chief of Staff of the Kars Fortress. 12.08.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 19.
Army that the department had not yet received information about where the former heads of the Sarykamysh, Kagyzman, Olti, and Erivan squads could be found (earlier they had received money to support the Armenian hunds [squads]). The commanders of the Caucasian Army asked for the names, military ranks, and places of service of these people. This was the way the Main Administration of Supplies tried to obtain reports from the Armenian commanders on how the money had been spent.

Dashnaktsutiun and Gncchak, two Armenian political parties blessed by the Catholicos, set up a National Bureau in Tiflis to command the squads of volunteers and coordinate mobilization and the activities of the volunteers arriving from abroad. Armenian Bishop Mesrop, Mayor of Tiflis Alexander Khatiosv, Director of the Department for External Contacts of Dashnaktsutiun Doctor Yakov Zavriev, Commander (khmbapet) of the armed forces of Dashnaktsutiun Samson Arutunov and squad commanders Dro and Andranik were involved in what the National Bureau was doing. The heads of the Gncchak party placed 150 Armenian volunteers mobilized in Bulgaria under the command of the National Bureau. They carried flags that bore the inscription, “Self-defense of the Armenian nation. One for all and all for one. Long Live liberty. 1887-1914.”

The volunteer squads were staffed by coercion; Armenian clerics and Russian consulates tracked down Armenians who had escaped from the battlefield and sent them to the voluntary squads on the frontline. On 2 February, 1915, the Russian vice-consul in Varna sent a cyphered telegram to the Foreign Ministry, in which he said that groups of Bitlis, Muş, Sivas, and Erzurum Armenians had been returned to the front.

A Russian consul general in the provinces of Van and Erzurum since 1895, Mayevskiy wrote about crimes of the Dashnaks and a fabricated “Armenian question:” “I’d like to emphasize here that the so-called Armenian question, which was mainly lies, led the entire Armenian nation along a false path, perplexed the minds of perhaps its best representatives, stupefied hundreds of Armenians and stirred them up to anarchy and endless disasters, took thousands away from a beneficial cause, especially among peasants of Asian Turkey, and later on the Armenians of Transcaucasia. It was the mass media that fogged the truth, making it impossible for the light of truth to penetrate this fog.” Mayevskiy was brave enough to inform his department about the following: “Facts I’m personally aware of about the clashes between Armenians and Muslims in different cities of Turkey suggest that bloody massacres are initiated by Armenians themselves.”

The Armenian Trace in Murders and Plunder in Kars and Ajaria

Armenian combat squads as a part of the Russian army were notorious in the history of world crimes with their massacres in Kars and Ardahan in the spring of 1915. Prof. J. Baberovski wrote that when the Russian army captured Kars, Erzurum, Trabzon and Erzincan, Armenian volunteer squads committed a lot of bloody crimes against the Turkish population.

50 See: Main Administration of Supplies of the Caucasian Army to the Quartermaster of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army. 23.07.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 558, sheet 405.
52 See: Cyphered Telegram of the Foreign Ministry Addressed to a Diplomatic Official. 02.02.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 558, sheet 232.
53 V.F. Mayevskiy, op. cit., pp. 36-38.
54 Zapiska generalnogo konsula Rossii v Ezerume V. Maevskogo, Baku, 1994, p. 17.
55 See: J. Baberovski, op. cit.
In the first months of the war, genocide of the Muslim population carried out by the Armenians acquired dimensions that forced Major General Alexey Podgurskiy of the First Corps of the Caucasian Army to send a telegram to Colonel Grigolia in Sarykamys and heads of the Ardahan, Olty, and Kagyzman districts with the following order: “Take the most decisive measures to prevent plunders and marauding of the Muslim by the Christian population. Warn that the guilty would be brought to courts-martial and sentenced to grave punishments; detain, disarm, and bring the guilty to courts-martial.”

A newspaper Iqbal published in Baku wrote in its issue of 19 February, 1915: “We are informed that Muslims are going through unbelievable hardships and massacres in the battlefield near the Ottoman borders: men are exterminated, women are kidnapped, children are scattered about mountains and woods, the region is in ruins… Refugees are naked and hungry, utterly impoverished… Our poor co-religionists suffered so much grief and troubles that, if described in our newspaper, our readers would get ready for mourning, not holiday.”

A massacre in Kars committed by Armenian gangsters caused great anxiety in Azerbaijan. As soon as the Azerbaijani public learned about mass murders of Muslims by Dashnak militants, including in Kars, Ali Mardan bey Topchibashev, Aghabala Guliyev from Baku, as well as prominent representatives of Ganja and Erevan provinces immediately left for Kars. The purpose of their journey was to identify facts of crimes of Armenians and inform ruling bodies about it, as well as “ask the authorities to protect Muslims against Armenians striving to annihilate Muslims.” A Muslim delegation headed by Ali Mardan bey Topchibashev intended to ask from the authorities “a permission to raise money in favor of Tatar families who lost their lives because of bloody crimes of Armenians in the Kars region.” They came to see General Myshlayevskiy who permitted them to raise money and “promised to take appropriate measures against impertinent Armenians.”

Shooting of the peaceful Muslim population of Ajaria in the spring of 1915 raised a new wave of protest against the anti-Turkic policy of the Russian Empire. This event aroused stormy response in the Muslim environment; the Muslim faction of the State Duma made a statement that caused anxiety in the ruling circles of Russia. However, the government decided to dismiss 78-year-old pro-Armenian Caucasian vicegerent Vorontsov-Dashkov, this being not the best way out of the impasse. On 23 August, 1915, he was replaced by Great Prince Nikolay Nikolayevich. He was the last vicegerent to perform duties of commander of the Caucasian front. To investigate the shooting of Ajarian Muslims, Ali Mardan bey visited Tiflis, Kutaisi and Batum in 1915 and collected documents disclosing the truth.

Proceeding from these documents, he became confident that unfortunate Ajarians fell prey to the anti-Turkic policy of Russia. Ali Mardan bey pointed out that thousands of Ajarians were imprisoned and charged with betrayal on denunciation of their neighbors—Armenians; hundreds of villages were destroyed, thousands of old men, women and children became refugees in the Batum Region. He prepared a report on this tragedy and dispatched it to the Caucasian vicegerent, and facts as shown in the report were so tragic and terrible that the prince had to set up a special committee for investigation. The inquiry reaffirmed atrocities of the Russian army, especially Cossacks, against Ajarians. It became evident that it was false information and slander of Armenians against Muslims that led to the atrocities.

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56 Telegram of Military Governor Podgurskiy to Colonel Grigolia in Sarykamys and Heads of the Ardahan, Olty, Kagyzman Districts. 12.01.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 460, sheet 75.
57 Iqbal, 9 February, 1915.
59 Ibidem.
Activity of Ali Mardan bey directed to protecting rights of the Caucasian Muslims attracted attention of the ruling bodies. A secret report of the Baku mayor of 4 May, 1916, said that according to information of secret agents, Ali Mardan bey had been known since 1911 as the most prominent pan-Islamist.62

Van—1915

The events, however, took a course very different from what the Armenians had expected; everything happened much earlier than April 1915. In fact, Armenian “genocide” claims are not supported by facts. Analysis of the 1915 documents proves the contrary. It became apparent that Armenian “genocide” is none other than a fabricated myth. In his report, General Bolkhovitinov pointed out that when the Russian troops seized Van, Armenian squads killed everyone, making hay of the region.63 French scholar Georges de Maleville is right in holding that a thesis of the Turkish government’s decision is “a fiction of the alleged secret plan of butchering Armenians to occupy their place. This thesis is groundless and primitive.”64

The intelligence of the Caucasian Army intercepted a letter from a certain Arshak who fought in Van sent to an Armenian Tiratsiyan in Zurich (Switzerland), in which he wrote: “Van was occupied on 7 May by Armenian volunteers with the help of regular army units. Aram (Manukian), whom people call Pasha, a member of Dashnaksutun, is the governor of Van. Today, our troops are moving in the Muş and Manazkerd directions.”65 The author complained: “The nation is in a grave situation: certain groups of state officials are unfriendly toward the Armenians. The press has been writing about autonomy, but the time was ill-chosen: it produced a very bad impression on the neighboring peoples and military circles. Volunteers demonstrate miracles of heroism, but for some reason, the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army hates the Armenians; he made changes to the official papers that were detrimental to the Armenians. The Armenians complained to the Vicegerent. Our excessive preparations frightened the government to the extent that it reduced the number of volunteers; they were given bad weapons and forced to do the hardest jobs on the frontline.”66 Arshak admitted that he envied Tiratsiyan, who lived in Switzerland; “There is a lot of poverty in Turkish Armenia; we are on the threshold of great disappointment… I envy your life in Switzerland. Here life is unbearable and prices are impossibly high… people hope the Dardanelles will be opened soon so that Germany cannot send weapons to Turkey and Rumania. Turkey will fall; prices will become lower.”67

The Armenian terrorist squads did not wait until the Dardanelles opened. On 18 May, 1915, The Times wrote that it had been discovered in Constantinople that Armenians and Turks hostile to the Young Turks Party plotted to murder Sultan Enver Pasha, Field Marshal von der Goltz, and General Liman von Sanders… The plot was discovered through an admission of the son of Zograf Effendi, an Armenian representative in Constantinople.68

After the Russian troops occupied Van, a “trusted” representative of the Armenian people sent an anonymous letter to the War Ministry, in which he said that to remain in control of the entire

62 Information about Topchibashi supplied by the Baku Mayor. 04.05.1916, State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), rec. gr. 102, inv. 236, f. 609, sheet 48.
65 From a Letter Signed “Arshak” and Addressed to Tiratsiyan in Switzerland. 29.07.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 5.
66 Ibidem.
67 Ibid., sheet 5rev.
68 See: The Times, 18 May, 1915.
population it would be necessary to distribute weapons among the local Christians. This was to be done on a “mass scale” to make Russia’s loyal allies of them. The author wrote “The Muslims, Jews, and Georgians should not be trusted, they are hostile… I prefer to remain unknown so far, but my soul and my body are devoted to Russia and its peoples. [Signed] One of the loyal sons of Russia.”

Expecting to receive the Turkish lands occupied by Russian troops, the Armenian volunteers showed unrivalled cruelty toward the Muslims. On 5 April, 1915, they, by sheer chance, obtained a typewritten copy of the report the Commander of the Caucasian Army had sent to the Commander-in-Chief, which said in part that “it is expedient to settle the abandoned Turkish lands in the Alashkert, Diadin, and Beyazit valleys with people from the Kuban and Don provinces to make them borderline Cossacks.” The document obtained by secret means (it had been intercepted in Rostov by Armenian advocate Grigory Chalkhushian and sent to the Armenian Bureau in Tiflis) aggrieved the Armenian leaders. The author suggested that Don and Kuban Cossacks should be moved to the occupied Turkish lands by way of encouragement. The letter was addressed to the provincial heads with instructions to promote the idea among the Cossacks. The letter to Head of the Kuban Province Cossack Ataman Labinskiy said that “the Russian population should be immediately informed about the possibilities of future resettlement in the territory captured from the Turks.” Investigators discovered that the letter had been intercepted with the help of a certain Ayvazian, a village head in Armavir. On 12 October, 1915, when the truth was revealed, Ayvazian committed suicide.

The Armenians were shocked. An article titled “Budushchee turetskoy Armenii” (The Future of Turkish Armenia), which appeared in the Kavkazskoe slovo newspaper on 18 August, 1916, caused a harsh response from the Foreign Minister of Russia, which invited another bout of Armenian anger. The minister pointed out “Today, articles of this type on the Armenian question are extremely ill-timed; they serve the purpose of agitation and stir up political passions.” He asked General Yanushkevich, who supervised censorship, not to allow similar publications in the future.

The article looked at different versions of the settlement of the Armenian question: an Armenian state in the provinces of Van, Bitlis, and Muş; keeping these territories under the Vicegerent of the Caucasus after the pattern of Finland; or autonomy under Russian protectorate. The author was fully aware that the areas in which the future state would be set up were not vacant. “Today, there are Kurds living in Turkish Armenia in the mountains; there are Turks in towns and cities; the Muslim population of Armenia is growing by the day.”

The Armenians were very sensitive to the territorial issues. A letter mailed on 14 August, 1916 from Tiflis to the Armiansky vestnik newspaper in Moscow and intercepted by military censors said that even though it was the Ottoman Empire that was mainly responsible for everything going on in Turkish Armenia, Russia, Armenia’s perfidious friend, was no less guilty. It should be clearly stated that it was Russia’s duty rather than its free will to help Armenia. “So far,” the letter further said, “Armenia has had nothing from Russia apart from harm… The time has come, Mr. Editor, to stop humiliating ourselves and looking at perfidious Russia as a savior of Armenia. It is better for our motherland to die (forgive me, motherland) than to accept freedom from mean and impudent Russia after this blow.”

The military and political circles of Russia were fully aware that the Armenians could be saved only if the Russian army was successful; they were convinced that no further promises were needed.

69 An Anonymous Letter to the State Secretary of the War Ministry. 25.06.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 665, sheet 207.
70 See: To Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District, Information. 01.05.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 172.
71 Letter by Assistant for Military Affairs at the Caucasian Vicegerent to the War-Time Governor of Turkish Regions. 26.09.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 13227, inv. 2, f. 8, sheet 6.
72 Kavkazskoe slovo, 18 August, 1916.
73 Copy of the Letter Sent from Tiflis to Moscow to the Editorial Office of Armianskiy vestnik. 14.08.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 13227, inv. 2, f. 8, sheets 2-3.
This was what General Bolkhovitinov wrote on 25 February, 1916 in his response to the report “O chuvstvakh narodnostey v period voyny” (On the Feelings of Peoples at the Time of War) written by Prince Vasily Gajimukov on 21 January: “The Turkish Armenians lived and are still living in grave or even tragic circumstances. This means that any changes in Armenophylic sentiments would not suit Russia’s political interests. The future of the Armenians depends on Russia’s military successes. They all know this quite well and, therefore, there is no need to give advances. It is no secret that all prominent Armenian political parties openly declared their aim to be liberation from Turkey with the help of Russia.”74 The Russian intelligentsia was not very enthusiastic about the Armenian idea of an independent state in Turkey.

Commander of the Beyazit detachment of the 4th Corps of the Russian Army in the Caucasus front, General Nikolayev, said in his report that he knew nothing of the mass massacres of the Armenian population in Eastern Anatolia. He reported that “approximately 50,000 Armenian refugees left Van for Tapariz, and of them 100 refugees were killed by Kurds. Upon return from Tapariz to Bergrigala, there were 500 Armenians who died of illness.” According to General Bolkhovitinov, refugees numbering 200,000 were moving toward Russia. During their march from the southern part of Lake Van toward Khoisk and Iğdır, “the refugees were dying from fatigue, hunger, and thirst.”75 The commander of the 4th Corps of the Caucasian Army, in turn, informed that “he knew nothing about what had forced the Armenians to leave the Van District en mass, since there were no Turks there. Aram, acting governor of Van, had never asked about anything and had never reported that there was an exodus. There had been no slaughter of Armenians in the Malazgirt District when the troops were retreating and no slaughter of the people who were retreating in front of the troops.”76 A certain Papasian, an Armenian, reported to Bishop Mesrop in Tiflis, “Right now there are about 15,000 destitute refugees from Van who fill the Beyazit Valley. I try to persuade them to return, but frequent retreats and the absence of economic guarantees of security routes and life breed suspicions and wavering. In expectation of more or less clear information, the refugees go hungry; there is no food and the aid is too small. I ask you to send us food as soon as possible and tell us where we can settle these miserable people.”77

For many reasons, the Armenians associated what happened in Van with the activities of the volunteer squads. They accused Dashnaktsutiun, one of their initiators, and insisted that it had been their involvement in the hostilities that triggered these misfortunes by provoking the Turks to take revenge on the Armenians. The party and its members called on the Armenians not to become dispirited and tried to calm the people with, “As long as there is one Armenian on earth, the Armenian Question will remain pending.” They accused the Russians of the defeat in Van and insisted that the roots of all the misfortunes should be sought for in Russia’s policy and accused certain commanders and officials who hated Armenians of deliberately moving the Armenians out of Van.78 In Van, captured by the Russians and ruled for a while by Aram Pasha, “the Turkish Armenians, who consoled themselves with their trust in Russia as their liberator, realized that they had found themselves in the enemy camp. So it comes as no surprise that many of them moved to the side of the Turkish authorities.”79

75 Report of General L. Bolkhovitinov to the Assistant for Military Affairs at the Caucasian Vicegerent. 11.12.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 74.
76 Ibidem.
77 Telegram of Papasian from Beyazit to Bishop Mesrop in Tiflis. 06.08.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 2, f. 646, sheet 107.
78 See: From the Chancellery of the Caucasian Vicegerent to the Chief of Field Headquarters of the Caucasian Army. 24.08.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 48.
A telegram mailed on 22 August, 1915 by Vratsiyan, commander of a volunteer squad in Iğdır, to the Orizon newspaper published in Tiflis described in detail everything what was going on in Erzurum, Bayburt, Erzincan, Muş, Harput, and Sasun: “A trusted person who left Hınıs two weeks ago insists that there were no Armenian pogroms to the west of Erzurum; only soldiers were murdered. The Erzurum vali protested against the slaughter; the Armenians are safe in Bayburt, Erzincan, Harput, and other areas; the Turks are retreating together with the Armenians. The Muş valley, the city, and the monastery are ruined, all of the people have been slaughtered. Sasun continues fighting. According to a person who has just arrived from these places, the province avoided massacre; he saw with his own eyes that many of the Armenian villages survived. His information breeds hope.”

After the defeat in Van, many of the Armenian commanders, Andranik particular, became convinced that the squads should no longer take commands from the Russian Army and should switch to guerrilla warfare or be disbanded. Squad commanders Andranik, Basturmachiyan, Dro, Aram, Vratsiyan, and others met in Iğdır to decide what to do next. The majority voted for preserving the squads and going on with the cause with renewed enthusiasm.

The meeting was especially displeased with Lieutenant General Abatsiev, who was an Osset, Prince Magomed Mirza Qajar, and General Nikolayev. The squad commanders accused General Abatsiev of entrusting command to the Tatars, Georgians, and Ossets and of oppressing the Armenians. The squad commanders were also displeased with the governors of Elisavetpol and Erivan.

The discussion was not limited to this meeting. On 4 June, 1915, the Catholics of All Armenians discussed this issue with Caucasian Vicegerent Vorontsov-Dashkov. After reading the letter from the Catholics, General Bolkhovitinov drafted a report for the vicegerent, in which he assessed the letter as an obvious attempt to interfere in military command, which could not be tolerated. In his letter to the Catholics, the vicegerent deemed it necessary to soften the general’s opinion. He referred to Chief of Staff General Yudenich to point out that in the military units fighting under General Abatsiev, the Armenians were not discriminated against.

Mayor of Tiflis Khatissov, in turn, tried to interfere in military affairs. As a rule, the Armenian squads sent their reports to Tiflis “to Khatissov at the Main Staff” or to the “Armenian Staff.” The Chief Headquarters of the Caucasian Front warned him against issuing military orders in the name of the city administration to the Armenian squads deployed in the areas of military action and sent a confidential letter to Petrograd with a request not to dispatch Muslim officers from other fronts to the Caucasian Front. General Bolkhovitinov wrote the following in this connection: “Recently, more and more Muslim officers have been asking for a transfer from the Western to the Caucasian Front. It would be wise to decline Giulazizov’s request so as not to create a precedent.” In fact, the Armenians were behind this.

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80 Telegrams from Vratsiyan in Iğdır to Orizon in Tiflis. 22.08.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 53.
81 See: From the Chancellery of the Caucasian Vicegerent to the Chief of Field Headquarters of the Caucasian Army. 24.08.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 48rev.
82 Ibid., sheet 49.
84 See: Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army Vorontsov-Dashkov to the Catholics of Armenians. 19.06.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 335.
85 See: From the Headquarters of the Caucasian Army to Mayor of Tiflis Khatissov. 26.01.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 1200, inv. 1, f. 558, sheet 74.
86 Telegram of Bolkhovitinov to the War Ministry. 30.01.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 535, sheet 34.
The Armenian Volunteer Squads Disbanded

On 3 January, 1916, the commanders of the 5th volunteer squad gathered in Erivan for a secret meeting to discuss, among other things, the possible disbandment of the Armenian squads. According to the information supplied by the Special Departments of the Chancellery of the Caucasian Viceroy, the meeting was attended by squad commander Vartan, his aide, known as Kostia, two other officers, Garegin and Nzhde (an Armenian of Bulgarian origin), and another Armenian from Iran. All those present insisted it was not in the interests of the Armenians to replace the squads with rifle battalions. They were “against the service of Armenian volunteers in the Russian army because of problems created by discipline; besides the Armenians would be deprived of the opportunity to serve the Armenian cause.” The meeting passed a secret decision that “the Armenians should not join the newly formed rifle units and, if worst comes to worst, should go to England, from where they can join the army as volunteers.”

These negative feelings created the background against which the Armenian rifle units preferred to keep away from the action.

Deployed on the front, the Armenian units insisted that they should be removed from the action to the rear; they were convinced that they were much more effective as guerillas fighting civilians, rather than armed units involved in hostilities. The commanders of the Armenian squads gathered together to decide that they should try to weaken the enemy by organizing guerilla warfare to sow fear and panic among the peaceful population. The squad commanders bombarded the National Bureau and the Catholics with their requests, but the demands remained ignored. Moreover, Mikael Safrian, commander of the 6th squad from the village of Unan, Muş Region, known among the Gnchak members as Pandukt, was replaced with Sub-Lieutenant Avsharov.

In 1916, the Armenian volunteer squads showed no enthusiasm when fighting side-by-side with the Russian army. Many of those dispatched by the Armenian Bureau to the front tried to escape; the rank-and-file soldiers were especially determined. General Chernozubov reported to the Headquarters of the Caucasian Army that only 1,741 of the 2,482 Armenians sent to replenish the 4th, 5th and 6th squads reached their destination; “the others, 741 people, or nearly 30 percent, fled en route.”

On 20 December, 1915, S. Vratsiyan, member of the committee of contacts with the Armenian squads who had come from the United States, wrote from Erivan to Boston that he had been horrified by the doings of those obsessed with “restoring Armenia.” He described what he had seen in the following way: “I have changed my opinion about the volunteer squads. It was with a lot of pain that I detected their numerous incorrigible shortcomings. I am disenchanted by our heroes. The hopes that I pinned on our younger generation are shattered; I have started doubting that these squads should be regarded as the beginning of a future army. This is incompatible with our great expectations. Look at the volunteers who have arrived from America and about whom I wrote a lot to you. Many of those who had been dispatched on the money of the Central Committee fled halfway; some of them fled even before they reached Tiflis. They are looking for plausible motives to extort money; a third group arrived here and, after dividing up your money among themselves (over three thousand rubles), refused to account for it. In short, in this chaos, the dog does not recognize its master.”

Mnatsakanian, who represented Gnchak in the Caucasus, confirmed this in his letter to the central structures of his

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87 From the Chancellery of the Caucasian Viceroy to the Commander of the Field Headquarters of the Caucasian Army. 24.08.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 16.
88 See: From the Chancellery of the Caucasian Viceroy to the Commander of the Field Headquarters of the Caucasian Army. 23.01.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheets 22-23; Report of General L. Bolkhovitinov to the Assistant for Military Affairs at the Caucasian Viceroy. 11.12.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 57rev.
89 From General Chernozubov to the Headquarters of the Caucasian Army. 29.08.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 245.
90 Letter of Member of the Organizing Committee S. Vrantsiyan to the Armenian Committee in Boston. 20.12.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheets 11-12.
party in America. In July 1915, he wrote that “the guys I brought from America became bashibuzuks; they quarrel among themselves, they say that they do not like the food; they avoid training sessions. In short, I am going mad… They expected that they would be living like princes here, but they must obey the laws of wartime.”

How many Armenian volunteers were fighting in the Caucasus in the ranks of the Russian army? The address of the Armenian Socialist Party published in the La Libre Parole newspaper said that “130,000 Armenians are fighting under the Russian flag” on the Caucasian Front. This was an obvious overstatement—by November 1915 there were 771 so-called volunteers fighting under Dro in the 2nd Armenian squad. The report submitted by the Head of Gendarmerie of the Tiflis Province about Dro and his squad said that “nearly all the members of his squad are former terrorists. This frame of mind of Dro and the composition of his squad demand special attention.”

By 1 November, 1915, the list of the 3rd squad signed by its commander Avetis contained 718 names; the list of the 7th squad signed by its commander Vartan contained 227 names. In the telegram of 20 January, 1915, to General Riabinkin, a member of the war council of the Caucasian Army, commander of the 5th squad pointed out that his unit was formed with the chief commander’s permission and received 1,500 Mannlicher rifles on the order of the Headquarters. The number of distributed rifles indicates the squad’s numerical strength—by mid-1915 there were 850 people in it. General Bolkhovitinov pointed out that “there were six squads fighting on the front; each of them should have had 1,000 people, but in fact the total number was slightly lower—about five thousand.” The general pointed out that the number had dropped by late 1915—485 volunteers had been killed, while 1,260 were either wounded, ill, or missing. The general believed that “the number of those killed was somewhat overstated, while the number of volunteers removed from action or missing was more or less correct since desertion among the Armenians was widely practiced.”

It should be taken into account that in their correspondence the Russian military structures described not only the Armenians who belonged to the Armenian squads as volunteers, but also those Armenians who remained in the zone of fighting and had been armed by Russian military units. Military instructors from among the rank-and-file soldiers taught them how to handle weapons and obey discipline. They guarded tunnels and bridges; in the event of Turkish attacks, the volunteers were instructed to start a fire to warn other units and, together with their instructors, occupy positions on the frontline.

Heavy defeats increased desertion among the Armenian volunteers. The Caucasian Army Headquarters responded to its huge dimensions with an order of 6 December, 1915, which transformed the Armenian squads into rifle battalions. Several days later, under the order of 13 December and according to wartime regulations, they became regular units. The status of the Armenian Turkish subjects

92 See: La Libre Parole, 11 June, 1915.
93 See: List of Volunteers of the 2nd Armenian Squad by 1 November, 1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheets 241-254.
95 See: See: List of Volunteers of the 3rd Armenian Squad by the State of 1 November, 1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheets 230-240.
96 See: List of Volunteers of the 7th Armenian Squad by the State of 1 November, 1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheets 208-212.
who served according to Russian laws mainly among the rank-and-file contingents created several problems.\textsuperscript{101} Some squads were disbanded. In his report of 17 January, 1916, Commander of the Alexandropoli squad Vartapetians wrote that his squad had been disbanded, while the weapons had been returned to the Alexandropoli artillery unit.\textsuperscript{102} As soon as the process began, the Armenian political parties warned the volunteers that they “should not return their weapons in order to become an armed force ready to fight the Russian Government if Russia refused to give autonomy to Armenia.”\textsuperscript{103}

On 23 August, 1915, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov was replaced with Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolayevich as the Caucasian Vicegerent and Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Army. A special meeting convened in Tiflis was attended by “General Myshlayevskiy, Steward of the Household Peterson; Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District General Yudenchik, Head of the Tiflis Dioceses Bishop Mesrop; Mayor of Tiflis A. Khatisov; Chairman of the Armenian National Committee S. Arutunov; and Doctor Ya. Zavriev. The Armenians were asked to set up special squads (khumbs) under the command of experienced chetniks (khumbapets)… The Armenians were only too willing to comply, but insisted on their regularly repeated demand that the Russian government seek preliminary agreement of the ambassadors of neutral countries to put pressure on Turkey to deprive it of the opportunity to institute an Armenian massacre… After unanimously approving the plan to set up the squads, the meeting promised the Armenians moral and material support.”\textsuperscript{104}

In 1916, the number of “volunteers sent to the front began gradually dropping; they were not dispatched in great numbers. On 27 February, 1916, the Staff of the Caucasian Army reported that 150 puds of ammunition (a pud = 16.3804815 kg.—Ed.) had been sent from Tiflis to the Julfa railway station to 40 Armenian volunteers under Jamal Chapkalian and the Van volunteer.”\textsuperscript{105} On 9 May, 1916, Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District received an order from the commanders of the Caucasian Army, which said that “the Army commander is dead set against forming new Armenian squads.”\textsuperscript{106}

In 1914, when the war with Turkey began, Armenians began arriving in Tiflis either with documents issued by Russian consulates abroad or without documents. By mid-1916, the opposite trend began unfolding—those who wanted to return needed documents, but it turned out that the documents issued by the Russian consulates were not enough. Mayor of Tiflis Alexander Khatisov wrote the following to the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Army: “A large number of Armenians from America came to Tiflis as soon as the war with Turkey began, they joined the Armenian squads. They left America under documents issued by the Consul General of the Russian Empire in New York, which did not have the legal force of a passport. Today, when the Armenian squads have been disbanded, these people want to go back, but they have no documents under which they can cross the border.”\textsuperscript{107}

The mayor of Tiflis asked the authorities to supply the volunteers who had come to Tiflis with documents to allow them to return home. By late 1915, Armenians with no documents were no longer allowed to join the Armenian squads; this was particularly true of the Turkish Armenians. The Russian commanders feared that there might be unwelcome volunteers among them. The Staff of the Caucasian

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\textsuperscript{101} See: On Transformation of Armenian Squads into Battalions. 06.12.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 279; From Lieutenant Colonel Saveliev to the Chancellery of the Caucasian Vicegerent. 1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 332rev.

\textsuperscript{102} See: Report of Unit Commander Captain Vartapetians. 17.01.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 665, sheet 14.

\textsuperscript{103} Report of General L. Bolkhovitinov to the Assistant for Military Affairs at the Caucasian Vicegerent. 11.12.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 49rev.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., sheets 50-51rev.

\textsuperscript{105} Telegram about Movement of Cargoes for Armenian Volunteers. 27.02.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 665, sheets 112-113.

\textsuperscript{106} From General Saveliev to the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District. 09.05.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 174.

\textsuperscript{107} Letter of A. Khatisov to the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Army. 28.09.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 263.
Army passed a decision to demonstrate caution, since too many Turkish Armenians wanted to join the Armenian squads. Volunteers from other foreign countries arrived in Turkey and were allowed to join the squads under a treaty between the War and Foreign ministries, on the one hand, and the Armenian organizations, on the other.108

“The Bullet of a Russian Soldier Hits the Leg, the Bullet of an Armenian Soldier the Heart”

At the beginning of the war, the Armenians were driven to the Caucasus by lofty ideals; in late 1915 and early 1916 they fell into depression. S. Vramian, who had been driven from Boston to the Caucasus by dreams of a Greater Armenia, declined the invitation of Kh. Darpinian, Editor of Ayrenik, to return in late 1915. “Under present conditions my return is impossible. I would like to flee from here, but I cannot do this. The continued war and the sufferings of the Armenian people have greatly affected our philosophizing leaders: some of them live amid the tragedy, many of them are tired and can no longer work, still others joined the ranks of the disappointed… We are at a loss, we have made and continue making numerous errors, we are marred from the right and left, we cannot widen the scope of our activities. There are many opponents and many reproach us for the volunteers.”109 In the same letter, Vramian sent a photograph taken on the front that showed General Oganovskiy, Commander of the 4th Corps of the Caucasian Army, and Armenian volunteers with the following inscription on the back: “He is considered an Armenophile, his is a correct personality. He participated in the capture of Van and the retreat from it. He did a lot for our volunteer squads, which he called ‘my little allies’.”110

Not all Russian officers were prepared to tolerate Armenia’s whims. In his letter to a certain Sokolova in the town of Yuriev confiscated by military censors, Lieutenant Colonel Polianov spared no words: “Our Caucasian Front is perfect in all respects but one. The Armenians, who are a commercial plague and drag in all respects, poison our existence. They are everywhere, you run across them around every corner. They are past masters of feigning sickness and are incredible cowards, they flee from the fighting positions, do not want to work in the rear, they crowd the hospitals in huge numbers and insist on being discharged from the service. I keep statistics which I plan to present to the commanders; practically all of them retire—we have one ‘-OV’ (most frequent male ending of Russian family names.—Tr.) for a thousand ‘-YANTS’ (most frequent male ending of Armenian family names.—Tr.), who cannot cope with everything.”111

The Armenian volunteers were responsible for another headache of the Russian commanders—they committed atrocities against the local Muslims and shifted the blame onto the Russian units. Between 17 March and 1 April, 1916, the commanders of the Caucasian Army received three telegrams related to the subject. The first of them, dated 17 March, was sent to General Quartermaster at the Supreme Headquarters; the second, dated 23 March, to the commander of the 4th Corps; and the third was addressed to Generals Bolkhovitinov and Pustovoytenko.112

The telegram of 17 March said that a request to investigate the atrocities committed by the Armenian volunteers against the local Turks had been sent to the commander of the Bitlis Army (the telegram referred to two thousand Turks exterminated by Armenians in Bitlis). Commander of the

108 From General Saveliev to the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District. 09.05.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 333.
110 Ibid., sheet 28.
112 See: Letter of General Bolkhovitinov to Prince V. Orlov. 03.04.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 87.
Bitlis Army General Abatsiev wrote the following: “As for the Armenian squad, there are many Turkish subjects among the fighters. On the third day after the capture of Bitlis, I had to remove the squad to the Bitlis-Muş communication line.”\textsuperscript{113} This squad operated under Andranik.

In Todvand, the Armenian volunteers were even crueler. Russian riflemen and Armenian volunteers shared the same house divided into two parts. The Russians gave shelter and food to 20 Muslim orphaned children. After returning from a reconnaissance mission, they found them dead. The telegram said that the Armenians were left alone in the house. General Abatsiev reported that the investigation pointed to the Armenians as the culprits.\textsuperscript{114} Another letter dated 31 January, 1916 described the murder of two children in the village of Kinar (Beyazit District) committed by Nagabet Grigoriants, a volunteer of the 2nd Armenian squad, who had murdered a boy of 8 and a girl of 11 with his bayonet.\textsuperscript{115} According to written information dated 26 September, 1916, a former Armenian volunteer attacked the village of Yuhkary Suleymanly. Three local people were killed, four abducted, and 12 buffalos stolen.\textsuperscript{116}

The local Armenians, likewise, were involved in pogroms and violence against the Muslims. In a telegram to General Yudenich, General Nikolayev wrote: “I know that many of the local and armed Armenians follow our troops in Turkish territory to plunder Muslims and violate them.”\textsuperscript{117} General Bolkhovitinov wrote the following in one of his reports: “Practically each and every combatant officer has seen with his own eyes how not only volunteers, but also their commanders violate military discipline, as well as their disagreements among themselves, intrigues and boasting, individual cases of cowardice, stealing and plunder and, finally, violence against the peaceful Muslim population of the Turkish areas occupied by the Russian army. These acts of violence and practically total destruction of the population of the Kurdish auls by Armenian squads, irrespective of sex and age, are confirmed, in particular, not only by intercepted correspondence from the volunteers, but also by letters from other people indignant about what the volunteers were doing.”\textsuperscript{118} General Nikolayev wrote that the plundering organized by the Armenian volunteers during the capture of Van reached dimensions that required courts-martial to stop the wave of crime.”\textsuperscript{119}

After receiving information from General Nikolayev about the Armenian atrocities in Van, the Armenian National Bureau dispatched Duma deputy Iosif Khununts and writer Ovanes Tumanian on a fact-finding mission.\textsuperscript{120}

The Armenian militia, set up allegedly to maintain law and order in the Turkish lands occupied by the Russian army, was also involved in plundering. In June 1916, Levon Varadian, one of the volunteers, wrote from Van to Ambartsum Arakelian, who edited the \textit{Mshak} newspaper in Tiflis, that “most of the militiamen are robbers.”\textsuperscript{121} Even the National Bureau, which coordinated the activity of the volunteer squads in Tiflis, admitted that the 6th squad comprising primarily the followers of the Ginchak Party was involved in plundering.\textsuperscript{122} A lot of documents in the Russian archives are related to the atrocities of the Armenian volunteers.

\textsuperscript{113} Telegram of the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Army. 17.03.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 88.
\textsuperscript{114} See: Telegram of General Bolkhovitinov Addressed to General Pustovoytenko. 01.04.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 90.
\textsuperscript{115} See: About the Murder of Two Children in the Village of Kinar. 31.01.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2301, inv. 2, f. 119, sheet 1.
\textsuperscript{117} Telegram to General Nikolayev to General Yudenich. 16.05.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 154.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., sheet 68rev.
\textsuperscript{120} See: Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{121} Letter of Levon Varadian Addressed to Tiflis, to the Editor of the \textit{Mshak} Newspaper Ambartsum Arakelian. 03.06.1916, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 646, sheet 19rev.
\textsuperscript{122} An Extract from the Letter Sent to the \textit{Eriassard Hayastan} newspaper in the U.S.. 15.06.1915, RGVIA, rec. gr. 2100, inv. 1, f. 557, sheet 33.
“A Memorandum of the Foreign Commissar to the Council of Commissars on the Armenian Question” was executed in 1916. The document confirms that the Armenian question was exploited by great powers to weaken the Ottoman Empire. The memorandum says: “The purpose was to make the most of the situation and seize the straits.” It noted: “with the objective of weakening Turkey, Russia considered it a state duty to back Armenians in Turkey, so since 1912 the Russian diplomacy has been taking active measures to carry out reforms in Turkish Armenia.”

It added: “The efforts of the Russian diplomacy were a success largely due to the charm of the Russian name in the Armenian areas of Turkey. Note that Turkish Armenians, despite their civic duty, formed numerous armed forces to combat the Turks. In assessing the situation, one of the distinguished Turkish political figures, Jevdet-bey, stressed: ‘A bullet of the Russian soldier hits our leg; a bullet of the Armenian hits our heart.’ To clarify the role of Armenians in this war, suffice it to cite a fragment from a diary of a Turkish officer who died on the battlefield: ‘Should our Armenians join us, we would crush Russians,’” A memorandum of the Russian Foreign Commissariat (Ministry) suggested: “Russia’s goal is to put a barrier between the Turks, Kurds, and Azerbaijans.”

It was a great migration of Armenians to the Southern Caucasus following the East Anatolian developments that stirred up national-ethnic confrontation in the region. Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolayevich sent a report to Nicholas II entitled “On the Political Situation in the Caucasus,” which uncovered the nature of these contradictions: “In Tiflis, as a principal Center of the Caucasus, the public administration is fully in the hands of Armenians.”

The bloody adventures of the Armenian volunteers in Turkey, the murders, violence, plunder, and ethnic purges they committed reached their logical conclusion. After the 1917 revolution, the Caucasian Front started falling apart; the Armenian volunteers, who served in the Russian army and thus acquired fighting experience in 1914-1916 in Turkey, brought it to the Caucasus. In 1917-1918, the Southern Caucasus became a scene of the Armenian volunteers’ bloody struggle; in the Southern Caucasus, they were as violent as in Eastern Turkey and used the same methods, albeit on a smaller scale.

**Conclusion**

Today, 100 years later, the events described above have been moved from the sphere of history to politics. Deliberately or not, the atrocities of the Armenian volunteer squads perpetrated in Eastern Anatolia are pushed aside and forgotten. The Armenians insist that the world should recognize the Armenian genocide (which never happened) as a fact of history; they use it to put pressure on Turkey. In the last twenty years, in the context of history, this has become the main line of Armenian propaganda spearheaded against Turkey; in the political context, it is used to present Armenia (which occupies Azeri land) as an oppressed and vilified country to justify its aggressive policies.

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123 B. Borian, op. cit., Part II, p. 413.
124 Ibid., p. 414.
125 Ibid., pp. 416-417.
126 Ibid., pp. 418.
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